What Price for Genuine Free Will?

[Billy T]

...A choice between two or more alternatives is the equivalent of simply taking two or more inputs and producing one output.
I can make a choice. A machine can make a choice. ...

Certainly choices are made. For example at an intersection where both right and left turns are possible. that is not the problem, or under discussion.

The question is how is the choice made. Is it by some procedure that is reasonable to interpret as "you made a choice" or by "the net result of many Browian motion (random walks) of neurotransmitters in your synaptic gaps" (among other "biasing facts") that made the choice for 'you'. "

You keep asking me to define GFW, and I have made a stab at it by telling what it is not. Now it is my turn to ask for a definition that is even more critical to the discussion:

What are "you," this choice making thing?
I.e. Please define "you", "yourself" "me" etc.

I have done this in the attachment to first post this thread. Summary of that definition:
"I" am a subroutine in a parietal simulation of the sensible world surrounding my physical body - I.e. an non material information process and as such not constrained to follow exactly the laws of physics - For example "I" can make choices some what (but not much) independent of the the flux of neurotransmitters in synaptic gaps that are controlled by the laws of physics. That is, like a digital simulation in a computer, plus or minus a few neurotransmitters attaching to a nerve cell wall does not change the computation anymore than a few electrons more or less changes the 1 or 0 state of the transister's computers.

 

[moving finger]

I grant this, but you missed my point,

Billy T, with the deepest respect, perhaps I miss your point because your point is confusing and unclear? See my remarks below.

The interval between two activations of a detector is random. Everything about the decay is unpredictable, but I grant that it could be "deterministic" and we just are ignorant of the "hidden variables" that are making it appear to be "indeterminent." ... So I will build my demonstration at a higher level that exploits the well confirmed random statistics of the decay:

I assume that by "random" you mean "not deterministic". If so, the above is contradictory. Either the decay is random or it is deterministic - you seem to be saying that it is both. Please clarify your meaning here.

Suppose I place a small quantity of large half-life radio-active material equally distant from two detectors, A & B, and spend a few years observing the detection data (just to confirm it is more random than any random number generation program in any computer program - I.e. grant me the sequences of detections, ...AABABBBAB...etc. is truly random, even if the individual decays are the result of "hidden variables".)

Again, you contradict yourself! Either the results of radioactive decay are "truly random" as you suggest, or they are "the result of hidden variables" - they cannot be both since these are contradictory assumptions! Please clarify what you mean here.

If you are saying the decay is truly random, I would ask how do you KNOW it is truly random? I think you will find that your epistemic observation of apparent randomness cannot necessarily be unambiguously translated to an ontic reality of true randomness.

That is: all I am asking of you is to accepted the demonstrated fact that the sequence of detector responses is truly random, even though each decay was completely determined as you and Einstein believed.
If you reject well demonstrated facts, then our discussion is over. If you accept this demonstrated fact, then at least your future is indeterminant, not just epistemologically unknown (unpredictable).

Billy T - What "demonstrated facts"? Again, please explain how you will prove (demonstrate) that it is truly random? (ie prove that there are no non-local hidden variables acting?). I believe this cannot be proven. Or are you asking me to simply assume it is random, without any proof?

Your argument (B) is irrelevant as it is the sequence ...ABBABBBAAAB... etc. that is important (and demonstrably random) not the deterministic or indeterministic individual decays. - Again, you missed this point.

OK, now let me explain my answer :
IF the sequence is truly random then my future is not determined.
IF the sequence is deterministic then my future is determined.

You seem to be asking me to simply "assume" that it is random - and I agree if we accept this assumption then my future is not determined.

My point is that your assumption may be invalid - what you need to do is to PROVE it is truly random if you wish to conclude infallibly that my future is not determined.

You have not proven that it is truly random, and I believe it is not possible to prove it is truly trandom. Ergo, my future may be determined.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Certainly choices are made. For example at an intersection where both right and left turns are possible. that is not the problem, or under discussion.

Good, we agree!

The question is how is the choice made. Is it by some procedure that is reasonable to interpret as "you made a choice" or by "the net result of many Browian motion (random walks) of neurotransmitters in your synaptic gaps" (among other "biasing facts") that made the choice for 'you'. ".

It is one and the same - see my definition of "you" below.

You keep asking me to define GFW, and I have made a stab at it by telling what it is not. Now it is my turn to ask for a definition that is even more critical to the discussion:

lol - sorry Billy T, I do not mean any disrespect but I have to laugh at this point because it is clear that you wish to evade defining what you mean by GFW, hence the whole point of this thread up to now is meaningless - how can you debate GFW if you refuse to define GFW?

What are "you," this choice making thing?
I.e. Please define "you", "yourself" "me" etc.

Gladly. "you" is just the collection of neural patterns, synaptic pathways, biochemical transmitters (call them what you will), located mostly in your brain. There is no separate "you" in isolation from these things.

I have done this in the attachment to first post this thread. Summary of that definition:
"I" am a subroutine in a parietal simulation of the sensible world surrounding my physical body - I.e. an non material information process and as such not constrained to follow exactly the laws of physics - For example "I" can make choices some what (but not much) independent of the the flux of neurotransmitters in synaptic gaps that are controlled by the laws of physics. That is, like a digital simulation in a computer, plus or minus a few neurotransmitters attaching to a nerve cell wall does not change the computation anymore than a few electrons more or less changes the 1 or 0 state of the transister's computers.

You are of course entitled to your opinion and definition of "you", but it does not agree with mine. Does your "you" follow any laws at all, or is it supposed to be completely oblivious to any and all laws? (Your analogy to a digital simulation on a computer is false, such a simulation still follows laws). If oblivious to all laws, how does that "you" interact with the physical universe? If your "you" is supposed to be oblivious to all laws, then this is similar to the 17th century "mind-body" dualism that Descartes proposed.

 

[Billy T]

...Either the decay is random or it is deterministic - you seem to be saying that it is both. ...
Again, you contradict yourself! Either the results of radioactive decay are "truly random" as you suggest, or they are "the result of hidden variables" - they cannot be both since these are contradictory assumptions! Please clarify what you mean here.

No I am trying to get your attention directed away from individual decays - you may chose either hidden variables that make them deterministic or grant that they are random - I first mentioned "hidden variables"
What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields.

Please stop speaking about the individual decays! Focus on the sequence ...AABBBABAA... That is demonstrably random because neither decay has any influence upon another decay. If you like make the experimental arrangement more complex by using two different radioactive source and only count in the sequence decays that are separated in time by such a small increment of time that even light can not travel between the two separated sources (guaranteeing that one does not have any control over the other)

Summary you are still missing the point, why I went to a higher level, where it does not matter if the individual decays are random or controlled by hidden variables. That is also why I mentioned that I might sped two years just proving from observation that the sequence is more random than any computer's random bit string ...1100010001111001001... as they all repeat if you wait long enough (at least so I am told, not an expert in this area.) etc.

 

[Billy T]

...Gladly. "you" is just the collection of neural patterns, synaptic pathways, biochemical transmitters (call them what you will), located mostly in your brain. There is no separate "you" in isolation from these things.

So "you" are a physical thing subject to the laws of physics, which you claim are deterministic. How is then that you can make a genuine choice? Is it not determined by the physics of your body processes? I.e. if these laws are deterministic, you could not do otherwise than what you did. (no real choice among alternatives was made.)

...Does your "you" follow any laws at all, or is it supposed to be completely oblivious to any and all laws?

yes the parietal neural tissue making the simulation is completely following the laws of physics, but what is simulated does not need to. For example, a simulated fire need not produce any smoke - that is it need not exactly simulate a physical fire. "I" could have minor or major variations from physical reality. I think the parietal simulation is quite accurate in regard to most physical processes (Evolution has selected to make this so.) but when it comes to creating "ME" within the simulation, there are psychological aspects not existent in the physical world - one might be free will, another the qualia of "red," another pain, etc. Things that do not exist in material objects like computers, but can exist in simulations, if the experiencer of these things is also just part of the simulation, I.e. not a material but an informaion process. As far as how this information process controls some material objects it does the same way that mental processes control other body functions, like accelerating heart rates when your body is under stress etc. Please note that I am not claiming that free will must exist, only that it can without violation of physics.

(Your analogy to a digital simulation on a computer is false, such a simulation still follows laws). If oblivious to all laws, how does that "you" interact with the physical universe? If your "you" is supposed to be oblivious to all laws, then this is similar to the 17th century "mind-body" dualism that Descartes proposed.

No, it is not "oblivious to all laws" - I don't subscribe to a "spirit" that thinks independent of the body, etc. I stated that the computer (my body's brain) follows all the physical laws but what is simulated need not follow them exactly already.

 

[moving finger]

No I am trying to get your attention directed away from individual decays - you may chose either hidden variables that make them deterministic or grant that they are random - I first mentioned "hidden variables"
What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields.

I am sorry, Billy T, but I think we have a major disconnect here.
By definition, either the decay is random (ie indeterministic) or it is not random (ie deterministic). Hidden Variables theories are attempts to explain how the quantum world can be deterministic and yet still obey the probabilistic rules of QM. Hidden Variables theories ARE deterministic theories, they are not random.

Therefore it is a contradiction to say that "the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random." Your statement makes no sense in the proper context of Hidden Variables theories.

Please stop speaking about the individual decays! Focus on the sequence ...AABBBABAA... That is demonstrably random because neither decay has any influence upon another decay.

I grant you the decay maybe appears random, but Hidden Variables theories would say that this is an appearance only, because the variables which control the decay are indeed hidden. There is no way that you can show the difference between a sequence which simply appears (epistemically) to be random (but which is controlled by Hidden Variables) and one which truly is (ontically) random.

If you like make the experimental arrangement more complex by using two different radioactive source and only count in the sequence decays that are separated in time by such a small increment of time that even light can not travel between the two separated sources (guaranteeing that one does not have any control over the other)

Making the experiment more complex makes no difference, and there is no way that you can make such a guarantee.

The key is : EITHER (A) the decay is truly indeterminstic (random), OR (B) it is deterministic but controlled by hidden variables (simply appears to be random). The decay cannot be both. And I suggest there is no way that you can distinguish experimentally between A or B - you must simply assume either A or B.

Summary you are still missing the point, why I went to a higher level, where it does not matter if the individual decays are random or controlled by hidden variables. That is also why I mentioned that I might sped two years just proving from observation that the sequence is more random than any computer's random bit string ...1100010001111001001... as they all repeat if you wait long enough (at least so I am told, not an expert in this area.) etc.

I hope you can see now that it is YOU who has been missing the point. You cannot mix "random" with "hidden variables" because the two mean very different things.
All you would ever prove this way is that the sequence APPEARS as random as possible (epistemic quality). You could never know for sure whether it is truly random (and thus indeterministic), or simply appears random because it is controlled by hidden variables (and thus deterministic) (ontic quality).

MF

Niels Bohr brainwashed a whole generation of physicists into believing that the problem had been solved
Murray Gell-Mann​

 

[moving finger]

So "you" are a physical thing subject to the laws of physics, which you claim are deterministic. How is then that you can make a genuine choice? Is it not determined by the physics of your body processes? I.e. if these laws are deterministic, you could not do otherwise than what you did. (no real choice among alternatives was made.)

Several posts back, when I pointed out a "choice" can be as simple as taking two inputs and making one output, and even a simple machine can make such a choice, you agreed with me but you said the issue is not about making "choices". I think you will find that determinism and choice are not incompatible concepts...

the parietal neural tissue making the simulation is completely following the laws of physics, but what is simulated does not need to. For example, a simulated fire need not produce any smoke - that is it need not exactly simulate a physical fire.

That is an incorrect analogy. The "simulated fire" you produce still follows the underlying laws of physics, even though it does not follow the smoke-releated laws of thermodynamics and fluid flow. You cannot use a physical substrate (which obeys the laws of physics) to produce a simulation which miraculously doesn't obey laws.

"I" could have minor or major variations from physical reality. I think the parietal simulation is quite accurate in regard to most physical processes (Evolution has selected to make this so.) but when it comes to creating "ME" within the simulation, there are psychological aspects not existent in the physical world - one might be free will, another the qualia of "red," another pain, etc.

I disagree. I believe qualia DO exist in the physical world, and they follow physical laws, but 3rd person objective science can never hope to explain or understand all of the details of qualia (or consciousness), because these are 1st person subjective experiences.

Please note that I am not claiming that free will must exist, only that it can without violation of physics.

And I claim (again) that it is pointless for you to discuss whether something you call "free will" exists or does not exist until you have first defined what you mean by "free will".

No, it is not "oblivious to all laws" - I don't subscribe to a "spirit" that thinks independent of the body, etc. I stated that the computer (my body's brain) follows all the physical laws but what is simulated need not follow them exactly already.

OK, so it is controlled by some laws but not by others? Sounds pretty weird to me. (but still along the lines of Descartes dualism)

MF

 

[Billy T]

...I think you will find that determinism and choice are not incompatible concepts...

THEY ARE! You are fond of definitions. The definition of "determined, determinism, etc." is that there is one and only one possible outcome or future. It has been determined by things in the past, which we may or may not know / understand, such as "hidden variables" determining when a particular radioactive atom will decay.

...You cannot use a physical substrate (which obeys the laws of physics) to produce a simulation which miraculously doesn't obey laws.

Of course the simularion will follow many laws, often some that closely agree with the physical world's laws, but I think one can have a component of the simulation that does neither follows deterministic laws nor is purely a random selection. Exactly how one would achieve this is not very clear to me. I am not computer programmer and doubt that many of them could give a good example, but I am impressed that nature has usually found a way to do almost any thing that is not forbidden by the physical laws. For example, the first fission reaction on Earth was in Africa when a water moderated natural uranium deposit slowly critical - discovered by the mining company. They were began encountering depleted U instead of a natural U ore body deposit! I am inclined to believe that evolution has found a way to make real choices possible, but this is just my opinion. I have never claimed "we" actually have anything more than the illusion of choosing.

I disagree. I believe qualia DO exist in the physical world, ...

let's consider the most discussed example: "red." (do you know about Mary, who knew everything there is about red, but had never seen it?) In my book Dark Visitor, there is a footnote tied to the term "red giant" (a stellar phase astronomer Jack is describing) that gives the following proof that it is not red: Assume that thousands of years ago, a virus killed all humans except those whose DNA code for Daltonism (people who see objects most people call red as green). Now Astronomer Jack would call this star a "green giant" because it has the same green color as his hemiglobin rich blood. (point of foot note is to admit the error of assigning colors to objects, but state, that to avoid confusion, this erroneous practice will continue.)

In your post 56, in response to my:
"What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields."
you said:

...By definition, either the decay is random (ie indeterministic) or it is not random (ie deterministic). Hidden Variables theories are attempts to explain how the quantum world can be deterministic and yet still obey the probabilistic rules of QM. Hidden Variables theories ARE deterministic theories, they are not random.
Therefore it is a contradiction to say that "the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random." Your statement makes no sense in the proper context of Hidden Variables theories.

Let me prove that the interval between decays and hence the sequence ...AABBBABABB... is not only demonstrably (as I prior stated) random, even if every decay is determined by hidden variables, but that it must be, if you agree information can not be exchanged between to points in less time than light can travel between these same two points. (I hinted at the proof in prior post and did not want to go to trouble of giving it.)

Assume there are two radioactive sources, each with near by detectors, but these detectors are separated by two light seconds. Also assume that the only decays that are included in the ...AABBBABBABBa... sequence are those that occur within one second of each other. That is at the two sites of the two radioactive sources the time of the decay is recorded with an accuracy of at least 0.4 seconds. Now there is no way that anything at one site can influence any thing at the other site which is recorded in the sequence. . That is the sequence completely without any correlation i.e. is random.

Note that the sequence ...AABBBABBABBa... need not be constructed in "real time." For example, once a week the time marked records from both sites are bought to my house and I construct the sequence (throwing out all events from either site that have an event at the other site more than one second earlier.) The last event in the sequence I can so construct (an A or a B) is what determines if you get $10,000 or die, even if every decay was completely determined by hidden variables!

I asked you in last post to stop talking about the individual decays. You did not. That is why you continue to miss the point, which I can not make any more clearly. The sequence is random. Your future (fortune or death) is not determined. Your case for a deterministic world is lost. Not even only your future is determined.

 

[The Rev]

It seems to me that if freewill is not possible, and everything is scripted, then why do we think?

Thinking is, at least from a biological point of view, a means to turn sensory input into a meaningful interpretation of the current situation which we then can examine to make decisions about how best to survive. IOW, human beings are set up to process input and decide on courses of action. If that were a redundant or irrelevant process (because all those actions are pre-scripted anyway), then what's the point in going through the motions?

Or, for that matter, what's the point in having senses, or the ability to act?

It seems to me, that while we are not so sure whether we have freewill, nature seems to think we do, or is at least counting on it in her design of our bodies.

\phi

The Rev

 

[Tournesol]

Causal determinism is not the same as fatalism. For a causal determinist, things are
ineveitable *becasue* of the causal chains linking them; you can't jump straight
to the end of the chain. The omelette may be inevitable, but you still have to break
the eggs to arrive at it.

 

[moving finger]

THEY ARE! You are fond of definitions. The definition of "determined, determinism, etc." is that there is one and only one possible outcome or future. It has been determined by things in the past, which we may or may not know / understand, such as "hidden variables" determining when a particular radioactive atom will decay.

Again you are mistaken, Billy T. As I pointed out already, a choice can be as simple as taking two inputs and producing one output, and in this sense even a simple demonstrably deterministic machine can make a choice, hence choice is compatible with determinism. Making a choice has nothing to do with indeterminism or “free will” (whatever that might be). I am glad however that you do finally acknowledge that hidden variables provide a deterministic solution

Of course the simularion will follow many laws, often some that closely agree with the physical world's laws, but I think one can have a component of the simulation that does neither follows deterministic laws nor is purely a random selection. Exactly how one would achieve this is not very clear to me. I am not computer programmer and doubt that many of them could give a good example,

It is certainly not clear to me, and I doubt that it is clear to anyone! Reflect on it a little while, Billy T. I see no way that a purely deterministic substrate (hardware, firmware, software etc) can produce a simulation which is in any way indeterministic. We can “simulate” indeterminism yes (just as we simulate a random number generator on a computer), but a computer generated random number is in fact 100% deterministic. In order to get indeterminism, you need to start with indeterminism, you cannot fabricate it from determinism.

but I am impressed that nature has usually found a way to do almost any thing that is not forbidden by the physical laws. For example, the first fission reaction on Earth was in Africa when a water moderated natural uranium deposit slowly critical - discovered by the mining company. They were began encountering depleted U instead of a natural U ore body deposit! I am inclined to believe that evolution has found a way to make real choices possible, but this is just my opinion. I have never claimed "we" actually have anything more than the illusion of choosing.

Yes, but so what? Nature could be 100% deterministic and still show the variety of forms She has shown. Nothing you have said points to indeterminism.

lets consider the most discussed example: "red." (do you know about Mary, who knew everything there is about red, but had never seen it?)

Yes, this is a famous argument in the debate on qualia, but it is based on a false premise. The premise is that Mary can know EVERYTHING there is to know about the colour red without ever having the experience of seeing the colour red, which is false. One of the fundamental aspects of qualia is that they are 1st person subjective experiences, and it is impossible to convey all of the properties of a 1st person subjective experience using 3rd person objective science. Therefore Mary did NOT know everything about the colour red, because she had never experienced seeing red. But what does this have to do with the subject of this thread?

In my book Dark Visitor, there is a footnote tied to the term "red giant" (a stellar phase astronomer Jack is describing) that gives the following proof that it is not red: Assume that thousands of years ago, a virus killed all humans except those whose DNA code for Daltonism (people who see objects most people call red as green). Now Astronomer Jack would call this star a "green giant" because it has the same green color as his hemiglobin rich blood. (point of foot note is to admit the error of assigning colors to objects, but state, that to avoid confusion, this erroneous practice will continue.)

What relevance does this have to the subject of this thread?

In your post 56, in response to my:
"What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields."
you said:

Quote:
Originally Posted by moving finger
...By definition, either the decay is random (ie indeterministic) or it is not random (ie deterministic). Hidden Variables theories are attempts to explain how the quantum world can be deterministic and yet still obey the probabilistic rules of QM. Hidden Variables theories ARE deterministic theories, they are not random.
Therefore it is a contradiction to say that "the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random." Your statement makes no sense in the proper context of Hidden Variables theories.

Let me prove that the interval between decays and hence the sequence ...AABBBABABB... is not only demonstrably (as I prior stated) random, even if every decay is determined by hidden variables, but that it must be, if you agree information can not be exchanged between to points in less time than light can travel between these same two points. (I hinted at the proof in prior post and did not want to go to trouble of giving it.)

Assume there are two radioactive sources, each with near by detectors, but these detectors are separated by two light seconds. Also assume that the only decays that are included in the ...AABBBABBABBa... sequence are those that occur within one second of each other. That is at the two sites of the two radioactive sources the time of the decay is recorded with an accuracy of at least 0.4 seconds. Now there is no way that anything at one site can influence any thing at the other site which is recorded in the sequence. . That is the sequence completely without any correlation i.e. is random.

Note that the sequence ...AABBBABBABBa... need not be constructed in "real time." For example, once a week the time marked records from both sites are bought to my house and I construct the sequence (throwing out all events from either site that have an event at the other site more than one second earlier.) The last event in the sequence I can so construct (an A or a B) is what determines if you get $10,000 or die, even if every decay was completely determined by hidden variables!

I asked you in last post to stop talking about the individual decays. You did not. That is why you continue to miss the point, which I can not make any more clearly. The sequence is random. Your future (fortune or death) is not determined. Your case for a deterministic world is lost. Not even only your future is determined.

Billy T, I have never been talking only about individual decays, I have no idea why you keep harping on about this. And you have not proven (as you claim) that “the interval between decays and hence the sequence ...AABBBABABB... is not only demonstrably random, even if every decay is determined by hidden variables”.

IF each individual decay is deterministic (eg, as you suggest, determined by hidden variables) then it follows that the SEQUENCE will also be deterministic; and it also follows that two separate radioactive sources (no matter how far apart they are) will also each have deterministic decay sequences, and (unless you can show that there is a SOURCE OF INDETERMINISM somewhere, which you have not shown), then it also follows that any correlation between the two sources will also be deterministic. Whether they are in causal contact or not. Why do you keep insisting the sequence must be random or indeterministic?

To make it easier, let us look at a different example, such as two computers each “simulating” a radioactive source, but each doing so according to a simple algorithm and hence deterministically. I am sure you will agree that the individual “decays” are deterministic, and you will also agree that each decay sequence produced by each computer is also deterministic. It also follows (unless you can show where there is a source of indeterminism coming in) that any kind of correlation of sequences between the two computers, no matter how far apart they are, is also deterministic. You cannot produce any kind of indeterministic outcome from a purely deterministic process. If you believe that you can, then the onus is on you to demonstrate how this can be done (you have not done it so far).

Therefore it all boils down to : Is the basic process of radioactive decay deterministic or indeterministic? If the former, then the sequence and the correlations will also be deterministic; if the latter then the sequence and the correlations will also be indeterministic. It is as simple as that!

The question therefore remains : Are you assuming that radioactive decay is a deterministic or an indeterministic process?

MF

 

[moving finger]

It seems to me that if freewill is not possible, and everything is scripted, then why do we think?

What is your definition of freewill please?

It’s pointless to debate whether something exists or not unless that something is defined.

I have asked the originator of this thread to define what he means by free will, but so far he has not done so.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Causal determinism is not the same as fatalism. For a causal determinist, things are
ineveitable *becasue* of the causal chains linking them; you can't jump straight
to the end of the chain. The omelette may be inevitable, but you still have to break
the eggs to arrive at it.

did anyone suggest it was?

MF

 

[Billy T]

...Thinking is, at least from a biological point of view, a means to turn sensory input into a meaningful interpretation of the current situation which we then can examine to make decisions about how best to survive. IOW, human beings are set up to process input and decide on courses of action. If that were a redundant or irrelevant process (because all those actions are pre-scripted anyway), then what's the point in going through the motions? Or, for that matter, what's the point in having senses, or the ability to act? It seems to me, that while we are not so sure whether we have freewill, nature seems to think we do, or is at least counting on it in her design of our bodies.

I have made your definition of thinking bold to show that your definition and following argument applies equally well to an amoeba, swiming away from a drop of vingar that falls in its pond. I also note that the existence of some "purpose to life", other than to sever as a vehicle for extending genes into the future, is not proven or granted by all.

 

[Billy T]

...Making a choice has nothing to do with indeterminism or “free will” (whatever that might be).

In a quantum mechanical or non-deterministic world (which you do not accept as the real world) one might chose to turn right or left at an intersection because the future is not determined by the past. In deterministic world, the past has determined whether you will turn right or left (definition of "determined," "deterministic world," etc.). You may suffer under the psychological illusion that you made a "choice", when turning left, but you did not. That left turn was determined even before you were born! (If world is deterministics as you believe.) No choice is possible if the future is completely determined by the past.

I am glad however that you do finally acknowledge that hidden variables provide a deterministic solution

I did not want to argue about hidden variables and they make no difference to the discussion of free will, so because I anticipated that you might bring them up, I granted even before you ever mentioned them (that is hardly "finally" -check back prior posts) that you could have radio active decay deterministic and controlled by "hidden variables" if you wish. I said I would "go to a higher level and work only with the sequence of detections" that can be demonstrably shown to be random. (my "two years of testing")

You disputed that the sequence was random (and still do), so I set up two radio active source separated with space like separation of 2 light seconds and only included decays in the construction of the sequence that have locally recorded time differing by one second or less to prove that no information about one decay at A could travel to influence the other decay at B.

I thought you would accept this as proof that the sequence is random. I will not bother to describe how Bell's inequality and experimental results also prove it is as that would be lost on you if you do not understand the simpler proof already given. (I.e. space-like separated events can never effect each other, and must therefore proceed completely independently - no correlation - i.e. random relative to each other, and hence their sequence is also random.)

...Yes, but so what? Nature could be 100% deterministic and still show the variety of forms She has shown. Nothing you have said points to indeterminism.

False the sequence has been proven to be uncorrelated as the events included in the sequence were space like separated.

...IF each individual decay is deterministic ...then it follows that the SEQUENCE will also be deterministic; and it also follows that two separate radioactive sources (no matter how far apart they are) will also each have deterministic decay sequences, ...

Yes the sequence ...BBBBBBBBBB... could have deterministic intervals. (and likewise ...AAAAAAAAAAAA... could have deterministic intervals.) because one comes solely from site B and the other solely from site A. Clearly B site is not space-like separated from site B. (and etc. for site A.) (I have made your word "each" bold to show where you continue to miss the point.)

BUT, the sequence ...AABBBABBAAAB... I constructed comes from one event at B occurring less that 1 second prior to one at A, and conversely. When the information that the event at B occurred takes at least 2 second to get from B to A, it can not have any influence upon the event at A, if the "A event" is only one second after the B event. Thus, the information, even if it did exist, arrives too late to have controlled when the event at A occurred.

In fact the sequence was constructed at my house, from the records made separately B and at A, a week earlier. These records would just be a list of times (accurate to 0.4s) of when decays occurred. For example, B's record could include times ...0:54:02, 1:03:15, 1:13:22 ...
and A's could include ... 1:01:05, 1:02:45, 1:06:14...
and then only the "B event" at 1:03:15 together with the event A at 1:02:45 meet the criteria of having occurred with in 1 second of each other (space like separation guaranteed In this case, "A" occurred first, so these two events will contribute a "AB" in the constructed sequence (not a "BA") and all of the other possible pairing of the six events listed above, from the two different sites, (for example B=1:03:15 and A=1:06:14) will be ignored/ discarded as there is time for the B event at 1:03:15 to influence the A event at 1:06:14 (I.e. they are "time like separated" and conceivable related in some way.)

If you don't understand it now, I will give up trying to get you to see that no matter what type of determinism at each of the sites is occurring (hidden variable or anything else you wish to postulate) separately at A & B sites the sequence constructed from only space-like separated decays is random.

That is why I said hidden variable make no difference and readily granted them to you even though I know Bell's inequality and real world data show they do not. - Einstein was wrong on hidden variables.

...Therefore it all boils down to : Is the basic process of radioactive decay deterministic or indeterministic? If the former, then the sequence and the correlations will also be deterministic; if the latter then the sequence and the correlations will also be indeterministic. It is as simple as that!...MF

I have show this false in increasing detail in last three posts to you. I can do no more.

You need to have some understanding of what "space like separation" means for the sequence constructedonly from space-like separated events.

 

[The Rev]

What is your definition of freewill please?

It’s pointless to debate whether something exists or not unless that something is defined.

I have asked the originator of this thread to define what he means by free will, but so far he has not done so.

MF

There's this old argument for the existence of God that says He must exist because the universe is just a bunch of actions that are effects of previous causes, which themselves are effects of causes, etc. Since there must have been a first cause to set everything else in motion, there must be a God.

I derive my idea of freewill from this prime mover idea. If you can create a cause from nothing, you are exercising freewill, if not, not. For example, if I decide to make a pass at a hot blonde, there is either the option that this decision is just an effect, at the end of a long cause/effect chain leading back to the Big Bang, or the option that I spontaneously created the decision to some degree.

If that decision is in any way not a product of simple cause and effect outside my own volition, then I have, to that degree, freewill.

\phi

The Rev

 

[The Rev]

I have made your definition of thinking bold to show that your definition and following argument applies equally well to an amoeba, swiming away from a drop of vingar that falls in its pond.

I don't see how a lower lifeform's reflex reaction to a life threatening situation wouldn't be freewill. I know it's a big philosophical conundrum, but that doesn't mean it only applies to higher life forms.

I also note that the existence of some "purpose to life", other than to sever as a vehicle for extending genes into the future, is not proven or granted by all.

This may be just a difference in our views of freewill. I admit I haven't read the entire thread, but rather just tossed in an idea to see what people thought of it. I think it's meaningful that living things (not necessarily just humans) are designed to make decisions. It doesn't prove freewill, I know, but it does seem strange that living things function as though they have it.

\phi

The Rev

 

[moving finger]

In a quantum mechanical or non-deterministic world (which you do not accept as the real world) one might chose to turn right or left at an intersection because the future is not determined by the past. In deterministic world, the past has determined whether you will turn right or left (definition of "determined," "deterministic world," etc.). You may suffer under the psychological illusion that you made a "choice", when turning left, but you did not. That left turn was determined even before you were born! (If world is deterministics as you believe.) No choice is possible if the future is completely determined by the past.

I would say you are confusing “choice” with some notion of “unconstrained choice”. As I have pointed out, a choice is simply “taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output”. Such a choice can be made by a completely deterministic machine. Now, you would presumably say that this is then “not a choice” because it is somehow constrained (the machine had to do what it did), but what you are actually saying is that the machine is making a constrained choice as opposed to a free choice – but we have no idea what a free choice is because we still do not have your definition of free will!

I did not want to argue about hidden variables and they make no difference to the discussion of free will, so because I anticipated that you might bring them up, I granted even before you ever mentioned them (that is hardly "finally" -check back prior posts) that you could have radio active decay deterministic and controlled by "hidden variables" if you wish. I said I would "go to a higher level and work only with the sequence of detections" that can be demonstrably shown to be random. (my "two years of testing").

You have not made it clear what you mean by “a higher level”. You still have not shown how a deterministic process can produce an indeterministic outcome.

You disputed that the sequence was random (and still do) .

No, I dispute that you have proven it is random. There is a difference. The sequence MAY BE RANDOM, I am not saying it is not random. What I am saying is that there is no way to know whether the sequence is truly random or not – it may appear to be random but it cannot be proven to be random. There is a difference between epistemic indeterminability and ontic indeterminism, and you cannot prove one from the other.

so I set up two radio active source separated with space like separation of 2 light seconds and only included decays in the construction of the sequence that have locally recorded time differing by one second or less to prove that no information about one decay at A could travel to influence the other decay at B.

You have not proven that there is no correlation between the sources. Two sources can be correlated even though there is no direct information transfer at superluminal speeds between the two sources. All it requires is that information could have been transferred between the two sources at sometime (any time) in the past.

I thought you would accept this as proof that the sequence is random. I will not bother to describe how Bell's inequality and experimental results also prove it is as that would be lost on you if you do not understand the simpler proof already given.

I am fully aware of Bell’s theorem, I think you are the one who does not understand. Bell’s inequality and the experimental results of QM shows that the universe must behave non-locally, which simply means that space-like separated events can remain ENTANGLED with each other, such that what happens on one side of the universe can be quantum mechanically entangled instantaneously with another event on the other side of the universe, ie apparent superluminal effects (but no useful information is transferred at superluminal speeds). Read Bell’s work and Aspect’s work closely and you will understand. It has NOTHING to do with indeterminism. In fact Bell was a supporter of Bohm’s hidden variables ideas, Bell did not believe the quantum world was fundamentally indeterministic.

(I.e. space-like separated events can never effect each other, and must therefore proceed completely independently - no correlation - i.e. random relative to each other, and hence their sequence is also random.) .

Correlation has nothing to do with space-like separation, as I have pointed out already. And quantum entanglement shows that spacelike separated events can still be entangled.

False the sequence has been proven to be uncorrelated as the events included in the sequence were space like separated. .

Incorrect, for the reasons I have shown.

Yes the sequence ...BBBBBBBBBB... could have deterministic intervals. (and likewise ...AAAAAAAAAAAA... could have deterministic intervals.) because one comes solely from site B and the other solely from site A. Clearly B site is not space-like separated from site B. (and etc. for site A.) (I have made your word "each" bold to show where you continue to miss the point.) .

You continue to miss the point that spacelike separation does not imply no correlation.

BUT, the sequence ...AABBBABBAAAB... I constructed comes from one event at B occurring less that 1 second prior to one at A, and conversely. When the information that the event at B occurred takes at least 2 second to get from B to A, it can not have any influence upon the event at A, if the "A event" is only one second after the B event. Thus, the information, even if it did exist, arrives too late to have controlled when the event at A occurred.

Again, spacelike separation does not imply no correlation.

In fact the sequence was constructed at my house, from the records made separately B and at A, a week earlier. These records would just be a list of times (accurate to 0.4s) of when decays occurred. For example, B's record could include times ...0:54:02, 1:03:15, 1:13:22 ...
and A's could include ... 1:01:05, 1:02:45, 1:06:14...
and then only the "B event" at 1:03:15 together with the event A at 1:02:45 meet the criteria of having occurred with in 1 second of each other (space like separation guaranteed In this case, "A" occurred first, so these two events will contribute a "AB" in the constructed sequence (not a "BA") and all of the other possible pairing of the six events listed above, from the two different sites, (for example B=1:03:15 and A=1:06:14) will be ignored/ discarded as there is time for the B event at 1:03:15 to influence the A event at 1:06:14 (I.e. they are "time like separated" and conceivable related in some way.)

If you don't understand it now, I will give up trying to get you to see that no matter what type of determinism at each of the sites is occurring (hidden variable or anything else you wish to postulate) separately at A & B sites the sequence constructed from only space-like separated decays is random.

Again, spacelike separation does not require that there is no correlation. With respect, you are woefully misguided.

That is why I said hidden variable make no difference and readily granted them to you even though I know Bell's inequality and real world data show they do not. - Einstein was wrong on hidden variables.

Einstein was demonstrably wrong only in believing in a local reality. The results of QM show that the world cannot be both real and local, however it can be real and non-local. And this is what Bell himself believed. In fact no matter what interpretation of QM you adopt, the world must be non-local. So non-locality is here to stay. But nobody has EVER proven that the world is not deterministic at a quantum level, and nobody has ever proven that non-local hidden variables theories do not work.

I have show this false in increasing detail in last three posts to you. I can do no more.

You misunderstand causation and correlation at an elementary level my dear friend. If you continue to misunderstand this, as well as the results of Bell’s theorem and the results of QM, then I also can do no more. You obviously refuse to believe me. I suggest you go ask someone whom you will believe.

You need to have some understanding of what "space like separation" means for the sequence constructedonly from space-like separated events.

You need to understand that spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

MF

 

[moving finger]

There's this old argument for the existence of God that says He must exist because the universe is just a bunch of actions that are effects of previous causes, which themselves are effects of causes, etc. Since there must have been a first cause to set everything else in motion, there must be a God.

Why must the first cause be God? (unless one defines God as "the first cause", in which case the answer is obvious)

I derive my idea of freewill from this prime mover idea. If you can create a cause from nothing, you are exercising freewill, if not, not. For example, if I decide to make a pass at a hot blonde, there is either the option that this decision is just an effect, at the end of a long cause/effect chain leading back to the Big Bang, or the option that I spontaneously created the decision to some degree.

QM suggests that events may happen at a QM level without cause, does this mean that QM particles have free will?

Are you suggesting that free will is some kind of spontaneous "action with no prior cause"? Surely this just results in random events, how can this be translated into something we call human free will?

But no, you are suggesting that free will is something "I spontaneously created" - which seems a contradiction? Either something is spontaneous (ie without cause), or it is created (in this case by "I", whatever "I" might be). Therefore we need to ask - is this act (of free will) spontaneous (without cause) or is it in fact caused by the "I"?

If that decision is in any way not a product of simple cause and effect outside my own volition, then I have, to that degree, freewill.

And now "my own volition" is coming into it. Thus free will is not, in fact, simply action without cause, it is action caused or at least moderated by "my own volition"?

Can you define what you mean by "my own volition"?

Where is the "you" which is presumably part of the "my own" in all of this?

Are you suggesting that "your volition" proceeds independently of the cause and effect of the material world, in some kind of dualistic realtionship, a la Descartes?

MF

 

[moving finger]

Billy T

If you would like to educate yourself about causal relationships and the difference between direct causation and correlation, and at the same time understand how spacelike events can be correlated even though there is no direct causation between the events concerned, read the following :

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-Rpcc/

MF

 

[Tournesol]

I am fully aware of Bell’s theorem, I think you are the one who does not understand. Bell’s inequality and the experimental results of QM shows that the universe must behave non-locally, which simply means that space-like separated events can remain ENTANGLED with each other, such that what happens on one side of the universe can be quantum mechanically entangled instantaneously with another event on the other side of the universe, ie apparent superluminal effects (but no useful information is transferred at superluminal speeds). Read Bell’s work and Aspect’s work closely and you will understand. It has NOTHING to do with indeterminism.

It has everything to do with determinism by local hidden variables.

In fact Bell was a supporter of Bohm’s hidden variables ideas, Bell did not believe the quantum world was fundamentally indeterministic.

But the Aspect experiment produced the opposite result to what he
was hoping for. Nature is the ultimate arbitor, not famous scientists.

Einstein was demonstrably wrong only in believing in a local reality. The results of QM show that the world cannot be both real and local,

Cannot be determined and local

however it can be real and non-local.

determined non-locally. Or just plain indetermined.

And this is what Bell himself believed. In fact no matter what interpretation of QM you adopt, the world must be non-local. So non-locality is here to stay. But nobody has EVER proven that the world is not deterministic at a quantum level, and nobody has ever proven that non-local hidden variables theories do not work.

Debatable
http://www.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0206/0206196.pdf

 

[moving finger]

It has everything to do with determinism by local hidden variables.

As I said, it has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Nature is the ultimate arbitor, not famous scientists.

And nature shows that the quantum world is non-local, but it is not necessarily indeterministic. The latter agrees with Bell’s, Bohm’s and Einstein's beliefs.

Cannot be determined and local

To Einstein, “real” was his way of saying “determined”

determined non-locally. Or just plain indetermined.

But not necessarily indetermined, which is what many followers of Bohr mistakenly assume

http://www.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant...206/0206196.pdf[/QUOTE]

The cited paper claims to show that some experimental results do not agree with a very particular non-local hidden-variables theory, but the paper does not show that non-local hidden variables theories in general do not work.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

As I said, it has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Of course it does. It rules out the form of determinism, local determinism,
that most determinists believe in.

And nature shows that the quantum world is non-local, but it is not necessarily indeterministic. The latter agrees with Bell’s, Bohm’s and Einstein's beliefs.

Or necessarilly deterministic.

To Einstein, “real” was his way of saying “determined”

It's a True Scotsman approach.

But not necessarily indetermined, which is what many followers of Bohr mistakenly assume

Works both ways. Determinists assume it proves the existence of non-local
determinism.

The cited paper claims to show that some experimental results do not agree with a very particular non-local hidden-variables theory, but the paper does not show that non-local hidden variables theories in general do not work.

But Bohm's is the only fully worked out on. It looks like the determinists
are clutching at straws.

 

[moving finger]

It rules out the form of determinism, local determinism, that most determinists believe in.

And as I said, this has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Or necessarilly deterministic.

I never said it was necessarily deterministic. Unlike followers of Bohr who say the world is necessarily indeterministic.

It's a True Scotsman approach.

What on Earth does that mean?

Works both ways. Determinists assume it proves the existence of non-local determinism.

I disagree. It proves only that the world is non-local. It may be deterministic, it may be indeterministic, there is no way we can ever know.

It looks like the determinists are clutching at straws.

Not at all, some of us are keeping an open mind and not being blinkered by jumping to conclusions.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

http://atheism.about.com/od/logicalfallacies/a/notruescotsman.htm

 

[moving finger]

It's a True Scotsman approach.

Not at all. Read about Einstein's work and his beliefs yourself. You'll start to understand then.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Free will is not free!

...like almost everyone, I feel I make real choices in life and want a rational bases for a belief in Genuine Free Will, GFW

Discussions on "free will" are notoriously difficult, usually because most participants take sides before they even agree what they are talking about (ie participants declare "I do/do not believe in free will" before there is any agreement on the definition or meaning of "free will").

Therefore, rather than debate whether "free will" (whatever the definition) really exists, I think it is much more instructive to ask :

what do people really mean when they say that they believe they act with "free will", and are they justified in having this belief?

I humbly suggest that what most people (who claim to believe in "free will") mean when they say they act with "free will" is that they believe "their actions are not entirely constrained by external factors".

I say "entirely" constrained because I believe most of us would agree that our actions are usually some way constrained to a greater or lesser extent by external factors (eg I cannot willingly hold my breath for more than a minute or two, no matter how much I "want" to), but belief in "free will" would imply that not all of the external constraints on our actions are necessarily absolute.

This is where it becomes useful to look closely at how we define the "person" (or better still, the agent) which we are claiming has this "free will".

Paraphrasing Dennett, one can externalise everything by making oneself really, really small. Conversely, an agent can subsume many (potentially external) constraints within itself by making itself a sufficiently finite size.

What we call our "self" is not an infinitesimal point in space. It has finite physical and logical boundaries and, most importantly, it includes within those boundaries many of the causes and effects of our decisions; in fact the personal decision-making process is based on what I like to call self-referential causal loops.

If we can identify the external "cause" of a particular decision (ie an external constraint on our "free will") then we know that we are not in fact deciding freely. But for many of our decisions we are unable to unambiguously identify the "causes" of those decisions, simply because those causes are internalised in a complex and self-referential way within our decision-making selves.

Thus, it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are uncaused; neither is it the case that our "free will" decisions are unconstrained. It is simply the case that the decisions which we choose to call our "free will" decisions are largely caused and constrained by internal self-referential causal loops, of which we have (most of the time) incomplete awareness - and this is what leads us to say that we act with "free will".

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

All quite good until this pioint...

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

..where you suddenly decide that "free Will" is just a feeling. Feeling free when
you are not actually free is just as much an illusion as feeling like a million dollats when you are a pauper.

 

[moving finger]

All quite good until this pioint...

why thank you!

..where you suddenly decide that "free Will" is just a feeling. Feeling free when you are not actually free is just as much an illusion as feeling like a million dollats when you are a pauper.

Two things here.

One.
I did not say that "free will" is "just" a feeling. You may consider it is “just” a feeling, but I do not.

When we say that we act with "free will" then we are indeed acting such that our actions are not entirely constrained by external factors. This is consistent with the definitions I have suggested above. In this sense we act freely.

But our actions, no matter how free we think we might be, are never unconstrained, and they are never uncaused. It is simply the fact that many of the constraints and causes are internal to ourselves that allows us to believe that we act freely, even though all may be determined.

Two
Are you suggesting that all feelings are illusions?

When I feel happy, am I deluding myself that I am happy?

I think not.
When I feel happy, I am happy.
When I feel free, I am free.
Both are indeed feelings. But neither is an illusion.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

When we say that we act with "free will" then we are indeed acting such that our actions are not entirely constrained by external factors. This is consistent with the definitions I have suggested above. In this sense we act freely.

But our actions, no matter how free we think we might be, are never unconstrained, and they are never uncaused. It is simply the fact that many of the constraints and causes are internal to ourselves that allows us to believe that we act freely, even though all may be determined.

But if determinism is true, eveything that goes on causally inside us
is the ultimate product of factors that went on outside us, before
we were born even. The external/internal distinction is no good
in combination with determisnim.

 

[moving finger]

But if determinism is true, eveything that goes on causally inside us is the ultimate product of factors that went on outside us, before
we were born even.

Yes, agreed. If determinism is true than everything, including all of our actions, is determined (possibly also even determined at a quantum level).

But this does NOT mean that we do not have free will, as I have pointed out above. It depends critically on what one means by free will.

If we define free will as (A) "acting without being totally constrained by external factors" then this is compatible with determinsim (because most of our decisions are based on internalised constraints, not on external factors).

But if you wish to define free will as (B) "acting without any constraints at all" then this is incompatible with determinism.

The external/internal distinction is no good in combination with determisnim.

Only if you insist on the definition (B) above.

If you insist on (B), then your only hope for rescuing free will is that determinism turns out to be false (eg Libertarianism)

MF

 

[Tournesol]

we define free will as (A) "acting without being totally constrained by external factors" then this is compatible with determinsim (because most of our decisions are based on internalised constraints, not on external factors).

But the internal factors, if determinism is true, are ultimately external.

Your version of events is like saying that Lincoln was killed by a bullet,
not by a gun or John Wilkes Booth.

 

[strid]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid... You sould see it more as probabilirties...

So if I'm singing a song, its not that it is pre-determined. There are those who would say that it IS pre-detremined... maybe that the environment I am in, unconciously reminds me about this specific song and uncously makes me want to sing it.
But i would prefer seeing this as probababilities. The enviorment and all that unconcsious stuff sets up probabliites for me singing. It is still me who sings by free will but there is a specific probability for me CHOOSING to sing.

So when I enter a room where it is dark, there is say 90% probabilitythat I will turn on the light. There is a probability, but it is not pre-determined that i will turn on the light.

 

[Billy T]

...You need to understand that spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

I understand this difference.

I think at this point we should just agree to disagree on the randomness of my series. I.e. I will admit that if everything in a deterministic universe is already "entangled" with everything else, then my space like separation, does not prevent there from being a direct correlation in the decays between two spacelike separated radioactive sources.

Also in a deterministic universe, even if not entangled, the decay a B at time T2 could have many factors, none from events at A prohibited from direct causation by speed of light limit, unless entangled, but both the near simultaneous decay at A & B could have common cause(s) in the past.

Thus to one like you who thinks the universe is determined by the past, it is logically possible that my sequence is not random. I would need to rely upon the many experimental tests that have demonstrated that radio active decays are not influenced by external events (like magnetic or electrical forces and the only other two known forces are too short range).

Thus I accept that the sequence I construct from space like decays only is demonstrable random, (Even for a single source - for example assign A if interval from last decay is twice average and assign B if it is less than half average. This would have a bias towards either A or B, but with a little adjustment in the "half interval," the difference in long run between the number of A & Bs could be made very small.

I.e. I will cease to argue with you on this aspect, but think you need to do better in defining "choice" also.

For me, if the future is determined completely by the past, then nothing I would call "choice" is possible. In my example of you making a left turn (as opposed to a right one) you have the illusion of a choice, but that, like everything else, was fixed before you were born in a deterministic universe. Thus it is not a choice, it is an inevitability. That follows from what I understand the words "deterministic universe" to mean. Is that not what you understand also by these words? (Perhaps this is our communication difficulty?)

LaPlace put this well long ago. We don't know the future (epistemic problem) but in your system of beliefs, it is defined by the past. You can have the illusion of choice, but no choice can made. I.e. turning right, instead of the left you did, was not a choice as the right turn was no more possible than your walking to the moon.

If you are going to define "choice" as you have (2 inputs with one output) then turning left instead of walking to the moon was a choice, but that is not what choice means to me. There must be a selection by an agent between at least two alternatives, not uniquely following a path determined years ago, before you were born.

I admit I have only given partial definitions of "free will" and "real choices" by telling examples of things they are not. You have yet to do this, so until you do, stop asking me for more positive definitions.

Tell me what constitutes a "choice" in a universe where exactly everything that happens in 2008 (including your left turn) has already been decided.

 

[Billy T]

..."Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe...

I think I understand your position, but it is one i would call an illusion of free will. You seem to be claiming that the internalized factors that compelled (determined) you to make a left turn in 2008 would be your "free will" at the time when you "decided" to make the left turn. I claim that you as a physical body governed by the laws of nature in a completely deterministic universe, only think you are making a choice. In fact that left turn was determined before you were born.

We can agree to let me refer to this as inevitable act, producing what I call the "illusion of choice" and let you call it "a choice" because some of the deterministic factors which produced this act were "internalized" to use your term.
I.e. I am willing to drop the discussion if you like, but I would add your "already determined free will future acts" to the list of things I have already given as not "genuine free will." Except for this negative list, I admit I have difficulty defining what "genuine free will" is.

 

[Billy T]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid...

The thing that makes the exchange with Moving Finger interesting is that he is:
(1) well informed, logical etc. and
(2) is claiming that the universe is deterministic (although at times his seems not so sure about this at the quantum level).

Tournesol has made more explicit the point I was making earlier about his "free choice" even being determined before he was born - by only externalities that during his life became internalized.

BTW - his "handel" is well chosen - from the Rubiant (Fitzgerald's second translation if memory serves be correctly) "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on. / Not all you piety nor wit, can lure it back to cancel half a line of it." (Not exact also from memory.) It is my second most favorite poem. filled with determinism.

My favorite poem is "Invictus," which has just the opposite idea, concluding with: I am the captain of my ship, I am the master of my soul. (no quotes this time as from memory that is rough version.)

When I was younger, Kiplin's "IF" was important to me. - I have done most of it by now. (Fortunately, I had the good sense to "make one heap of all you winnings and lose it on one turn of pitch and toss ..." when I took all my earnings as a paper boy ($50) an bought a fraction of my father's investment in what turned out to be a dry oil well in West Virginia where I lived at age 12. (I did not even have money for my share of pipe recovery costs, so it was a total loss of "all my winings.")

 

[moving finger]

But the internal factors, if determinism is true, are ultimately external.

If determinism is true then everything is determined, by definition.
If you wish to define "free will" as "acting without any constraints whatsoever" then this kind of free will is incompatible with determinism, and there is no getting away from that.

Your version of events is like saying that Lincoln was killed by a bullet,
not by a gun or John Wilkes Booth.

If determinism is true then Lincoln's manner and time of death was predetermined at the moment of the big bang.

You clearly do not like the idea of determinism - what do you propose as an alternative?

Libertarianism is a nice airy-fairy feel-good idea, but it is groundless (in the sense that it is not supported by any coherent rational theory or experimental evidence).

MF

 

[moving finger]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid... You sould see it more as probabilirties...

So if I'm singing a song, its not that it is pre-determined. There are those who would say that it IS pre-detremined... maybe that the environment I am in, unconciously reminds me about this specific song and uncously makes me want to sing it.
But i would prefer seeing this as probababilities. The enviorment and all that unconcsious stuff sets up probabliites for me singing. It is still me who sings by free will but there is a specific probability for me CHOOSING to sing.

So when I enter a room where it is dark, there is say 90% probabilitythat I will turn on the light. There is a probability, but it is not pre-determined that i will turn on the light.

What you have described is basically Libertarianism - ie that the mind is capable of initiating some uncaused or unconstrained actions (ie "YOU" are not ruled by the laws of physics). This was also the basis of Descartes' view of Dualism (that there is a "thinking self" and a "physical self"; the physical self is subject to the laws of physics but the thinking self is somehow free and not subject to laws).

Problem is there is no coherent rational theory or any experimental evidence to support the idea that such an uncaused "thinking self" exists.

MF

 

[moving finger]

... spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

I understand this difference.

Good. Then you should understand that two spacelike separated radioactive sources can nevertheless be correlated – ie the combined output from those sources is not necessarily random.

I think at this point we should just agree to disagree on the randomness of my series.

Billy T, with respect, you are simply being blind to the obvious. Spacelike separation (I agree) DOES imply no direct causal influence; but it does NOT imply no correlation. That is a very simple truth that (I am sorry) you seem to wish to ignore.

Also in a deterministic universe, even if not entangled, the decay a B at time T2 could have many factors, none from events at A prohibited from direct causation by speed of light limit, unless entangled, but both the near simultaneous decay at A & B could have common cause(s) in the past.

In a 100% deterministic universe, if the entire universe was within causal contact at some stage in the past (ie the moment of the Big Bang) then ALL (all, not some) of the subsequent events in that universe WILL NECESSARILY BE CORRELATED. Think about it. Each and every event, no matter how far it is TODAY from other events in terms of spacelike separation, can be traced back along a pure deterministic line to the Big Bang, where all the universe arises in a common cause.

It’s a bit like a family tree. I may be on the other side of the world from and totally out of touch with my long-lost cousin, but we can both trace a link back in the past to common ancestors. Determinism acts just the same way. If the universe originated in a singularity and is 100% deterministic, then all today’s events can be traced back 100% deterministically to a common source in the past – hence ALL events are correlated today and forevermore.

The ONLY way to argue uncorrelated events is to postulate EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both). You cannot derive randomness in any other way, I am sorry.

it is logically possible that my sequence is not random. I would need to rely upon the many experimental tests that have demonstrated that radio active decays are not influenced by external events (like magnetic or electrical forces and the only other two known forces are too short range) .

It makes no difference whether radioactive events are influenced by external factors or not! I would hope (really) that someone with a PhD in physics could see this. The ONLY important factors are (a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past? If the answers to (a) and (b) are both “yes” then it necessarily follows that EVERYTHING we see is correlated with everything else, whether there is direct causal contact in the present day or not.

Thus I accept that the sequence I construct from space like decays only is demonstrable random, (Even for a single source - for example assign A if interval from last decay is twice average and assign B if it is less than half average. This would have a bias towards either A or B, but with a little adjustment in the "half interval," the difference in long run between the number of A & Bs could be made very small.

I.e. I will cease to argue with you on this aspect, but think you need to do better in defining "choice" also.

You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

For me, if the future is determined completely by the past, then nothing I would call "choice" is possible.

Implicit in your argument is the assumption that you are referring to “free choice” or “unconstrained choice” as opposed to “constrained choice”. In a deterministic universe, then it is a simple fact that all choices are constrained. I can still make choices in such a universe, and a computer can still make choices, it is simply the case that our choices are constrained, by determinism.

In my example of you making a left turn (as opposed to a right one) you have the illusion of a choice,

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained.

but that, like everything else, was fixed before you were born in a deterministic universe. Thus it is not a choice, it is an inevitability.

It is still a choice, I am sorry. I choose between two possibilities. I agree my choice may be pre-determined, but that does not make it “not a choice”.

That follows from what I understand the words "deterministic universe" to mean. Is that not what you understand also by these words? (Perhaps this is our communication difficulty?)

Our communication difficulty (I believe) is based on different definitions. You still have not defined what you mean by free will.

LaPlace put this well long ago. We don't know the future (epistemic problem) but in your system of beliefs, it is defined by the past.

No. If the world is deterministic then the future is defined by the past (and also the past by the future by the way). I am open-minded as to whether the world is deterministic or not.

You can have the illusion of choice, but no choice can made. I.e. turning right, instead of the left you did, was not a choice as the right turn was no more possible than your walking to the moon.

If the universe is deterministic then my choices are pre-determined and constrained, yes.

If you are going to define "choice" as you have (2 inputs with one output) then turning left instead of walking to the moon was a choice, but that is not what choice means to me

Clearly.

There must be a selection by an agent between at least two alternatives, not uniquely following a path determined years ago, before you were born

But there ARE two alternatives in the mind of the agent. The agent can model the situation and can foresee what will happen with (a) and with (b), even if the agent is operating deterministically. The choice that the agent subsequently makes may well be determined, but in my book that would simply be a “constrained choice”.

I admit I have only given partial definitions of "free will" and "real choices" by telling examples of things they are not. You have yet to do this, so until you do, stop asking me for more positive definitions

I beg your pardon? I have given VERY clear and concise definitions of both free will and choice in this thread. If we provide clear and unambiguous definitions about what these terms “mean”, then ( I hope you would agree) we should not need to explain what these terms “do not mean”.
You choose not to accept the definitions I offered (on the other hand, in your definition of choice, maybe you did not in fact “choose”?), but that does not mean that I have not defined these terms. You are the one that seems to refuse to define what you are talking about. I wonder why?

To refresh your memory, my definitions are :

free will is the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable (post #47)

A choice between two or more alternatives is the equivalent of simply taking two or more inputs and producing one output. (post #49)

Tell me what constitutes a "choice" in a universe where exactly everything that happens in 2008 (including your left turn) has already been decided

Read the definition above. The difference between us is that you seem to assume that “choice” necessarily implies “unconstrained choice”, whereas I do not.

..."Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe...

I think I understand your position, but it is one i would call an illusion of free will.

And that is exactly what I predicted – that many people would prefer to call this an "illusion".
But free will as I have defined it here is 100% compatible with determinism, hence is not an illusion, even in a deterministic universe.
I do not accept that you can make the conclusion that free will is an illusion, unless and until you provide an alternative definition of free will (which you seem reluctant to do) which can be shown to be incompatible with determinism – hence your conclusion is invalid.

You seem to be claiming that the internalized factors that compelled (determined) you to make a left turn in 2008 would be your "free will" at the time when you "decided" to make the left turn

No. I am claiming that anyone who defines free will as I have done above is correct in believing that they act with free will. You seem to have a different definition of free will, but as long as you insist on keeping the definition “secret” then (with respect) it is irrelevant whether you think free will is an illusion or not.
What you are in effect saying is that “something that I cannot/will not define, is an illusion”, which is pretty meaningless really, don’t you agree?

I claim that you as a physical body governed by the laws of nature in a completely deterministic universe, only think you are making a choice

We are going round in circles, aren’t we. Depends on one’s definition of choice, and you clearly believe that choice implies unconstrained choice, whereas I do not. Period.

In fact that left turn was determined before you were born

If the universe is deterministic, yes I agree.

We can agree to let me refer to this as inevitable act, producing what I call the "illusion of choice" and let you call it "a choice" because some of the deterministic factors which produced this act were "internalized" to use your term.

I would prefer to say that it is a constrained choice; or that in a deterministic universe, we cannot make unconstrained choices.

I.e. I am willing to drop the discussion if you like, but I would add your "already determined free will future acts" to the list of things I have already given as not "genuine free will." Except for this negative list, I admit I have difficulty defining what "genuine free will" is.

If you do not accept the definition of free will that I have provided already some time ago, then with respect I don’t think we can make any further progress in this debate unless and until you provide an alternative definition of free will that you are happy with.

The thing that makes the exchange with Moving Finger interesting is that he is:
(1) well informed, logical etc. and
(2) is claiming that the universe is deterministic (although at times his seems not so sure about this at the quantum level).

Why, thank you!
Just to clarify this – I am intuitively inclined to believe that the universe is 100% deterministic even at a quantum level, however my scientific training tells me to remain open-minded on this, because it has not been proven that QM is either deterministic or indeterministic (even though the Schroedinger equation is 100% deterministic in configuration space). This is why I very often preface my arguments with “if the universe is 100% deterministic”.

However, IF QM is indeterministic (ie random) then I still do not see how this can be a source of the naïve type of free will that most people seem to want to have (but cannot define).

BTW - his "handel" is well chosen - from the Rubiant (Fitzgerald's second translation if memory serves be correctly) "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on. / Not all you piety nor wit, can lure it back to cancel half a line of it." (Not exact also from memory.) It is my second most favorite poem. filled with determinism.

Well done! Except that it says NOTHING of determinism, but everything about the impossibility of changing the past

The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
The Rubôayôat of Omar Khayyôam, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (1953)

MF

 

[moving finger]

My favorite poem is "Invictus," which has just the opposite idea, concluding with: I am the captain of my ship, I am the master of my soul. (no quotes this time as from memory that is rough version.)

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul
William Ernest Henley. 1849–1903

Billy T, I believe it is such a shame that you cannot see how all of this is entirely compatible with determinism, as long as one accepts the definition of free will that I have given.

To understand where freedom comes from, one needs to understand that the "I" in the poem is not an infinitesimal dimensionless point in space. "I" comprises a finite volume within the deterministic universe. As such, many of the causes and effects that make the "I" what it is, the constraints of "I", are internally contained within the "I". Thus the "I" to which we refer is not simply a powerless cork bobbing on the ocean of determinism, it is a PART of that deterministic ocean, intertwined and convoluted with the causes and effects of the rest of the universe. Within the "I" there are multiple, hidden and ambiguous self-referential causal loops which (because of their self-referential nature) absolutely prohibit the possibility of determining cause and effect relationships by anyone interacting within the same universe.

Thus I believe that such an "I" is indeed the captain of it's fate, EVEN THOUGH THE FATE IS PRE-DETERMINED. I know it seems very difficult to understand, but it is understandable, as long as you realize that the "I" is part and parcel of the deterministic universe, and part and parcel of the fate it talks about.

The poem says nothing about whether "I" can unconstrainedly choose the future; ideas about "freedom of choice" are interpretations that the naive amongst us read into the poem. The processor controlling a ship's motion can still be said to be the "captain of the fate of the ship", even if the processor is acting deterministically. At the end of the day, it is the instructions from the processor which cause the ship to move in one way or another (regardless of whether these instructions are predetermined or not).

Where I believe most people (naively) go wrong is in thinking dualistically; thinking in terms of, on the one hand, an absolutely separate "I" which is not subject to physical laws, and on the other "the rest of the deterministic universe". To most people who think about this in a naive fashion, this is the only way to make sense of freedom of will within a deterministic universe. In part, I blame the traditional 3rd part objective scientific reductionist way of looking at problems.

MF

 

[Billy T]

...The ONLY way to argue uncorrelated events is to postulate EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both). You cannot derive randomness in any other way, I am sorry.

I do the first alternative, but agree with you that the randomness provided by quantum mechanics, does not provide (as many quite important philosophers seem to think) anything I would call "genuine free will" - If that is the only type of free will that I can have, I hope you will welcome me into you camp, which you do state very well.

...It makes no difference whether radioactive events are influenced by external factors or not! I would hope (really) that someone with a PhD in physics could see this. The ONLY important factors are (a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past? If the answers to (a) and (b) are both “yes” then it necessarily follows that EVERYTHING we see is correlated with everything else, whether there is direct causal contact in the present day or not.

My answers are, no & yes. The first being less defensible than your "open mind" about determinism and QM.

...You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

I like yours definition but it is of "constrained choice," and too constrained for me to call "choice." It is what I would call "inevitable act," if the uncertainty of QM is only epistemic (hidden variables exist etc.), which you seem strongly inclined to. Thus I understand you, and admit that my refusal to define GFW makes it hard for you to understand/ discuss with me. (I am like the judge who refused to define pornography. He knew it when he saw it. I am in a worse position than him. - I only know what GFW is not and "inevitable acts" are in my growing list of the "its not")

...Implicit in your argument is the assumption that you are referring to “free choice” or “unconstrained choice” as opposed to “constrained choice”. In a deterministic universe, then it is a simple fact that all choices are constrained. I can still make choices in such a universe, and a computer can still make choices, it is simply the case that our choices are constrained, by determinism.

I am not sure I would accept “unconstrained choice” as GFW. Some might argue that QM uncertainty has removed the "constraints." I hope you can see why I add the "genuine" in front of FW, trying to avoid / contrast with / "QM's FW" that some accept as FW.

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained...

I will grant you that as you have defined it, you do make a "choice" - even one that is "100% compatible with determinism," but I want my "choice" to be something more, which is hard to define.

...I would prefer to say that it is a constrained choice; or that in a deterministic universe, we cannot make unconstrained choices.

I would admit that even with my undefined GFW, almost all my choices are still constrained to a high degree. We really don't disagree much. You are perhaps a little more logically consistent and certainly better able to clearly state / define your position than I am.

...Why, thank you! ...Well done! Except that it says NOTHING of determinism, but everything about the impossibility of changing the past
The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
The Rubôayôat of Omar Khayyôam, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (1953)

I agree on this being only about the past, but in your deterministic universe, as you yourself have noted, it is almost as valid to view the past as the future with time reversed {the whole "movie" is in the can - it could be played either way, but if we play it "backwards" the second law of thermodynamics (hope I got the number correct) would become "The entropy of a closed system tends to decrease." }
When I said Omar K's poem reflected determinism, I was really thinking more about the section (but remember it so poorly that I did not mention it) where he goes in the tent to decourse with the learned men, but always comes out the same door he went in.

I know a very short poem, I think we both can like:

One ship sails East, and another sails West,
with the very same winds that blow.
Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale,
which determines the way they go.

I have enjoyed our exchanges, but think we have come to the end of this subject.
Thanks for stating the poems and for expressing your view so clearly. - Wish I could do the same, but like your intuition about QM being deterministic (which I definitely do not share) I feel intuitively that there is some means in a deterministic processor (the human brain) to simulate something that is neither deterministic nor chance. - I admit there is currently no logical support for this view / hope/ intuition, but it is shared by Roger Penrose, among others. (See chapter 14 of http://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/d-Contents.html
which has a lot of other free chapters I think you will like also.

 

[moving finger]

... EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both).

I do the first alternative, but agree with you that the randomness provided by quantum mechanics, does not provide (as many quite important philosophers seem to think) anything I would call "genuine free will" - If that is the only type of free will that I can have, I hope you will welcome me into you camp, which you do state very well.

I agree with you that randomness (or indeterminism) does not provide us with any source of “free will” (or genuine free will – still don’t know what that is). It does seem a very tempting “solution” to the free will problem in the face of relentless determinism, but indeterminacy provides us with no more “free will” than does tossing a quantum coin.

(a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past?

My answers are, no & yes. The first being less defensible than your "open mind" about determinism and QM.

OK. I agree it may be the case that the world is not 100% deterministic (but as we have agreed, this has no real bearing on the free will debate).

I also agree it is possible that not everything arose from a common source at some point in the past, in which case there may be uncorrelated events.

However I would still maintain that nobody has demonstrated either that quantum mechanics is indeterministic (only that it is indeterminable, which is not the same), and neither has it been demonstrated that there are any uncorrelated events (only that the correlations, if there, must be below the limits of detectability).

You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

I like yours definition but it is of "constrained choice," and too constrained for me to call "choice." It is what I would call "inevitable act," if the uncertainty of QM is only epistemic (hidden variables exist etc.), which you seem strongly inclined to.

I agree. Your “inevitable act” is essentially the same as my “constrained choice” (and I guess an “evitable act” would be an “unconstrained choice”).

Thus I understand you, and admit that my refusal to define GFW makes it hard for you to understand/ discuss with me. (I am like the judge who refused to define pornography. He knew it when he saw it. I am in a worse position than him. - I only know what GFW is not and "inevitable acts" are in my growing list of the "its not").

If I may (and I apologise in advance if I am mistaken), I suspect I know why you do not want to define what you call GFW – and it is for the same reason that Penrose often does not like defining the things that he discusses in his books. Penrose argues that it is not wise to attempt to propose a definition of things that we poorly understand (in this particular case he is talking about consciousness, but in the same book he also debates the meaning of free will but omits to define it). Penrose instead suggests that we rely “on our subjective impressions and intuitive common-sense as to what the term means”. And I think this is EXACTLY the same sort of woolly thinking that many “philosophers” indulge in when they discuss free will.
I should point out that Penrose is a mathematician and not a scientist, so perhaps he can be excused for his rather vague and woolly thinking on philosophical and scientific matters. My view is entirely the opposite. It is precisely because we do not fully understand something that we must define it rigorously and unambiguously to begin with, before we can start to debate it. There is a very real danger that reliance on “our subjective impressions and intuitive common-sense” will lead us into blind alleys and self-deluding false trails, because there is no guarantee that either our subjective impressions or our intuitive common-sense are either consistent or correct. Our subjectivity and our common-sense have evolved to solve everyday problems relating to survival and reproduction, not to solve deep philosophical questions of the mind. Frankly, I am amazed that a distinguished mathematician such as Penrose can hold such irrational views.

I am not sure I would accept “unconstrained choice” as GFW.

and I am not sure we can usefully debate GFW unless and until you define what you mean by GFW.

Some might argue that QM uncertainty has removed the "constraints." I hope you can see why I add the "genuine" in front of FW, trying to avoid / contrast with / "QM's FW" that some accept as FW.

Not really, at least not until you define what GFW means.

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained... .

I will grant you that as you have defined it, you do make a "choice" - even one that is "100% compatible with determinism," but I want my "choice" to be something more, which is hard to define.

Hard to define, or impossible to define?
If the former, then let’s continue to try and define it.
If the latter, then GFW is a will-o-the-wisp.
I guess you want some kind of unconstrained (but NOT random or indeterministic) choice?

I would admit that even with my undefined GFW, almost all my choices are still constrained to a high degree.

I don’t know, because I don’t know what you mean by GFW.

We really don't disagree much. You are perhaps a little more logically consistent and certainly better able to clearly state / define your position than I am.

I would like to explore a little more what we mean by an “unconstrained choice”, and how it is essentially different from a “constrained choice”, and why this would matter (if at all) to a finite “I” which exists within (and not separate from) a deterministic universe.

I agree on this being only about the past, but in your deterministic universe.

Not mine. Though I am intuitively inclined to believing the universe is deterministic, if pushed into a corner I would fall back on my scientific training which tells me to remain open-minded on this question, since we simply do not know. Belief in determinism (or indeterminism) is (I think) a matter of faith rather than science.

as you yourself have noted, it is almost as valid to view the past as the future with time reversed {the whole "movie" is in the can - it could be played either way, but if we play it "backwards" the second law of thermodynamics (hope I got the number correct) would become "The entropy of a closed system tends to decrease." }.

This is another tricky question – the direction of the arrow of time. If the universe is 100% deterministic and if time is symmetric (as it appears to be at the quantum level) then why is time asymmetric at the macro level?

When I said Omar K's poem reflected determinism, I was really thinking more about the section (but remember it so poorly that I did not mention it) where he goes in the tent to decourse with the learned men, but always comes out the same door he went in.

Ahhh, ok. Apologies.

I know a very short poem, I think we both can like:

One ship sails East, and another sails West,
with the very same winds that blow.
Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale,
which determines the way they go.

Yes, I like that one!
To me it evokes exactly what we mean by free will in humans! Each human has a “set of the sails” internally within himself/herself, and it is this set of the sails which determines their actions. I would say that “the set of the sails” is in itself determined (but we cannot trace the source of this determinism), whereas believers in GFW (whatever that is) would presumably say that the “set of the sails” is somehow not determined (but also not random!).

I have enjoyed our exchanges, but think we have come to the end of this subject.

I have enjoyed it also, but (with respect) we still have much to discuss – I still don’t know what you mean by GFW!

I feel intuitively that there is some means in a deterministic processor (the human brain) to simulate something that is neither deterministic nor chance. - I admit there is currently no logical support for this view / hope/ intuition, but it is shared by Roger Penrose, among others. (See chapter 14 of http://www.edge.org/documents/Third...d-Contents.html .

Yep, I have read a lot of Penrose. I respect him as a mathematician, but I’m afraid he is not a terribly good philosopher, see my above comments on his ideas. And he also doesn’t like defining things that he doesn’t understand.

Take care, Billy T. If you find what you are looking for (but I doubt you will) please let me know.

May your god go with you,

MF

 

[Billy T]

...I would like to explore a little more what we mean by an “unconstrained choice”, and how it is essentially different from a “constrained choice”, and why this would matter (if at all) to a finite “I” which exists within (and not separate from) a deterministic universe.

Several times you have stated that "I", the maker of choices, is finite and/or that the unknown, but deterministic factors, making the choice are internal in contrast to external ones. Even more frequently you have asked for a definition of GFW.

I am going to attempt to at least partially define GFW by stealing from you. GFW is the same as your choice, except that the "I" making the choice is not "finite" (nor infinite); however, "I" does not exist outside of space/time or precede space/time or succeed space/time as some religions teach. This choice making "I" is an information process, not a finite volume of biological material. (As stated more fully in attachment to first post of this thread.)

Like your internalized factors that constitute "you," my informational "I" has memory, ideas (biases), preferences, etc. which if more fully understood would make most of the choices predictable with high probably of being correct. Clearly, as I think we both agree, the finite material "you" can make only constrained choices because all these choices result from physical processes, but an informational (only) "I" would not necessarily be constrained by physical laws. - This assertion seems both obvious and highly questionable.

"Obvious" in that if "I" is only part of a simulation of the physical world that is clearly incomplete (For example, "I" is totally unaware of the EM waves surrounding the physical body in which this simulation is executing.) That is, the "I" is not perceiving everything that exists in the physical world. Likewise, "I" may perceive things that do not exist, and be strongly influenced by them.

This is because the "I" is not living in the physical world, but in a world that is constructed in a physical world simulation of itself, (which evolutionary selection has caused to be reasonable accurate in all factors likely to affect the survival of the simulation machine). Consequently, the "I" may live in a world that is not deterministic even if the physical world is deterministic. Obviously, if the "I" lives in a non deterministic world, then the "I" also could be non deterministic. (Sharp as you are, you will no doubt note that my "non" etc. is still just more of my old telling what GFW is not, but keep reading I do try to be more positive.)

It is a "highly questionable" assertion because there seems to be no middle ground between "deterministic" and "random" and we both agree "random" is not a source of any form of FW - only a guarantee that the indeterminate nature of reality is fundamental, not just epistemological.

My fundamental problem is in trying to define this MG, "Middle Ground." Every computer simulation program I know of is completely deterministic, even the random number generator is at best tied to the time it is activated etc. (I don't know much about computer programs - just guessing.)

I am sure that I can not have my GFW in any system of physical processes, yet I want it and do seem to experience it, but admit (as I do in the attachment to first post) that this may be only illusion. (To bad the MG company just went bankrupt - not a good omen for my view! ) Thus the only hope is if "I" is part of a non deterministic / non random simulation, built in part on this MG.

I once asked you if you would welcome me into your camp, if the only FW I could have was the one built on the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. I am coming to join you in part because I now believe choice is well defined by the selection of one act after consideration of the consequence of alternatives that at least appear possible to the "I". The choice is "genuine" if at least two of the alternatives were possible, not just the one inevitable act was possible. (We both agree that there is no FW in a deterministic world, but I have already granted that as you define it, you do make a choice, even in a deterministic world.) Making such a "genuine choice" is the exercise of GFW and its definition, although it is like giving a definition of a unicorn - no evidence of the existence of GFW until at least one GFW choice can be demonstrated.

Because of my ignorance, I can only postulate that the "necessary for GFW existence" MG is possible. Fortunately for me, it will be very hard for you to show it is not. (I share this "asset" with those who postulate a "soul".) Perhaps it is only in this domain of unresolvable believes that genuine choice occurs.

Perhaps also we are at a stand off. - You lean towards determinism, even in QM, but can't prove it, so you like to say: "No one has shown that QM is not deterministic" (throwing the essentially impossible burden of proof on others).
I lean towards GFW, but can't prove it. I say: "No one has shown that a MG is impossible (to my knowledge) and thus I throw the burden of proof on to others. If my hunch is correct, your's is wrong. If your hunch is correct, mine is wrong. Neither of us (as I see it) can demonstrate our position to be correct. I.e. we are at a stand off. Would you agree?

...This is another tricky question – the direction of the arrow of time. If the universe is 100% deterministic and if time is symmetric (as it appears to be at the quantum level) then why is time asymmetric at the macro level?

I don't think the second law implies that time is "asymmetric" in a deterministic world either and think I have some understanding as to why it would appear to be that may help you. I think it has to do with the way humans tend to group (equally?) probable events into categories and then note the probability of these categories.

In other threads I have illustrated this in two different ways (One had to do with shaking a box containing 100 white and 100 black marbles that holds exactly 100 on each level (Shaking is of steadily decreasing amplitude so only levels one and two are populated with marbles when the box cover is removed.) We are surprized to open the box and find all the white marbles on top level, but this configuration is just as probable as any other, most of which would not surprize us. The other example was when I was trying to discourage my wife for playing the far from zero sum state lottery. The only bet I ever made on the six required numbers was: 1,2,3,4,5,6. She said: "That number will never win. - You are being silly." - She was correct, at least in the second statement. - She still enjoys playing the lottery, carefully choosing her numbers, including current birthdays etc.

That is, I think the increase of entropy with time is the way humans establish the collections of possible events into categories, more than anything else.

...Take care, Billy T. If you find what you are looking for (but I doubt you will) please let me know. May your god go with you, MF

thanks. If I do, I will (assuming I have not been baned from posting here). I don't think much about God anymore. He is on my list of things that are too likely to be beyond rational consideration. If he exists, I suspect however, that it is I who must go with him, rather than the way you put it.

PS - As I look back at your post, I realize I did not comment on "why it would matter" - I don't think it does if "you" are a finite collection of biological material as you seem to think you are. It is not very important even if "I" am my MG simulation because GFW is seldom exercised, even if it exists, and very rarely, if at all, in daily decisions of behavior in the physical world. Perhaps only in which set of "hunches" / beliefs we chose to believe in, when the alternatives are not excluded from the realm of possibility by logic. (I am not as logical as you, but much more that many others, who perhaps make greater use of their GFW, if it exists.)

 

[moving finger]

Several times you have stated that "I", the maker of choices, is finite and/or that the unknown, but deterministic factors, making the choice are internal in contrast to external ones. Even more frequently you have asked for a definition of GFW.

I am going to attempt to at least partially define GFW by stealing from you.

That’s cool. Knowledge should be shared and built upon.

Like your internalized factors that constitute "you," my informational "I" has memory, ideas (biases), preferences, etc. which if more fully understood would make most of the choices predictable with high probably of being correct. Clearly, as I think we both agree, the finite material "you" can make only constrained choices because all these choices result from physical processes, but an informational (only) "I" would not necessarily be constrained by physical laws. - This assertion seems both obvious and highly questionable.

I would say that such an informational “I” is still constrained by deterministic laws – the laws relating to whatever medium in/on which the information processing is supposed to be taking place. Either this, or it is operating partly or wholly “indeterministically” – but I can assure you that you do not want to go there (but if you do want to go there I will gladly follow, and show you why indeterminism cannot endow the kind of free will you want).
And (unless you can explain how something can be neither determinsitic nor indeterministic) I think we are stuck between the two horns of this dilemma.

"Obvious" in that if "I" is only part of a simulation of the physical world that is clearly incomplete (For example, "I" is totally unaware of the EM waves surrounding the physical body in which this simulation is executing.) That is, the "I" is not perceiving everything that exists in the physical world. Likewise, "I" may perceive things that do not exist, and be strongly influenced by them.

Its not clear to me how anything can “perceive things that do not exist” (unless you mean it is having a delusion) – can you elaborate please?

This is because the "I" is not living in the physical world, but in a world that is constructed in a physical world simulation of itself, (which evolutionary selection has caused to be reasonable accurate in all factors likely to affect the survival of the simulation machine). Consequently, the "I" may live in a world that is not deterministic even if the physical world is deterministic.

We have the same problem again. I am not insisting that the world (even the physical world) is deterministic (though that is my intuition), but what I am saying is that your only alternative to determinism is indeterminism, and I do not see how indeterminism can have anything to do with free will.

Obviously, if the "I" lives in a non deterministic world, then the "I" also could be non deterministic. (Sharp as you are, you will no doubt note that my "non" etc. is still just more of my old telling what GFW is not, but keep reading I do try to be more positive.)

By “non-deterministic”, do you mean indeterminsitic?
If not, what do you mean?

It is a "highly questionable" assertion because there seems to be no middle ground between "deterministic" and "random" and we both agree "random" is not a source of any form of FW - only a guarantee that the indeterminate nature of reality is fundamental, not just epistemological.

Hey, we think alike!
So we are rather stuck with this problem – you want to define “non-deterministic” as being neither deterministic nor indeterministic (random). Good luck!

My fundamental problem is in trying to define this MG, "Middle Ground." Every computer simulation program I know of is completely deterministic, even the random number generator is at best tied to the time it is activated etc. (I don't know much about computer programs - just guessing.)

Yep, you are right. It is possible to make a hardwired RNG, and whether this is ultimately deterministic or not then depends on whether one believes QM is indeterministic, or simply indeterminable.

I am sure that I can not have my GFW in any system of physical processes, yet I want it and do seem to experience it, but admit (as I do in the attachment to first post) that this may be only illusion.

Most people’s feeling of free will is born of intuition – the intuition that there is “me”, and there is “the rest of the universe”, and that somehow “me” can operate (make choices) according to “my” own rules, independently of the rest of the universe. It is turning this intuition into a logical and coherent understanding of what is actually going on that is the tricky part.

(To bad the MG company just went bankrupt - not a good omen for my view! ) Thus the only hope is if "I" is part of a non deterministic / non random simulation, built in part on this MG.

I once asked you if you would welcome me into your camp, if the only FW I could have was the one built on the indeterminism of quantum mechanics.

QM may be indeterministic, but I don’t think this has any bearing on free will.

I am coming to join you in part because I now believe choice is well defined by the selection of one act after consideration of the consequence of alternatives that at least appear possible to the "I".

I agree 100%.

The choice is "genuine" if at least two of the alternatives were possible, not just the one inevitable act was possible.

Ahhhh, now this is the tricky part. Are you saying “in order for me to have free will, it must have been possible for me, in exactly the same circumstances, to have done otherwise than what I actually did”?

If you are saying this is how you define free will, then we have a problem, because such aview is clearly not compatible with determinism. Hence most people who believe in this kind of free will try to invoke some kind of indeterminism in their choices in order to be able to say “I could have done otherwise”. I agree that indeterminism means that “things could have turned out differently”, but I do NOT agree that indeterminsim endows free will (and I have yet to see anyone show how it can endow free will). All indeterminism does is to make our choices indeterminate, not to make them free.

(We both agree that there is no FW in a deterministic world,

Sorry? I do not agree. It depends on how one defines free will.

but I have already granted that as you define it, you do make a choice, even in a deterministic world.)

Yep.

Making such a "genuine choice" is the exercise of GFW and its definition, although it is like giving a definition of a unicorn - no evidence of the existence of GFW until at least one GFW choice can be demonstrated.

If you wish to define your GFW in terms of “the ability to have done otherwise” then I am afraid that you will find your GFW is impossible (or a best it results in random choices, not in free will choices). Unless you can work out what this MG is.

Because of my ignorance, I can only postulate that the "necessary for GFW existence" MG is possible. Fortunately for me, it will be very hard for you to show it is not. (I share this "asset" with those who postulate a "soul".) Perhaps it is only in this domain of unresolvable believes that genuine choice occurs.

I cannot show anything about GFW until you define GFW and its associated MG, that is what I have been trying to explain. As long as you keep the definition a secret then it is rather pointless for me to try and show that GFW is either possible or impossible, n’est ce pas?

To try to suggest that the solution is to be found in defining something like your MG, which you agree you have no idea how it might work, how it would be related to determinism or indeterminism, etc, is equivalent to me saying “ahhh, well, I have no idea how free will works, but intuitively it feels right therefore if I cannot explain it, maybe it’s just that a miracle happens, or maybe it’s the fairies at the bottom of my garden that do it for me”…… I’m sorry, I’m trying not to make fun, but I do want you to see that you need to be rational in proposing a solution. Suggesting that there is something called a MG which is neither determinism nor indeterminism, and yet you cannot say what it is, is rather like hoping for a magic potion.

Perhaps also we are at a stand off. - You lean towards determinism, even in QM, but can't prove it, so you like to say: "No one has shown that QM is not deterministic" (throwing the essentially impossible burden of proof on others).

Where free will is concerned, I think the question of whether the world is deterministic or not is irrelevant. Invoking indeterminism does not endow free will, thus defining free will in terms of indeterminism does not work. Whether the quantum world is determinsitic or not does not affect my arguments.

I lean towards GFW, but can't prove it.

I disagree. You cannot DEFINE it (along with MG). Until you define it, neither you nor I can either prove or disprove it.

I say: "No one has shown that a MG is impossible (to my knowledge) and thus I throw the burden of proof on to others. If my hunch is correct, your's is wrong. If your hunch is correct, mine is wrong. Neither of us (as I see it) can demonstrate our position to be correct. I.e. we are at a stand off. Would you agree?

Not really. If your position is that you postulate this MG as the source of free will, the onus is on you to explain how it fits with the rest of the world. If you cannot do that, it’s not a terribly useful or credible proposal (about as useful as me saying free will is granted to me by the tooth fairy).

...Take care, Billy T. If you find what you are looking for (but I doubt you will) please let me know. May your god go with you, MF

thanks. If I do, I will (assuming I have not been baned from posting here). I don't think much about God anymore. He is on my list of things that are too likely to be beyond rational consideration. If he exists, I suspect however, that it is I who must go with him, rather than the way you put it.

I put it that way deliberately, because IMHO most people carry their gods around with them.

MF

 

[Billy T]

You are too good for me, MF. I can't argue with you in your logical fashion. I am reduced to either completely joining you with your definition of FW (and of choosing) which are compatible with determinism or trying to breath life into my "tooth fairy" of a middle ground, MG, between determinism and randomness.

I will try to define this MG, but fear it a not very successful effort: It (MG) is the realm (which you no doubt will claim is of zero measure, non existent) of logical space not contained in either the realm of deterministic logic nor the realm of randomness (indeterminant logic?). I had not noticed that I was avoiding "indeterminant" by using "non determinant", but would like to continue and maintain that they are not identical, but again I can not satisfy you with a precise discription of how they differ. I fear that you have backed me into a small space, which I concede may not even exist with only the weak claim remaining to me that you can not show it does not exist, just as you can not show the tooth fairy does not exist.

I am not even tempted to mutter some words about "fuzzy logic" as surely all implementations of it are deterministic, certainly if they make use of common computer codes for generation of random numbers and even if they make use of what you called "hard wired" random sources, if the world is deterministic.

I don't think you are as generous with me as I have been with you. I grant you many different possibilities (Most important being that the universe may be deterministic as you think, and if it is, then we agree there is only "choice" as you define it. I grant this "universe may be deterministic" possibility because I can not show it is not true. Why will you not grant me possibility of some non zero realm for the MG, again for same reason I granted to you possibility of a deterministic universe, because you can not (I assume) show that it a space of zero measure.

I know, before you tell me, that there is a big difference. - You can define what I am granting and I can not define MG on which I tried to define my GFW. Thus I will not ask for this grant exactly in that form. Instead I ask, in fully definable terms:

Can you demonstrate that "determinism" and "randomness" are not only mutually exclusive, as any reasonable definitions of them would insure, but also that together (jointly) they are inclusive of all logically possible space / events?

 

[moving finger]

You are too good for me, MF. I can't argue with you in your logical fashion. I am reduced to either completely joining you with your definition of FW (and of choosing) which are compatible with determinism or trying to breath life into my "tooth fairy" of a middle ground, MG, between determinism and randomness.

I will try to define this MG, but fear it a not very successful effort: It (MG) is the realm (which you no doubt will claim is of zero measure, non existent) of logical space not contained in either the realm of deterministic logic nor the realm of randomness (indeterminant logic?). I had not noticed that I was avoiding "indeterminant" by using "non determinant", but would like to continue and maintain that they are not identical, but again I can not satisfy you with a precise discription of how they differ. I fear that you have backed me into a small space, which I concede may not even exist with only the weak claim remaining to me that you can not show it does not exist, just as you can not show the tooth fairy does not exist.

Billy T, I have a lot of respect for your position. It shows how open-minded and receptive you are that you accept your MG may not have much meaning. I agree with the above.

I am not even tempted to mutter some words about "fuzzy logic" as surely all implementations of it are deterministic, certainly if they make use of common computer codes for generation of random numbers and even if they make use of what you called "hard wired" random sources, if the world is deterministic.

And as I have said, even invoking indeterminism (IMHO) does not help. The kind of free will that most people want (what I actually call naive free will, because it tends to be based on intuition rather than any rational argument) is (IMHO) impossible. Naive free will is incompatible with determinism, and yet it also does not find its roots in indeterminism. It requires something like your MG. I wish that I could offer a more constructive solution - but I am afraid that such naive free will simply does not exist.

I don't think you are as generous with me as I have been with you. I grant you many different possibilities (Most important being that the universe may be deterministic as you think, and if it is, then we agree there is only "choice" as you define it. I grant this "universe may be deterministic" possibility because I can not show it is not true.

Sorry, Billy T, but I am not insisting the universe be deterministic (I thought I explained that in my last post?). My concept of free will does not require determinism, neither does it require indeterminism. Thus as far as free will is concerned I am not too bothered whether the universe is deterministic or not (though as I have said, my intuition is for determinism).

Why will you not grant me possibility of some non zero realm for the MG, again for same reason I granted to you possibility of a deterministic universe, because you can not (I assume) show that it a space of zero measure.

Billy T, I am not saying that this MG does not exist. I am also not saying the tooth fairy does not exist. What I am saying is that if you want anyone to take the idea seriously you need to come up with some idea of how it works, how it relates to the rest of reality. I can't really help you there (partly because I am happy with my own concept of free will, which does not require MG).

I know, before you tell me, that there is a big difference. - You can define what I am granting and I can not define MG on which I tried to define my GFW. Thus I will not ask for this grant exactly in that form. Instead I ask, in fully definable terms:

Can you demonstrate that "determinism" and "randomness" are not only mutually exclusive, as any reasonable definitions of them would insure, but also that together (jointly) they are inclusive of all logically possible space / events?

I need to think about this. It's a good question!

I'll get back to you,

MF

 

[Billy T]

Billy T, I have a lot of respect for your position. ...

It is mutual. Perhaps because we agree on several aspects of this problem. You are 100% correct, safe, and happy in you position and I am not. You liked my poem about what determines the course of sailing ships. So I will put it in nautical terms (which I hope you know):
I think we both are quite familiar with the "storms" common in this "sea" and, although not moving on parallel "courses", have somewhat similar ones. With your definitions, you are very secure on a "broad reach" and in no danger of loosing your "way". With my GFW and MG, I have my sails set "tighter to the wind", in a more ambitious "tack", but I am in real danger of "luffing" and losing my "way".

And as I have said, even invoking indeterminism (IMHO) does not help. The kind of free will that most people want (what I actually call naive free will, because it tends to be based on intuition rather than any rational argument) is (IMHO) impossible. Naive free will is incompatible with determinism, and yet it also does not find its roots in indeterminism. It requires something like your MG. I wish that I could offer a more constructive solution - but I am afraid that such naive free will simply does not exist.

We agree completely here. I go even further. Even with the indeterminism of quantum mechanics, the "free will" possible is not worth having. I prefer yours. That is why I have asked you to "welcome me into your camp" if you can show that my essential MG does not exist.

Sorry, Billy T, but I am not insisting the universe be deterministic...

I know that. - That is why I only granted that it may exist as it has not been proven (as you like to point out) that QM's indeterminate nature is not just epistemic. I think if you reread my comments you will see that I have never said you believe in a deterministic universe, only that your lean towards that view.

I have been so impressed with the success of QM and tend naturally in most cases (GFW excepted ) to give little ontological status to variables that are not necessary (Hidden or otherwise). I think you have read first post of my only other thread: Time does not exist - math proof, but want to note here, as I have several times elsewhere, that the math proof only shows that the variable "t" is not required for a complete description of the universe. Thus unlike you, I believe QM is correct and tend to go along with the Copenhagen school, but I do not like the fact that "observations" are some how an ad hoc addition to the QM theory. I also have spoken up against "feel good words" and offended and annoyed some by doing so. - I must just be by nature a guy who is hard to please.

Billy T, I am not saying that this MG does not exist. I am also not saying the tooth fairy does not exist. What I am saying is that if you want anyone to take the idea seriously you need to come up with some idea of how it works, how it relates to the rest of reality. I can't really help you there (partly because I am happy with my own concept of free will, which does not require MG).

I can't help me either. Possibly because my MG does not in fact exist, but I prefer to think that it is a combination of my ignorance and lack of cleverness that is restraining me for arguing my hope more persuasively.
On the question of being taken seriously about my view that the possibly of my GFW (still not well defined, but more desirable to me than yours which is) is open, I don't really care. It was an unexpected possibility that fell out of my revision of what we are and how we perceive. I would like my view of perception, which differs from the one generally accepted by cognitive scientists, to be taken seriously. That is why I devised three separate "proofs" that the conventional view of perception "emerging" after many stages of neural transforms is wrong. I notice that you are active in the thread about Libet's experiments - I have read many of his papers, but that was about a dozen years ago. Based on some of his methods, I have even designed a non invasive experiment that can test a prediction of my theory. (I lack the commuter skills to implement it.)

This is not the place to go into details, but it involves a dot of light steadily moving against a background grid and a brief random sound. The subject indicates by moving a marker (all this in a computer display) where the dot was when the sound was perceived. (The grid helps him to be accurate and makes the time required to mark it unimportant.) I predict that his perception of the dot is "real time", not delayed by neural processing, but obviously the new sound will be. Hence, the indicated position will have the dot farther along than it actually was when the sound occurred. (I am trying to show that, as claimed in the attachment to first post, that humans do not perceive the emergent result sensor transforms, but do use the senses to construct a "real time simulation" which they perceive instead and correct to conform to external reality when necessary. If "I" am also only a subroutine in this simulation, (and my postulated MG is real) then I can have my GFW as "I" am only constrained by the simulation, not the laws of physics, which only apply to material objects, energy etc., not information in the abstract. Libet often used a similar approach and I have borrowed from it.

I need to think about this. It's a good question! I'll get back to you, MF

I hope you will (and fail to bar my MG) At least you have taught me how necessary to have well defined and mutually accepted definitions if one is really going to be convincing. Few here are as careful or logical as you, me included. If you can bar my MG, I will change my concept of free will to yours and try to be happy with it.

 

[Billy T]

...Sorry, Billy T, but I am not insisting the universe be deterministic ...

woops - I did literally accuse you of this: My "...grant that the universe may be deterministic as you believe" I fail to type at end : "it may be." Sorry I did not make this implied phrase explicit. I have on several occasions indicated that you were "open minded" and that you were "leaning towards" a deterministic QM (an certainly a capable and stanch defender of this possibility. Einstein would be proud of you.

I can now see how my omission of these last three implied words, required you to state you did not believe or assume a deterministic universe.

 

[moving finger]

I have been so impressed with the success of QM and tend naturally in most cases (GFW excepted ) to give little ontological status to variables that are not necessary (Hidden or otherwise). I think you have read first post of my only other thread: Time does not exist - math proof, but want to note here, as I have several times elsewhere, that the math proof only shows that the variable "t" is not required for a complete description of the universe. Thus unlike you, I believe QM is correct and tend to go along with the Copenhagen school, but I do not like the fact that "observations" are some how an ad hoc addition to the QM theory.

The Copenhagen school is fine for making predictions, but IMHO it does not provide a very satisfying account of what is actually going on (Bohr would say we have no right to ask what is actually going on). Neither Einstein nor Schroedinger were happy with the consequences of Copenhagen : The ugly “wave/particle duality” and “collapse of the wavefunction”.

I also have spoken up against "feel good words" and offended and annoyed some by doing so. - I must just be by nature a guy who is hard to please.

I also dislike “feel good words”, which is why I am such a stickler for rational argument and rigorous definitions of terms. I know this does sometimes offend people, but I make no apologies, because I feel sorry for the kind of people who submit irrational posts based on gut feelings and intuition.

I can't help me either. Possibly because my MG does not in fact exist, but I prefer to think that it is a combination of my ignorance and lack of cleverness that is restraining me for arguing my hope more persuasively.
On the question of being taken seriously about my view that the possibly of my GFW (still not well defined, but more desirable to me than yours which is) is open, I don't really care.

With respect, I do not see how can one be content with an undefined concept?
The Libertarian concept of free will seems (IMHO) to suffer from the same problem – Libertarians like to think there is “something” which somehow endows free will onto humans, but cannot define or specify exactly what this “something” is.

This is not the place to go into details, but it involves a dot of light steadily moving against a background grid and a brief random sound. The subject indicates by moving a marker (all this in a computer display) where the dot was when the sound was perceived. (The grid helps him to be accurate and makes the time required to mark it unimportant.) I predict that his perception of the dot is "real time", not delayed by neural processing, but obviously the new sound will be. Hence, the indicated position will have the dot farther along than it actually was when the sound occurred. (I am trying to show that, as claimed in the attachment to first post, that humans do not perceive the emergent result sensor transforms, but do use the senses to construct a "real time simulation" which they perceive instead and correct to conform to external reality when necessary. If "I" am also only a subroutine in this simulation, (and my postulated MG is real) then I can have my GFW as "I" am only constrained by the simulation, not the laws of physics, which only apply to material objects, energy etc., not information in the abstract. Libet often used a similar approach and I have borrowed from it.

I don’t understand this at all. I need to study your ideas again I think. Or can you e-mail me the details?
I’ve been mulling over your “MG” the last few days. If I take the accepted definition of determinism (this defines the “deterministic space”), and I then take the negation of determinism – which to me seems to be “indeterminism” – which defines the “indeterministic space”, then the problem I have is there seems to be “no space left over” – ie there seems (to me) to be nothing left which is neither deterministic nor indeterministic, there is no “room” for this middle ground.

Definition of Determinism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving deterministically if it has only one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.
Definition of Indeterminism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving indeterministically if there is more than one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.

Do we accept the above two definitions? If yes, then they seem to be perfect “mirrors” of each other, defining the whole space of possibilities, with no space “left over” for anything else to get a toe-hold?

If we could somehow define the “properties" of this middle ground, we might be able to specify where it fits in relation to determinism and indeterminism. In the absence of a definition of middle ground I simply cannot see how it fits in.
MF

 

[Billy T]

The Copenhagen school is fine for making predictions, but IMHO it does not provide a very satisfying account of what is actually going on (Bohr would say we have no right to ask what is actually going on). Neither Einstein nor Schroedinger were happy with the consequences of Copenhagen : The ugly “wave/particle duality” and “collapse of the wavefunction”.

I agree with you, Einstein, Bohr & Schroedinger - i.e. QM is good for predicting experimental results (when the math can be solved) but what, if anything, it is stating about "reality" is very likely beyond human comprehension (too strange for us who have basically experienced only a classical world).

I also dislike “feel good words”, which is why I am such a stickler for rational argument and rigorous definitions of terms.

I think the "feel good words" can be defined as: Accepted "explanations" that are in fact false. Transformer secondary current being caused by magnetic field lines cutting thru it is the best classical example of "feel good words" I know of.
At the other extreme, where your ideas are usually found, at least those I have read here, is based on solid definitions and logical consequences.
Humans also have feeling, intuitions, emotions, hopes, etc. which are essentially impossible to define. My GFW & MG fall into this group.

...I don’t understand this {an experiment I proposed to test my conclusion that perception is not the result of many stages of neural transformations of sensory data, as cognitive scientists believe, but a real time simulation of the physical world} all. I need to study your ideas again I think. Or can you e-mail me the details?

Try study of attachment "free will - out of Africa." Ask questions about any parts of it you don't understand or disagree with.

I’ve been mulling over your “MG” ... Definition of Indeterminism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving indeterministically if there is more than one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.
Do we accept the above two definitions? If yes, then they seem to be perfect “mirrors” of each other, defining the whole space of possibilities, with no space “left over” for anything else to get a toe-hold?...

I will accept your definitions, provided you allow the possibility that one can refine the definition of "indeterminism" to contain two "mirror parts" - one called "random decisions" and the other called "agent decisions." I quickly admit that this subspace called "agent decisions" has never been shown to exist (may have non zero measure) and is only defined (by being a non-random subdivision of the indeterminism space). I.e. we are not really making progress - I am just being agreeable in accepting your definitions, rather than arguing about them or offering my own. But it does show another way to frame the same old question is: Do genuine agents exist?

A main point of my attachment, is the frank admission that if the agent is material, then it is not "genuine" because all its decisions are caused by physical processes. (Part of a "genuine" agent's decisions have no causes, other than possibly self referencing loops. - Just guessing - I don't know the logic possible in my MG.)

Furthermore, I find it hard to believe that there are any significant QM processes going on in the human brain. (Some people hold hope that QM processes occur in "microtubes" / very fine "hairs" / that are attached to cells - but I am not interested in any "chance free will" made possible by QM "observations" forcing mixed state wavefunctions into Eigen states. I like your free will as developed by evolution better, so have not followed their progress on "microtubes.") That is I suspect the human brain is a deterministic computer, even if QM does not have hidden variables etc. Thus, from this and prior paragraph, if GFW is to exist, it can only exist in a non material form - either a "soul", which I don't want to turn to for my desired GFW, or in a simulation of the real world - the only world "we" actually experience and "live" in. - See attachment.

In the "Has determinism ever bothered you?" thread you say:

I agree one can separate software from hardware, but I do not agree that this is a good analogy for the concept of “self”. Let us imagine a “gedanken” experiment – Einstein’s brain. Let us imagine that some incredibly advanced alien race had managed to analyse the way that Einstein’s brain worked to the finest detail, such that they could reproduce his brain, in it’s entirety, on one of their computers as a program (in hardware plus software). ...

I anticipated this argument more than 10 years ago in paper about visual perception that had a brief philosophical speculative termination (My ideas about the possibility of GFW fell out unexpectedly from my revision of perceptual theory presented in this paper. - Ref 1 of the attachment to my first post here.)

Basically I claim that in any complex neural system, the physical connections are important but more important for thoughts are the ionic and neurotransmitter fluxes. These dynamic variables can not be recovered from a dead brain. I went so far as to postulate a "biological uncertainty principle" which basically states that the more carefully one measures the dynamic activity of a complex living brain, the more this activity is disturbed by the measurement process. I illustrated this with two types of measurement I have made on monkey.
(1)Simple EEGs make essentially no disturbance, (None directly, but he does not like being restrained for the measurement.) but provide only very gross information about brain activity (good for studies of epilepsy spreading, which is called "kindling." - Our monkey were part of an epilepsy therapy study.)
(2)In dwelling micro electrodes (very sharp chemically etched point is only part without enamel insulation) tell much more about the disturbed activity of a few dozen cells near the electrode tip.
Thus I do not believe your "thought experiment" is possible even with great advance in technology. - I believe that my "biological uncertainty principle" is true for complex brains, but admit it does not have the mathematical proof that the physical one does.