What Price for Genuine Free Will?

[Billy T]

Tournesol is replying to my prior post and I do not know how to cause sections of it to reappear in my reply to him below, so I will insert into his reply between { and } as little as I can to make his references to "this" etc. clear to the reader.

You must be at least fairly sure about this, {We, our psychological selves, are non-physical.} because you argue for the existence
of the simulation in the first place on the basis of how the brain works neurologicaly. If there is no physical world, there are no neurons.

Almost correct. It is not my understanding of "brain neurology" but my understanding of how vision works, which differs very strongly from the standard view of cognitive scientists - See attachment to first post this thread for three proofs that they are wrong and a great deal of support for my view, but nothing can ever be claimed to be "proven", so I only say "lots of support."

...Most people think Berkeley's arguments are dreadful.

I do not base any of my view, on Berkley. I only mention him to admit that long ago others were holding my "crazy" view that we are neither Descarte' "spirit" nor the materialist's (brain-mind identity people) "physical body." (For new comers to the thread, I think we are "an information process" in a realtime simulatin that runs in the parietal section of our brains. Again see first post attachment for details.)

Despite the lack of any need to, I will however disagree with you about the general view of Berkeley:
For example, F. Max Muller, often recognized as having made the best translation into English of Kant states: "...but for Berkeley, Kant would never have been, and philosophy would never have reached the heights which he occupies."
Is your view to the contrary only your personnel opinion or can you cite someone else, preferrable a recognized authority on phlosophical matters, as I have? If what you ment to say is that in this age of materialism, very few read Berkeley, I agree with that.

But the 'parallel processor' isn't in your experienced subjective world. So where is it?

The answer is that it (the parietal section of my brain) is in the physical world, assuming that Berkeley is wrong and that the physical world, which I infer to exist from my more primary experiences, does in fact exist. If the physical world does not exist, then my theory is clearly wrong and Bishop Berkeley's explanation is the only alternative I know of, so I would be forced to agree with him.

But when you do that sort of thing, {hit curve ball, duck thrown rocks. etc} you have to make a conscious effort to predict where the ball is going be. You don't literally see it there.

I think I do. Conscious effort would be much too slow. That is the whole point of perceiving the "real time simulation" not the cognitive scientist's "emergent" transforms made and delayed up to 0.5 seconds by many stages of "neural calculations" each of which has only slow difusions of neurtransmitter across synaptic gaps to move the signal forward to the next processing stage.

They and I agree that these neural processes extract "features" of the visual field in many different regions of the brain. They never explain how these physically separated details, like color, motion, location, texture, size, etc. of a ball (image on the retina), are ever "reassembled" and unified into the 3D perception we all have of it. The best they can do is mutter their favorite word "emerge".

In contrast, I think these separated features are used like a pilot's check list to keep the simulation on course (when we are awake, but not when we are dreaming) The complex task of checking out a plane or keeping a simulation faithful to the external world is best done, detail by detail. In my view that is why the "features" were separated out from the integrated retinal data base in the first place. They have no idea why this selection of features occurs or why they should be set to different parts of the brain to make a unified 3D perception.

I note that during our evolution TVs and movies did not exist and consequently the image on our retinas (say of a rock approaching our head) was always a continuous changing variable and the powerful parallel processor in our heads can easily project ahead a fraction of a second the data currently available to compensate for the neural delays and let us have a real time perception of what is happing in the physical world, despite the unavoidable neural processing delays. If really interest in my theory of vision and and more details, read my JHU paper, first reference of the attachment.

I don't think our success {surviving and evolving}is down to reacting to real-time events. Cats do much better.

I never declared that our reaction time is faster than a cat's, but I will guarantee you that if we perceived the way cognitive scientists say we do (emerging after many stages of neural processsing with difusion delays) then tigers would have eaten many more of our ancestors, and pehaps we would not now be here and killing off the tigers as we are if most of those ancestors did not survived.

I don't think this stage of your argument is where the problems lie.

I did not ask for an analysis of "my problem." what I asked was:
"(1)How do you explain that our perception of the physical world is so synchronized, despite the demonstrable neural sensing and processing delays?"
You caimed that our perception must be synchronized with external events (and I agree). You reject the means I suggest by which this could be achieved. I am still waiting for your to reply to the question as to how, in your view, the synchronization is achieved. Certainly your above comment on "my problem" is not a reply to the question.

I will stop my responce here (not go on now to your comments on my other three questions) and see what you have to say about my above responce to your long post. If you respond, I will return to the remaining items of your post later.

 

[Tournesol]

Despite the lack of any need to, I will however disagree with you about the general view of Berkeley:
For example, F. Max Muller, often recognized as having made the best translation into English of Kant states: "...but for Berkeley, Kant would never have been, and philosophy would never have reached the heights which he occupies."

True -- in the sense that Berkely is one of the people Kant wants to refute (eg in the Refutation of Idealism).

I did not ask for an analysis of "my problem." what I asked was:
"(1)How do you explain that our perception of the physical world is so synchronized, despite the demonstrable neural sensing and processing delays?"
You caimed that our perception must be synchronized with external events (and I agree). You reject the means I suggest by which this could be achieved. I am still waiting for your to reply to the question as to how, in your view, the synchronization is achieved. Certainly your above comment on "my problem" is not a reply to the question.

One possible answer is that we react firs, unconsciously, and then notice
both the stimulus and our reaction consciusly. But my main problem is how
this is supposed to lead to FW.

 

[Billy T]

...One possible answer is that we react firs, unconsciously, and then notice both the stimulus and our reaction consciusly. But my main problem is how this is supposed to lead to FW.

There is a lot of support for the idea that well before conscious awareness on any decision, our brains have decided to act. (Libet's many experiments on alert patients with micro electrodes (and some gross ones on brain surface)) but I think you are confused or ignoring the question still.

Most of Libet's tests (if not all) have nothing to due with the sense of perception of an external stimulus that must pass thru many stages of neural transfoms. Instead the patient is nstructed to "at random" decide to push a button etc. and notice the position of a moving light, second hand, etc. when he made the decision etc. What Libet found was that brain activity related to the button push began before the conscious decision, which thus tend to suport the idea that conscuiousness is only an epiphomon, not the real caues of the act. (All this from memory - I have not read any of his papers for at least 12 years.)

My question did not concern voluntary acts. Your ability to duck a rock thrown at your head, is more of a problem than how you make a voluntary decision. If your only knowledge of the rock comes to your consciousness after many synaptic delays without my "real time simulation" in contrast to the standard cognitive science view that perception "emerges" following these synaptic delays, you are going to get your brains knocked out! Even if you start to duck before signals get to a conscious level, there will be many synaptic delays, before the "reflex" that moves your head but I grant this could be quicker and might save you.

The real time sim is achieved by the parallel processor that is your parietal cortex, and projects ahead the synaptic delayed sensory information (which prior to TV and movies) is always contiunously evolving and easy for that fantastically advanced processor to "project ahead" a fraction of a second to exactly compenstate for the sysnaptic delays. I think this is how you duck the rock. - Your perception is real time, despite the delays.

You agree, infact you first stated the we must have a schronized perception of the environment. You reject my concept of how it is done. My question is: if not by parietal computer projecting ahead the continuously changing, but neurally delayed sensory infromation, How is schronization between environment and perception achieved?

I am still waiting for an answer to this question.

ON your free will question: I have explained that it was my revision of the standard theory of "emergent" perception that lead me to postulate the real time sim. If "I" am to perceive the real time sim, the simplest and most efficient rapid way is if "I" am an intergal part of it. I.e. I am information, not a material body. Once I live inside a simulation, that is only approximately in accord with the laws that govern the physical world, I can have genuine free will without violating the physical laws (not claiming that I have it, only that I may.) That is, I did not start out to justify the possibility of GFW, that just fell out of my (I think better) understanding of how visual perception works.

 

[Tournesol]

Most of Libet's tests (if not all) have nothing to due with the sense of perception of an external stimulus that must pass thru many stages of neural transfoms. Instead the patient is nstructed to "at random" decide to push a button etc. and notice the position of a moving light, second hand, etc. when he made the decision etc. What Libet found was that brain activity related to the button push began before the conscious decision, which thus tend to suport the idea that conscuiousness is only an epiphomon, not the real caues of the act. (All this from memory - I have not read any of his papers for at least 12 years.)

OTOH, it must have been a real, if indirect, cause of the act,
since patients were respondig ot a prior verbal instruction.

You agree, infact you first stated the we must have a schronized perception of the environment. You reject my concept of how it is done. My question is: if not by parietal computer projecting ahead the continuously changing, but neurally delayed sensory infromation, How is schronization between environment and perception achieved?

If the stuff that needs to happen quickly, happens without conscious perception, there is no need for conscious perception to stay in sync, and it can simply lag. But what I am really interested in is the free will issue.

I am still waiting for an answer to this question.

ON your free will question: I have explained that it was my revision of the standard theory of "emergent" perception that lead me to postulate the real time sim. If "I" am to perceive the real time sim, the simplest and most efficient rapid way is if "I" am an intergal part of it. I.e. I am information, not a material body. Once I live inside a simulation, that is only approximately in accord with the laws that govern the physical world, I can have genuine free will without violating the physical laws (not claiming that I have it, only that I may.)

Which still runs into the problem that the more accurate the simulation is, the less FW you have in it, and the more FW you have in it, the less accurate it
is.

 

[Billy T]

...Which still runs into the problem that the more accurate the simulation is, the less FW you have in it, and the more FW you have in it, the less accurate it is.

I think it is very meaningful to speak of "accuracy" when one is perceiving the behavior of an external objects. We both, I think, believe that my perception of a rock approaching my head needs to be accurate.

I can't remember if you are really "signed on board" to the idea that we make a real time sim and perceive the representation of the rock in it or if you are still with the standard cognitive scientist's view that we perceive the neurally delayed "emergent" transforms of the sensory information, and only unconsciously react (reflex) to the approaching rock, but it does not matter, too much in a discussion of "accuracy," instead of speed and ability to not get hit.

But the concept of being accurate loses all meaning when applied to my psychological self (= "I" in my notation), instead of to some physical external object. "I" don't exist in the physical world, but "I" can control a body that does and many mistakenly think that body is "me."

On accuracy as related to Free Will:
I have noted that the sim is very good, in some ways much better than any transform of retinal image could be for representing physical world objects. (This is one of my 3 proofs, given in the attachment to the thread starting post, that the cognitive scientists are simply wrong.) The retinal image and neural impulses derived form it, have high resolution in less than 0.1% of the visual field, the part corresponding to the fovea. The perception is high resolution and nearly uniform resolution over most of the "forward hemisphere of vision." That is, it is much more accurate than it could be if it were simple transforms of retinal infromation. It is "I" that may have free will. (I am not so bold as to claim that I have proved "I" have free will, only that I could without violation of physics, but like most I think "I" do.) Accuracy of the simulation "I" perceive has nothing to do with the free will question.

 

[Billy T]

...{Genuine Free Will} GFW, if it is truly genuine, must demonstrate (without any shaky foundation) how the mind animates the body of any size and scale of referece in spacetime unrestricted or unobstructed by anything else.[/B]

Sorry I have taken so long to get back to you. Most of your post I did not understand and /or failed to see what it hadto do with GFW, so reproducing only the last part above, which clearly does relate to GFW.

You seem to have the mind very separate from the body as Descarte did. All "idealists" who (almost by definition) hold this view have trouble breaking down the physicalist's objection that nothing outside the realm of physics can enter into that realm and move even a single atom. Physicists think that to move an atom, a "force" must be applied to it. Now many non physicists will speak of psychic "forces and energy." These, from the physicist POV, are just empty terms. Physicists think there are only four forces and all four have the "action/reaction" nature. That is if "A" applies a force to "B" then "B" applies an equal and oppositely directed force to "A." As a consequence of this, if the mind could applied a force to move even a single atom, then on that non physical (massless) mind a force would also be applied. But then the mind, by hypothesis being massless non matter, would have infinite acceleration and the whole concept of it moving even a single atom is rejected as nonsense.

This admittedly leaves the physicist who wants to believe he has GFW in an awarkward position. If classical physics (pre quantum era) were true, then the state of the universe at any time (T1) determins it at all future times (T2, T3, etc.) and clearly if everything is predetermined, there is no GFW.

Quantum Physics recognize that the concept of a "definite state of the universe" at time = T1 is nonsense. QM permits unobserved components of the universe to be in "mixed states." The rules for QM calculations permit one to predict exactly what is the probability for realizing each of the possible pure state when an observation is made (I.e. when the mixed state is forced into a single state.) but this is little help with the GFW problem. At best, QM only permits a random selection of what is the state of the universe at T2. There is still zero opportunity for anyone to decide or chose anything.

This does not imply that we can not have a impression that we are deciding things. The future is no longer determined by classical physics, but indeterminant. We can for example believe that we chose to raise our right rather than left hand, but it is only an illusion of choice. The real decision was made by QM observations, probably a set of them associated with the Browian motion of neurotransmitters in the synaptic gaps and/or the attachment or not of these neurotransmitters to specific "receptor sites" on the post synaptic cell wall. (Actually the release of previously attached neurotransmitters is equally important in determining when that post synaptic cell fires as is the internal chemistry of the cell - for brief periods after its last firing, this chemistry is dominant - it can't fire again until the anti osmotic "sodium pumps" reestablish the interior of the axion potential to approximately -70mV by pumping the recent inflow of Na+ ions back outside.)

All this is troubled me for years because I wanted a non illusionary GFW yet I knew too much physics and about how the the brain works to see any solution that would permit GFW to be consistent with physics and biology. Finally I stopped thinking about it and added this mystery to the set of others (such as why is there something instad of nothing etc.) that were beyond human understanding (Collin McGinn's well defended view.) Then, I became interested in understanding how vision works:

How do we experience a 3D world from the 2D image on our retina? Why is this experience equally sharp and clear over most of the forward hemisphere, when the retinal data base is high resolution over much less than 1% of that forward hemisphere - the part of image illuminating the retina? And many other problems / obvious errors in the standard view of cognitive scientists as to how visual percption works. (They hold that after the retinal information is separated into "features" such as texture, color, motion, size, shape, etc. which are processed in entirely separate regions of the brain, the 3D perception "emerge" following all this "neural computation" but none suggest how or where the separated nformation is unified.)

I found a solution to this problem, which explains all these visual mysteries and many other things, like why one group of humanoids dominated all others in a less that 20 thousand year, after essentially nothing happening for millions (The "Out of Africa" event) and many other things that one would not even suspect were related including the possibility that GFW can be consistent with physics. That is my solution has great "explainatory power."

I have not attached it for sometime, and this thread seems to need some help now, so I will attach it again. Warning - it is about four pages long and requires an open mind about your very nature. It gives three independant proofs that the standard view of cognitive scientists as to how vision works is simply wrong. - this plus the supporting evidence is what makes it four pages.

 

[Billy T]

In earlier thread (On free will) Bolo said: "well, I like to separate everything into levels...level 1 is quantum mechanics, and level 2 is "our" level.
it all depends on if level 1 controls level 2, or vice versa.. see at level 1, it can either be random or not, it doesn't matter. It's what we experience at level 2, in our minds, that matter...at this level, i fully believe free will exists."
... { in relative long section here Bolo claimed humans were at level 2 a "closed system." to which g[x] said: "I beg to differ... Human beings are in no way closed systems." I agree with g[x] and for this reason have omitted everything about closed systems.} Bolo concluded with:...
"bottom line for me: you can't make subjective viewpoints based on a quantum level we know very little about. ... we need to stop thinking about it and see what's in front of us. people have been held responsible for their actions since the dawn of time, is this a coincidence? i think not. nature intended everyone to be responsible, and this is born into humans, we feel it and know it. we know it because we have thoughts and emotions, and we know it because we have all felt guilty when we have hurt someone. we took responsibility ourselves. now until i know more about the fundamental workings of the universe, I am going to go with the simple humanistic view of free will; we have it, we are responsible, this is all i know"

I want to comment on his concluding point(s):
I think societies that survive find practical ways to help themselves cope with the stresses of their environment (Social Darwinism?), not that "nature intended ..." The Eskimo son who helps his frail and aging father build his final igloo (without door) because the father can no longer travel with the group, does not feel guilty. He is doing his duty. Helping his society cope. We put people in prison etc. at least in the belief that it is a protection of society in their particular case and probably a deterrent to others who would disrupt smooth functioning of society.
I also want to note that Bolo's level 2 is to a large extent the statistical regularities of level 1.
For example, to take another complex case: The slope of the beach changes little with each wave breaking on it. Yet on the detailed level of each sand grain, it is entirely changed. The grains that were touching before the wave broke, are thousand of times their diameter apart after it breaks.
If we look at the gross level of human behavior we do not see the fine molecular details that are controlling it. If we think about what cause the beach to have the inclination it does or what causes a human to behave as he/she does, we understand that it is the net result of many details, not some high level "choice." We have the illusion of making a choice.
Our understanding of the probably consequences (Things society may do to us in its own survival interest, or things society has instilled in us before we were old enough to think that we call guilt when contradicted.) are also very effective in making our "choice." That is, the bag of chemicals we humans are is far from a closed system. Thus, I am not claiming, as some do, that we are just a bag of chemicals, following the laws of physics, but recognizing the our options are guided also by the wishes of our society. However it is true that via our memory etc, these "external factors" have to a large extent been incorporated into the bag of chemicals.

As a consequence of all this, for years I thought "free will" was an illusion. I now understand it can be genuine, if we cease to think of ourselfs as a physical body, which is ruled by the statistics of quantum mechanics. My new view, not only permits genuine free will but explains many other things that initially one would not suspect are even related - For example the explosion of one group of humanoids "Out of Africa" about 50K year BP and fact your visual perception is equally clear over the entire forward hemisphere and not just in the less than 1% which corresponds to the high resolution fovea are both explained by the same "paradigm shift" in understanding ourselfs. See attachment to post 1 or 36 for details of this new view of ourselves (Nothing to do with "souls" etc. - I am a Physicist.)

 

[moving finger]

Billy T

Can you please define what you mean by GFW? (I mean a rigorous definition).

I doubt that much progress can be made in understanding unless we agree definitions of the things we are trying to debate.

Cheers

MF

 

[Billy T]

Billy T Can you please define what you mean by GFW? (I mean a rigorous definition). I doubt that much progress can be made in understanding unless we agree definitions of the things we are trying to debate.

Let me try to sneak by a tough question with a negative reply. If really unhappy, I will think about it and see if I can do better, but honestly I have just been using GFW to contrast with FW that many others have justified as existing with various arguments - none of which I buy into.

Thus, off the top of my head:
1) No type of FW exist if future is determined.
2) No type of FW exists if "granted" by some powerful "spirit" who can violate physical laws at his will to permit you a miracle, at least none I consider worth having.
3)The type of FW, which is the macroscopic statistical average (regardless of how regular this statistical average may be at the macro level) is only an illusion of FW - In fact you are still just a very complex biological machine, but not a deterministic one, thanks to quantum physics being true. Often because of the fact that the macro level the results of many QM "observations" which force mixed states into "pure states" have reasonably predictable averages, you are almost in the case (1) determinism.

As a side note on this point, I would not want to prevent society from throwing the more disruptive members in jail etc, just because the "poor bloke, really had no choice" given his education, the way society treated him, his incompetent public defenders, etc.

4) No form of FW exist directly in any assembly of matter, except the illusion of FW that is quite possible, due to QM and discussed in point 3.

5) Secondary GFW can exist in an assembly of matter (even computers much more advance than any man has yet conceived) if it is the "secondary result" of FW existing in a non-material informational system which has the ability to control some material objects. For example a physical body or a robotic arm etc.

6) Point 5 only permits GFW to be manifest in the physical world, does not imply it need ever actually exist.

7) Any choices that can still be made by any organization capable making decision not ruled out by considerations 1 thru 5 or 6 I would consider genuine free will, GFW.

Hope that helps - just some thoughts without spending much time on it. I invite your comment, efforts at making a better definition etc.

 

[moving finger]

Let me try to sneak by a tough question .

I'm glad you think it's tough, because I do too. However, I strongly believe it is fruitless to debate FW unless we firstly define exactly what we are talking about.

1) No type of FW exist if future is determined.

I disagee that this necessarily follows. I think that depends on how one defines FW in the first place. That's why I'm saying we must define exactly what our terms mean before we can argue whether they exist or not.

2) No type of FW exists if "granted" by some powerful "spirit" who can violate physical laws at his will to permit you a miracle, at least none I consider worth having.

Need to resolve (1) above before we can make any progress on (2)

3)The type of FW, which is the macroscopic statistical average (regardless of how regular this statistical average may be at the macro level) is only an illusion of FW - In fact you are still just a very complex biological machine, but not a deterministic one, thanks to quantum physics being true. Often because of the fact that the macro level the results of many QM "observations" which force mixed states into "pure states" have reasonably predictable averages, you are almost in the case (1) determinism.

Whether a feeling of FW is an illusion of not cannot be addressed until we first answer (1)

As a side note on this point, I would not want to prevent society from throwing the more disruptive members in jail etc, just because the "poor bloke, really had no choice" given his education, the way society treated him, his incompetent public defenders, etc.

What is a "choice"? This gets back to what exactly do we mean by FW?

4) No form of FW exist directly in any assembly of matter, except the illusion of FW that is quite possible, due to QM and discussed in point 3.

Cannot resolve this until you define FW as in reply to (1) above.

5) Secondary GFW can exist in an assembly of matter (even computers much more advance than any man has yet conceived) if it is the "secondary result" of FW existing in a non-material informational system which has the ability to control some material objects. For example a physical body or a robotic arm etc.

Oooops. Now we are onto GFW. We need two definitions now :)

7) Any choices that can still be made by any organization capable making decision not ruled out by considerations 1 thru 5 or 6 I would consider genuine free will, GFW.

I'm not sure I understand your definition here (assuming this is intended to be a definition). Until we define FW how do we know what is or is not ruled out by 1 thru 5?

Hope that helps - just some thoughts without spending much time on it. I invite your comment, efforts at making a better definition etc.

I see where you are coming from, but from a rational and logical point of view it takes us nowhere until we define exactly what we mean by FW and GFW.

I'm very interested in the subject BTW, having done a lot of thinking about it myself.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

3)The type of FW, which is the macroscopic statistical average (regardless of how regular this statistical average may be at the macro level) is only an illusion of FW - In fact you are still just a very complex biological machine, but not a deterministic one, thanks to quantum physics being true. Often because of the fact that the macro level the results of many QM "observations" which force mixed states into "pure states" have reasonably predictable averages, you are almost in the case (1) determinism.

OTOH, suppose that there is significant indeterminism in your macrsocopic
behaviour due to micro-level interminsim in your brain. The suspicion that this
is not genuine FW seems to be based "you" have no control over such events.
But there is no reason to suppose that such an event gets translated into
action without going through a lot of other neural processing, which surely
constitutes such control. If your actions were determined by random events outside your brain, you would have a case that they would not constitute
genuine FW -- but the n you would if they were determinined by deterministic events outside your brain. OTOH, if deterministic events
inside your brain lead to "your" actions (for all that they might not be your free actions), why shouldn't indeterministic events inside your brain be yours ?

 

[Billy T]

I'm glad you think it's tough, because I do too. However, I strongly believe it is fruitless to debate FW unless we firstly define exactly what we are talking about...MF

Be my guest - feel "free" to put up your more positive definition. I was just trying to narrow the field by saying somethings FW and GFW are not.

 

[Billy T]

OTOH, suppose that there is significant indeterminism in your macrsocopic
behaviour due to micro-level interminsim in your brain. The suspicion that this
is not genuine FW seems to be based "you" have no control over such events.
But there is no reason to suppose that such an event gets translated into
action without going through a lot of other neural processing, which surely
constitutes such control. If your actions were determined by random events outside your brain, you would have a case that they would not constitute
genuine FW -- but the n you would if they were determinined by deterministic events outside your brain. OTOH, if deterministic events
inside your brain lead to "your" actions (for all that they might not be your free actions), why shouldn't indeterministic events inside your brain be yours ?

Not sure i followed you - I feel a little like Harry Truman when he concluded hearing a lot of economist try to help him - He said: "What I need is a one-handed economist."
But I got enough of it to note that you seem to be arguing that even though the ideas etc that "pop into your head" may be the result of some quantum process producing "stastical regularities" at the more micro level, "you" still have the option of veto or accepting and acting. If that is basically what you are saying then I would ask how do "you" decide. Are not "you" and your decision process, just the result of other "stastitical regularities" at the micro level also? How do "you" escape from these more fundamental processes. That is why I think quantum mechanics only permits the ilusion of free will - it, not "you" is "calling the shots" - I.e. making the decisions.

 

[Tournesol]

Not sure i followed you - I feel a little like Harry Truman when he concluded hearing a lot of economist try to help him - He said: "What I need is a one-handed economist."
But I got enough of it to note that you seem to be arguing that even though the ideas etc that "pop into your head" may be the result of some quantum process producing "stastical regularities" at the more micro level, "you" still have the option of veto or accepting and acting. If that is basically what you are saying then I would ask how do "you" decide. Are not "you" and your decision process, just the result of other "stastitical regularities" at the micro level also?

Yes. So what ? I am constituted by my body and nervous system, which are constituted by the physical processes that make them up, and so on. Nothing
that is not "me" is involved at any stage, so I am not being pushed around
by something else.

How do "you" escape from these more fundamental processes.

I don't need to. FW doesn't require a separate non-physical self.
It does require freedom from strict determinism, but that is already given
by the physics.

That is why I think quantum mechanics only permits the ilusion of free will - it, not "you" is "calling the shots" - I.e. making the decisions.

"It" is "me* under a different description.

 

[Billy T]

Yes. So what ? I am constituted by my body and nervous system, which are constituted by the physical processes that make them up, and so on. Nothing that is not "me" is involved at any stage, so I am not being pushed around by something else...

I never said you were, but while on the subject, you surely agree that someone stronger and perhaps willing to go to jail, could "push you around" don't you?

What you seem quite happy to accept is that the final result of a lot of microscopic processes, such a Brownian diffusion of neural transmitters across synaptic gaps, etc. is "you" and whatever this final cumulative effect of the deterministic part of the microprocess plus the quantum mechanically indeterminant part (if any) is also "you" and thus, by definition, "You" are always "acting freely."

By this logic, so is the computer I am typing on. As with you, it is subjected to some external "pushing around" (mainly key strokes and power line "glitches") but it also is just behaving as a cumulative result of many of its synaptic (should I say transistors?) switching on and off (like your nerves) under the control of the physics at a more fundamental level.

If your are happy with this "computer like" free will, good for you. I am not.

 

[Tournesol]

By this logic, so is the computer I am typing on. As with you, it is subjected to some external "pushing around" (mainly key strokes and power line "glitches") but it also is just behaving as a cumulative result of many of its synaptic (should I say transistors?) switching on and off (like your nerves) under the control of the physics at a more fundamental level

To say that being pushed around by an external force is a sufficient criterion for *not* being free, does not mean that *not* being pushed around is a
sufficient criterion for being free. Other necessary criteria IMO are
the ability-to-have-done-otherwise and the capacity for conscious reflection.

 

[moving finger]

Be my guest - feel "free" to put up your more positive definition. I was just trying to narrow the field by saying somethings FW and GFW are not.

Sorry, Billy T, but the whole point of the exercise is that you should define what you mean when you speak of FW and GFW. The point I am trying to make is that it is useless to try and debate whether something we call GFW or FW exists or does not exist unless and until we have a definition for these terms.

I can offer several (incompatible) alternative definitions of free will, some of which you may agree with and some of which you may not. But what I do not know is what YOU mean when you talk about FW or GFW (only you can tell me that).

I believe that the universe is deterministic and that (in the strict definition of determinism) there is no room for what many people naively believe is "genuine free will" (ie the ability to "do otherwise than what we actually did"). But I also believe that humans genuinely "feel" that they act with free will, and what we need to do to further our understanding of this feeling is to encapsulate this feeling of free will in a definition that is compatible with determinism (but such definition I know will likely not be acceptable to those who believe that humans possesses some kind of soul or other decision-making capability which transcends determinism).

In the interests of further debate, I therefore offer my personally preferred definition of free will, the kind that is compatible with determinism, the kind that people really do have and the kind that many of us naively (but wrongly) think gives us the ability to "do otherwise than what we did do" :

Definition : free will is the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable.

I believe free will defined in this way (a) is compatible with determinism (b) is exactly what humans experience when they claim that they act with free will (it is entirely consistent with our psychological experience of free will) and (c) implies that free will is not an exclusively human characteristic (ie machines can also have free will).

Of course I accept that you may not accept the above definition. But whether you accept it or not, it is nevertheless a definition and free will defined this way does have the properties I have described.

MF

 

[Billy T]

...I believe that the universe is deterministic and that (in the strict definition of determinism) there is no room for what many people naively believe is "genuine free will" (ie the ability to "do otherwise than what we actually did").

I have more problem with this than your definition of free will, because, if one believes that quantum mechanics is valid, as I do, then it is easy to show mathematically that the universe is not deterministic. I doubt that you would object to the math that does this (assuming you can follow it) but you could object to the validity of quantum mechanics (to maintain your belief in "strict determinism." ) Consequently I will not bother with the math proof. Instead, I will offer an experimental /observational proof, trusting that at least you will accept empirical demonstrations:

The radioactive decay of various elements has been extensively studied. Hugh number of observations have permitted "half lifes" to be defined and they do not seem to influenced by external things like magnetic or electric fields. The interval between two activations of a detector is random. every thing about the decay is unpredictable, but I grant that it could be "deterministic" and we just are ignorant of the "hidden variables" that are making it appear to be "indeterment." (That was basically Einstein's view.) so I will build my demonstration at a higher level that exploits the well confirmed random statistics of the decay:

Suppose I place a small quantity of large half-life radio-active material equally distant from two detectors, A & B, and spend a few years observing the detection data (just to confirm it is more random than any random number generation program in any computer program - I.e. grant me the sequences of detections, ...AABABBBAB...etc. is truly random, even if the individual decays are the result of "hidden variables".) Then on your birthday I flip a switch which drops one of two stamped envelopes into a US post offices mail box. If detector "A" is activated before detector "B" then "envelope A" gets mailed, if "B" before "A" it is "envelope B" that is mailed. Once either is mailed the switch is disabled so only only one is mailed. (or some other means achieves "single mailing.")

You will be interested to know more about the envelopes as one is addressed to you. I can't tell to whom the other is addressed or he, a contract murderer, will kill me instead of you. Both envelopes have US $10,000 in them.
In summary, your "happy birthday present" or death (things that should be important to you) is purely random, and completely indeterminant, even if each individual decay of the radioactive material was deterministic by unknown "hidden variables." Never mind the universe, is your future determined or indeterminant?

...I therefore offer my personally preferred definition of free will, ...
Definition : free will is the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable....MF

To compensate for putting your life at risk, I will accept your definition of free will (or most any reasonable one). The key problem, and why I have been avoiding making one of my own, is the two words I made bold. How is this choice made? Is it not the the net result of a lot of indeterminate small molecules banging into a larger one that we call a "neurotransmitter" and giving it the motion that botanist Brown first observed 180 years ago and we now call "Browian motion" - that random walk Einstein quantified in one of his 5 famous 1905 papers? It is the progress of these neurotransmitters across your synaptic gaps, not you, if you are a "physical body" that is randomly "choosing" what at some much higher level you will presume was your choice. - MHO.

 

[moving finger]

I have more problem with this than your definition of free will, because, if one believes that quantum mechanics is valid, as I do, then it is easy to show mathematically that the universe is not deterministic.

I think you are mistaken here. I also believe quantum mechanics is valid (as far as it goes), but I challenge you or anyone else to show that quantum mechanics implies the universe is necessarily not deterministic. All QM shows is that the world is not predictable. And there is a world of difference between the meaning of "not predictable" and "not deterministic". There are for example perfectly acceptable non-local hidden-variables theories which are consistent with the results of QM and yet are based on determinism.

I doubt that you would object to the math that does this (assuming you can follow it) but you could object to the validity of quantum mechanics (to maintain your belief in "strict determinism." ) Consequently I will not bother with the math proof. Instead, I will offer an experimental /observational proof, trusting that at least you will accept empirical demonstrations:

The radioactive decay of various elements has been extensively studied. Hugh number of observations have permitted "half lifes" to be defined and they do not seem to influenced by external things like magnetic or electric fields. The interval between two activations of a detector is random. every thing about the decay is unpredictable, but I grant that it could be "deterministic" and we just are ignorant of the "hidden variables" that are making it appear to be "indeterment." (That was basically Einstein's view.) so I will build my demonstration at a higher level that exploits the well confirmed random statistics of the decay:

Suppose I place a small quantity of large half-life radio-active material equally distant from two detectors, A & B, and spend a few years observing the detection data (just to confirm it is more random than any random number generation program in any computer program - I.e. grant me the sequences of detections, ...AABABBBAB...etc. is truly random, even if the individual decays are the result of "hidden variables".) Then on your birthday I flip a switch which drops one of two stamped envelopes into a US post offices mail box. If detector "A" is activated before detector "B" then "envelope A" gets mailed, if "B" before "A" it is "envelope B" that is mailed. Once either is mailed the switch is disabled so only only one is mailed. (or some other means achieves "single mailing.")

You will be interested to know more about the envelopes as one is addressed to you. I can't tell to whom the other is addressed or he, a contract murderer, will kill me instead of you. Both envelopes have US $10,000 in them.
In summary, your "happy birthday present" or death (things that should be important to you) is purely random, and completely indeterminant, even if each individual decay of the radioactive material was deterministic by unknown "hidden variables." Never mind the universe, is your future determined or indeterminant?

The answer is simple and self-evident, one or the other of the following must be true :
(A) if the radioactive decay follows some form of deterministic hidden-variables law then my future is determined (regardless of whether it can be predicted).
(B) if the radioactive decay is truly random and not deterministic, then my future is not determined.

Problem is, what we do not know is whether (A) or (B) above is true (though most followers of Bohr assume B is true).

To compensate for putting your life at risk, I will accept your definition of free will (or most any reasonable one). The key problem, and why I have been avoiding making one of my own, is the two words I made bold. How is this choice made? Is it not the the net result of a lot of indeterminate small molecules banging into a larger one that we call a "neurotransmitter" and giving it the motion that botanist Brown first observed 180 years ago and we now call "Browian motion" - that random walk Einstein quantified in one of his 5 famous 1905 papers? It is the progress of these neurotransmitters across your synaptic gaps, not you, if you are a "physical body" that is randomly "choosing" what at some much higher level you will presume was your choice. - MHO.

Yes – but so what?
A choice between two or more alternatives is the equivalent of simply taking two or more inputs and producing one output.
I can make a choice. A machine can make a choice. None of this implies that GFW (whatever that is – I am still waiting for your definition) exists.

Is there anything wrong with my definition, as a definition?
If you do not like my definition, please tell me why, and please do offer a better one?

The following question is not meant to be inflammatory or aggressive, so please take it in the spirit intended :

Can you please explain what is the point of debating the existence or non-existence of something you call "GFW" if you are unwilling to define what you mean by "GFW"?

MF

 

[Billy T]

...There are for example perfectly acceptable non-local hidden-variables theories which are consistent with the results of QM and yet are based on determinism.

I grant this, but you missed my point, so I will repeat it, slightly condensed:

"The interval between two activations of a detector is random. Everything about the decay is unpredictable, but I grant that it could be "deterministic" and we just are ignorant of the "hidden variables" that are making it appear to be "indeterminent." ... So I will build my demonstration at a higher level that exploits the well confirmed random statistics of the decay:
Suppose I place a small quantity of large half-life radio-active material equally distant from two detectors, A & B, and spend a few years observing the detection data (just to confirm it is more random than any random number generation program in any computer program - I.e. grant me the sequences of detections, ...AABABBBAB...etc. is truly random, even if the individual decays are the result of "hidden variables".)"

That is: all I am asking of you is to accepted the demonstrated fact that the sequence of detector responses is truly random, even though each decay was completely determined as you and Einstein believed.
If you reject well demonstrated facts, then our discussion is over. If you accept this demonstrated fact, then at least your future is indeterminant, not just epistemologically unknown (unpredictable).

Your argument (B) is irrelevant as it is the sequence ...ABBABBBAAAB... etc. that is important (and demonstrably random) not the deterministic or indeterministic individual decays. - Again, you missed this point.

 

[Billy T]

...A choice between two or more alternatives is the equivalent of simply taking two or more inputs and producing one output.
I can make a choice. A machine can make a choice. ...

Certainly choices are made. For example at an intersection where both right and left turns are possible. that is not the problem, or under discussion.

The question is how is the choice made. Is it by some procedure that is reasonable to interpret as "you made a choice" or by "the net result of many Browian motion (random walks) of neurotransmitters in your synaptic gaps" (among other "biasing facts") that made the choice for 'you'. "

You keep asking me to define GFW, and I have made a stab at it by telling what it is not. Now it is my turn to ask for a definition that is even more critical to the discussion:

What are "you," this choice making thing?
I.e. Please define "you", "yourself" "me" etc.

I have done this in the attachment to first post this thread. Summary of that definition:
"I" am a subroutine in a parietal simulation of the sensible world surrounding my physical body - I.e. an non material information process and as such not constrained to follow exactly the laws of physics - For example "I" can make choices some what (but not much) independent of the the flux of neurotransmitters in synaptic gaps that are controlled by the laws of physics. That is, like a digital simulation in a computer, plus or minus a few neurotransmitters attaching to a nerve cell wall does not change the computation anymore than a few electrons more or less changes the 1 or 0 state of the transister's computers.

 

[moving finger]

I grant this, but you missed my point,

Billy T, with the deepest respect, perhaps I miss your point because your point is confusing and unclear? See my remarks below.

The interval between two activations of a detector is random. Everything about the decay is unpredictable, but I grant that it could be "deterministic" and we just are ignorant of the "hidden variables" that are making it appear to be "indeterminent." ... So I will build my demonstration at a higher level that exploits the well confirmed random statistics of the decay:

I assume that by "random" you mean "not deterministic". If so, the above is contradictory. Either the decay is random or it is deterministic - you seem to be saying that it is both. Please clarify your meaning here.

Suppose I place a small quantity of large half-life radio-active material equally distant from two detectors, A & B, and spend a few years observing the detection data (just to confirm it is more random than any random number generation program in any computer program - I.e. grant me the sequences of detections, ...AABABBBAB...etc. is truly random, even if the individual decays are the result of "hidden variables".)

Again, you contradict yourself! Either the results of radioactive decay are "truly random" as you suggest, or they are "the result of hidden variables" - they cannot be both since these are contradictory assumptions! Please clarify what you mean here.

If you are saying the decay is truly random, I would ask how do you KNOW it is truly random? I think you will find that your epistemic observation of apparent randomness cannot necessarily be unambiguously translated to an ontic reality of true randomness.

That is: all I am asking of you is to accepted the demonstrated fact that the sequence of detector responses is truly random, even though each decay was completely determined as you and Einstein believed.
If you reject well demonstrated facts, then our discussion is over. If you accept this demonstrated fact, then at least your future is indeterminant, not just epistemologically unknown (unpredictable).

Billy T - What "demonstrated facts"? Again, please explain how you will prove (demonstrate) that it is truly random? (ie prove that there are no non-local hidden variables acting?). I believe this cannot be proven. Or are you asking me to simply assume it is random, without any proof?

Your argument (B) is irrelevant as it is the sequence ...ABBABBBAAAB... etc. that is important (and demonstrably random) not the deterministic or indeterministic individual decays. - Again, you missed this point.

OK, now let me explain my answer :
IF the sequence is truly random then my future is not determined.
IF the sequence is deterministic then my future is determined.

You seem to be asking me to simply "assume" that it is random - and I agree if we accept this assumption then my future is not determined.

My point is that your assumption may be invalid - what you need to do is to PROVE it is truly random if you wish to conclude infallibly that my future is not determined.

You have not proven that it is truly random, and I believe it is not possible to prove it is truly trandom. Ergo, my future may be determined.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Certainly choices are made. For example at an intersection where both right and left turns are possible. that is not the problem, or under discussion.

Good, we agree!

The question is how is the choice made. Is it by some procedure that is reasonable to interpret as "you made a choice" or by "the net result of many Browian motion (random walks) of neurotransmitters in your synaptic gaps" (among other "biasing facts") that made the choice for 'you'. ".

It is one and the same - see my definition of "you" below.

You keep asking me to define GFW, and I have made a stab at it by telling what it is not. Now it is my turn to ask for a definition that is even more critical to the discussion:

lol - sorry Billy T, I do not mean any disrespect but I have to laugh at this point because it is clear that you wish to evade defining what you mean by GFW, hence the whole point of this thread up to now is meaningless - how can you debate GFW if you refuse to define GFW?

What are "you," this choice making thing?
I.e. Please define "you", "yourself" "me" etc.

Gladly. "you" is just the collection of neural patterns, synaptic pathways, biochemical transmitters (call them what you will), located mostly in your brain. There is no separate "you" in isolation from these things.

I have done this in the attachment to first post this thread. Summary of that definition:
"I" am a subroutine in a parietal simulation of the sensible world surrounding my physical body - I.e. an non material information process and as such not constrained to follow exactly the laws of physics - For example "I" can make choices some what (but not much) independent of the the flux of neurotransmitters in synaptic gaps that are controlled by the laws of physics. That is, like a digital simulation in a computer, plus or minus a few neurotransmitters attaching to a nerve cell wall does not change the computation anymore than a few electrons more or less changes the 1 or 0 state of the transister's computers.

You are of course entitled to your opinion and definition of "you", but it does not agree with mine. Does your "you" follow any laws at all, or is it supposed to be completely oblivious to any and all laws? (Your analogy to a digital simulation on a computer is false, such a simulation still follows laws). If oblivious to all laws, how does that "you" interact with the physical universe? If your "you" is supposed to be oblivious to all laws, then this is similar to the 17th century "mind-body" dualism that Descartes proposed.

 

[Billy T]

...Either the decay is random or it is deterministic - you seem to be saying that it is both. ...
Again, you contradict yourself! Either the results of radioactive decay are "truly random" as you suggest, or they are "the result of hidden variables" - they cannot be both since these are contradictory assumptions! Please clarify what you mean here.

No I am trying to get your attention directed away from individual decays - you may chose either hidden variables that make them deterministic or grant that they are random - I first mentioned "hidden variables"
What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields.

Please stop speaking about the individual decays! Focus on the sequence ...AABBBABAA... That is demonstrably random because neither decay has any influence upon another decay. If you like make the experimental arrangement more complex by using two different radioactive source and only count in the sequence decays that are separated in time by such a small increment of time that even light can not travel between the two separated sources (guaranteeing that one does not have any control over the other)

Summary you are still missing the point, why I went to a higher level, where it does not matter if the individual decays are random or controlled by hidden variables. That is also why I mentioned that I might sped two years just proving from observation that the sequence is more random than any computer's random bit string ...1100010001111001001... as they all repeat if you wait long enough (at least so I am told, not an expert in this area.) etc.

 

[Billy T]

...Gladly. "you" is just the collection of neural patterns, synaptic pathways, biochemical transmitters (call them what you will), located mostly in your brain. There is no separate "you" in isolation from these things.

So "you" are a physical thing subject to the laws of physics, which you claim are deterministic. How is then that you can make a genuine choice? Is it not determined by the physics of your body processes? I.e. if these laws are deterministic, you could not do otherwise than what you did. (no real choice among alternatives was made.)

...Does your "you" follow any laws at all, or is it supposed to be completely oblivious to any and all laws?

yes the parietal neural tissue making the simulation is completely following the laws of physics, but what is simulated does not need to. For example, a simulated fire need not produce any smoke - that is it need not exactly simulate a physical fire. "I" could have minor or major variations from physical reality. I think the parietal simulation is quite accurate in regard to most physical processes (Evolution has selected to make this so.) but when it comes to creating "ME" within the simulation, there are psychological aspects not existent in the physical world - one might be free will, another the qualia of "red," another pain, etc. Things that do not exist in material objects like computers, but can exist in simulations, if the experiencer of these things is also just part of the simulation, I.e. not a material but an informaion process. As far as how this information process controls some material objects it does the same way that mental processes control other body functions, like accelerating heart rates when your body is under stress etc. Please note that I am not claiming that free will must exist, only that it can without violation of physics.

(Your analogy to a digital simulation on a computer is false, such a simulation still follows laws). If oblivious to all laws, how does that "you" interact with the physical universe? If your "you" is supposed to be oblivious to all laws, then this is similar to the 17th century "mind-body" dualism that Descartes proposed.

No, it is not "oblivious to all laws" - I don't subscribe to a "spirit" that thinks independent of the body, etc. I stated that the computer (my body's brain) follows all the physical laws but what is simulated need not follow them exactly already.

 

[moving finger]

No I am trying to get your attention directed away from individual decays - you may chose either hidden variables that make them deterministic or grant that they are random - I first mentioned "hidden variables"
What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields.

I am sorry, Billy T, but I think we have a major disconnect here.
By definition, either the decay is random (ie indeterministic) or it is not random (ie deterministic). Hidden Variables theories are attempts to explain how the quantum world can be deterministic and yet still obey the probabilistic rules of QM. Hidden Variables theories ARE deterministic theories, they are not random.

Therefore it is a contradiction to say that "the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random." Your statement makes no sense in the proper context of Hidden Variables theories.

Please stop speaking about the individual decays! Focus on the sequence ...AABBBABAA... That is demonstrably random because neither decay has any influence upon another decay.

I grant you the decay maybe appears random, but Hidden Variables theories would say that this is an appearance only, because the variables which control the decay are indeed hidden. There is no way that you can show the difference between a sequence which simply appears (epistemically) to be random (but which is controlled by Hidden Variables) and one which truly is (ontically) random.

If you like make the experimental arrangement more complex by using two different radioactive source and only count in the sequence decays that are separated in time by such a small increment of time that even light can not travel between the two separated sources (guaranteeing that one does not have any control over the other)

Making the experiment more complex makes no difference, and there is no way that you can make such a guarantee.

The key is : EITHER (A) the decay is truly indeterminstic (random), OR (B) it is deterministic but controlled by hidden variables (simply appears to be random). The decay cannot be both. And I suggest there is no way that you can distinguish experimentally between A or B - you must simply assume either A or B.

Summary you are still missing the point, why I went to a higher level, where it does not matter if the individual decays are random or controlled by hidden variables. That is also why I mentioned that I might sped two years just proving from observation that the sequence is more random than any computer's random bit string ...1100010001111001001... as they all repeat if you wait long enough (at least so I am told, not an expert in this area.) etc.

I hope you can see now that it is YOU who has been missing the point. You cannot mix "random" with "hidden variables" because the two mean very different things.
All you would ever prove this way is that the sequence APPEARS as random as possible (epistemic quality). You could never know for sure whether it is truly random (and thus indeterministic), or simply appears random because it is controlled by hidden variables (and thus deterministic) (ontic quality).

MF

Niels Bohr brainwashed a whole generation of physicists into believing that the problem had been solved
Murray Gell-Mann​

 

[moving finger]

So "you" are a physical thing subject to the laws of physics, which you claim are deterministic. How is then that you can make a genuine choice? Is it not determined by the physics of your body processes? I.e. if these laws are deterministic, you could not do otherwise than what you did. (no real choice among alternatives was made.)

Several posts back, when I pointed out a "choice" can be as simple as taking two inputs and making one output, and even a simple machine can make such a choice, you agreed with me but you said the issue is not about making "choices". I think you will find that determinism and choice are not incompatible concepts...

the parietal neural tissue making the simulation is completely following the laws of physics, but what is simulated does not need to. For example, a simulated fire need not produce any smoke - that is it need not exactly simulate a physical fire.

That is an incorrect analogy. The "simulated fire" you produce still follows the underlying laws of physics, even though it does not follow the smoke-releated laws of thermodynamics and fluid flow. You cannot use a physical substrate (which obeys the laws of physics) to produce a simulation which miraculously doesn't obey laws.

"I" could have minor or major variations from physical reality. I think the parietal simulation is quite accurate in regard to most physical processes (Evolution has selected to make this so.) but when it comes to creating "ME" within the simulation, there are psychological aspects not existent in the physical world - one might be free will, another the qualia of "red," another pain, etc.

I disagree. I believe qualia DO exist in the physical world, and they follow physical laws, but 3rd person objective science can never hope to explain or understand all of the details of qualia (or consciousness), because these are 1st person subjective experiences.

Please note that I am not claiming that free will must exist, only that it can without violation of physics.

And I claim (again) that it is pointless for you to discuss whether something you call "free will" exists or does not exist until you have first defined what you mean by "free will".

No, it is not "oblivious to all laws" - I don't subscribe to a "spirit" that thinks independent of the body, etc. I stated that the computer (my body's brain) follows all the physical laws but what is simulated need not follow them exactly already.

OK, so it is controlled by some laws but not by others? Sounds pretty weird to me. (but still along the lines of Descartes dualism)

MF

 

[Billy T]

...I think you will find that determinism and choice are not incompatible concepts...

THEY ARE! You are fond of definitions. The definition of "determined, determinism, etc." is that there is one and only one possible outcome or future. It has been determined by things in the past, which we may or may not know / understand, such as "hidden variables" determining when a particular radioactive atom will decay.

...You cannot use a physical substrate (which obeys the laws of physics) to produce a simulation which miraculously doesn't obey laws.

Of course the simularion will follow many laws, often some that closely agree with the physical world's laws, but I think one can have a component of the simulation that does neither follows deterministic laws nor is purely a random selection. Exactly how one would achieve this is not very clear to me. I am not computer programmer and doubt that many of them could give a good example, but I am impressed that nature has usually found a way to do almost any thing that is not forbidden by the physical laws. For example, the first fission reaction on Earth was in Africa when a water moderated natural uranium deposit slowly critical - discovered by the mining company. They were began encountering depleted U instead of a natural U ore body deposit! I am inclined to believe that evolution has found a way to make real choices possible, but this is just my opinion. I have never claimed "we" actually have anything more than the illusion of choosing.

I disagree. I believe qualia DO exist in the physical world, ...

let's consider the most discussed example: "red." (do you know about Mary, who knew everything there is about red, but had never seen it?) In my book Dark Visitor, there is a footnote tied to the term "red giant" (a stellar phase astronomer Jack is describing) that gives the following proof that it is not red: Assume that thousands of years ago, a virus killed all humans except those whose DNA code for Daltonism (people who see objects most people call red as green). Now Astronomer Jack would call this star a "green giant" because it has the same green color as his hemiglobin rich blood. (point of foot note is to admit the error of assigning colors to objects, but state, that to avoid confusion, this erroneous practice will continue.)

In your post 56, in response to my:
"What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields."
you said:

...By definition, either the decay is random (ie indeterministic) or it is not random (ie deterministic). Hidden Variables theories are attempts to explain how the quantum world can be deterministic and yet still obey the probabilistic rules of QM. Hidden Variables theories ARE deterministic theories, they are not random.
Therefore it is a contradiction to say that "the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random." Your statement makes no sense in the proper context of Hidden Variables theories.

Let me prove that the interval between decays and hence the sequence ...AABBBABABB... is not only demonstrably (as I prior stated) random, even if every decay is determined by hidden variables, but that it must be, if you agree information can not be exchanged between to points in less time than light can travel between these same two points. (I hinted at the proof in prior post and did not want to go to trouble of giving it.)

Assume there are two radioactive sources, each with near by detectors, but these detectors are separated by two light seconds. Also assume that the only decays that are included in the ...AABBBABBABBa... sequence are those that occur within one second of each other. That is at the two sites of the two radioactive sources the time of the decay is recorded with an accuracy of at least 0.4 seconds. Now there is no way that anything at one site can influence any thing at the other site which is recorded in the sequence. . That is the sequence completely without any correlation i.e. is random.

Note that the sequence ...AABBBABBABBa... need not be constructed in "real time." For example, once a week the time marked records from both sites are bought to my house and I construct the sequence (throwing out all events from either site that have an event at the other site more than one second earlier.) The last event in the sequence I can so construct (an A or a B) is what determines if you get $10,000 or die, even if every decay was completely determined by hidden variables!

I asked you in last post to stop talking about the individual decays. You did not. That is why you continue to miss the point, which I can not make any more clearly. The sequence is random. Your future (fortune or death) is not determined. Your case for a deterministic world is lost. Not even only your future is determined.

 

[The Rev]

It seems to me that if freewill is not possible, and everything is scripted, then why do we think?

Thinking is, at least from a biological point of view, a means to turn sensory input into a meaningful interpretation of the current situation which we then can examine to make decisions about how best to survive. IOW, human beings are set up to process input and decide on courses of action. If that were a redundant or irrelevant process (because all those actions are pre-scripted anyway), then what's the point in going through the motions?

Or, for that matter, what's the point in having senses, or the ability to act?

It seems to me, that while we are not so sure whether we have freewill, nature seems to think we do, or is at least counting on it in her design of our bodies.

\phi

The Rev

 

[Tournesol]

Causal determinism is not the same as fatalism. For a causal determinist, things are
ineveitable *becasue* of the causal chains linking them; you can't jump straight
to the end of the chain. The omelette may be inevitable, but you still have to break
the eggs to arrive at it.