What Price for Genuine Free Will?

[moving finger]

THEY ARE! You are fond of definitions. The definition of "determined, determinism, etc." is that there is one and only one possible outcome or future. It has been determined by things in the past, which we may or may not know / understand, such as "hidden variables" determining when a particular radioactive atom will decay.

Again you are mistaken, Billy T. As I pointed out already, a choice can be as simple as taking two inputs and producing one output, and in this sense even a simple demonstrably deterministic machine can make a choice, hence choice is compatible with determinism. Making a choice has nothing to do with indeterminism or “free will” (whatever that might be). I am glad however that you do finally acknowledge that hidden variables provide a deterministic solution

Of course the simularion will follow many laws, often some that closely agree with the physical world's laws, but I think one can have a component of the simulation that does neither follows deterministic laws nor is purely a random selection. Exactly how one would achieve this is not very clear to me. I am not computer programmer and doubt that many of them could give a good example,

It is certainly not clear to me, and I doubt that it is clear to anyone! Reflect on it a little while, Billy T. I see no way that a purely deterministic substrate (hardware, firmware, software etc) can produce a simulation which is in any way indeterministic. We can “simulate” indeterminism yes (just as we simulate a random number generator on a computer), but a computer generated random number is in fact 100% deterministic. In order to get indeterminism, you need to start with indeterminism, you cannot fabricate it from determinism.

but I am impressed that nature has usually found a way to do almost any thing that is not forbidden by the physical laws. For example, the first fission reaction on Earth was in Africa when a water moderated natural uranium deposit slowly critical - discovered by the mining company. They were began encountering depleted U instead of a natural U ore body deposit! I am inclined to believe that evolution has found a way to make real choices possible, but this is just my opinion. I have never claimed "we" actually have anything more than the illusion of choosing.

Yes, but so what? Nature could be 100% deterministic and still show the variety of forms She has shown. Nothing you have said points to indeterminism.

lets consider the most discussed example: "red." (do you know about Mary, who knew everything there is about red, but had never seen it?)

Yes, this is a famous argument in the debate on qualia, but it is based on a false premise. The premise is that Mary can know EVERYTHING there is to know about the colour red without ever having the experience of seeing the colour red, which is false. One of the fundamental aspects of qualia is that they are 1st person subjective experiences, and it is impossible to convey all of the properties of a 1st person subjective experience using 3rd person objective science. Therefore Mary did NOT know everything about the colour red, because she had never experienced seeing red. But what does this have to do with the subject of this thread?

In my book Dark Visitor, there is a footnote tied to the term "red giant" (a stellar phase astronomer Jack is describing) that gives the following proof that it is not red: Assume that thousands of years ago, a virus killed all humans except those whose DNA code for Daltonism (people who see objects most people call red as green). Now Astronomer Jack would call this star a "green giant" because it has the same green color as his hemiglobin rich blood. (point of foot note is to admit the error of assigning colors to objects, but state, that to avoid confusion, this erroneous practice will continue.)

What relevance does this have to the subject of this thread?

In your post 56, in response to my:
"What I want you to recognize is the the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random. That is why I mentioned that the lifetimes are not affected by external things like electric or magnetic fields."
you said:

Quote:
Originally Posted by moving finger
...By definition, either the decay is random (ie indeterministic) or it is not random (ie deterministic). Hidden Variables theories are attempts to explain how the quantum world can be deterministic and yet still obey the probabilistic rules of QM. Hidden Variables theories ARE deterministic theories, they are not random.
Therefore it is a contradiction to say that "the interval between two decays (even if controlled by hidden variables) is random." Your statement makes no sense in the proper context of Hidden Variables theories.

Let me prove that the interval between decays and hence the sequence ...AABBBABABB... is not only demonstrably (as I prior stated) random, even if every decay is determined by hidden variables, but that it must be, if you agree information can not be exchanged between to points in less time than light can travel between these same two points. (I hinted at the proof in prior post and did not want to go to trouble of giving it.)

Assume there are two radioactive sources, each with near by detectors, but these detectors are separated by two light seconds. Also assume that the only decays that are included in the ...AABBBABBABBa... sequence are those that occur within one second of each other. That is at the two sites of the two radioactive sources the time of the decay is recorded with an accuracy of at least 0.4 seconds. Now there is no way that anything at one site can influence any thing at the other site which is recorded in the sequence. . That is the sequence completely without any correlation i.e. is random.

Note that the sequence ...AABBBABBABBa... need not be constructed in "real time." For example, once a week the time marked records from both sites are bought to my house and I construct the sequence (throwing out all events from either site that have an event at the other site more than one second earlier.) The last event in the sequence I can so construct (an A or a B) is what determines if you get $10,000 or die, even if every decay was completely determined by hidden variables!

I asked you in last post to stop talking about the individual decays. You did not. That is why you continue to miss the point, which I can not make any more clearly. The sequence is random. Your future (fortune or death) is not determined. Your case for a deterministic world is lost. Not even only your future is determined.

Billy T, I have never been talking only about individual decays, I have no idea why you keep harping on about this. And you have not proven (as you claim) that “the interval between decays and hence the sequence ...AABBBABABB... is not only demonstrably random, even if every decay is determined by hidden variables”.

IF each individual decay is deterministic (eg, as you suggest, determined by hidden variables) then it follows that the SEQUENCE will also be deterministic; and it also follows that two separate radioactive sources (no matter how far apart they are) will also each have deterministic decay sequences, and (unless you can show that there is a SOURCE OF INDETERMINISM somewhere, which you have not shown), then it also follows that any correlation between the two sources will also be deterministic. Whether they are in causal contact or not. Why do you keep insisting the sequence must be random or indeterministic?

To make it easier, let us look at a different example, such as two computers each “simulating” a radioactive source, but each doing so according to a simple algorithm and hence deterministically. I am sure you will agree that the individual “decays” are deterministic, and you will also agree that each decay sequence produced by each computer is also deterministic. It also follows (unless you can show where there is a source of indeterminism coming in) that any kind of correlation of sequences between the two computers, no matter how far apart they are, is also deterministic. You cannot produce any kind of indeterministic outcome from a purely deterministic process. If you believe that you can, then the onus is on you to demonstrate how this can be done (you have not done it so far).

Therefore it all boils down to : Is the basic process of radioactive decay deterministic or indeterministic? If the former, then the sequence and the correlations will also be deterministic; if the latter then the sequence and the correlations will also be indeterministic. It is as simple as that!

The question therefore remains : Are you assuming that radioactive decay is a deterministic or an indeterministic process?

MF

 

[moving finger]

It seems to me that if freewill is not possible, and everything is scripted, then why do we think?

What is your definition of freewill please?

It’s pointless to debate whether something exists or not unless that something is defined.

I have asked the originator of this thread to define what he means by free will, but so far he has not done so.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Causal determinism is not the same as fatalism. For a causal determinist, things are
ineveitable *becasue* of the causal chains linking them; you can't jump straight
to the end of the chain. The omelette may be inevitable, but you still have to break
the eggs to arrive at it.

did anyone suggest it was?

MF

 

[Billy T]

...Thinking is, at least from a biological point of view, a means to turn sensory input into a meaningful interpretation of the current situation which we then can examine to make decisions about how best to survive. IOW, human beings are set up to process input and decide on courses of action. If that were a redundant or irrelevant process (because all those actions are pre-scripted anyway), then what's the point in going through the motions? Or, for that matter, what's the point in having senses, or the ability to act? It seems to me, that while we are not so sure whether we have freewill, nature seems to think we do, or is at least counting on it in her design of our bodies.

I have made your definition of thinking bold to show that your definition and following argument applies equally well to an amoeba, swiming away from a drop of vingar that falls in its pond. I also note that the existence of some "purpose to life", other than to sever as a vehicle for extending genes into the future, is not proven or granted by all.

 

[Billy T]

...Making a choice has nothing to do with indeterminism or “free will” (whatever that might be).

In a quantum mechanical or non-deterministic world (which you do not accept as the real world) one might chose to turn right or left at an intersection because the future is not determined by the past. In deterministic world, the past has determined whether you will turn right or left (definition of "determined," "deterministic world," etc.). You may suffer under the psychological illusion that you made a "choice", when turning left, but you did not. That left turn was determined even before you were born! (If world is deterministics as you believe.) No choice is possible if the future is completely determined by the past.

I am glad however that you do finally acknowledge that hidden variables provide a deterministic solution

I did not want to argue about hidden variables and they make no difference to the discussion of free will, so because I anticipated that you might bring them up, I granted even before you ever mentioned them (that is hardly "finally" -check back prior posts) that you could have radio active decay deterministic and controlled by "hidden variables" if you wish. I said I would "go to a higher level and work only with the sequence of detections" that can be demonstrably shown to be random. (my "two years of testing")

You disputed that the sequence was random (and still do), so I set up two radio active source separated with space like separation of 2 light seconds and only included decays in the construction of the sequence that have locally recorded time differing by one second or less to prove that no information about one decay at A could travel to influence the other decay at B.

I thought you would accept this as proof that the sequence is random. I will not bother to describe how Bell's inequality and experimental results also prove it is as that would be lost on you if you do not understand the simpler proof already given. (I.e. space-like separated events can never effect each other, and must therefore proceed completely independently - no correlation - i.e. random relative to each other, and hence their sequence is also random.)

...Yes, but so what? Nature could be 100% deterministic and still show the variety of forms She has shown. Nothing you have said points to indeterminism.

False the sequence has been proven to be uncorrelated as the events included in the sequence were space like separated.

...IF each individual decay is deterministic ...then it follows that the SEQUENCE will also be deterministic; and it also follows that two separate radioactive sources (no matter how far apart they are) will also each have deterministic decay sequences, ...

Yes the sequence ...BBBBBBBBBB... could have deterministic intervals. (and likewise ...AAAAAAAAAAAA... could have deterministic intervals.) because one comes solely from site B and the other solely from site A. Clearly B site is not space-like separated from site B. (and etc. for site A.) (I have made your word "each" bold to show where you continue to miss the point.)

BUT, the sequence ...AABBBABBAAAB... I constructed comes from one event at B occurring less that 1 second prior to one at A, and conversely. When the information that the event at B occurred takes at least 2 second to get from B to A, it can not have any influence upon the event at A, if the "A event" is only one second after the B event. Thus, the information, even if it did exist, arrives too late to have controlled when the event at A occurred.

In fact the sequence was constructed at my house, from the records made separately B and at A, a week earlier. These records would just be a list of times (accurate to 0.4s) of when decays occurred. For example, B's record could include times ...0:54:02, 1:03:15, 1:13:22 ...
and A's could include ... 1:01:05, 1:02:45, 1:06:14...
and then only the "B event" at 1:03:15 together with the event A at 1:02:45 meet the criteria of having occurred with in 1 second of each other (space like separation guaranteed In this case, "A" occurred first, so these two events will contribute a "AB" in the constructed sequence (not a "BA") and all of the other possible pairing of the six events listed above, from the two different sites, (for example B=1:03:15 and A=1:06:14) will be ignored/ discarded as there is time for the B event at 1:03:15 to influence the A event at 1:06:14 (I.e. they are "time like separated" and conceivable related in some way.)

If you don't understand it now, I will give up trying to get you to see that no matter what type of determinism at each of the sites is occurring (hidden variable or anything else you wish to postulate) separately at A & B sites the sequence constructed from only space-like separated decays is random.

That is why I said hidden variable make no difference and readily granted them to you even though I know Bell's inequality and real world data show they do not. - Einstein was wrong on hidden variables.

...Therefore it all boils down to : Is the basic process of radioactive decay deterministic or indeterministic? If the former, then the sequence and the correlations will also be deterministic; if the latter then the sequence and the correlations will also be indeterministic. It is as simple as that!...MF

I have show this false in increasing detail in last three posts to you. I can do no more.

You need to have some understanding of what "space like separation" means for the sequence constructedonly from space-like separated events.

 

[The Rev]

What is your definition of freewill please?

It’s pointless to debate whether something exists or not unless that something is defined.

I have asked the originator of this thread to define what he means by free will, but so far he has not done so.

MF

There's this old argument for the existence of God that says He must exist because the universe is just a bunch of actions that are effects of previous causes, which themselves are effects of causes, etc. Since there must have been a first cause to set everything else in motion, there must be a God.

I derive my idea of freewill from this prime mover idea. If you can create a cause from nothing, you are exercising freewill, if not, not. For example, if I decide to make a pass at a hot blonde, there is either the option that this decision is just an effect, at the end of a long cause/effect chain leading back to the Big Bang, or the option that I spontaneously created the decision to some degree.

If that decision is in any way not a product of simple cause and effect outside my own volition, then I have, to that degree, freewill.

\phi

The Rev

 

[The Rev]

I have made your definition of thinking bold to show that your definition and following argument applies equally well to an amoeba, swiming away from a drop of vingar that falls in its pond.

I don't see how a lower lifeform's reflex reaction to a life threatening situation wouldn't be freewill. I know it's a big philosophical conundrum, but that doesn't mean it only applies to higher life forms.

I also note that the existence of some "purpose to life", other than to sever as a vehicle for extending genes into the future, is not proven or granted by all.

This may be just a difference in our views of freewill. I admit I haven't read the entire thread, but rather just tossed in an idea to see what people thought of it. I think it's meaningful that living things (not necessarily just humans) are designed to make decisions. It doesn't prove freewill, I know, but it does seem strange that living things function as though they have it.

\phi

The Rev

 

[moving finger]

In a quantum mechanical or non-deterministic world (which you do not accept as the real world) one might chose to turn right or left at an intersection because the future is not determined by the past. In deterministic world, the past has determined whether you will turn right or left (definition of "determined," "deterministic world," etc.). You may suffer under the psychological illusion that you made a "choice", when turning left, but you did not. That left turn was determined even before you were born! (If world is deterministics as you believe.) No choice is possible if the future is completely determined by the past.

I would say you are confusing “choice” with some notion of “unconstrained choice”. As I have pointed out, a choice is simply “taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output”. Such a choice can be made by a completely deterministic machine. Now, you would presumably say that this is then “not a choice” because it is somehow constrained (the machine had to do what it did), but what you are actually saying is that the machine is making a constrained choice as opposed to a free choice – but we have no idea what a free choice is because we still do not have your definition of free will!

I did not want to argue about hidden variables and they make no difference to the discussion of free will, so because I anticipated that you might bring them up, I granted even before you ever mentioned them (that is hardly "finally" -check back prior posts) that you could have radio active decay deterministic and controlled by "hidden variables" if you wish. I said I would "go to a higher level and work only with the sequence of detections" that can be demonstrably shown to be random. (my "two years of testing").

You have not made it clear what you mean by “a higher level”. You still have not shown how a deterministic process can produce an indeterministic outcome.

You disputed that the sequence was random (and still do) .

No, I dispute that you have proven it is random. There is a difference. The sequence MAY BE RANDOM, I am not saying it is not random. What I am saying is that there is no way to know whether the sequence is truly random or not – it may appear to be random but it cannot be proven to be random. There is a difference between epistemic indeterminability and ontic indeterminism, and you cannot prove one from the other.

so I set up two radio active source separated with space like separation of 2 light seconds and only included decays in the construction of the sequence that have locally recorded time differing by one second or less to prove that no information about one decay at A could travel to influence the other decay at B.

You have not proven that there is no correlation between the sources. Two sources can be correlated even though there is no direct information transfer at superluminal speeds between the two sources. All it requires is that information could have been transferred between the two sources at sometime (any time) in the past.

I thought you would accept this as proof that the sequence is random. I will not bother to describe how Bell's inequality and experimental results also prove it is as that would be lost on you if you do not understand the simpler proof already given.

I am fully aware of Bell’s theorem, I think you are the one who does not understand. Bell’s inequality and the experimental results of QM shows that the universe must behave non-locally, which simply means that space-like separated events can remain ENTANGLED with each other, such that what happens on one side of the universe can be quantum mechanically entangled instantaneously with another event on the other side of the universe, ie apparent superluminal effects (but no useful information is transferred at superluminal speeds). Read Bell’s work and Aspect’s work closely and you will understand. It has NOTHING to do with indeterminism. In fact Bell was a supporter of Bohm’s hidden variables ideas, Bell did not believe the quantum world was fundamentally indeterministic.

(I.e. space-like separated events can never effect each other, and must therefore proceed completely independently - no correlation - i.e. random relative to each other, and hence their sequence is also random.) .

Correlation has nothing to do with space-like separation, as I have pointed out already. And quantum entanglement shows that spacelike separated events can still be entangled.

False the sequence has been proven to be uncorrelated as the events included in the sequence were space like separated. .

Incorrect, for the reasons I have shown.

Yes the sequence ...BBBBBBBBBB... could have deterministic intervals. (and likewise ...AAAAAAAAAAAA... could have deterministic intervals.) because one comes solely from site B and the other solely from site A. Clearly B site is not space-like separated from site B. (and etc. for site A.) (I have made your word "each" bold to show where you continue to miss the point.) .

You continue to miss the point that spacelike separation does not imply no correlation.

BUT, the sequence ...AABBBABBAAAB... I constructed comes from one event at B occurring less that 1 second prior to one at A, and conversely. When the information that the event at B occurred takes at least 2 second to get from B to A, it can not have any influence upon the event at A, if the "A event" is only one second after the B event. Thus, the information, even if it did exist, arrives too late to have controlled when the event at A occurred.

Again, spacelike separation does not imply no correlation.

In fact the sequence was constructed at my house, from the records made separately B and at A, a week earlier. These records would just be a list of times (accurate to 0.4s) of when decays occurred. For example, B's record could include times ...0:54:02, 1:03:15, 1:13:22 ...
and A's could include ... 1:01:05, 1:02:45, 1:06:14...
and then only the "B event" at 1:03:15 together with the event A at 1:02:45 meet the criteria of having occurred with in 1 second of each other (space like separation guaranteed In this case, "A" occurred first, so these two events will contribute a "AB" in the constructed sequence (not a "BA") and all of the other possible pairing of the six events listed above, from the two different sites, (for example B=1:03:15 and A=1:06:14) will be ignored/ discarded as there is time for the B event at 1:03:15 to influence the A event at 1:06:14 (I.e. they are "time like separated" and conceivable related in some way.)

If you don't understand it now, I will give up trying to get you to see that no matter what type of determinism at each of the sites is occurring (hidden variable or anything else you wish to postulate) separately at A & B sites the sequence constructed from only space-like separated decays is random.

Again, spacelike separation does not require that there is no correlation. With respect, you are woefully misguided.

That is why I said hidden variable make no difference and readily granted them to you even though I know Bell's inequality and real world data show they do not. - Einstein was wrong on hidden variables.

Einstein was demonstrably wrong only in believing in a local reality. The results of QM show that the world cannot be both real and local, however it can be real and non-local. And this is what Bell himself believed. In fact no matter what interpretation of QM you adopt, the world must be non-local. So non-locality is here to stay. But nobody has EVER proven that the world is not deterministic at a quantum level, and nobody has ever proven that non-local hidden variables theories do not work.

I have show this false in increasing detail in last three posts to you. I can do no more.

You misunderstand causation and correlation at an elementary level my dear friend. If you continue to misunderstand this, as well as the results of Bell’s theorem and the results of QM, then I also can do no more. You obviously refuse to believe me. I suggest you go ask someone whom you will believe.

You need to have some understanding of what "space like separation" means for the sequence constructedonly from space-like separated events.

You need to understand that spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

MF

 

[moving finger]

There's this old argument for the existence of God that says He must exist because the universe is just a bunch of actions that are effects of previous causes, which themselves are effects of causes, etc. Since there must have been a first cause to set everything else in motion, there must be a God.

Why must the first cause be God? (unless one defines God as "the first cause", in which case the answer is obvious)

I derive my idea of freewill from this prime mover idea. If you can create a cause from nothing, you are exercising freewill, if not, not. For example, if I decide to make a pass at a hot blonde, there is either the option that this decision is just an effect, at the end of a long cause/effect chain leading back to the Big Bang, or the option that I spontaneously created the decision to some degree.

QM suggests that events may happen at a QM level without cause, does this mean that QM particles have free will?

Are you suggesting that free will is some kind of spontaneous "action with no prior cause"? Surely this just results in random events, how can this be translated into something we call human free will?

But no, you are suggesting that free will is something "I spontaneously created" - which seems a contradiction? Either something is spontaneous (ie without cause), or it is created (in this case by "I", whatever "I" might be). Therefore we need to ask - is this act (of free will) spontaneous (without cause) or is it in fact caused by the "I"?

If that decision is in any way not a product of simple cause and effect outside my own volition, then I have, to that degree, freewill.

And now "my own volition" is coming into it. Thus free will is not, in fact, simply action without cause, it is action caused or at least moderated by "my own volition"?

Can you define what you mean by "my own volition"?

Where is the "you" which is presumably part of the "my own" in all of this?

Are you suggesting that "your volition" proceeds independently of the cause and effect of the material world, in some kind of dualistic realtionship, a la Descartes?

MF

 

[moving finger]

Billy T

If you would like to educate yourself about causal relationships and the difference between direct causation and correlation, and at the same time understand how spacelike events can be correlated even though there is no direct causation between the events concerned, read the following :

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-Rpcc/

MF

 

[Tournesol]

I am fully aware of Bell’s theorem, I think you are the one who does not understand. Bell’s inequality and the experimental results of QM shows that the universe must behave non-locally, which simply means that space-like separated events can remain ENTANGLED with each other, such that what happens on one side of the universe can be quantum mechanically entangled instantaneously with another event on the other side of the universe, ie apparent superluminal effects (but no useful information is transferred at superluminal speeds). Read Bell’s work and Aspect’s work closely and you will understand. It has NOTHING to do with indeterminism.

It has everything to do with determinism by local hidden variables.

In fact Bell was a supporter of Bohm’s hidden variables ideas, Bell did not believe the quantum world was fundamentally indeterministic.

But the Aspect experiment produced the opposite result to what he
was hoping for. Nature is the ultimate arbitor, not famous scientists.

Einstein was demonstrably wrong only in believing in a local reality. The results of QM show that the world cannot be both real and local,

Cannot be determined and local

however it can be real and non-local.

determined non-locally. Or just plain indetermined.

And this is what Bell himself believed. In fact no matter what interpretation of QM you adopt, the world must be non-local. So non-locality is here to stay. But nobody has EVER proven that the world is not deterministic at a quantum level, and nobody has ever proven that non-local hidden variables theories do not work.

Debatable
http://www.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0206/0206196.pdf

 

[moving finger]

It has everything to do with determinism by local hidden variables.

As I said, it has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Nature is the ultimate arbitor, not famous scientists.

And nature shows that the quantum world is non-local, but it is not necessarily indeterministic. The latter agrees with Bell’s, Bohm’s and Einstein's beliefs.

Cannot be determined and local

To Einstein, “real” was his way of saying “determined”

determined non-locally. Or just plain indetermined.

But not necessarily indetermined, which is what many followers of Bohr mistakenly assume

http://www.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant...206/0206196.pdf[/QUOTE]

The cited paper claims to show that some experimental results do not agree with a very particular non-local hidden-variables theory, but the paper does not show that non-local hidden variables theories in general do not work.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

As I said, it has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Of course it does. It rules out the form of determinism, local determinism,
that most determinists believe in.

And nature shows that the quantum world is non-local, but it is not necessarily indeterministic. The latter agrees with Bell’s, Bohm’s and Einstein's beliefs.

Or necessarilly deterministic.

To Einstein, “real” was his way of saying “determined”

It's a True Scotsman approach.

But not necessarily indetermined, which is what many followers of Bohr mistakenly assume

Works both ways. Determinists assume it proves the existence of non-local
determinism.

The cited paper claims to show that some experimental results do not agree with a very particular non-local hidden-variables theory, but the paper does not show that non-local hidden variables theories in general do not work.

But Bohm's is the only fully worked out on. It looks like the determinists
are clutching at straws.

 

[moving finger]

It rules out the form of determinism, local determinism, that most determinists believe in.

And as I said, this has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Or necessarilly deterministic.

I never said it was necessarily deterministic. Unlike followers of Bohr who say the world is necessarily indeterministic.

It's a True Scotsman approach.

What on Earth does that mean?

Works both ways. Determinists assume it proves the existence of non-local determinism.

I disagree. It proves only that the world is non-local. It may be deterministic, it may be indeterministic, there is no way we can ever know.

It looks like the determinists are clutching at straws.

Not at all, some of us are keeping an open mind and not being blinkered by jumping to conclusions.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

http://atheism.about.com/od/logicalfallacies/a/notruescotsman.htm

 

[moving finger]

It's a True Scotsman approach.

Not at all. Read about Einstein's work and his beliefs yourself. You'll start to understand then.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Free will is not free!

...like almost everyone, I feel I make real choices in life and want a rational bases for a belief in Genuine Free Will, GFW

Discussions on "free will" are notoriously difficult, usually because most participants take sides before they even agree what they are talking about (ie participants declare "I do/do not believe in free will" before there is any agreement on the definition or meaning of "free will").

Therefore, rather than debate whether "free will" (whatever the definition) really exists, I think it is much more instructive to ask :

what do people really mean when they say that they believe they act with "free will", and are they justified in having this belief?

I humbly suggest that what most people (who claim to believe in "free will") mean when they say they act with "free will" is that they believe "their actions are not entirely constrained by external factors".

I say "entirely" constrained because I believe most of us would agree that our actions are usually some way constrained to a greater or lesser extent by external factors (eg I cannot willingly hold my breath for more than a minute or two, no matter how much I "want" to), but belief in "free will" would imply that not all of the external constraints on our actions are necessarily absolute.

This is where it becomes useful to look closely at how we define the "person" (or better still, the agent) which we are claiming has this "free will".

Paraphrasing Dennett, one can externalise everything by making oneself really, really small. Conversely, an agent can subsume many (potentially external) constraints within itself by making itself a sufficiently finite size.

What we call our "self" is not an infinitesimal point in space. It has finite physical and logical boundaries and, most importantly, it includes within those boundaries many of the causes and effects of our decisions; in fact the personal decision-making process is based on what I like to call self-referential causal loops.

If we can identify the external "cause" of a particular decision (ie an external constraint on our "free will") then we know that we are not in fact deciding freely. But for many of our decisions we are unable to unambiguously identify the "causes" of those decisions, simply because those causes are internalised in a complex and self-referential way within our decision-making selves.

Thus, it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are uncaused; neither is it the case that our "free will" decisions are unconstrained. It is simply the case that the decisions which we choose to call our "free will" decisions are largely caused and constrained by internal self-referential causal loops, of which we have (most of the time) incomplete awareness - and this is what leads us to say that we act with "free will".

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

All quite good until this pioint...

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

..where you suddenly decide that "free Will" is just a feeling. Feeling free when
you are not actually free is just as much an illusion as feeling like a million dollats when you are a pauper.

 

[moving finger]

All quite good until this pioint...

why thank you!

..where you suddenly decide that "free Will" is just a feeling. Feeling free when you are not actually free is just as much an illusion as feeling like a million dollats when you are a pauper.

Two things here.

One.
I did not say that "free will" is "just" a feeling. You may consider it is “just” a feeling, but I do not.

When we say that we act with "free will" then we are indeed acting such that our actions are not entirely constrained by external factors. This is consistent with the definitions I have suggested above. In this sense we act freely.

But our actions, no matter how free we think we might be, are never unconstrained, and they are never uncaused. It is simply the fact that many of the constraints and causes are internal to ourselves that allows us to believe that we act freely, even though all may be determined.

Two
Are you suggesting that all feelings are illusions?

When I feel happy, am I deluding myself that I am happy?

I think not.
When I feel happy, I am happy.
When I feel free, I am free.
Both are indeed feelings. But neither is an illusion.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

When we say that we act with "free will" then we are indeed acting such that our actions are not entirely constrained by external factors. This is consistent with the definitions I have suggested above. In this sense we act freely.

But our actions, no matter how free we think we might be, are never unconstrained, and they are never uncaused. It is simply the fact that many of the constraints and causes are internal to ourselves that allows us to believe that we act freely, even though all may be determined.

But if determinism is true, eveything that goes on causally inside us
is the ultimate product of factors that went on outside us, before
we were born even. The external/internal distinction is no good
in combination with determisnim.

 

[moving finger]

But if determinism is true, eveything that goes on causally inside us is the ultimate product of factors that went on outside us, before
we were born even.

Yes, agreed. If determinism is true than everything, including all of our actions, is determined (possibly also even determined at a quantum level).

But this does NOT mean that we do not have free will, as I have pointed out above. It depends critically on what one means by free will.

If we define free will as (A) "acting without being totally constrained by external factors" then this is compatible with determinsim (because most of our decisions are based on internalised constraints, not on external factors).

But if you wish to define free will as (B) "acting without any constraints at all" then this is incompatible with determinism.

The external/internal distinction is no good in combination with determisnim.

Only if you insist on the definition (B) above.

If you insist on (B), then your only hope for rescuing free will is that determinism turns out to be false (eg Libertarianism)

MF

 

[Tournesol]

we define free will as (A) "acting without being totally constrained by external factors" then this is compatible with determinsim (because most of our decisions are based on internalised constraints, not on external factors).

But the internal factors, if determinism is true, are ultimately external.

Your version of events is like saying that Lincoln was killed by a bullet,
not by a gun or John Wilkes Booth.

 

[strid]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid... You sould see it more as probabilirties...

So if I'm singing a song, its not that it is pre-determined. There are those who would say that it IS pre-detremined... maybe that the environment I am in, unconciously reminds me about this specific song and uncously makes me want to sing it.
But i would prefer seeing this as probababilities. The enviorment and all that unconcsious stuff sets up probabliites for me singing. It is still me who sings by free will but there is a specific probability for me CHOOSING to sing.

So when I enter a room where it is dark, there is say 90% probabilitythat I will turn on the light. There is a probability, but it is not pre-determined that i will turn on the light.

 

[Billy T]

...You need to understand that spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

I understand this difference.

I think at this point we should just agree to disagree on the randomness of my series. I.e. I will admit that if everything in a deterministic universe is already "entangled" with everything else, then my space like separation, does not prevent there from being a direct correlation in the decays between two spacelike separated radioactive sources.

Also in a deterministic universe, even if not entangled, the decay a B at time T2 could have many factors, none from events at A prohibited from direct causation by speed of light limit, unless entangled, but both the near simultaneous decay at A & B could have common cause(s) in the past.

Thus to one like you who thinks the universe is determined by the past, it is logically possible that my sequence is not random. I would need to rely upon the many experimental tests that have demonstrated that radio active decays are not influenced by external events (like magnetic or electrical forces and the only other two known forces are too short range).

Thus I accept that the sequence I construct from space like decays only is demonstrable random, (Even for a single source - for example assign A if interval from last decay is twice average and assign B if it is less than half average. This would have a bias towards either A or B, but with a little adjustment in the "half interval," the difference in long run between the number of A & Bs could be made very small.

I.e. I will cease to argue with you on this aspect, but think you need to do better in defining "choice" also.

For me, if the future is determined completely by the past, then nothing I would call "choice" is possible. In my example of you making a left turn (as opposed to a right one) you have the illusion of a choice, but that, like everything else, was fixed before you were born in a deterministic universe. Thus it is not a choice, it is an inevitability. That follows from what I understand the words "deterministic universe" to mean. Is that not what you understand also by these words? (Perhaps this is our communication difficulty?)

LaPlace put this well long ago. We don't know the future (epistemic problem) but in your system of beliefs, it is defined by the past. You can have the illusion of choice, but no choice can made. I.e. turning right, instead of the left you did, was not a choice as the right turn was no more possible than your walking to the moon.

If you are going to define "choice" as you have (2 inputs with one output) then turning left instead of walking to the moon was a choice, but that is not what choice means to me. There must be a selection by an agent between at least two alternatives, not uniquely following a path determined years ago, before you were born.

I admit I have only given partial definitions of "free will" and "real choices" by telling examples of things they are not. You have yet to do this, so until you do, stop asking me for more positive definitions.

Tell me what constitutes a "choice" in a universe where exactly everything that happens in 2008 (including your left turn) has already been decided.

 

[Billy T]

..."Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe...

I think I understand your position, but it is one i would call an illusion of free will. You seem to be claiming that the internalized factors that compelled (determined) you to make a left turn in 2008 would be your "free will" at the time when you "decided" to make the left turn. I claim that you as a physical body governed by the laws of nature in a completely deterministic universe, only think you are making a choice. In fact that left turn was determined before you were born.

We can agree to let me refer to this as inevitable act, producing what I call the "illusion of choice" and let you call it "a choice" because some of the deterministic factors which produced this act were "internalized" to use your term.
I.e. I am willing to drop the discussion if you like, but I would add your "already determined free will future acts" to the list of things I have already given as not "genuine free will." Except for this negative list, I admit I have difficulty defining what "genuine free will" is.

 

[Billy T]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid...

The thing that makes the exchange with Moving Finger interesting is that he is:
(1) well informed, logical etc. and
(2) is claiming that the universe is deterministic (although at times his seems not so sure about this at the quantum level).

Tournesol has made more explicit the point I was making earlier about his "free choice" even being determined before he was born - by only externalities that during his life became internalized.

BTW - his "handel" is well chosen - from the Rubiant (Fitzgerald's second translation if memory serves be correctly) "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on. / Not all you piety nor wit, can lure it back to cancel half a line of it." (Not exact also from memory.) It is my second most favorite poem. filled with determinism.

My favorite poem is "Invictus," which has just the opposite idea, concluding with: I am the captain of my ship, I am the master of my soul. (no quotes this time as from memory that is rough version.)

When I was younger, Kiplin's "IF" was important to me. - I have done most of it by now. (Fortunately, I had the good sense to "make one heap of all you winnings and lose it on one turn of pitch and toss ..." when I took all my earnings as a paper boy ($50) an bought a fraction of my father's investment in what turned out to be a dry oil well in West Virginia where I lived at age 12. (I did not even have money for my share of pipe recovery costs, so it was a total loss of "all my winings.")

 

[moving finger]

But the internal factors, if determinism is true, are ultimately external.

If determinism is true then everything is determined, by definition.
If you wish to define "free will" as "acting without any constraints whatsoever" then this kind of free will is incompatible with determinism, and there is no getting away from that.

Your version of events is like saying that Lincoln was killed by a bullet,
not by a gun or John Wilkes Booth.

If determinism is true then Lincoln's manner and time of death was predetermined at the moment of the big bang.

You clearly do not like the idea of determinism - what do you propose as an alternative?

Libertarianism is a nice airy-fairy feel-good idea, but it is groundless (in the sense that it is not supported by any coherent rational theory or experimental evidence).

MF

 

[moving finger]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid... You sould see it more as probabilirties...

So if I'm singing a song, its not that it is pre-determined. There are those who would say that it IS pre-detremined... maybe that the environment I am in, unconciously reminds me about this specific song and uncously makes me want to sing it.
But i would prefer seeing this as probababilities. The enviorment and all that unconcsious stuff sets up probabliites for me singing. It is still me who sings by free will but there is a specific probability for me CHOOSING to sing.

So when I enter a room where it is dark, there is say 90% probabilitythat I will turn on the light. There is a probability, but it is not pre-determined that i will turn on the light.

What you have described is basically Libertarianism - ie that the mind is capable of initiating some uncaused or unconstrained actions (ie "YOU" are not ruled by the laws of physics). This was also the basis of Descartes' view of Dualism (that there is a "thinking self" and a "physical self"; the physical self is subject to the laws of physics but the thinking self is somehow free and not subject to laws).

Problem is there is no coherent rational theory or any experimental evidence to support the idea that such an uncaused "thinking self" exists.

MF

 

[moving finger]

... spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

I understand this difference.

Good. Then you should understand that two spacelike separated radioactive sources can nevertheless be correlated – ie the combined output from those sources is not necessarily random.

I think at this point we should just agree to disagree on the randomness of my series.

Billy T, with respect, you are simply being blind to the obvious. Spacelike separation (I agree) DOES imply no direct causal influence; but it does NOT imply no correlation. That is a very simple truth that (I am sorry) you seem to wish to ignore.

Also in a deterministic universe, even if not entangled, the decay a B at time T2 could have many factors, none from events at A prohibited from direct causation by speed of light limit, unless entangled, but both the near simultaneous decay at A & B could have common cause(s) in the past.

In a 100% deterministic universe, if the entire universe was within causal contact at some stage in the past (ie the moment of the Big Bang) then ALL (all, not some) of the subsequent events in that universe WILL NECESSARILY BE CORRELATED. Think about it. Each and every event, no matter how far it is TODAY from other events in terms of spacelike separation, can be traced back along a pure deterministic line to the Big Bang, where all the universe arises in a common cause.

It’s a bit like a family tree. I may be on the other side of the world from and totally out of touch with my long-lost cousin, but we can both trace a link back in the past to common ancestors. Determinism acts just the same way. If the universe originated in a singularity and is 100% deterministic, then all today’s events can be traced back 100% deterministically to a common source in the past – hence ALL events are correlated today and forevermore.

The ONLY way to argue uncorrelated events is to postulate EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both). You cannot derive randomness in any other way, I am sorry.

it is logically possible that my sequence is not random. I would need to rely upon the many experimental tests that have demonstrated that radio active decays are not influenced by external events (like magnetic or electrical forces and the only other two known forces are too short range) .

It makes no difference whether radioactive events are influenced by external factors or not! I would hope (really) that someone with a PhD in physics could see this. The ONLY important factors are (a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past? If the answers to (a) and (b) are both “yes” then it necessarily follows that EVERYTHING we see is correlated with everything else, whether there is direct causal contact in the present day or not.

Thus I accept that the sequence I construct from space like decays only is demonstrable random, (Even for a single source - for example assign A if interval from last decay is twice average and assign B if it is less than half average. This would have a bias towards either A or B, but with a little adjustment in the "half interval," the difference in long run between the number of A & Bs could be made very small.

I.e. I will cease to argue with you on this aspect, but think you need to do better in defining "choice" also.

You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

For me, if the future is determined completely by the past, then nothing I would call "choice" is possible.

Implicit in your argument is the assumption that you are referring to “free choice” or “unconstrained choice” as opposed to “constrained choice”. In a deterministic universe, then it is a simple fact that all choices are constrained. I can still make choices in such a universe, and a computer can still make choices, it is simply the case that our choices are constrained, by determinism.

In my example of you making a left turn (as opposed to a right one) you have the illusion of a choice,

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained.

but that, like everything else, was fixed before you were born in a deterministic universe. Thus it is not a choice, it is an inevitability.

It is still a choice, I am sorry. I choose between two possibilities. I agree my choice may be pre-determined, but that does not make it “not a choice”.

That follows from what I understand the words "deterministic universe" to mean. Is that not what you understand also by these words? (Perhaps this is our communication difficulty?)

Our communication difficulty (I believe) is based on different definitions. You still have not defined what you mean by free will.

LaPlace put this well long ago. We don't know the future (epistemic problem) but in your system of beliefs, it is defined by the past.

No. If the world is deterministic then the future is defined by the past (and also the past by the future by the way). I am open-minded as to whether the world is deterministic or not.

You can have the illusion of choice, but no choice can made. I.e. turning right, instead of the left you did, was not a choice as the right turn was no more possible than your walking to the moon.

If the universe is deterministic then my choices are pre-determined and constrained, yes.

If you are going to define "choice" as you have (2 inputs with one output) then turning left instead of walking to the moon was a choice, but that is not what choice means to me

Clearly.

There must be a selection by an agent between at least two alternatives, not uniquely following a path determined years ago, before you were born

But there ARE two alternatives in the mind of the agent. The agent can model the situation and can foresee what will happen with (a) and with (b), even if the agent is operating deterministically. The choice that the agent subsequently makes may well be determined, but in my book that would simply be a “constrained choice”.

I admit I have only given partial definitions of "free will" and "real choices" by telling examples of things they are not. You have yet to do this, so until you do, stop asking me for more positive definitions

I beg your pardon? I have given VERY clear and concise definitions of both free will and choice in this thread. If we provide clear and unambiguous definitions about what these terms “mean”, then ( I hope you would agree) we should not need to explain what these terms “do not mean”.
You choose not to accept the definitions I offered (on the other hand, in your definition of choice, maybe you did not in fact “choose”?), but that does not mean that I have not defined these terms. You are the one that seems to refuse to define what you are talking about. I wonder why?

To refresh your memory, my definitions are :

free will is the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable (post #47)

A choice between two or more alternatives is the equivalent of simply taking two or more inputs and producing one output. (post #49)

Tell me what constitutes a "choice" in a universe where exactly everything that happens in 2008 (including your left turn) has already been decided

Read the definition above. The difference between us is that you seem to assume that “choice” necessarily implies “unconstrained choice”, whereas I do not.

..."Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe...

I think I understand your position, but it is one i would call an illusion of free will.

And that is exactly what I predicted – that many people would prefer to call this an "illusion".
But free will as I have defined it here is 100% compatible with determinism, hence is not an illusion, even in a deterministic universe.
I do not accept that you can make the conclusion that free will is an illusion, unless and until you provide an alternative definition of free will (which you seem reluctant to do) which can be shown to be incompatible with determinism – hence your conclusion is invalid.

You seem to be claiming that the internalized factors that compelled (determined) you to make a left turn in 2008 would be your "free will" at the time when you "decided" to make the left turn

No. I am claiming that anyone who defines free will as I have done above is correct in believing that they act with free will. You seem to have a different definition of free will, but as long as you insist on keeping the definition “secret” then (with respect) it is irrelevant whether you think free will is an illusion or not.
What you are in effect saying is that “something that I cannot/will not define, is an illusion”, which is pretty meaningless really, don’t you agree?

I claim that you as a physical body governed by the laws of nature in a completely deterministic universe, only think you are making a choice

We are going round in circles, aren’t we. Depends on one’s definition of choice, and you clearly believe that choice implies unconstrained choice, whereas I do not. Period.

In fact that left turn was determined before you were born

If the universe is deterministic, yes I agree.

We can agree to let me refer to this as inevitable act, producing what I call the "illusion of choice" and let you call it "a choice" because some of the deterministic factors which produced this act were "internalized" to use your term.

I would prefer to say that it is a constrained choice; or that in a deterministic universe, we cannot make unconstrained choices.

I.e. I am willing to drop the discussion if you like, but I would add your "already determined free will future acts" to the list of things I have already given as not "genuine free will." Except for this negative list, I admit I have difficulty defining what "genuine free will" is.

If you do not accept the definition of free will that I have provided already some time ago, then with respect I don’t think we can make any further progress in this debate unless and until you provide an alternative definition of free will that you are happy with.

The thing that makes the exchange with Moving Finger interesting is that he is:
(1) well informed, logical etc. and
(2) is claiming that the universe is deterministic (although at times his seems not so sure about this at the quantum level).

Why, thank you!
Just to clarify this – I am intuitively inclined to believe that the universe is 100% deterministic even at a quantum level, however my scientific training tells me to remain open-minded on this, because it has not been proven that QM is either deterministic or indeterministic (even though the Schroedinger equation is 100% deterministic in configuration space). This is why I very often preface my arguments with “if the universe is 100% deterministic”.

However, IF QM is indeterministic (ie random) then I still do not see how this can be a source of the naïve type of free will that most people seem to want to have (but cannot define).

BTW - his "handel" is well chosen - from the Rubiant (Fitzgerald's second translation if memory serves be correctly) "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on. / Not all you piety nor wit, can lure it back to cancel half a line of it." (Not exact also from memory.) It is my second most favorite poem. filled with determinism.

Well done! Except that it says NOTHING of determinism, but everything about the impossibility of changing the past

The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
The Rubôayôat of Omar Khayyôam, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (1953)

MF

 

[moving finger]

My favorite poem is "Invictus," which has just the opposite idea, concluding with: I am the captain of my ship, I am the master of my soul. (no quotes this time as from memory that is rough version.)

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul
William Ernest Henley. 1849–1903

Billy T, I believe it is such a shame that you cannot see how all of this is entirely compatible with determinism, as long as one accepts the definition of free will that I have given.

To understand where freedom comes from, one needs to understand that the "I" in the poem is not an infinitesimal dimensionless point in space. "I" comprises a finite volume within the deterministic universe. As such, many of the causes and effects that make the "I" what it is, the constraints of "I", are internally contained within the "I". Thus the "I" to which we refer is not simply a powerless cork bobbing on the ocean of determinism, it is a PART of that deterministic ocean, intertwined and convoluted with the causes and effects of the rest of the universe. Within the "I" there are multiple, hidden and ambiguous self-referential causal loops which (because of their self-referential nature) absolutely prohibit the possibility of determining cause and effect relationships by anyone interacting within the same universe.

Thus I believe that such an "I" is indeed the captain of it's fate, EVEN THOUGH THE FATE IS PRE-DETERMINED. I know it seems very difficult to understand, but it is understandable, as long as you realize that the "I" is part and parcel of the deterministic universe, and part and parcel of the fate it talks about.

The poem says nothing about whether "I" can unconstrainedly choose the future; ideas about "freedom of choice" are interpretations that the naive amongst us read into the poem. The processor controlling a ship's motion can still be said to be the "captain of the fate of the ship", even if the processor is acting deterministically. At the end of the day, it is the instructions from the processor which cause the ship to move in one way or another (regardless of whether these instructions are predetermined or not).

Where I believe most people (naively) go wrong is in thinking dualistically; thinking in terms of, on the one hand, an absolutely separate "I" which is not subject to physical laws, and on the other "the rest of the deterministic universe". To most people who think about this in a naive fashion, this is the only way to make sense of freedom of will within a deterministic universe. In part, I blame the traditional 3rd part objective scientific reductionist way of looking at problems.

MF