News When will the world reach peak fossil fuel production?

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Steve Mohr's extensive study from Newcastle University projects a peak in global fossil fuel production between 2016 and 2018, with coal and oil peaking in 2019 and 2011-2012, respectively. The study highlights that current energy consumption equates to every person on Earth having 90 slaves, emphasizing the unsustainable nature of fossil fuel reliance. Unconventional oil and gas are expected to extend production curves but won't alter peak dates. Concerns are raised about the rapid depletion of coal, particularly given its reliance in countries like China and India, while natural gas is projected to play a significant role in future energy scenarios. Overall, the findings underscore the urgent need for addressing energy sustainability and carbon footprint limits.
  • #201
apeiron said:
Is there any evidence or model that says human ingenuity must run ahead of the game here?

Past civilisations have collapsed because of resource limits. But this time round might be different because we have fully liberated human ingenuity with laisser-faire economics?
I'd say the evidence is in the fact that society hasn't stagnated or that new societies haven't collapsed for the same reason old ones have. I'd also say that the burden of proof shoe is on the other foot: clearly not all civilizations that collapsed did so because of resource depletion, but the peak oil claim is that society must eventually collapse because of peak oil. Has no society ever adapted to a depletion of resources?
 
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  • #202
mheslep said:
Have you http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/books/review/Easterly-t.html" I'm about to.

Haven't read the book (and the unkind would point out that Ridley was a chairman of Northern Rock among other things - a UK poster child for unsustainable growth models in finance) but the basic idea is clear enough.

Yes, broadly speaking, evolutionary theory would seem the natural way to model our adaptive capacity here. And we have a lot of reason to believe in our power to adapt.

But an immediate question presents itself. Is evolution is a theory about progressive advance or the maximising of entropification?

The cornucopian paradigm would seem wedded to a belief that it is all about human progress - things will keep getting better in some overall or global sense.

This could mean everyone is gets happier, or healthier, or GPD per capita rises forever, or human population keeps growing, or human social complexity keeps increasing. But to be a model, the cornucopian view would have to be able to spell out its measure of success.

And if this could be argued to be a natural goal, then we could argue that evolutionary theory is the model that predicts we will adapt and keep on moving towards this goal.

However most modern theoretical biologists (the ones I know, like Stan Salthe for instance http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/9/2/83/pdf) argue instead that evolution is about the acceleration of entropification. The natural goal is to dissipate gradients as fast as possible. And so this being the case, the "genius" of Homo sapiens will be directed towards exactly this goal. Our adaptive capacity is in fact being used to deplete the world of its natural resources.

So if left just to the natural forces of evolution, we would predict that human culture would evolve to "progressively" towards achieving that goal. And this of course appears to fit the facts. We are driven to be wasteful consumers of the otherwise locked away energy of fossil fuels.

Thus while I agree that evolutionary theory is a way to account for adaptive capacity, the same mechanism could have two quite different goals - some handwavey and pious notion of human ascension vs obedience to the second law of thermodynamics. And thus quite different views of the likely outcome.

So the cornucopian view seems to have to not only explain an adaptive capacity sufficient to stay a step ahead of resource depletion, but how that adaptive capacity is going to be used for anything other than the purpose of achieving resource depletion.

Of course, at this point people will begin appealing to things such as the "survival instinct". Or human foresight and choice. But again, let's hear something about the model that supports a belief in such things.

If I was continuing the cornucopian argument, I would now talk about anticipatory systems. I would be looking at the kind of societies that could indeed look ahead, agree "unnatural" goals like turning down the burn rate, and avoiding hitting the buffers.

My model of such a society would look rather different from the laisser-faire economies that Micawaber-like, say keep charging ahead blindly in the safe expecation that something will always turn up to rescue the day.

But that is not the kind of model that Ridley and his like are pushing, is it? So what kind of economic/social model can be shown to have 1) rich adaptive capacity, 2) a defined metric of success, and 3) sufficient anticipatory capacity to make choices far enough ahead of time with some certainty.

Laisser-faire economics would seem to offer only 1. On 2, the metric is usually GDP growth (a measure of entropification really) and perhaps a few quality of life stats like average life expectancy. On 3, there is a faith in market signals. Which is something - though you need a market (and do we have markets for goods like ecological services yet)? And you need honest markets (the credit crunch exposed that little issue bigtime - a shadow banking system orders of magnitude larger than the official one).

Another datapoint to throw into the mix is the question of whether we really are seeing rising rates of human innovation. There is the well-know criticisms of Jonathan Huebner for instance - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jonathan_Huebner

But to restate the question, a malthusian view of resource depletion seems easy to model. If a resource is finite and its exploitation exponential, the exploiting system can be predicted to hit a sudden wall. Even if the system has proven itself highly innovative in its past, there is no reason to expect it to have the kind of innovative capacity to handle the scale of disruption it must eventually strike.

The model supporting a cornucopian view is not clear to me at all. The best I can think of is that the system at question has been through enough disruptions in the past and has proved it has built up a general disruption handling capacity. But I would expect such a system to have recognisable methods for looking ahead so as to prepare for disruptions in timely fashion. And not to show a boom and bust bubble mentality when it comes to economics.

If we had a cornucopian model like this, we would be able to plug in the performance of countries and see how well designed they really are. We could say with some confidence that society is doing the right things. But I've talked to plenty of cornucopian economists who have said in a hand wavey fashion, humans are remarkably adaptive. However none so far who have been able to back this up with a formal model.

Another term for this is of course resilience. And there is a literature on that in relation to the disruptions of natural disasters. Peak oilers spend a lot of their time talking about building resilience and social capital too. But I guess that is back to the malthusian perspective.

I'm tossing around a lot of ideas here. But it is because I have not come across a robust reason to believe the cornucopian pitch. If there is a model out there, it would be great to be able to kick its tyres.
 
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  • #203
russ_watters said:
I'd say the evidence is in the fact that society hasn't stagnated or that new societies haven't collapsed for the same reason old ones have. I'd also say that the burden of proof shoe is on the other foot: clearly not all civilizations that collapsed did so because of resource depletion, but the peak oil claim is that society must eventually collapse because of peak oil. Has no society ever adapted to a depletion of resources?

Are you so sure? Jared Diamond would be one who argues that carrying capacity is the most general factor in the collapse of societies.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse:_How_Societies_Choose_to_Fail_or_Succeed

And the peak oilers optimistic scenario is a bumpy energy descent where we turn away from consumerism and relocalise. So this would be adaptation and an appealing vision to some.
 
  • #204
russ_watters said:
I figured out exactly what data came from the calculator. I have an idea of where the data came from for the other claim and it appears to me to be at best sloppy and at worst cherry-picked for the purpose of deception. Are you saying you know exactly what data came from the other link and what the resulting calculation was? Seriously? Do share with the rest of the class. We have two vastly different claims and need to reconcile how they can be so different.

So you didn't need more info, you have a problem with the info? That makes sense, but why not just say that in the first place?
 
  • #205
apeiron said:
Are you so sure? Jared Diamond would be one who argues that carrying capacity is the most general factor in the collapse of societies.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse:_How_Societies_Choose_to_Fail_or_Succeed

And the peak oilers optimistic scenario is a bumpy energy descent where we turn away from consumerism and relocalise. So this would be adaptation and an appealing vision to some.

In fact, boom or bust, we're bound to adapt, but adaptation may not be the most pleasant experience for the people living through it.
 
  • #206
apeiron said:
Haven't read the book (and the unkind would point out that Ridley was a chairman of Northern Rock among other things - a UK poster child for unsustainable growth models in finance) but the basic idea is clear enough.
And has doctorate in Zoology from Oxford. More later, maybe after I've read him.
 
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  • #207
mheslep said:
And has doctorate in Zoology from Oxford. More later, maybe after I've read him.

Maybe he wants to return the planet to non-human animals. :wink:


OR...

Maybe he's a bunch of wild animals in a PERSON MASK! TA TA TUM!
 
  • #208
Office_Shredder said:
As many as we're willing to pay for of course.

So far we have been willing to pay for an insignificant number. Do we expect this to change? I do not.
 
  • #209
Republican congressman, he say...

What America Needs
The total commitment of WWII
The technology intensity and focus of the Apollo Program to land a man on the moon$275 billion in 2006 dollars
The urgency of the Manhattan Project to develop the atom bomb $1.1 trillion in 2006 dollars
Mitigate Peak Oil $3-4 trillion over 20 years BEFORE peak in 2006 dollars

http://bartlett.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Energy%20Bartlett%20Special%20Order%20Charts%20Feb%2028%202008.pdf

The presentation is a couple of years old, but has good graphs.

The cornucopian view is that fuel substitution will happen in response to market signals. But the problem is that oil is not yet being priced in a way to send signals.

Because energy consumption is the economy, price rises puncture the economy and so collapse the price. If you want markets to deliver, they have to have the right feedback loops built into them.

Anyway, politicians are now worried. Even the IEA has changed its tune. The EIA is becoming the last optimist in the room.

A good summary of how the tune has been changing...

http://resourceinsights.blogspot.com/2011/01/you-dont-have-to-take-my-word-for-it.html
 
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  • #210
apeiron said:
The cornucopian view is that fuel substitution will happen in response to market signals. But the problem is that oil is not yet being priced in a way to send signals.

Because energy consumption is the economy, price rises puncture the economy and so collapse the price.
Seems to be priced sufficiently to make, for example, these alternatives economically viable: tar sand oil in Canada, some biofuels, PHEVs/EVs, more fuel efficient ICE vehicles.

Edit: the price signals might be a little more realistic without the $3-400 billion annual oil subsidies ($500 billion all fossil energy)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27c0ff92-7192-11df-8eec-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BGJ6ZsCl
 
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  • #211
mheslep said:
Seems to be priced sufficiently to make, for example, these alternatives economically viable: tar sand oil in Canada, some biofuels, PHEVs/EVs, more fuel efficient ICE vehicles.

I agree, but if you argue that those are a decade or so overdue (the middle, less so), then we're still behind the 8 ball on this. That just sends the debate back to "Go" however, and this is NOT my area of... you know I was going to say expertise, but I'll say "competence" and just be honest.
 
  • #212
nismaratwork said:
I agree, but if you argue that those are a decade or so overdue (the middle, less so), then we're still behind the 8 ball on this. That just sends the debate back to "Go" however, and this is NOT my area of... you know I was going to say expertise, but I'll say "competence" and just be honest.

This is the crux. Are things being left too late because a) political leadership does not get it/feels paralysed, or are we b) needlessly worrying because those in charge have already worked out all the angles and can see a path through?

I know what I believe from a lifetime seeing political decision making at close quarters (option a of course!).

But hopefully mheslep will return as promised with a cornucopian model of the situation that is convincing. I would like not to have to worry about peak cheap energy and only worry about global warming and global over-population o:).
 
  • #213
apeiron said:
This is the crux. Are things being left too late because a) political leadership does not get it/feels paralysed, or are we b) needlessly worrying because those in charge have already worked out all the angles and can see a path through?

I know what I believe from a lifetime seeing political decision making at close quarters (option a of course!).

But hopefully mheslep will return as promised with a cornucopian model of the situation that is convincing. I would like not to have to worry about peak cheap energy and only worry about global warming and global over-population o:).

Oh yeah, I don't think anyone is going to be sad if the cornucopian model is TRUE. I'd like to live in an ice-cream castle in heaven when I die too; I'm not placing my bets on it. :wink:
 
  • #214
apeiron said:
This is the crux. Are things being left too late because a) political leadership does not get it/feels paralysed, or are we b) needlessly worrying because those in charge have already worked out all the angles and can see a path through?

I think there are more cases.

1) leadership does not get it
2) leadership already has it figured out
3) leadership knows it is an issue and sees no solution
4) leadership knows it is an issue and sees no easy solution

My guess is #4. About three years ago Lawrence Livermore National Labs (US) was advertising for an economist to study the total life cycle cost of all future energy generation systems. I would love to know the results of that study.
 
  • #215
You know, we could probably significantly reduce fuel consumption (and hence petroleum) and also shave trillions out of healthcare expenditures, if Americans would lose some weight!
 
  • #216
CAC1001 said:
You know, we could probably significantly reduce fuel consumption (and hence petroleum) and also shave trillions out of healthcare expenditures, if Americans would lose some weight!

Yeah, that's what will change the course of fossil fuel history... :-p
 
  • #217
Some more modelling that perhaps gets under the skin of the peak oiler vs cornucopian debate.

http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-01-17/no-peak-oil-yet-limits-hubbert-model

This study contrasts the story for US oil production and US gas production. The one is peaked as Hubbert's curve predicted, the other still seems to be responding to cornucopian hopes - as prices rise, this stimulates innovation (such as fracking) that increases supply.

But...
 
  • #218
http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/daily-news/101221-US-Demand-for-Gasoline-Dropping/"

US News said:
America's demand for gasoline has declined four years in a row and will not reach the 2006 level again, even when the economy fully recovers,” USA Today says.
furthermore
US News said:
’'People wildly underestimate the effect that all this* is going to have on gasoline demand,’” says Paul Sankey, an analyst at Deutsche Bank who spoke with the AP. Sankey says that “by 2030 America will use just 5.4 million barrels a day, the same as in 1969.
He's referring there only to US motor gasoline consumption (not all petroleum derivatives) which has been hovering under 9 million barrels a day for a while now.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MGFUPUS2a.jpg

*'this' being:
o ICE cars and trucks becoming more fuel efficient
o blending of ethanol
o people driving less
o higher prices
o advent of hybrids and EVs
o waning popularity of SUVs
 
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  • #219
mheslep said:
http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/daily-news/101221-US-Demand-for-Gasoline-Dropping/"


furthermore

He's referring there only to US motor gasoline consumption (not all petroleum derivatives) which has been hovering under 9 million barrels a day for a while now.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MGFUPUS2a.jpg

*'this' being:
o ICE cars and trucks becoming more fuel efficient
o blending of ethanol
o people driving less
o higher prices
o advent of hybrids and EVs
o waning popularity of SUVs

Is there any indication that the petroleum market isn't finding an amenable customer in China? GM seems to think it's a good place to sell cars, and I think it's the definition of a growing market. Is there some indication that China won't pick up the slack, and then some?
 
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  • #220
nismaratwork said:
Is there any indication that the petroleum market isn't finding an amenable customer in China? GM seems to think it's a good place to sell cars, and I think it's the definition of a growing market. Is there some indication that China won't pick up the slack, and then some?
There's some. Chinese bought 21 million electric bikes/scooters last year with 100 million total on the road.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904334,00.html
 
  • #221
mheslep said:
There's some. Chinese bought 21 million electric bikes/scooters last year with 100 million total on the road.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904334,00.html

Yes, and they don't exactly have to gentrify much of the population to exert astounding purchasing power. Given that corporations have only very loose national ties in many cases, and are naturally addicted to money... do the math. China is the cocaine dealer of choice for junkies, if you substitute, "money" for cocaine, and "the US" for junkies.
 
  • #222
CAC1001 said:
One thing on this though, energy isn't so much what concerns me as usage of petroleum for materials. I mean everything from tires to plastics to laundry detergent, you need petroleum to make. Even if we could power our cities all on solar power, we still need petroleum for making things, right?

This is the case that this movie makes. Has anyone seen it? The guy talks about the countless petroleum products that can't be easily made with other materials. Most cars are full of plastic. Who cares if you can't afford to drive your car if can't afford to buy one any longer. mheslep thinks we can recycle enough, but I highly doubt we can recycle enough to meet future demand.

http://www.collapsemovie.com/
 
  • #223
Greg Bernhardt said:
This is the case that this movie makes. Has anyone seen it? The guy talks about the countless petroleum products that can't be easily made with other materials. Most cars are full of plastic. Who cares if you can't afford to drive your car if can't afford to buy one any longer. mheslep thinks we can recycle enough, but I highly doubt we can recycle enough to meet future demand.
Apparently petrochemical feedstock is about http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_psup_dc_nus_mbblpd_a.htm" since 2004; I can only speculate as to why. In any case plastics are all carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Maybe some of our chemists can address synthesis from the basics, but I can't imagine it is all that difficult given sufficient energy. Maybe the movie will show otherwise (thanks).
 
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  • #224
mheslep said:
but I can't imagine it is all that difficult given sufficient energy. Maybe the movie will show otherwise (thanks).

I fully accept you know vastly more about the subject than me. However is there a key in what you just said there? "given sufficient energy". Where are we going to get that energy? :)
 
  • #225
Greg Bernhardt said:
I fully accept you know vastly more about the subject than me. However is there a key in what you just said there? "given sufficient energy". Where are we going to get that energy? :)
Well right, that was https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3067871&postcount=198", or some of the other couple hundred posts in this thread. :wink:
 
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  • #226
The issue for the US that imports so much energy is net export oil. There is a fine talk about this issue at
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=db3a600e-e93f-43ae-80d8-0f1cfbb328fe
It makes the case that the top five exports will have zero oil available for export in about 2031. That is not to say they have zero production. It is to say that they increase their domestic use and are at this point using all their production for themselves. So the next 20 years will be interesting.
 
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  • #227
PhilKravitz said:
The issue for the US that imports so much energy is net export oil. There is a fine talk about this issue at
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=db3a600e-e93f-43ae-80d8-0f1cfbb328fe
It makes the case that the top five exports will have zero oil available for export in about 2031. That is not to say they have zero production. It is to say that they increase their domestic use and are at this point using all their production for themselves. So the next 20 years will be interesting.
That comes about from the assumption that the Saudi's will continue to not develop their largely untouched remaining oil reserves, and continue instead to hold production at current rates, while at the same time extrapolating a Saudi domestic increase in oil consumption at ~6% per year out through the 2030's, a trend counter to what is seen now in the developed world. I don't think either one of those assumptions are warranted.
 
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  • #228
mheslep said:
That comes about from the assumption that the Saudi's will continue to not develop their largely untouched remaining oil reserves,

No. Their assumption is that Saudi does not have large untouched reserves. Just as Matt Simon's made the point in his book "Sunset in the Desert".
 
  • #229
PhilKravitz said:
No. Their assumption is that Saudi does not have large untouched reserves. Just as Matt Simon's made the point in his book "Sunset in the Desert".
From one the Sandia slides, 21:00

Conventional Wisdom - The Economist Quote About Saudi Arabia

Saudi Aramco's proved reserves alone could keep the world supplied for several decades. But it is only exploiting ten of its 80 or so fields, so will be able to pump at the present rate for about 70 years even if it never discovers another drop of oil

Economist Magazine, August 10, 2006
 
  • #230
mheslep said:
From one the Sandia slides, 21:00

Aramco?... you mean, the company that becomes defunct if Saudi Oil dries up? I'm not sure if this is evidence of something, or just a prospectus.
 
  • #231
The counter is the Hubbert curve fits to the actual Saudi production data.

Yes it could be that they have secret fields, the same has been said of the US. Time will tell.
 
  • #232
PhilKravitz said:
The counter is the Hubbert curve fits to the actual Saudi production data.

Yes it could be that they have secret fields, the same has been said of the US. Time will tell.
The point of the Sandia brief, as I quickly went through it, was that the Saudi fields are not unknown nor secret but known and purposely not developed. As quoted above, they are exploiting only 1 in 8 of their known fields. Yes if they keep this up this artificial limitation internal demand make eventually overtake supply.
 
  • #233
mheslep said:
The point of the Sandia brief, as I quickly went through it, was that the Saudi fields are not unknown nor secret but known and purposely not developed. As quoted above, they are exploiting only 1 in 8 of their known fields. Yes if they keep this up this artificial limitation internal demand make eventually overtake supply.

Unless of course that's just Aramco's fantasy... and really, when is a company going to tell its investors: "Hey guys, the reaper is literally breathing down our necks! Bail now!"?
 
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  • #234
PhilKravitz said:
The issue for the US that imports so much energy is net export oil. There is a fine talk about this issue at
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=db3a600e-e93f-43ae-80d8-0f1cfbb328fe
It makes the case that the top five exports will have zero oil available for export in about 2031.

This is indeed a great talk - in a "may as well curl up and die right now" kind of way.

There was one really good policy suggestion in the Q&A. Because energy consumption is GDP, it makes sense to replace payroll tax with an energy consumption tax. So this would create the direct market signal that the situation needs. You can fill up your Hummer, but it is going to cost so much you might have to take the new neighbourhood tramtrain instead. So no taxes except on your fuel use.

And it was a little weird of mheslep to pull out the Economist quote out of the presentation as clearly that was the conventional wisdom the whole presentation debunks.

If Saudi has vast secret reserves, then that does not look reflected in the production curves, as Brown argues in slide 12. All other past and current scenarios fit the data (Brown claims) so Saudi would have to have been quietly carrying out some outlier production policy all this time. Are the Saudis really that politically sophisticated?

Overall, the presentation is very bad news. Top 5 exporters projected to cease exporting by 2031. And fuel price rises will be geometric as a consequence (from $100 a barrel, to $200, then $400, etc). Brown says the rich would bid up the price of remaining exports and so there is an accelerating feedback mechanism as part of the end game.

Of course all sorts of things would be happening at that stage. For instance, top exporters like Russia and Saudi might be having crash efficiency campaigns that would prolong their ability to supply. On the other hand, they would probably also decide to limit export so as to be able to supply their own folk.
 
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  • #235
apeiron said:
[...]
And it was a little weird of mheslep to pull out the Economist quote out of the presentation as clearly that was the conventional wisdom the whole presentation debunks.
Brown's presentation is all about pushing the idea that internal consumption eventually will net out exports to zero. He produces nothing almost nothing new on production, that is to the counter the notion as espoused by the Economist, that the Saudi's are exploiting only "ten of its 80 or so fields."

If Saudi has vast secret reserves, then that does not look reflected in the production curves, as Brown argues in slide 12. All other past and current scenarios fit the data (Brown claims) so Saudi would have to have been quietly carrying out some outlier production policy all this time. Are the Saudis really that politically sophisticated?
The current Saudi operation requires no secrecy or Machiavellian planning. They could simply choose a level of production to maintain or to slowly increase world prices.

We have (here) on this subject one respectable reference, that from the Economist on Saudi production, and no references at all to contradict it.
 
  • #236
mheslep said:
The point of the Sandia brief, as I quickly went through it, was that the Saudi fields are not unknown nor secret but known and purposely not developed. As quoted above, they are exploiting only 1 in 8 of their known fields.

I'm still scratching my head about this. Saudi reserves are indeed a state secret. People are reduced to using google maps satellite pictures to count oil wells and get some idea of the actual production trends. (http://www.theoildrum.com/tag/ghawar ). So the first point is that we are not dealing with "knowns" here, just trying to make sense of a lot of contradictory messages.

Here is as close to an honest answer as I've seen (http://www.energybulletin.net/node/50234 and http://www.energybulletin.net/node/50364) - which is a vote of confidence that Saudi can maintain 10 million barrels a day over a reasonable term, but the IEA goal of pushing Saudi to 15 mbd by 2020 (and that Saudi should already be at 12 mbd) is not do-able. And we have to remember that Saudi is in fact down around 8 mbd, and that during the 2008 price spike it appeared not to be responding to this price signal and so led some to feel it had in fact peaked.

- http://tomweston.net/saudioil.txt
- http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-05/saudi-arabia-s-2010-oil-production-exceeded-opec-quota-by-4-3-u-s-says.html
- http://www.silverbearcafe.com/private/saudireserves.html

And the second point - the implication that there is a ton in the ground because only 1 in 8 fields is being tapped - I think you will find that all the big fields are indeed in production and the rest are small fry. That was the Matt Simmons argument.

Or do you have do you have a source that backs up the impression Saudi are only tapping an eighth of what they have?
 
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  • #237
I went back and caught all of Brown's narrative. Ug. I did not find it instructive.
 
  • #238
Somewhere in the presentation early on Brown states, "the area under the [Hubbert] curve gives the ultimate recoverable reserves". I'm not inclined to argue with Brown per se, but I grant the point seems common in the peak oil discussion. So here's an example showing my problem with the assertion. Below is the coal production in the UK from 1900 to ~now.

2yy5bnr.png


The earlier history shows an increase similar to this century's decrease; ~1850 had 50 mt/year, about the same as todays, with production peaking in 1913 at 260 mt/year. Taken together this makes a nice 'Hubbert' curve from 1845, peaking in 1913, and tailing off to today. Roughly, the area under that curve (by linear approximation), or the total recoverable coal per Brown, in the UK should have been ~16,000 mt from beginning to end, leaving only dwindling scraps now.

That conclusion is wildly wrong. Various http://www.coal.gov.uk/media/860AD/Response%20to%20Energy%20Review%20-%20Appendix%202.pdf" coal in the UK. These surveys don't speculate on coal at sci fi depths either, they're limited to no deeper than 4000 ft. Economics, not depletion, has done away with UK coal production. We can speculate on several reasons: the rise of North Sea oil, cheaper US and Chinese coal, expense of exporting coal solids, perhaps mines planned poorly long ago mines, now collapsed and flooded, that would still be economic if constructed properly to begin with, and so on.
 
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  • #239
mheslep said:
We have (here) on this subject one respectable reference, that from the Economist on Saudi production, and no references at all to contradict it.

Again, the issue is not the raw number of Saudi fields (well it is insofar it is a state secret) but the size of them. So this is what you need to provide evidence for. Otherwise the statement seems intentionally deceptive.

Wiki says...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_reserves_in_Saudi_Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia has around 100 major oil and gas fields, over half of its oil reserves are contained in only eight giant oil fields, including the Ghawar Field.

Despite its large number of oil fields, 90 percent of Saudi Arabia's oil production comes from only five fields and up to 60 percent of its production comes from the Ghawar field.[7]

Since 1982, the Saudis have withheld their well data and any detailed data on their reserves, giving outside experts no way to verify Saudi claims regarding the overall size of their reserves and output.

So we can see the powerlaw distribution of reserves that makes a "1 in 8" comment meaningless.

If Saudi has managed to hide a few more Ghawars up its sleeve, that would not only be a triumph of secrecy unparalleled, but it would also look rather out of line with basic statistical probability here.

A little more source is required, no matter how respected :smile: you find the Economist.
 
  • #240
In response to Brown's main point, internal consumption will rapidly grow to eat internal production of todays oil exporters, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/canada/Oil.html" contrary to Brown's assertion in the talk (maybe it was true then).

[PLAIN]http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/canada/images/oil_production.gif

That is, Canadian net exports have increasing mostly continuously since ~1990. To go off and speak at Sandia on a net exports theory and ignore this fact is reckless.
 
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  • #241
apeiron said:
Again, the issue is not the raw number of Saudi fields (well it is insofar it is a state secret) but the size of them. So this is what you need to provide evidence for. Otherwise the statement seems intentionally deceptive.
[...]
A little more source is required, no matter how respected :smile: you find the Economist.
Then take it up with the Economist, not me.
 
  • #242
mheslep said:
We can speculate on several reasons: the rise of North Sea oil, cheaper US and Chinese coal, expense of exporting coal solids, perhaps mines planned poorly long ago mines, now collapsed and flooded, that would still be economic if constructed properly to begin with, and so on.

You can throw in other non-reserve factors too, such as pits were part of the social fabric and spent seams were kept going with subsidies just to provide continuity of local jobs. Thatcher came in and with the bonus of north sea oil was able to take on the mining unions in a power show-down.

But that is beside the point. Hubbert curve thinking is all about the varieties of friction that accumulate and force a shift from a first phase of easy extraction followed by a second of diminishing returns.

Anyway, back to what you were saying about all the untapped Saudi reserves which are known and should give us comfort...
 
  • #243
mheslep said:
Then take it up with the Economist, not me.

No fair. You cherry-picked this slide from the presentation and gave it to us out of context.

It seems to me a clear reason why "mainstream" sources can't be trusted - the quote is basically spin.

So you are saying you cannot find support for the 1 in 8 statement and want to close the discussion? OK, I can understand that.
 
  • #244
apeiron said:
You can throw in other non-reserve factors too, such as pits were part of the social fabric and spent seams were kept going with subsidies just to provide continuity of local jobs. Thatcher came in and with the bonus of north sea oil was able to take on the mining unions in a power show-down.
Exactly, agreed.

But that is beside the point. Hubbert curve thinking is all about the varieties of friction that accumulate and force a shift from a first phase of easy extraction followed by a second of diminishing returns...
Not according to Brown in this talk. He clearly states the production curve produces "ultimate recoverable reserves". That might indeed occur sometimes, but as a rule he's simply wrong.
 
  • #245
mheslep said:
That is, Canadian net exports have increasing mostly continuously since ~1990. To go off and speak at Sandia on a net exports theory and ignore this fact is reckless.

The Canadian story is a little indeed, err, special given Nafta. :smile:

One implication of this “proportionality clause” is that although as shown in Trends in Canadian Petroleum Production and Consumption, Canada is a net petroleum exporter, it still has to import petroleum to cover the excess (i.e., the excess over net production minus domestic consumption) petroleum it sends to the USA. Up till now that had not been a problem, because importing petroleum from Europe, the Middle East and from the USA, has been cheaper than shipping oil from Western Canada.

http://crash-watcher.blogspot.com/2010/11/canadapetroleum-superpower-or-super.html
 
  • #246
mheslep said:
Then take it up with the Economist, not me.

Yeah, from someone else I might buy that... not from you. You're way too bright to slip and fall into that one. I'd say, support the post you made with 'The Economist', and find a new source, or remove it. If the problem really is that you can be so easily gulled by this magazine, it may be best that you don't use it as a source.

This discussion over the last two pages has been driven by that piece of misinformation that you're not even willing to support. I find that a bit frustrating from someone as experienced and knowledgeable (according to Gokul, and you... and Russ, and others). Can you think how you might handle this if the situation were reversed... and yeah, I already know how you often have in the past; post records are great.

I'd add, that the Saudi Government ceases to be a meaningful authority in a country of international importance once those resources dry up. Obviously that process, and the possibility of annexation or war, increase as that peak and drop-off approach. I think you could argue that the entirety of Saudi oil production, and the house of Saud in general IS "Machiavellian", and they NOW require that approach. Having painted themselves into a corner politically, and socially with Wahabi Islam... I'd guess the greatest fear of anyone with a stake in SA is in fact that the oil-horizon appears.
 
  • #247
A little more on the near-term view on peak oil and conventional reserves.

1) Does Saudi have a lot more up its sleeve?

Here you can contrast the views of two top former Aramco staff. Here is a good WSJ analysis.

http://saudioilproduction.blogspot.com/2008/06/saleri-and-husseini.html

Husseini is sticking to his guns as recent interviews already cited show. And here from his own company website he still emphasises this key quote.

Husseini expressed a negative view about the world's proved oil reserves—
“[World] reserves are confused and in fact inflated. Many of the so called reserves are in fact resources. They’re not delineated, they’re not accessible, they’re not available for production”. By [Al-Husseini's] estimate 300 billion of the world’s 1200 [billion] barrels of proved reserves should be recategorized as speculative resources.
http://www.husseinienergy.com/Press_Releases_Details.aspx?Id=6

You can also check actual production figures for Saudi, which have bumped along at under 9.5 mbd for some years.
http://earlywarn.blogspot.com/2010/07/latest-saudi-arabian-oil-production.html

This does not tell us much I agree. The Saudi's claim to have the capacity as the world's swing producer to pump 12.5 mbd if needed (and Husseini says that's a fact). But with the oil spike/credit crunch/recession, the claim has not had to be tested.

But remember also the US wants Saudi to push production up to 15 mdb this decade. Which is what will show whether Saudi is actually mature as a producer or is stiil sitting on a hidden stash.

2) The actual big hope that Mheslep did not mention is Iraq. The obvious reason for effecting regime change was to get Iraq up from a measely 2 mbd to the 12 mbd where it "should be" for US economic interests and to fully exploit its reserves.

If everything goes smoothly and production gets ramped up in six years (an unparalleled increase in drilling, terminal building, etc) then Iraq could delay peak oil about a decade some say.

http://earlywarn.blogspot.com/2009/12/iraqi-oil-production-history.html
 
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  • #249
mheslep said:
I'm inclined to think CERA's estimates are most reliable. That is, if the demand is there and I don't think it will be.

I'm inclined to think Cera is at least as reliable as the Economist :wink:. But anyway, shouldn't you really be citing their most recent revised version of this graph?

https://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/client/report/reportImageDisplay.aspx?KID=5&CID=10720&IID=21246

Or the full report download...
https://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/filedisplay/publicfiledisplay.ashx?KID=5&CID=10720&PK=38356

Your earlier Cera graph shows plenty of growth in conventional oil production yet. The latest one looks to, err, have peaked, sorry to say. Average across all the spurious bumps of their undulating plateau and the line looks pretty flat at 85 mbd to me.

Unconventional oil still does roar away. But not nearly to the same extent as in the earlier graph.

Things overall look flat from 2020 at around 110 mbd. Then compare this current prediction to the one you cite which says supply will soar in a straight line to 135 mbd by 2035, only then peaking and flattening out.

So Cera may be reliable. It also seems to have changed its tune drastically in the space of a few years.

Like the IEA recent conversion to peak-ism, everyone's views are converging as they should. You would not be able to tell this just from Cera's rhetoric of course. So thanks for bringing attention to the graphs.
 
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  • #250
apeiron said:
I'm inclined to think Cera is at least as reliable as the Economist :wink:. But anyway, shouldn't you really be citing their most recent revised version of this graph?

https://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/client/report/reportImageDisplay.aspx?KID=5&CID=10720&IID=21246

Or the full report download...
https://www.cera.com/aspx/cda/filedisplay/publicfiledisplay.ashx?KID=5&CID=10720&PK=38356

Your earlier Cera graph shows plenty of growth in conventional oil production yet. The latest one looks to, err, have peaked, sorry to say. Average across all the spurious bumps of their undulating plateau and the line looks pretty flat at 85 mbd to me.

Unconventional oil still does roar away. But not nearly to the same extent as in the earlier graph.

Things overall look flat from 2020 at around 110 mbd. Then compare this current prediction to the one you cite which says supply will soar in a straight line to 135 mbd by 2035, only then peaking and flattening out.

So Cera may be reliable. It also seems to have changed its tune drastically in the space of a few years.

Like the IEA recent conversion to peak-ism, everyone's views are converging as they should. You would not be able to tell this just from Cera's rhetoric of course. So thanks for bringing attention to the graphs.

Wow, that's a real 180 turn in their graphs. How the hell did you miss that mheslep? First the Economist, now this... I thought the idea was that we didn't have to fact-check each other.
 
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