Where is the flaw with predetermined entanglement state?

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The discussion centers on the concept of predetermined entanglement states and their relationship to local hidden variable theories. Participants argue that while local hidden variables imply that entangled particles carry embedded information about measurement outcomes, predetermined states suggest that particles only exist in a definite opposing state without carrying information. The application of Bell's theorem is debated, with some asserting that it does not apply to actual states lacking hidden information. The conversation highlights the tension between local realism and quantum mechanics, particularly in how predetermined states could align with or contradict quantum predictions. Ultimately, the discussion reveals ongoing confusion and a search for clarity regarding the implications of predetermined entanglement in quantum theory.
  • #61
Carl B said:
In conclusion I would say that it is possible for the spin of entangled photons to be pre-determined,there is no experiment or theory which precludes this possibility. In Dirac's words what you ask is “outside the domain of science”!

But aren't the experiments that produced results that contradict classical realism actually are such experiments that are beginning to show evidence which preclude this possibility? Just a couple of weeks ago, we have the first ever demonstration of Wheeler's delayed choice experiments using single atoms (experiments using single photons have already been accomplished)[1].

And then there is a test of Leggett inequality, which has been shown to test realism, i.e .the notion that these measurements actually are already predetermined even before we measure them. There are now experiments showing that this inequality can be violated and thus, showing results that are incompatible with such realism.[2]

So I am not sure if you disagree with these experiments, disagree with their conclusions, or simply are ignoring them.

Zz.

[1] A.G. Manning et al., Nature Physics
[2] J. Romero et al., N. Jour. Phys. v.12, p.123007 (2010).
 
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  • #62
Carl B said:
...I would say that it is possible for the spin of entangled photons to be pre-determined,there is no experiment or theory which precludes this possibility.

The way I understand Bell's theorem, the "superdeterminism loophole" as applied to the case of Alice and Bob detecting photons in an EPR type experiment would require that Alice's and Bob's detector settings be pre-determined, in addition to the spins of the particles. The choice of settings can be based on absolutely anything: Alice might flip a coin to decide what setting to use, or might base it on who won a tennis game in Wimbledon, or whatever. So the superdeterminism loophole would end up requiring that absolutely everything about the universe be known ahead of time. So that's not just a small amount of pre-determinism. That's why Bell called it "super" determinism.
 
  • #63
stevendaryl said:
The way I understand Bell's theorem, the "superdeterminism loophole" as applied to the case of Alice and Bob detecting photons in an EPR type experiment would require that Alice's and Bob's detector settings be pre-determined, in addition to the spins of the particles. The choice of settings can be based on absolutely anything: Alice might flip a coin to decide what setting to use, or might base it on who won a tennis game in Wimbledon, or whatever. So the superdeterminism loophole would end up requiring that absolutely everything about the universe be known ahead of time. So that's not just a small amount of pre-determinism. That's why Bell called it "super" determinism.

I feel that Complete / Absolute / Total / Omni-determinism is a better word for it. SUPER sounds so.. weird. All it really is, is complete determinism. Which shouldn't be too hard to swallow if you already accept either Bohm or Many Worlds which is equally absolute in their determinism
 
  • #64
Carl B said:
The spin states of the entangled photons could have been pre-determined from the beginning of the experiment, it requires simply that certain assumptions on which quantum physics is based are either untrue or misleading and you may not wish to consider this!...
All of quantum mechanics is now based on Dirac's derivation of statistical rules based on the idea that determinism is impossible to prove so we will adopt a statistical approach. ... In Dirac's words what you ask is “outside the domain of science”!

Sorry, you want to have your cake and eat it too. You aren't going to be able to assert that is reasonable to assert pre-determination of outcomes, AND there are no instantaneous influences, AND hide in the refuge of Dirac's statements ("outside the domain of science"). Those of us who reject local realism make an assumption about what realism means, and that usually includes determination of the outcome of measurements INDEPENDENT of the choice of measurement settings. Clearly we DO consider this! If it is predetermined based on the observer's later choice of measurement settings... well, there are interpretations that support this already.

If you expect anyone to respect your point of view, you must define predetermination in some manner we can relate to. Then we can choose whether or not that definition is worth consideration. Otherwise, your "predetermination" (as it currently sits) may as well read "xyz-ism". Please be aware that there are entanglement experiments in which particles are entangled that have never been in each others' light cones. I would challenge you to define "predetermination" in that light.
 
  • #65
DrChinese said:
If it is predetermined based on the observer's later choice of measurement settings... well, there are interpretations that support this already.
The transactional interpretation? Backwards causation - nasty stuff. "Hello Alice, I'm your photon. I believe you're busily setting your detector to 22.5 degrees? Bob's setting his to 45 right now. That's what I and my buddy have prepared ourselves for. I expect you're wondering how we knew? Simple! The Confirmation Wave which you are about to launch backwards in time converged on us just as we were being emitted a little while ago. No, you can't change your mind. That would be against the Novikov consistency criterion. Grandfather can rest in peace."
DrChinese said:
If you expect anyone to respect your point of view, you must define predetermination in some manner we can relate to. Then we can choose whether or not that definition is worth consideration. Otherwise, your "predetermination" (as it currently sits) may as well read "xyz-ism".
Please be aware that there are entanglement experiments in which particles are entangled that have never been in each others' light cones. I would challenge you to define "predetermination" in that light.
We are all brains in a vat fed with bogus sense data by the Lizard People.
 
  • #66
Quantumental said:
I feel that Complete / Absolute / Total / Omni-determinism is a better word for it. SUPER sounds so.. weird. All it really is, is complete determinism. Which shouldn't be too hard to swallow if you already accept either Bohm or Many Worlds which is equally absolute in their determinism
Determinism is not difficult to accept. Superdeterminism requires the entire universe to have been microscopically prepared at the Big Bang so that apparently random events are correlated to this day. There is a huge difference.
 
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  • #67
ZapperZ said:
But aren't the experiments that produced results that contradict classical realism actually are such experiments that are beginning to show evidence which preclude this possibility?
I would say that idea of experimental results contradicting classical realism is so extraordinary that it's hard to take it seriously. Science takes realism for granted and if you consider possibility that realism is not acceptable then you just have to throw out all the science (and even more) and start from scratch (with philosophy). Additional problem is that such philosophical directions already have been explored and are not very popular.
 
  • #68
zonde said:
I would say that idea of experimental results contradicting classical realism is so extraordinary that it's hard to take it seriously. Science takes realism for granted and if you consider possibility that realism is not acceptable then you just have to throw out all the science (and even more) and start from scratch (with philosophy). Additional problem is that such philosophical directions already have been explored and are not very popular.

Then please scrutinize all those experiments and offer a formal rebuttal to them. Otherwise, all you have done is present an objection to them based on a matter of personal taste.

Zz.
 
  • #69
ZapperZ said:
Then please scrutinize all those experiments and offer a formal rebuttal to them.
Even an informal rebuttal of just one would suffice!
 
  • #70
ZapperZ said:
But aren't the experiments that produced results that contradict classical realism actually are such experiments that are beginning to show evidence which preclude this possibility? Just a couple of weeks ago, we have the first ever demonstration of Wheeler's delayed choice experiments using single atoms (experiments using single photons have already been accomplished)[1].

And then there is a test of Leggett inequality, which has been shown to test realism, i.e .the notion that these measurements actually are already predetermined even before we measure them. There are now experiments showing that this inequality can be violated and thus, showing results that are incompatible with such realism.[2]

So I am not sure if you disagree with these experiments, disagree with their conclusions, or simply are ignoring them.

Zz.

[1] A.G. Manning et al., Nature Physics
[2] J. Romero et al., N. Jour. Phys. v.12, p.123007 (2010).
Remember the reference [2] rules out certain classes of non-local hidden variable theories; thus realism is still possible, e.g. Bohm Mechanics.

Regarding the first reference, I sent my go-to-physics Professor this link -- http://phys.org/news/2015-05-quantum-theory-weirdness.html -- and they replied:

I’m not sure I agree 100% with the rather unsophisticated ontology of the last part of this…

"It proves that measurement is everything. At the quantum level, reality does not exist if you are not looking at it,"

…but I guess we see once again that what can be said about reality is contextual;and somehow arranged to be self-consistent within the context.

So not every physicist can agree with the interpretation of a particular experiment.
 
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  • #71
Quantumental said:
I feel that Complete / Absolute / Total / Omni-determinism is a better word for it. SUPER sounds so.. weird. All it really is, is complete determinism. Which shouldn't be too hard to swallow if you already accept either Bohm or Many Worlds which is equally absolute in their determinism

Superdeterminism - under any name - is ridiculous. Just try to formulate in a scientific (and falsifiable) manner and you will see just how so!

For example: if all interactions are superdetermined and local and realistic (the reason superdeterminism was invented), then every particle in the universe must carry a complete copy of its "answer" to every measurement (question) possible - with every other particle in the universe to which it ever has or will interact. That is because entanglement can be swapped from particle X to particle Y and you never know which particle might be entangled with what other particle. Basically you are talking about an infinite amount of information being stored locally in every particle in the universe. Of course that information is "hidden" because there is no other evidence of it.
 
  • #72
ZapperZ said:
Then please scrutinize all those experiments and offer a formal rebuttal to them. Otherwise, all you have done is present an objection to them based on a matter of personal taste.
Where did you get I have objections against these experiments? I have objections against your interpretation of these experiments. Besides my objections are not strict - I presented a way how one can still hold to this viewpoint. In particular one can become a philosopher who does not trust his senses an leave science to those who believe in realism.
As I understand you earn for your living by doing experimental physics, right? So becoming a philosopher who does not trust his senses would be quite extraordinary turn for you, I believe. So I don't quite understand your position. You can't have your cake and eat it too.
 
  • #73
zonde said:
I would say that idea of experimental results contradicting classical realism is so extraordinary that it's hard to take it seriously. Science takes realism for granted and if you consider possibility that realism is not acceptable then you just have to throw out all the science (and even more) and start from scratch (with philosophy). Additional problem is that such philosophical directions already have been explored and are not very popular.

I sort of agree with you, that a lot (most? all?) of science is done with an implicit idea of a universe external to us that we are learning about through experiment and observation. However, a more limited view of science is that it is about making predictions, of the form: If I perform such and such an experiment, I will get such and such result. That limited view of science doesn't require realism.
 
  • #74
zonde said:
Where did you get I have objections against these experiments? I have objections against your interpretation of these experiments. Besides my objections are not strict - I presented a way how one can still hold to this viewpoint. In particular one can become a philosopher who does not trust his senses an leave science to those who believe in realism.
As I understand you earn for your living by doing experimental physics, right? So becoming a philosopher who does not trust his senses would be quite extraordinary turn for you, I believe. So I don't quite understand your position. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

The sort of anti-realism suggested by violations of Bell's inequalities doesn't amount to rejecting experimental results. Instead, it amounts to rejecting the idea that there is a definite "state of the world" outside of experimental results.
 
  • #75
zonde said:
Where did you get I have objections against these experiments? I have objections against your interpretation of these experiments. Besides my objections are not strict - I presented a way how one can still hold to this viewpoint. In particular one can become a philosopher who does not trust his senses an leave science to those who believe in realism.
As I understand you earn for your living by doing experimental physics, right? So becoming a philosopher who does not trust his senses would be quite extraordinary turn for you, I believe. So I don't quite understand your position. You can't have your cake and eat it too.

Please note that that was not MY interpretation. If you read those papers that I referenced to, there is a clear reference to realism and what they are testing. The Leggett inequality was formulated with that in mind! That is why I said that if you disagree with that, you should be the one doing the rebuttals to those papers!

I don't get this reference to philosophy. If anything, you were the one who was arguing this based on philosophy. YOur post in #67 contains no physics, only personal preference. The fact that "realism", as defined within this context, can actually be tested experimentally means that it has been brought out of philosophy and into physics, the very same way the EPR paradox was brought out of philosophical argument and into physics when John Bell formalize its test. So if you have issues with this, let's see you rebut, say, Leggett's formalism.

Zz.
 
  • #76
DrChinese said:
Superdeterminism - under any name - is ridiculous. Just try to formulate in a scientific (and falsifiable) manner and you will see just how so!

For example: if all interactions are superdetermined and local and realistic (the reason superdeterminism was invented), then every particle in the universe must carry a complete copy of its "answer" to every measurement (question) possible - with every other particle in the universe to which it ever has or will interact. That is because entanglement can be swapped from particle X to particle Y and you never know which particle might be entangled with what other particle. Basically you are talking about an infinite amount of information being stored locally in every particle in the universe. Of course that information is "hidden" because there is no other evidence of it.

I agree with you that superdeterminism is unpalatable as a physical theory, but it wouldn't necessarily require infinite information stored in every particle. Instead, superdeterminism could be achieved through ordinary determinism plus very fine-tuned initial conditions.
 
  • #77
stevendaryl said:
I agree with you that superdeterminism is unpalatable as a physical theory, but it wouldn't necessarily require infinite information stored in every particle. Instead, superdeterminism could be achieved through ordinary determinism plus very fine-tuned initial conditions.

But why is it then unpalatable? We live in a infinite ocean of somethingness. Is it really that hard to accept that everything is fine tuned at the beginning?
 
  • #78
Quantumental said:
But why is it then unpalatable? We live in a infinite ocean of somethingness. Is it really that hard to accept that everything is fine tuned at the beginning?

Yes. Fine-tuning is like explaining something by "it's just a coincidence".
 
  • #79
stevendaryl said:
Yes. Fine-tuning is like explaining something by "it's just a coincidence".
Not really. Check out Gerard 't Hoofts proposals
 
  • #80
Quantumental said:
Not really. Check out Gerard 't Hoofts proposals

If we're talking about the same thing, I feel the same way about his proposals. Are you talking about his classical model for quantum mechanics?
 
  • #81
stevendaryl said:
I sort of agree with you, that a lot (most? all?) of science is done with an implicit idea of a universe external to us that we are learning about through experiment and observation. However, a more limited view of science is that it is about making predictions, of the form: If I perform such and such an experiment, I will get such and such result. That limited view of science doesn't require realism.
Actually even such a prediction assumes the onticity of the formula - otherwise it can't refer to real observations.
EPR does not require the rejection of realism, it requires the rejection of direct realism. In other words our view of the universe needs to be modified drastically but, very importantly, we can still think of it as real.
From what I've hear of it, the Leggett inequality violations confirm that the issue is a particular view of reality, that a system has a unique and definite state. That little dent in common-sense seems here to stay.
 
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  • #82
Derek Potter said:
From what I've hear of it, the Leggett inequality violations confirm that the issue is a particular view of reality, that a system has a unique and definite state. That little dent in common-sense seems here to stay.
The Leggett inequality only rules out certain classes of non-local hidden variables. Therefore realism is still possible, as it does not rule out Bohmian Mechanics.

The inequality I want tested is the Leggett-Garg inequality, which tests macro-realism. But if Bohmian Mechanics and QM give the same predictions, then realism could still be viable even if the inequality is violated.
 
  • #83
StevieTNZ said:
The Leggett inequality only rules out certain classes of non-local hidden variables. Therefore realism is still possible, as it does not rule out Bohmian Mechanics.
The inequality I want tested is the Leggett-Garg inequality, which tests macro-realism. But if Bohmian Mechanics and QM give the same predictions, then realism could still be viable even if the inequality is violated.
I do not follow the logic of that. If (and it's a big if) LG violation only rules out some classes and doesn't rule out BM then that does not mean realism is back on the table.

I'm not at all sure BM is realist in the required sense anyway. Sure there is a real wave and a real particle, but what of superpositions? The particle is like a predetermined collapse riding along with the wave, but how does BM cope the fact that Alice and Bob have not yet decided what basis to use? That's a genuine question, by the way. I suspect I know the answer - it doesn't - but I don't actually know.
 
  • #84
Derek Potter said:
I do not follow the logic of that. If (and it's a big if) LG violation only rules out some classes and doesn't rule out BM then that does not mean realism is back on the table.

I'm not at all sure BM is realist in the required sense anyway. Sure there is a real wave and a real particle, but what of superpositions? The particle is like a predetermined collapse riding along with the wave, but how does BM cope the fact that Alice and Bob have not yet decided what basis to use? That's a genuine question, by the way. I suspect I know the answer - it doesn't - but I don't actually know.

BM is realist in the sense that it solves the measurement problem in the most boring way possible.

BM deals with the preferred basis problem by assuming that position is the only thing one measures.
 
  • #85
Quantumental said:
But why is it then unpalatable? We live in a infinite ocean of somethingness. Is it really that hard to accept that everything is fine tuned at the beginning?

No. It is not unpalatable (people say these things, but it's not scientific). Rather, it is impractical, because we cannot write down such a theory. So basically, we have already done all the research we can on superdeterminism. The open questions are, if we cannot write down the true theory of everything (say superdeterminism or whatever), are there intermediate steps in theory we can take that will make sense to us in the traditional scientific framework? Maybe the answer is no. However, Bohmian Mechanics shows that it is too early to give up, and there's probably room to explore the other openings allowed by Bell, such as retrocausation and many-worlds.
 
  • #86
atyy said:
BM is realist in the sense that it solves the measurement problem in the most boring way possible.
BM deals with the preferred basis problem by assuming that position is the only thing one measures.
Really? What does entanglement look like in a position basis?
 
  • #87
Derek Potter said:
Really? What does entanglement look like in a position basis?

It's the same as in QM.

The idea is that we can measure momentum by measuring position - we just cannot do it measure the canonically conjugate position at the same time. But we can use a different position to indicate momentum. For example, in the double slit experiment, the momentum of the particle just after the slit can be read by its position at a distant screen.

Also, QM doesn't say that a particle cannot have a trajectory. It says that a particle cannot have position and momentum simultaneously. So we can just choose to have particles with position but no momentum.
 
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  • #88
Derek Potter said:
Really? What does entanglement look like in a position basis?
In this paper, the EPR experiment for spin-1/2 particles is analyzed from the point of view of Bohmian mechanics.

http://www.tau.ac.il/~vaidman/lvhp/m115.pdf
 
  • #89
atyy said:
It's the same as in QM.

The idea is that we can measure momentum by measuring position - we just cannot do it measure the canonically conjugate position at the same time. But we can use a different position to indicate momentum. For example, in the double slit experiment, the momentum of the particle just after the slit can be read by its position at a distant screen.

Also, QM doesn't say that a particle cannot have a trajectory. It says that a particle cannot have position and momentum simultaneously. So we can just choose to have particles with position but no momentum.

OK. However that just covers the particle position. I was more interested in the wave, which never collapses and therefore, I assume, propagates nonlocaly - in a space of 6 or more dimensions. It would seem - please correct me if I'm wrong - that the wavefunction/pilot wave for the two particles together cannot be a function of the two separate waves. So we are back to the wave of A not existing on its own but only being defined in relation to the wave of B. Which is the very definition of non-realism. Is that correct?
 
  • #90
Derek Potter said:
OK. However that just covers the particle position. I was more interested in the wave, which never collapses and therefore, I assume, propagates nonlocaly - in a space of 6 or more dimensions. It would seem - please correct me if I'm wrong - that the wavefunction/pilot wave for the two particles together cannot be a function of the two separate waves. So we are back to the wave of A not existing on its own but only being defined in relation to the wave of B. Which is the very definition of non-realism. Is that correct?

If you are talking about Leggett's definition of realism, which is a technical one, I don't know.
 

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