Why Do Materialist Compatibilists Believe in Free Will?

[imiyakawa]

Why don't you ask in the quantum forum, maybe someone knows or has heard something about such an experiment?

I did 8 months ago. They said it was probably a fraud, except didn't say if the experiment had been carried out anywhere else. Not really satisfied with that answer. I may re-post.

 

[GeorgCantor]

I may re-post.

When you do, mention the unobserved c60 molecule causing an interference pattern.

 

[imiyakawa]

When you do, mention the unobserved c60 molecule causing an interference pattern.

re-iterate? I'm noob.

 

[Coldcall]

When you say Von Neumann Process 1, do you mean the hypothesis that the Von Neumann chain ends in consciousness? (i.e. the hypothesis of wavefunction collapse to discrete-state as being caused by the which-path information entering consciousness itself?).

If that occurs, it would suggest an immaterial consciousness, but the collapse by consciousness in itself wouldn't allow free will - the immaterial consciousness would be the element that allows the free will.

If you don't mean that the wavefunction collapse is caused by human observers gaining which-path information, then how does the Copenhagen Interpretation enable free will? At best it would enable random will.. Right?

Yes i am in favour of observer dependent collapse theories, as that is where i feel the eviednece takes us naturally. The measurement problem is still completely baffling qm theory even today. Interpretations like MWI and decoherence don't solve the problem, they just offer a sort of classical objectiveness way of looking at wave reduction.

Well, subjective thought is certainly not material is it? Yes our brains are material, but from it emerges properties which in themselves cannot be reduced to simple physciality. This opens up the whole "systems" argument, the whole being greater than the sum of its parts.

We are so use to thinking that causality works only one way with the arrow of time as we experience it, and this enables a sense of determinism because a naturally follows b.

Even in cosmology today, we are taking retro-causality very seriously because it appears to be a legal property of qm. For instance what if the answer or causation for the big bang is actually retro-causal? If one takes Wheelers Delayed Choice seriously at face value, then it is quite possible that causes for past events can come from our future. That would really turn the idea of determinsim upside down.

 

[imiyakawa]

@ColdCall ^^^^

I don't see why we need a retrocausal/teleological Big Bang interpretation when there's more plausible models with less paradoxes. Although of course we can't rule it out.

And something like the transactional interpretation shouldn't enable free will.

Anyways I'm more than happy with JDStupis proposition that perhaps, even if it may not be plausible to our brains atm, higher order laws may not be able to be formulated from the fundamental laws.

 

[Coldcall]

How do the DCE or the CI hint at free will? The outcomes of the DCE could well be predetermined. There is no way whatsoever to prove or disprove free will in a reality like ours, unless you found a fortune teller that made correct predictions all the time about the choices Coldcall makes.

The only thing i can draw as a conclusion from the DCE is that:

1. Time and space do not exist at the quantum level, or if they exist they are very different from our perceptions

2. Our conscious choice of measurement equipment affects the outcomes. It seems to me to be related to the observer's knowledge as the only changes made to the setup are the potential ability to excract information that is prohibited by the HUP.

Anyway, i see no way how free will has anything to do with these experiments.

I agree that proving free-will is unfalsifiable. My point about qm was that choices appear to effect the past, hence making retro-causaltiy on a universal scale somewhat credible. So If the causal arrow of time works in both directions we would have to rethink our ideas of cause and effect, which is the basis for Determinism.

Of course that doesn't prove free-will :-)

 

[Coldcall]

@ColdCall ^^^^

I don't see why we need a retrocausal/teleological Big Bang interpretation when there's more plausible models with less paradoxes.

Although of course we can't rule it out.

well qm demsonstrates retro-causality so i think its just as credible as any of the more classical theories.

 

[GeorgCantor]

well qm demsonstrates retro-causality so i think its just as credible as any of the more classical theories.

If you think seriously about what happens in the DCE and especially - the quantum eraser, you'd likely reach for an ontology similar to that of RUTA - that nothing really went through the slits, and such statements are operationally meaningless until you get a detector click. It's tempting to intuitively think about solid balls going through one or the other slits in space and time, but... there appear to be just amplitudes of possible events(detections) in these two experiments.


If this is true, then we live in a reality of 'clicks' (good thing my beer detector has just clicked ).

 

[JDStupi]

Now, regarding the "conscious observer" ideas regarding the HUP and quantum state collapse, this is where I would disagree. I'm not claiming that you guys are wrong and I'm right, but I'm saying that I am inclined to disagree. I think that in sticking with the empirical, small steps type of scientific philosophy (by small steps I just mean taking small empriically veriviable steps rather than making huge hypothesis) I think that the "collapse" has nothing to do with us as special "conscious observers", I do not think that the fact that we are conscious plays a role in the collapse. I think that the fact that we are physical systems interacting with the outside world causes the HUP to exist, that the world exists in a kind of relational manner. From this, it follows that I think that other particles all are subject to a sort of HUP, that is everything is interacting as a physical system so can only form relationally, and that we can study the relationships between quantum particles and their environments and how through dynamic environment/system interaction the predominantly one macroscopic state of reality emerges. Entering complete speculation zone, possibly the relation between thermo and Info Sciences can be deepened and generalized at the quantum level and we can study how informational systems interact with their environment and settle in one state according to some type of "Informational/Thermo" equilibrium picture.

 

[Buckethead]

I wonder if free will could be examined at a more fundamental level and that is of true randomness. Causality is understood, but I'm not so sure that randomness is really understood and if one looks at the concept of randomness, it might shed some light on the concept of free will.

I do not believe that anything that is random follows any understandable laws. We can measure randomness using rules of probability, but if an event is truly random, it's outcome must be considered to be caused by something we cannot as yet comprehend. If it is random, this means it did not follow any of Newton's laws of motion or it would be deterministic. If something happens randomly, it happened for an incomprehensible reason.

We can apply the concept of randomness to the concept of free will in that if a random event is a result of an unknown cause, and if a free will decision is a result of an unknown cause, this unknown cause in both cases could be related. Studying randomness on it's deepest level could reveal something about free will.

 

[Coldcall]

If you think seriously about what happens in the DCE and especially - the quantum eraser, you'd likely reach for an ontology similar to that of RUTA - that nothing really went through the slits, and such statements are operationally meaningless until you get a detector click. It's tempting to intuitively think about solid balls going through one or the other slits in space and time, but... there appear to be just amplitudes of possible events(detections) in these two experiments.

If this is true, then we live in a reality of 'clicks' (good thing my beer detector has just clicked ).

Enjoy the beer :-)

I think the problem is we still don't know exactly what goes on before measurement. Some feel the wave function is totally abstract and in fact non-existent until observed/measured, and other interpretations claim there were pre-defined values before meausrement.

 

[Coldcall]

Now, regarding the "conscious observer" ideas regarding the HUP and quantum state collapse, this is where I would disagree. I'm not claiming that you guys are wrong and I'm right, but I'm saying that I am inclined to disagree. I think that in sticking with the empirical, small steps type of scientific philosophy (by small steps I just mean taking small empriically veriviable steps rather than making huge hypothesis) I think that the "collapse" has nothing to do with us as special "conscious observers", I do not think that the fact that we are conscious plays a role in the collapse. I think that the fact that we are physical systems interacting with the outside world causes the HUP to exist, that the world exists in a kind of relational manner. From this, it follows that I think that other particles all are subject to a sort of HUP, that is everything is interacting as a physical system so can only form relationally, and that we can study the relationships between quantum particles and their environments and how through dynamic environment/system interaction the predominantly one macroscopic state of reality emerges. Entering complete speculation zone, possibly the relation between thermo and Info Sciences can be deepened and generalized at the quantum level and we can study how informational systems interact with their environment and settle in one state according to some type of "Informational/Thermo" equilibrium picture.

well your view is probably the consensus view so you are certainly being safe :-)

I would argue that there is even stronger evidence today to support the view that our brains are quantum mechanical. If that were to be proven by isolating the quantum mechanical function in our brain (and perhaps other animals) then it would provide real support for the idea that "consciousness" or "mind" is a causal factor in collpasing the wave function or decoherence of a quantum state.

Why do i say there is stronger evidence for this today than a couple years ago? Max Tegmark's main argument against Penrose & Hammeroffs idea of quantum mechanics in the brain, was that the brain was too hot and wet for coherence to be sustained long enough for the necessary function to occur. In other words, biological systems were just too chaotic.

But hey ho, tegmark's argument has been falsified at the beginning of this year in the following study which showed that photosynthesis involved a quantum mechanical process in order to process solar energy to chemical energy with almost 100% efficiency. More importantly, the proteins involved in this mechanism operate at the same temperature as the proteins in microtubules or other components in the brain:

"What may prove to be this study’s most significant revelation is that contrary to the popular scientific notion that entanglement is a fragile and exotic property, difficult to engineer and maintain, the Berkeley researchers have demonstrated that entanglement can exist and persist in the chaotic chemical complexity of a biological system.

“We present strong evidence for quantum entanglement in noisy non-equilibrium systems at high temperatures by determining the timescales and temperatures for which entanglement is observable in a protein structure that is central to photosynthesis in certain bacteria,” Sarovar says."

http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/05/10/untangling-quantum-entanglement/

Leaving aside that this study is really interesting from an energy efficiency perspective (obviously helpful in the design of solar energy), this shows that a quantum mechncial function in our brains is viable.

It also shows that biology has evolved quantum mechanical functions to improve performance, survivability. So if plants have evolved this function then why would it not evolve in human biology? There really is no good reason to reject that possibility. In fact i think its more than possible; it would be almost perverse if more complex and evolved biologies scrapped quantum mechncial processes for the slower, less powerful classical processes.

There are plenty of other reasons why we should take the idea of quantum mechncial "consciounsess" seriously. We are now getting very close to builiding computers or AI which have the same raw classcial computational power as exists in our brains, but we are nowhere near delivering real synthetic consciousness. Why is that? Clearly we are missing something very important in our understanding of how consciousness can emerge.

So why are scientists so keen to develop quantum computing? Why do they say we will get performance increase of more than 1000 times our current computer architectures?

In my opinion, its pretty obvious conclusion that qm is the best place to look for what we call consicousness. Nothing else known to man can potentially offer that sort of computational power.

Hence if qm is responsible for consciousness, then it would start making a lot of sense that there is a mind to matter entanglement which could suggest "consciousness" is a causal factor in wave function collapse.

 

[JDStupi]

I'm not going to try to refute what you say because, of course, I do not know. That said, I do believe that the idea that consciousness has arisen due to some type of Quantum Mechanical effect that biology has evolved in order for us to have a selection advantage is too simplistic and reductionist an idea to account for consciousness. I feel as though it still looks at things from a reductionist, "this happens causing this" paradigm, whereas I don't know if this is necessarily the case with consciousness. I believe a more accurate approach, though I do not know much about it, is that of biosemiotics and the modern conceptual metaphor paradigm in cognitive science. Even if consciousness has some QM in it, it will be through similar processes to those described by environmental interaction/embodied mind theories and not simply some effect.

 

[Coldcall]

I'm not going to try to refute what you say because, of course, I do not know. That said, I do believe that the idea that consciousness has arisen due to some type of Quantum Mechanical effect that biology has evolved in order for us to have a selection advantage is too simplistic and reductionist an idea to account for consciousness. I feel as though it still looks at things from a reductionist, "this happens causing this" paradigm, whereas I don't know if this is necessarily the case with consciousness. I believe a more accurate approach, though I do not know much about it, is that of biosemiotics and the modern conceptual metaphor paradigm in cognitive science. Even if consciousness has some QM in it, it will be through similar processes to those described by environmental interaction/embodied mind theories and not simply some effect.

Well its an open debate. No doubt it will be many years before we get any real answers leading one way or another. But "consciousness" whatever it is, is special. And if we were ever in the position to understand it, and be able to replicate it, that would be incredible, a real technological singularity. That would be real AI.

 

[GeorgCantor]

re-iterate? I'm noob.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit_experiment


http://hexagon.physics.wisc.edu/teaching/2010s%20ph531%20quantum%20mechanics/interesting%20papers/zeilinger%20large%20molecule%20interference%20ajp%202003.pdf



It is no longer safe to state that unobserved atoms are 99.999% empty space.

 

[Mkorr]

Many compatibilists such as Richard Carrier or Daniel Dennett thinks that free will means the ability to predict the outcome of actions and act to avoid unpleasant outcomes. They do not think quantum mechanics enter the picture at all.

 

[Coldcall]

Many compatibilists such as Richard Carrier or Daniel Dennett thinks that free will means the ability to predict the outcome of actions and act to avoid unpleasant outcomes. They do not think quantum mechanics enter the picture at all.

Well *if* their brains are quantum mechanical then their ability to predict probabilities and make a choice of outcome would in itself be a quantum mechanical function. Of course Dennett rejects there is anything quantum mechncial about the human brain, but it would be the irony of ironies :-)

 

[tauon]

My question isn't that hard...

Is there a way that the brain, as a complex system, can do something not governed by physical law (DETERMINISTIC OR NOT[I'm not claiming the former!]!), which would then allow free will under the definition I provided?

I'm not a compatibilist but I'll join in anyway.

It seems that you're implicitly making assumptions that you never really state or clarify.
What is physical law? "Law"? The notion of "natural/physical law" as I see it is a remnant from a few centuries ago that has no place in science yet is constantly brought up by many because it is intuitively appealing...

But let's assume this hocus-pocus concept of "physical law", meaning that "somewhere" there is information "stored", that every natural process will inevitably address to "abide" by it.

Then maybe one (or more) of this laws states that if a physical system/process/etc. that is like this and does this and that, it must address some laws and not others, i.e. maybe there is a law of categorization/selection... a law that attaches some particular laws to a particular system. So the brain would follow natural laws, just not the same laws as say, a decaying atom would - altered ones, or different ones entirely. Problem solved.

Indeed, magical concepts like free-will are trivially explained when we assume magical concepts like physical laws.

 

[Mkorr]

Well *if* their brains are quantum mechanical then their ability to predict probabilities and make a choice of outcome would in itself be a quantum mechanical function. Of course Dennett rejects there is anything quantum mechanical about the human brain, but it would be the irony of ironies :-)

Perhaps, but as you noted, the general reply is that quantum mechanics may be not be very relevant on such a large scale. Dennett once candidly remarked in his book "Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness" in an early obscure footnote that

"Incurable optimist that I am, I find this recent invasion by physicist into the domains of cognitive neuroscience to be a cloud with a silver lining: for the first time in my professional life, an interloping discipline beats out philosophy for the prize for combining arrogance with ignorance about the field being invaded. Neuroscientists and psychologists who used to stare glassy-eyed and uncomprehending at philosophers arguing about the fine points of supervenience and intensionality-with-an-s now have to contend in a similar spirit with the arcana of quantum entanglement and Bose-Einstein condensates." (pp. 9-10)

He then goes on to make a tongue-in-cheek joke about theoretical physics.

 

[binbots]

Why does it always have to be one or the other? Why can't the universe be have a determined fate that follows certain rules. While life has free will in a un free world. Like watching tv, there shows on all the time at certain times. Yet we can choose which channel to watch. Free will within the rules of the universe.

 

[imiyakawa]

Free will within the rules of the universe.

Define what you mean by free will.
A) Define the agent.
B) Define what you think this agent can do.

 

[brainstorm]

How can free will emerge from subjectivity, if subjectivity emerges from an organic nervous system, which is governed by deterministic laws of biochemistry and neural electronics?

Think of it this way, the brain has evolved the means to reflect on sensory impulses prior to responding to them. If every action was purely a reflex to stimulus, you would have a determined nervous system. However, your nervous system is too complex to interpret every sensory input unproblematically. So you encounter dillemas of deciding how to interpret a particular situation, and which actions to undertake to achieve a desired outcome.

So, basically, I think you can attribute free-will to the evolution of the possibility of multiple interpretations of perceptions and the ability to postpone reflexive response until a preferred course of action is selected.

I think the best theory to read that connects the biological mechanisms to the emergence of free-will would actually be Freud on the formation of the ego through the conflict between id and superego. As the instinct-driven id follows its desires reflexively, it encounters resistance from its environment. As such it develops an internalized superego, i.e. knowledge of what actions result in punishment or other suffering. Consequently, the ego develops as a means of balancing the desires of the id against the constraints of the superego, which involves choosing when and how to pursue means to gratification that don't result in punishment or other painful and frustrating failures.

 

[imiyakawa]

I'm in agreement with most of your analysis. You're misunderstanding my position. My only claim is that we don't have reason to suspect a materialistic consciousness can escape the laws of physics that "runs" it/"determines" its evolution (random or determined).

I understand that the brain is self-organized. I understand all your points - it's not a reflexive responder but it matches stimuli recursively (or however it does it) to mind models (memory, desires, beliefs, etc) and outputs a response that is non-linear and as a result of what is essentially a chaotic system (I'm not talking about behaviorism, subjectivity is there as well), etc etc.

My claim all along has been that underneath all this are laws of physics. These laws precede/cause this complexity. These laws are, as far as our knowledge can tell, either random or determined (if the former, it'll be a mixture of both, and for the brain randomness may not even come into the picture in any significant way). So if you want true agent self-causation, a self-program that has its own causality, you need to show us how this self-causation can be layered onto either randomness or determinism (i.e. how this self-program escapes randomness &/or determinism, somehow). My position is that there is almost no reason to suspect the brain has this capacity, and so the type of free will that the random guy on the street thinks he has - the ability to actually bias outcomes - can't exist.
I think you've misunderstood my position.

Then my following question to the members of PF is, is this definition of free will - the perspective from physics - more pertinent than the definition concerning intelligent choice (in people) under the usual constraints (beliefs, environmental, attitudes, etc). So those are the two definitions of free will that have achieved attention in the literature. The former, the one that I brought up, HAS achieved some attention - Jaegwon Kim gives a good overview of it in his recent book (and attempts to refute the possibility of it existing on a supervening consciousness).

So my question I posed was whether the definition of a self-causing agent should be discussed. Apeiron answered no because there's nothing to argue about, you misunderstood me (thought I was denying the other definition of free will), ThorX agreed with me, and nobody else commented so I assumed they weren't interested (which is why I recommended the previous thread take a detour).

On another note:

How can free will emerge from subjectivity.

I don't think it's clear yet to say that intelligent choice arises from subjectivity which then arises from 'X' processes. Intelligent choice and subjectivity could be inextricably (perhaps dependently) linked.

 

[brainstorm]

I'm in agreement with most of your analysis. You're misunderstanding my position. My only claim is that we don't have reason to suspect a materialistic consciousness can escape the laws of physics that "runs" it/"determines" its evolution (random or determined).

I understand that the brain is self-organized. I understand all your points - it's not a reflexive responder but it matches stimuli recursively (or however it does it) to mind models (memory, desires, beliefs, etc) and outputs a response that is non-linear and as a result of what is essentially a chaotic system (I'm not talking about behaviorism, subjectivity is there as well), etc etc.

My claim all along has been that underneath all this are laws of physics. These laws precede/cause this complexity. These laws are, as far as our knowledge can tell, either random or determined (if the former, it'll be a mixture of both, and for the brain randomness may not even come into the picture in any significant way). So if you want true agent self-causation, a self-program that runs itself, you need to show us how this self-causation can be layered onto either randomness or determinism (or escape it totally, somehow).

My understanding of your logic is that somehow the determinism of physical matter, i.e. lack of free-will in atomic interactions, must somehow automatically transfer to subjectivity. There's no basis for assuming that, since the mechanism(s) that cause matter to behave deterministically are not the same as those that result in free-will agency in subjective beings.

Just consider the relationship between voluntary and involuntary nervous system and body behavior. Certain muscles reflexively control bodily processes whether someone is conscious of them or not. Other muscles respond to conscious control. So the very fact that the body has the voluntary option to contract or relax certain muscles means that the body has to have a way of deciding which option to choose.

What you seem to want to argue is that there is some subconscious mind that totally determines what happens in the conscious-mind to the point that what is experienced consciously is just an echo of what has already been decided sub-consciously. So you think that whatever reasoning or other method is "chosen" to make a decision is just the body's method of making a subconsciously pre-determined choice seem voluntary instead of involuntary.

If this is what you think, then you should find or develop a theory of how the subconscious mind connects with and interacts with the conscious mind. I believe Karl Jung wrote that the subconsciousmind could or should be measured the same way sound is measured, as having a threshold of audibility. In other words, he thought that the same way humans can't hear sounds below a certain amount of decibels, they also couldn't hear thoughts below a certain level of whatever unit you would use to measure thought-levels.

The problem with this is what would cause the conscious mind to obey the subconscious mind's will if it couldn't hear it? Freud's subconscious would work better, in that it supposedly actually "drives" conscious process directly, but again you get to the problem of conflict between the biological drives/desires (id) and moral and environmental dissuasions from pursuing those drives by certain means (superego). Thus, you end up with a conflicted ego that has to choose between behaving itself and foregoing its desires, at least temporarily, or pursuing them directly and getting punished or otherwise suffering as a result.

My position is that there is almost no reason to suspect the brain has this capacity, and so the type of free will that the random guy on the street thinks he has - the ability to actually bias outcomes - can't exist.
I think you've misunderstood my position.

What prevents the random guy on the street from doing anything he desires at any moment if he has no free-will? If you say it is reflexive fear repressing him, then what causes him to overcome his fear to leave the house, cross-streets, talk to strangers, etc.?

I don't think it's clear yet to say that intelligent choice arises from subjectivity which then arises from 'X' processes. Intelligent choice and subjectivity could be inextricably (perhaps dependently) linked.

Intelligent choice does not require free-will. A computer can make intelligent choices given the right algorithm. Out of thousands of dictionary words, a spell check can narrow a misspelled word down to just a few or even one replacement choice, balancing spelling similarities with usage frequency, etc. The computer always wins against me at chess too.

Humans are different in that they have the free-will to avoid or choose rational choices. E.g. it's rational to turn off lights when they're not needed, but you have the free-will to decide that it's not important enough to bother if you don't feel like it. However, the fact that you don't feel like it is also not determinant of your choice, because you could just as easily overcome the feeling, get up, and go turn off the unnecessary lights. It's not random or rationality that causes your choice, it's a whim that can go in either direction according to what you ultimately will.

 

[imiyakawa]

i.e. lack of free-will in atomic interactions, must somehow automatically transfer to subjectivity. There's no basis for assuming that,

OK, please demonstrate how your new causality could arise on top of determined and/or random processes. Then claim your Nobel prize in physics.

laws --> brain heuristics and self organization.

Please demonstrate how the latter has no (total) causal dependency on the former. Again, once you've done that your contention with my position will be resolved and you will be famous.

Just consider the relationship between voluntary and involuntary nervous system and body behavior. Certain muscles reflexively control bodily processes whether someone is conscious of them or not. Other muscles respond to conscious control. So the very fact that the body has the voluntary option to contract or relax certain muscles means that the body has to have a way of deciding which option to choose.

You're debasing to the other definition of free will/"choice"(by a subjective agent) again. I clearly agreed with this view, this is not the definition I'm talking about.

What you seem to want to argue is that there is some subconscious mind that totally determines what happens in the conscious-mind to the point that what is experienced consciously is just an echo of what has already been decided sub-consciously.

You're misunderstanding. Read my last post. This is sooooooooooooooooo not what I'm saying. In fact I said in my second paragraph that I agree this is NOT what is occurring. !

If this is what you think, then you should find or develop a theory of how the subconscious mind connects with and interacts with the conscious mind. I believe Karl Jung wrote that the subconsciousmind could or should be measured the same way sound is measured, as having a threshold of audibility. In other words, he thought that the same way humans can't hear sounds below a certain amount of decibels, they also couldn't hear thoughts below a certain level of whatever unit you would use to measure thought-levels.

It's clear you're NOT understanding the two definitions, and how I'm talking about the OTHER one. Read my last post extremely carefully. All the required information is there. You're still latching on to the idea that I'm discussing the definition you think I am discussing. I am not discussing that definition.

---

You keep talking about the subconscious or whatever and how it's not like that. Well, I AGREE. Nor did I ever propose this in any way. I proposed that the brain cannot bias physical law. You have replied to my last post, where I restated that proposal, but have argued a notion that I never proposed, nor did I even hint at it. I stated in the second paragraph that it is not what I thought, and then I stated in the proceeding paragraphs what my position is.

it's a whim that can go in either direction according to what you ultimately will.

The perspective I suggested was this.

[[[Laws]]] --complete dependency--> [[[brain "weighing" up alternatives/decides (subjectivity is there as well!). ]]]

(I am not asserting that total reduction of laws to some base-level TOE is necessarily possible, BTW).
(And yes, I accept the conceptual schema of communicative hierarchies. Laws being the antecedent of the above "-->" does not deny this.)

 

[brainstorm]

OK, please demonstrate how your new causality could arise on top of determined and/or random processes. Then claim your Nobel prize in physics.

laws --> brain heuristics and self organization.

Please demonstrate how the latter has no (total) causal dependency on the former. Again, once you've done that your contention with my position will be resolved and you will be famous.

I think the opposite is the case. When you unify social science or just psychology with physics, you'll be famous. In fact, when you turn the tables so that philosophy is a branch of physics, instead of physics being a branch of natural philosophy, that would a radical paradigm shift.

You're debasing to the other definition of free will/"choice"(by a subjective agent) again. I clearly agreed with this view, this is not the definition I'm talking about.

How are you not making up a definition to suit your desired conclusion?

You keep talking about the subconscious or whatever and how it's not like that. Well, I AGREE. Nor did I ever propose this in any way. I proposed that the brain cannot bias physical law. You have replied to my last post, where I restated that proposal, but have argued a notion that I never proposed, nor did I even hint at it. I stated in the second paragraph that it is not what I thought, and then I stated in the proceeding paragraphs what my position is.

I don't know what you're arguing then? I think you're arguing for some kind of epistemological consistency between physics and psychology by grounding it in the logic that subjectivity is hard-wired into material tissue. Epistemological reasoning does not just magically follow associative logic. You are arguing that determinism in one kind of system automatically implies determinism in a radically different type of system.

This reminds me of when people used to think hitting their computers would fix them when they froze up the same way it helped their TV sets when the tubes were out of alignment.

The perspective I suggested was this.

[[[Laws]]] --complete dependency--> [[[brain "weighing" up alternatives/decides (subjectivity is there as well!). ]]]

(I am not asserting that total reduction of laws to some base-level TOE is necessarily possible, BTW).
(And yes, I accept the conceptual schema of communicative hierarchies. Laws being the antecedent of the above "-->" does not deny this.)

What are these supposed "laws" that govern brain-function through dependency? Please provide a specific, concrete example so I can analyze how such a law is related to natural laws of physics, and what mechanisms connect them with actual functioning of brain or subjectivity in the operational sense.

 

[imiyakawa]

I think the opposite is the case. When you unify social science or just psychology with physics, you'll be famous. In fact, when you turn the tables so that philosophy is a branch of physics, instead of physics being a branch of natural philosophy, that would a radical paradigm shift.

Just because one cannot possibly "deduce"/predict a complex system arising from the laws of physics we have laid out (given today's knowledge/technology) is no argument for the existence of a brand new type of causality that supersedes determinism &/or randomness.

You acquire the burden of proof of outlining how randomness &/or determinism is surpassed, and how a complex systems can escape from determinism &/or randomness (just one reason will do).

I comprehend the systems viewpoint, which apeiron elucidates well, but I think such a viewpoint does not preclude laws that cause that system to change over time. Such laws are not created by the system. Rules are created by the system, shaped around the laws. Rules are governed by laws that the system cannot change, no matter how much it likes to think so!

How are you not making up a definition to suit your desired conclusion?

I'm not sure what you mean here. This definition has achieved attention in the literature (see Kim's book for a rigorous handling) and it's not a case of "making it up". I specified a semantic category.

I don't know what you're arguing then?

That the brain's "evolution" through time is caused by random &/or determined laws. That a complex system doesn't lead to a new, third type of causality that is layered on top of determinism &/or randomness but is not determined &/or random. It leads to chaos and emergent properties that are the result of determined &/or random interactions.

You MUST bear the burden of proof for this new type of causality, because I don't think anyone can even begin to envisage of a way that the existence of the system itself can be the root cause of the creation of a third type of causality - the ability to self-cause around laws of its own making (and not just its own heuristics that are created in tandem to physical law).

I think you're arguing for some kind of epistemological consistency between physics and psychology by grounding it in the logic that subjectivity is hard-wired into material tissue.

This makes it sound like I'm arguing for a reductionist/weak emergence stance on consciousness. I am not. I am arguing that the brain cannot bias physical law. Do you think the brain, that evolves according to laws, can bias laws? I hope not. Can it create its own laws? Outlook seems doubtful. Even if there are laws that arise at the hierarchical "level" that consciousness "arises" on, this is no case for a self-causing consciousness. Those laws are still objective laws, laws that consciousness is totally and utterly constrained under.

You are arguing that determinism in one kind of system automatically implies determinism in a radically different type of system.

Our observations of the micro does indeed allude to what type of causation is responsible for the complex macro. You must provide a coherent reason as to why we should expect a brand new type of causality, layered on top of the determined/random micro, yet not determined &/or random. Such a feat would be amazing.

What are these supposed "laws" that govern brain-function through dependency? Please provide a specific, concrete example so I can analyze how such a law is related to natural laws of physics, and what mechanisms connect them with actual functioning of brain or subjectivity in the operational sense.

Obviously I can't lay out all the laws - random &/or determined - that govern a system.

However, I am asserting that they are laws. I am also asserting that they cause the evolution of complex systems through time, and hence those complex systems cannot "escape" them. "Self-organization" according to specific heuristics (Rules are different to Laws) and subjectivity and the feeling of actually choosing is not denied, of course.

This is one definition of free will that I'm proposing can't exist. The other one, the one you were talking about, I am in total agreement with.

 

[brainstorm]

Just because one cannot possibly "deduce"/predict a complex system arising from the laws of physics we have laid out (given today's knowledge/technology) is no argument for the existence of a brand new type of causality that supersedes determinism &/or randomness.

You acquire the burden of proof of outlining how randomness &/or determinism is surpassed, and how a complex systems can escape from determinism &/or randomness (just one reason will do).

I still don't get where you think that determinism has been established as a universal law. Are you trying to establish it as universal by insisting on the need for explaining exceptions? Isn't that putting the cart before the horse?

I'm not sure what you mean here. This definition has achieved attention in the literature (see Kim's book for a rigorous handling) and it's not a case of "making it up". I specified a semantic category.

Why can't you just keep things explicit within this discussion so that I don't have to go on a literature search just to have a fruitful online forum discussion?

That the brain's "evolution" through time is caused by random &/or determined laws. That a complex system doesn't lead to a new, third type of causality that is layered on top of determinism &/or randomness but is not determined &/or random. You MUST bear the burden of proof for this new type of causality, because such a discovery would be incredible... and unlikely.

The water level of lakes is determined by rainfall and evaporation, and cold air causes clouds to begin condensing into raindrops, which fall through the cloud causing more vapor to condense into more raindrops. Does that mean that air temperature determines the water level of a lake? Two systems can be related and even cause each other without having the same operational parameters. Each system operates according to its own logic and parameters. Generalizations are the result of observed consistencies, not the rule prior to an exception being demonstrated as an exception.

Do you think that the number of hits a particular website gets is determined by the speed of computer processors because the internet evolved by interconnecting computers?

And even if the brain can create its own laws (we have no reason to suppose this, by the way), this STILL isn't a cause for pure agent self-causation. Laws --> brain --> New laws. The original, objective laws have an unknown level of constraint on the resulting self-causal laws that are created by the brain. (I am not saying that the brain can create laws, but you may back up to this stance).

What I'm saying is that you need to at least temporarily move from generally philosophizing about the logic of causation and how laws are created and followed to put forth an empirical example for analysis.

This makes it sound like I'm arguing for a reductionist/weak emergence stance on consciousness. I am not. I am arguing that the brain cannot bias physical law. Do you think the brain, that evolves according to laws, can bias laws? I hope not. Can it create its own laws? Outlook seems doubtful. Even if there are laws that arise at the hierarchical "level" that consciousness "arises" on, this is no case for a self-causing consciousness. Those laws are still objective laws, laws that consciousness is totally and utterly constrained under.

Claiming that the brain can't alter gravity is different from claiming that the subjective behavior is determined by natural laws because the brain evolved within a gravitational field.

Our observations of the micro does indeed allude to what type of causation is responsible for the complex macro. You must provide a coherent reason as to why we should expect a brand new type of causality, layered on top of the determined/random micro, yet not determined &/or random. Such a feat would be amazing.

Actually, free-will preceded determinism as a type of causation, but that's completely irrelevant. Also, you're not stating what you are implying has to do with micro and macro. Why do you avoid using concrete examples if you're not trying to pull a fast one by hovering at the abstract level and pulling logical strings the way a magician does to make one thing change into another?

Obviously I can't lay out all the laws - random or determined - that govern a system.

You don't have to. If you just provide one clear example, I can analyze what you're saying in a concrete sense, repeat it, and compare it to my own empirical observations and analysis.

However, I am asserting that they are laws. I am also asserting that they cause the evolution of complex systems through time, and hence those complex systems cannot "escape" them. Self-organization and subjectivity and the feeling of actually choosing is not denied, of course.

I know you're asserting that. What you're not doing is providing anything concrete that can be analyzed and discussed at an empirical level.

 

[imiyakawa]

I still don't get where you think that determinism has been established as a universal law.

Never said this.

Why can't you just keep things explicit within this discussion so that I don't have to go on a literature search just to have a fruitful online forum discussion?

You stated that I was inventing the definition to suit my own needs.

I HAD to reference a credible source to refute your accusation.

Each system operates according to its own logic and parameters.

Precisely. The brain is the same. Unfortunately for your position, these parameters are bound to physical law, until you show why they are not. Computers are similar in this regard. They are bound to algorithms and rulesets. Data comes in (the exogenous), it is processed and apposed to these models and rulesets (the processing), and an output is made that is optimal/correct. Of course, physical law was underpinning this entire operation from time 0. The rulesets were built around the law, physical law wasn't invented. Whilst it is true that the brain is not functionally like this computer, and is therefore not an accurate analogy, this scenario demonstrates what I mean by physical law underpinning the entire operation - an example of a mildly complex system still being governed by physical law.

The brain doesn't create physical law. The brain is bound to physical law. The brain has rules (i.e. its structure, its constraints), and these rules are bound to laws. Physical law causes the brain to evolve over time. This is my position, and you are disagreeing with this, which I think is magical. How can the brain not be bound by physical laws? It's inside the physical universe.

Claiming that the brain can't alter gravity is different from claiming that the subjective behavior is determined by natural laws

Are you asserting that the brain is NOT governed by natural laws? Magic.

The two ways you can disagree with me:
1. The brain doesn't follow laws.
2. The brain creates its own laws.

If 1., there is no arguing with you.
If 2., you have to demonstrate how it does this, and demonstrate how it escapes from the micro's determined/randomness. The burden of proof is not for me to outline some magnificent etiology and interconnectedness of a complex system and "prove" that it operates according to random/determined laws. The burden is on you to demonstrate where the brand new type of causality is coming from, and how it is surpassing the micro's random &/or determined laws. Where is the Shrodinger equation breaking down? Where exactly is the biasing of wave packets occurring? Where does this magical biasing mechanism come from? Please demonstrate where these equations are being tampered with. I am NOT the one that has to describe, fully, a complex system and prove that there is no 3rd causality. You're the one proposing the third causality, divorced from randomness/determinism, you have to give a coherent picture of how it can arise.

When I say random &/or determined laws, I'm not saying that any random laws of the quantum play any significant role in the state changes of the brain as a whole. But I have to state it for correctness and so I'm not accused of assuming determinism.[/size]

(please provide) concrete examples

That's fair, but not really. You think that I'm undertaking a position that requires proving. The burden isn't on me. Whoever claims that a physical system inside the physical universe is not bound by the laws of physics is the one proposing the magic. I'm simply saying that we have no reason to suppose such a thing is happening.

However, I'll try to give you my actual reasons. Of course I can't provide a complete example of a complex system, with the exact etiolgical pathway in tact. I have not modeled such a system bit by bit.

What I do know is that everything we've observed of the micro seems to follow laws (random &/or determined) - strictly - without deviation.
Everything (not literally everything has been observed of course) in the macro apart from complex systems have been observed to follow law without deviation.
Smaller meso systems (coalitions of molecules) are known to follow strict laws.

What's left is medium/large scale (Anything living, cells, etc), (usually incredibly) complex systems that really do seem to be able to govern, downwards cause, and choose. Now, you seem to think that since the brain is so amazingly complex, it could allow an escape hatch away from being controlled completely by natural laws. I think this is magic until I am provided with a reason why it isn't.

There's two main problems with this perspective:
- 1. You have
A) My position: The brain running via the observed determined &/or random mechanisms (so an extrapolation of the 2 possible basic types of causality that exists for the simple to the complex),
B) Your position (or perhaps you're ambivalent to this but just arguing because you're not certain): The brain is not following physical laws, there exists a type of causality that we can't envisage at present (something other than random &/or determined).

The issue is, both scenarios seem compatible with observations of what appears to be pure agent-causation. One can easily see certain rule-sets and heuristics governing the brain (I'm not talking functionalism here), that conform to physical law in all totality, producing what looks like actual choice from the perspective of the scale of emergence (and there are many philosophers and physicists that agree with this, so don't call it bonkers. Read Stephen Wolfram, he's published some nice stuff on this). So both your position and my position are fully compatible, until conclusively demonstrated otherwise, with observations of "choice".

The problem lies with the fact that A) is much more parsimonious because it matches our observations of the simple meso, the micro, and the simple macro. B) does not follow, nor do we have reason to suspect that it is correct when A) is a viable option, and no framework for a new type of causation has been outlined that makes any sense that arises despite of the random &/or determined governing the micro and the meso.

The burden of proof is all on you.

- 2. The macro is constructed on the micro. I understand the posit of Aristotle's formal causation. This is still a type of causation, and while the type of causation is there because of the state of the system itself, it adheres to laws. So is interactive hierarchies, and any other systems view that you may want to propose. The micro has been observed to be purely causal, strictly so. I don't see reason to afford any exception for an incredibly complex system. You have to demonstrate how something can have a micro level, with what seems to be perfect causation, then have the system as a whole escaping from either randomness &/or determinism. You must demonstrate this ability of systems before we even entertain the idea.

When I say "perfect", I don't mean determined. I just mean there's laws, and those laws don't seem to deviate/'slip up'. And, of course, if the laws have a random element, this could be a type of acausation. I wasn't trying to address this when I said "perfect".[/size]

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You even asserted that brain function can be thought as analogous to algorithmic processes. Algorithms are determined ...

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You asked me to give an empirical example of a complex system we know that definitely follows physical law. I tried my best, although of course a rigorous example from my perspective is impossible.

Now I ask you, do we have 1 single reason to suppose that the brain doesn't follow physical laws? Remember I was assuming physicalism (i.e. no soul) for this whole discussion.

 

[brainstorm]

Precisely. The brain is the same. Unfortunately for your position, these parameters are bound to physical law, until you show why they are not. Computers are similar in this regard. They are bound to algorithms and rulesets. Data comes in (the exogenous), it is processed and apposed to these models and rulesets (the processing), and an output is made that is optimal/correct. Of course, physical law was underpinning this entire operation from time 0. The rulesets were built around the law, physical law wasn't invented. Whilst it is true that the brain is not functionally like this computer, and is therefore not an accurate analogy, this scenario demonstrates what I mean by physical law underpinning the entire operation - an example of a mildly complex system still being governed by physical law.

I see what you are saying now, i.e. how can a brain consist of deterministic chemistry and electrical activity and not be determined in its more complex functioning.

The only answer I can come up with, through empirical reflection on the experience of having a brain and nervous system that responds to impulses in various ways, is that the various systems operate relatively independently of each other. So, for example, while I do think light that hits my corneas does determine more or less the signal that reaches the brain, there's another part of my brain that thinks about what I see and what to do about it, and yet another that controls musculature, movement, actions, etc.

Probably the interactions between the thinking part and the seeing or doing parts of my brain are deterministic in some way. Only, I think the signals compete in such a way as to create conflicting protocols. For example, seeing a bull can trigger an adrenaline/flight response, which could trigger me to run away. But if I see a strong fence between me and the bull, my sense of satisfaction and relaxation is triggered, as if I had fought against the bull and dominated it, which may overpower the adrenaline response. If the fence appears to be weak or structurally compromised, and the bull appears to be at the point of finding its way through the fence, the conflict between the two deterministic patterns has to be resolved, so a third system-mechanism comes into play that analyzes the bull's behavior, the weakness of the fence-breach, etc. This may all take place relatively sub-consciously, but the fact remains that the different systems are operating more or less independently and conflicting, and the one that resolves the conflict is going to generate the feeling that triggers either adrenaline response or euphoria based on a sense of control.

How can you assume that the outcome of a conflict between multiple deterministic systems is determined by a third control system? If a warm front and a cold front run into each other, there is no third deterministic system that mediates the conflict. Yet it is also not totally random which system dominates the other, or what dynamic process of synthesis emerges between the two systems. Perhaps will-power itself is a deterministic process at the level of neural activity, but the particular choice made could synthesize competing information and reasoning in any number of ways depending on the feedback generated by various sub-levels of cognitive experimentation with the parameters of representation of the conflict within the theoretical imagination.

Free-will probably evolved as a neural function to intervene in unresolvable theoretical complexity. It may be nothing more than the ability for part of cognition to short-circuit other parts and supercede them in controlling action-initiative. Maybe it initially operates as a random choice generator, which becomes hesitant to act due to failures. As a result, it may oscillate between intervention and hesitating and allowing theoretical cognition to continue as long as some other process fails to exert enough deterministic power to overcome it. It might even develop the ability to keep conflicting deterministic processes in balance whenever possible, yet the balance results in the ability to postpone action or to "allow the scale to tip" when it senses that action is necessary to avoid problems. Yet, which direction is allows it to tip in is also controlled by the specific method of achieving balance it is using, so it has to choose between methods and therefore learns to mitigate the competing choices through exercise of the more or less random-choice system that could be called free-will.

I wonder if anyone has tried programming an AI system with multiple, competing algorithms and protocols and then given it a random escape algorithm that must select the most appropriate decision on the basis of processing up to the point escape-necessity is reached. If the random-choice generator was programmed to develop non-random choices by analyzing and learning from outcomes of past escape-choices, maybe the computer would develop increasingly complex free-will. You could ask the computer how it mitigated between conflicting algorithms and it would provide an exact record of the process of emergent algorithm-creation it generated in order to reach the point of an escape-choice, as well as what it learned from the outcome of the particular choice and how it has incorporated that new information into its self-revising escape-logic generator/algorithm.

The brain doesn't create physical law. The brain is bound to physical law. The brain has rules (i.e. its structure, its constraints), and these rules are bound to laws. Physical law causes the brain to evolve over time. This is my position, and you are disagreeing with this, which I think is magical. How can the brain not be bound by physical laws? It's inside the physical universe.

Cognition does not have fixed rules. It has variable processes and the ability to mitigate between multiple ones as they conflict.

Are you asserting that the brain is NOT governed by natural laws? Magic.

At the chemical/electronic level of infrastructure, it probably does. It's only at the meta-level of synthesizing process-outcomes that variability emerges. It sees what it sees, but vagueness of information about whether an object is a living person or a scarecrow results in the stimulus to undertake actions that increase relevant information as quickly as possible. It is programmed to avoid short-circuiting or getting frozen in a feedback loop, so it learns to manage its choices.

The two ways you can disagree with me:
1. The brain doesn't follow laws.
2. The brain creates its own laws.

If 1., there is no arguing with you.

There is no arguing with you if you sincerely believe that the reason nature behaves in predictable ways is because it is following laws or rules the way a computer follows protocols. Objects don't fall because they are complying with gravity as a law. That's just a term used to express the observed pattern that all objects fall at the same rate in the same direction. The reason any given object falls is force imparted on it and expressed by it, not because it is following a law or rule but because it is forced to do so by a field. If it contains sufficient force/energy to resist the force of gravity, either by friction, counter-force from another gravitational field (lagrangian points) or orbital velocity/momentum, it will not follow the rule that it must fall in the direction of another object that lacks the same means of resistance.

If 2., you have to demonstrate how it does this, and demonstrate how it escapes from the micro's determined/randomness. The burden of proof is not for me to outline some magnificent etiology and interconnectedness of a complex system and "prove" that it operates according to random/determined laws. The burden is on you to demonstrate where the brand new type of causality is coming from, and how it is surpassing the micro's random &/or determined laws.

The brain does not escape from the force of gravity, except by controlling blood pressure to get blood to flow upward against it, and even then the muscle contraction of blood-vessels to achieve this is determined by autonomic nervous activity. The brain also does not escape the flow of current between the synapses, except to the extent that those are mitigated by factors that evolve in response to learned effects of them firing with disappointing consequences. Each of these natural forces operate independently of the others. Their determinism is not a general force that drives all of them any more than time is a general force that drives all energy-motion occurrences. You are confusing the logical extrapolation of a generality (determinism) for a physical force, which it's not.

That's fair, but not really. You think that I'm undertaking a position that requires proving. The burden isn't on me. Whoever claims that a physical system inside the physical universe is not bound by the laws of physics is the one proposing the magic. I'm simply saying that we have no reason to suppose such a thing is happening.

Do you accept my argument that forces do not act on the basis of laws but purely as forces, or rather expressions of force in individual particles and objects?

What I do know is that everything we've observed of the micro seems to follow laws (random &/or determined) - strictly - without deviation.
Everything (not literally everything has been observed of course) in the macro apart from complex systems have been observed to follow law without deviation.
Meso systems (coalitions of molecules) are known to follow strict laws.

But this may well be due to the ability of cognition to interpret observations according to patterns and refine the patterns to a level of generality/regularity that allows abstract laws to be stated, which apply to multiple occurrences. The law-like regularity is probably more due to the ability of cognition to generate general categories that distinguish individual commonalities from their differences and focus on the similarity by predicting behavior in terms of them. If you would focus on the reason why different objects fall at different rates, instead of explaining the differences as mitigating factors in uniform force-behavior, no law of gravity would emerge because each falling object would appear to follow its own set of rules according to its shape, where it was falling, what it bumped into on the way down, etc.

B) Your position (or perhaps you're ambivalent to this but just arguing because you're not certain): The brain is not following physical laws, there exists a type of causality that we can't envisage at present (something other than random &/or determined).

My position is that the brain's materiality is subject to the same physical forces, but these physical forces do not produce law-like behavior when they interact and conflict with each other's unimpeded functioning.

I think this position sufficiently addresses your other points. If not, please repeat which ones do not follow your misapplication of law-governance as causal force in and of itself and I will reconsider.