Why does math work in our reality?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Perspectives
  • Start date Start date
  • Tags Tags
    Reality Work
AI Thread Summary
The discussion centers on the philosophical understanding of why mathematics works in explaining reality. Participants explore the relationship between mathematical models and physical phenomena, emphasizing that while mathematics can approximate reality, it never perfectly aligns with it. The conversation touches on the historical development of mathematical concepts and how they are shaped by human perception and reasoning. There is a debate about the arbitrary nature of mathematical definitions and the implications for understanding fundamental truths. Ultimately, the consensus suggests that mathematics is a powerful tool for modeling the universe, reflecting our logical deductions about the world.
  • #51
kote said:
I'm confused here. Generalizing observation is exactly what science does. You take measurements and generate models or theories. Then, you check to make sure your theory fits all of the generalizations you intended it to fit by making additional observations.
I suppose you'll have to tell that to Einstein regarding an assumption of invariance or QM regarding the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Relativity theory is the formalization resulting from the axiom that the laws of physics are the same in any intertial reference frame.
Really? Science doesn't try to uncover the patterns between causes and effects? It doesn't try to tell you why certain things are observed? Are you saying that the less science has to do with physical cause and effect, the better it is? Physics is the study of physical causation.
Aristotle's model didn't make predictions. Gallileo's model was empirically more accurate. Being within an inch is closer than not even making a guess.

You posted a lot, so I'll have to apologize for only responding to parts.

Ok Aristotle's model worked better
-science does not generalize observation-- observation is merely sense data.
Science does not fundamentally uncover patterns - pattern fitting is only a tool -what about the Ptolemaic system? - a great pattern fit. It was considered to be dogmatic, axiomatic, rigid and false because it did not penetrate our ideas of how God the geometer would have constructed the universe.

- Einstein's theory of relativity originally did not,at first, explain new data - it discovered a new concept of space time - physicists believe that is was a totally unexpected and anomalous idea precisely because of this. They agree that physics could have gone along explaining known data just fine without it.

Most mathematical theories examine our ideas of space and quantity. I gave only a few examples. I think it would benefit the philosopher to do some real mathematics.

I guess underlying these thoughts is the idea that sense perception is merely a shadow of reality and its true nature needs to be discovered with this shadow as a guide. These is no doubt that science progressed on this assumption. The physicists and mathematicians who believed this are too numerous to list - e.g. Gauss, Riemann, Einstein, Kepler, Planck,most Quantum physicists, etc

There is a deep book on this subject written by Henri Poincare called Science and Hypothesis. In it he says that there are two schools of physics, the English school which denies the need for hypotheses about the nature of reality and believes that all science is just pattern fitting and the Continental school which says that underlying assumptions/hypotheses are necessary. the pattern fitters were notably Newton and Faraday both who explicitly claimed that they needed no hypotheses - maybe Maxwell also though I am not sure of his view on this. Curiously it seems that there were really two schools of physics centered around this controversy.
 
Last edited:
Physics news on Phys.org
  • #52
wofsy said:
Science does not fundamentally uncover patterns - pattern fitting is only a tool -what about the Ptolemaic system? - a great pattern fit. It was considered to be dogmatic, axiomatic, rigid and false because it did not penetrate our ideas of how God the geometer would have constructed the universe.

What is science if not a tool? Also, the Ptolemaic system is not "false," it is simply inelegant. Inelegance is not a mathematical or scientific criteria; it is aesthetics. And since when is a historical religious view the determining factor in scientific worth? Is acceptance by the church a requirement of good science?

Maybe it would help if you could explain what you think the goal of science is if it is not to formally generalize observations or to uncover physical causation.

wofsy said:
I think it would benefit the philosopher to do some real mathematics.

Why do you assume we haven't done "real math?" What does performing calculations or derivations or constructing proofs have to do with the philosophical foundations of mathematics anyway?
 
Last edited:
  • #53
kote said:
What is science if not a tool? Also, the Ptolemaic system is not "false," it is simply inelegant. Inelegance is not a mathematical or scientific criteria, it is aesthetics. And since when is a historical religious view the determining factor in scientific worth? Is acceptance by the church a requirement of good science?

Maybe it would help if you could explain what you think the goal of science is if it is not to formally generalize observations or to uncover physical causation.
Why do you assume we haven't done "real math?" What does performing calculations or derivations or constructing proofs have to do with the philosophical foundations of mathematics anyway?

By doing mathematics - by which I mean coming up with new theories or extending existing theories in important ways - not just doing proofs and calculations - you will see my point.
If you have done this and don't agree with me then I am astounded and would like to discuss it further. Do you think the theory of Riemann surfaces was thought of as a calculation or a proof of something?

Science is a tool but is more than that. that is what I am trying to say. I am also saying that the idea of mathematics as merely a modelling tool is just plain wrong. If you are a mathematician, how is it that you believe this?

By the way, the Ptolemaic system - though a good pattern fit, a grand lovely model - was an impediment to the progress of science - yet it was able to predict and to model wonderfully.
 
Last edited:
  • #54
wofsy said:
By doing mathematics - by which I mean coming up with new theories or extending existing theories in important ways - not just doing proofs and calculations - you will see my point.
If you have done this and don't agree with me then I am astounded and would like to discuss it further. Do you think the theory of Riemann surfaces was thought of as a calculation or a proof of something?

Science is a tool but is more than that. that is what I am trying to say. I am also saying that the idea of mathematics as merely a modelling tool is just plain wrong. If you are a mathematician, how is it that you believe this?

It's because the idea that modeling deserves to be qualified by "mere" is a philosophical idea and not a mathematical one. Judgments about the value of modeling are not mathematical or scientific. I disagree that math is a science, so I see no problem in asserting that science is modeling while math is not. Math is a tool used by science to create models. Mathematical theories, in a way, can be said to be models themselves, they just aren't models of anything in particular without science attached. Math is the logical analytic extension of axioms or assumptions.

Mathematical theories often precede scientific theories. They are often surprising and paradoxical and cause us to think about things in new ways. Math is necessary for formal science and nearly all technology. Extending or applying mathematics can be a very creative process. None of that changes the fact that it involves only purely formal structures (or models), the application of which lies in the realm of science, and the value of which lies in the realm of ethics and aesthetics.

From Barry Mazur http://www.math.harvard.edu/~mazur/papers/plato4.pdf:

If we adopt the Platonic view that mathematics is discovered, we are suddenly in surprising territory, for this is a full-fledged theistic position. Not that it necessarily posits a god, but rather that its stance is such that the only way one can adequately express one’s faith in it, the only way one can hope to persuade others of its truth, is by abandoning the arsenal of rationality, and relying on the resources of the prophets. ...

It seems to me that, in the hands of a mathematician who is a determined Platonist, proof could very well serve primarily this kind of rhetorical function—making sure that the description is on track—and not (or at least: not necessarily) have the rigorous theory-building function it is often conceived as fulfilling.

Only math that involves "mere" abstract analytic constructions can talk about proof or universals. If math discusses anything other than models, it is reduced to mere inductive generalization, which cannot rationally be demonstrated as true.

Mazur also criticizes anti-platonistic views, but he focuses on the idea that math is socially constructed, which is not what we're talking about.

I also object to the view that what a mathematician says he thinks he is doing is valid evidence for what math actually is, unless truth is sociologically constructed. But if truth is sociological, math is already in trouble and needs to be knocked down a few levels.
 
  • #55
None of that changes the fact that it involves only purely formal structures (or models),

that to me is just wrong unless I don't know what you mean by purley formal. Are all ideas purely formal? Is love purely formal?

Ideas are not formalisms to me. Is a Bach fugue purely formal if we think of it rather than listen to it. Is the painting in Van Gogh's mind purely formal before he paints it?
 
  • #56
Mathematics is discovered. Mazur is right that this has potentially theological implications - but in my mind he is wrong that it is theistic. The reality of ideas is indisputable. Sense experience is always in doubt.
 
  • #57
wofsy said:
Mathematics is discovered. Mazur is right that this has potentially theological implications - but in my mind he is wrong that it is theistic. The reality of ideas is indisputable. Sense experience is always in doubt.

Ah, so you are a dualist :smile:! I almost agree with what you're saying here, except for one minor point.

You say that the reality of ideas is indisputable. I agree. But for real ideas to be discovered as opposed to being invented or constructed, they must be real before they are ideas in the minds of any particular mathematician. This leads you to Berkeley's argument that for these ideas to have timeless existence, they must be existing in the mind of God.

If ideas are real, then either they are created in the minds of those who are thinking them, or they exist permanently and objectively in an eternal mind. In order for real ideas to be discovered, there must be an eternal mind in which they exist prior to their being discovered by our minds. Also, in order for ideas to be objective, they must exist in an omniscient objective mind.

If math is ideas that are discovered, then there exists an objective and eternal mind.

If math is relations and not ideas, then we don't have this problem. Analytic relations may be discovered, but they are not objects and do not have such a thing as existence. That is what I mean by the idea that they are purely formal. Their method of discovery is deductive and logical rather than scientific.
 
  • #58
kote said:
Ah, so you are a dualist :smile:! I almost agree with what you're saying here, except for one minor point.

You say that the reality of ideas is indisputable. I agree. But for real ideas to be discovered as opposed to being invented or constructed, they must be real before they are ideas in the minds of any particular mathematician. This leads you to Berkeley's argument that for these ideas to have timeless existence, they must be existing in the mind of God.

If ideas are real, then either they are created in the minds of those who are thinking them, or they exist permanently and objectively in an eternal mind. In order for real ideas to be discovered, there must be an eternal mind in which they exist prior to their being discovered by our minds. Also, in order for ideas to be objective, they must exist in an omniscient objective mind.

If math is ideas that are discovered, then there exists an objective and eternal mind.

If math is relations and not ideas, then we don't have this problem. Analytic relations may be discovered, but they are not objects and do not have such a thing as existence. That is what I mean by the idea that they are purely formal. Their method of discovery is deductive and logical rather than scientific.

good explanation> I understand what you mean. I think our difference is largely semantic. A couple things though and this confuses me a bit. First of all why aren't relations just as objective as ideas?

Second, if we discover them did they come into existence at the moment of discovery or did we only become aware of them? If they come into existence then is the same relation in someone else's thoughts a different relation and if it is what unifies the two? In which mind does this unity exist and was that also created on the spot of discovery?

I like Riemann's idea that the universe itself has the intrinsic dynamics of a mind and that our minds partake in this and are part of it. He was I think a neo-Kantian and believed in intrinsic ideas. But it seems that he tried to extend this to explanation of physical phenomena as thoughts -e.g. particles. from this point of view there is a universal mind in a sense - but not a deity.
 
  • #59
wofsy said:
good explanation> I understand what you mean. I think our difference is largely semantic. A couple things though and this confuses me a bit. First of all why aren't relations just as objective as ideas?

It's been argued that all of philosophy is semantics :smile:. I'm inclined to agree. I would say that logical relations are objective. By objective here I mean not dependent on any particular point of view. I don't mean that they are objects or have existence.

Ideas are personal to the person who has them. They are about as subjective as you can get. Objectivity is trickier. It can be doubted whether or not there is such a thing at all. When it comes to logical or analytic truths, the best argument I can give for their objectivity (or universality) is that we can't conceive of them as being false or dependent on our point of view. Does it depend on my point of view that something can't both exist and not exist at the same time? Or that no unmarried men have wives?

Logic is the system in which we can make philosophical arguments, and, at least since Godel, we know that no logical system can prove its own validity. The fact that we can't rationally deny that 1=1, though, makes it as objective as may be possible in my opinion. This may also be a misuse of objective and subjective though, in that logic is supposed to come before either of those notions as a framework.
wofsy said:
I like Riemann's idea that the universe itself has the intrinsic dynamics of a mind and that our minds partake in this and are part of it. He was I think a neo-Kantian and believed in intrinsic ideas. But it seems that he tried to extend this to explanation of physical phenomena as thoughts -e.g. particles. from this point of view there is a universal mind in a sense - but not a deity.

I'm not familiar with Reimann's philosophy, but it might be relevant to point out that Kant did not believe in intrinsic ideas. From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/:

Kantian innateness is essentially a procedure-based innateness, consisting in an a priori active readiness of the mind for implementing rules of synthesis, as opposed to the content-based innateness of Cartesian and Leibnizian innate ideas, according to which an infinitely large supply of complete (e.g., mathematical) beliefs, propositions, or concepts themselves are either occurrently or dispositionally intrinsic to the mind. But as Locke pointed out, this implausibly overloads the human mind's limited storage capacities.

In other words, logic is innate, ideas are not. I like Bertrand Russell's treatment of the issue. Russell's laws of thought are somewhat similar to Kant's categories of perception. He talks about universals and relations in http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html chapters 7-10.
wofsy said:
Second, if we discover them did they come into existence at the moment of discovery or did we only become aware of them? If they come into existence then is the same relation in someone else's thoughts a different relation and if it is what unifies the two? In which mind does this unity exist and was that also created on the spot of discovery?

When we discover them, they come into existence as thoughts in our mind. From Russell (chap 9):

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. We have here the same ambiguity as we noted in discussing Berkeley in Chapter IV. In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness.

As for unity with other people's thoughts, there is still trouble in overcoming solipsism. There's not even a guarantee that our own thoughts are true representations of logical relations. Proofs have certainly been shown to be wrong before. The best we can probably do is say that unless we accept solipsism, we must accept universals.

In geometry, for example, when we wish to prove something about all triangles, we draw a particular triangle and reason about it, taking care not to use any characteristic which it does not share with other triangles. The beginner, in order to avoid error, often finds it useful to draw several triangles, as unlike each other as possible, in order to make sure that his reasoning is equally applicable to all of them. But a difficulty emerges as soon as we ask ourselves how we know that a thing is white or a triangle. If we wish to avoid the universals whiteness and triangularity, we shall choose some particular patch of white or some particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the resemblance required will have to be a universal.

I wish I had better answers than I do, but if I had all the answers, this wouldn't be interesting :smile:. With post-modernism and social construction etc, people have been dissatisfied with analyticity all together and have simply denied that circles are necessarily round, so I suppose that's another option. There are some more serious semantic differences in that stance though, and I'm not a fan.
 
Last edited:
  • #60
wofsy said:
Math is not a way of creating definite models - models are formal devices - real mathematics is a way of discovering our ideas of space, geometry and number- empirical observation can guide these discoveries but it is not the only source of guidance. What empirical model of reality would you say the theory of Riemann surfaces represents? How about the theory of differentiable structures on manifolds? Which empirical data did the Riemann hypothesis model? - what observations did it make "crisp"?
How about Thom's theory of cobordism of differentiable manifolds? After you explain all of these to me, you can move on to Chern-Simons invariants and then rational homotopy theory/ Oh yeah and maybe you could help me out with which empirical data the theory of Bieberbach groups was designed to model.


'

I appreciate the fact you like a good argument but you have to at least make an attempt to understand what the other side is saying. Saying you find things meaningless, or you don't believe, is not a very interesting position to hold. So I'll limit my responses.

"real mathematics is a way of discovering our ideas of space, geometry and number"

You mean pattern and form. Self-consistent organisation.

"What empirical model of reality would you say the theory of represents?"

As you say, it all starts with observation of the world - modelling at its most natural level. The ancients noted the regularities of the world and generalised to create some structural truths about objects like triangles and morphisms like spirals.

Then mathematics has developed by even greater generalisation - as articulated by category theory for example. And demonstrated in the move from euclidean to non euclidean geometry, or simple to complex number. We find that we exist in a world that is highly constrained (3D and flat - and scaled) and then generalise by successively removing those constraints to discover if self-consistent regularity still exists.

And you can see what happens when you do this with quarternions and octonions. The regularity frays. Properties like division erode as you generalise the dimensionality. Instead of producing crisp algebraic answers, the meaning of the algebra becomes vague.

So the most general maths can cease to model crisp properties that were there in the original "empirical" view.

When this happens, many say maths has just wandered off into the wilderness - or a landscape in string theory's case.

But my philosophical approach is different. I am saying that generalisations lead back to vague potential. And the way to rescue the situation is by also building the global constraints - the selection rules that represent the idea of "self-consistency" - back into the maths explicitly. So maths with scale.

"Science develops because people question or ideas of reality not because we model it."

Ideas are models - ideas formalised.
 
  • #61
wofsy said:
Ok
-what about the Ptolemaic system? - a great pattern fit. It was considered to be dogmatic, axiomatic, rigid and false because it did not penetrate our ideas of how God the geometer would have constructed the universe.

Epicycles did kind of fit with a harmony of the spheres. But we now think it ugly because it depended too much on construction - the addition of cycles - and not enough on global constraints (such as satisfying a universal law of gravitation).

At an instinctive level, we have long known that "good modelling" is about a natural balance of construction and constraint, local atoms and global laws. Now is the time to make this formally explicit in the form of an equilbration principle. Which is the main thing I've been working on with my interest in vagueness, dichotomies and hierarchies.

wofsy said:
- Einstein's theory of relativity originally did not,at first, explain new data - it discovered a new concept of space time - physicists believe that is was a totally unexpected and anomalous idea precisely because of this. They agree that physics could have gone along explaining known data just fine without it.

Michelson–Morley? Mach and centrifugal force?

wofsy said:
There is a deep book on this subject written by Henri Poincare called Science and Hypothesis. In it he says that there are two schools of physics, the English school which denies the need for hypotheses about the nature of reality and believes that all science is just pattern fitting and the Continental school which says that underlying assumptions/hypotheses are necessary. the pattern fitters were notably Newton and Faraday both who explicitly claimed that they needed no hypotheses - maybe Maxwell also though I am not sure of his view on this. Curiously it seems that there were really two schools of physics centered around this controversy.

One school worries about the information that must be discarded in modelling, the other doesn't.

Well actually the Newtons and the rest usually do wonder about the gap between reality in its fullness and their reduced descriptions that involve things like action at a distance.

But modern epistemology - Rosen's modelling relations being the best articulation I have come across - does away with this old hangover.
 
  • #62
kote said:
I disagree that math is a science, so I see no problem in asserting that science is modeling while math is not. Math is a tool used by science to create models. Mathematical theories, in a way, can be said to be models themselves, they just aren't models of anything in particular without science attached. Math is the logical analytic extension of axioms or assumptions.

The thread of prejudice running through your argument here is that knowledge is passive - it "exists". Whereas I am arguing from the opposite position that knowledge is active - it is about doing things, indeed getting things done. So that is why "modelling" is the chosen word. We do no represent reality or behold reality, instead we are seeking to have control over it - even if it is simply control over our perceptions at times.

Yes, you can talk about maths as people creating axioms and then investigating all the patterns that can flow from the axioms. This describes the day-to-day for many academics. It seems a very passive and interior exercise. And often is sterile. But the maths that gets sociologically rewarded is then the maths that turns out to be useful for control over the world, so betraying its true purpose.

So as I say - based on modelling relations epistemology - there is a natural divide into models and measurements. An observer needs the general of his ideas, the particulars of his impressions. And psychology tells us how these two develop from vague to crisp through their mutual interaction. The way a newborn baby learns to make sense of its world through active exploration.

This natural division is then repeated in our formalised disciplines. We have a method for constructing models, a method for making measurements. Maths is about fashioning tools for model construction. It may involve philosophy too in developing its crisp axioms.
 
  • #63
kote said:
Kantian innateness is essentially a procedure-based innateness, consisting in an a priori active readiness of the mind for implementing rules of synthesis, as opposed to the content-based innateness of Cartesian and Leibnizian innate ideas, according to which an infinitely large supply of complete (e.g., mathematical) beliefs, propositions, or concepts themselves are either occurrently or dispositionally intrinsic to the mind. But as Locke pointed out, this implausibly overloads the human mind's limited storage capacities.

In other words, logic is innate, ideas are not. I like Bertrand Russell's treatment of the issue. Russell's laws of thought are somewhat similar to Kant's categories of perception. He talks about universals and relations in http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html chapters 7-10.

.

Yes, neurology tells us that the brain indeed has a "logic" - a way of arriving at a crisp local orientation to a global world. And that process is dichotomisation. Figure-ground, focus-fringe, attention-habit, conscious-preconscious, etc.

And this "real logic" has scale. There is always a local-global asymmetry involved. Global universals and their local particulars. Whereas modern symbolic logic has developed through the discard of scale - the reduction of asymmetry to (mere) symmetry. So the yes/no, on/off, binary and scaleless choices of information theory.
 
  • #64
apeiron said:
I appreciate the fact you like a good argument but you have to at least make an attempt to understand what the other side is saying. Saying you find things meaningless, or you don't believe, is not a very interesting position to hold. So I'll limit my responses.

"real mathematics is a way of discovering our ideas of space, geometry and number"

You mean pattern and form. Self-consistent organisation.

"What empirical model of reality would you say the theory of represents?"

As you say, it all starts with observation of the world - modelling at its most natural level. The ancients noted the regularities of the world and generalised to create some structural truths about objects like triangles and morphisms like spirals.

Then mathematics has developed by even greater generalisation - as articulated by category theory for example. And demonstrated in the move from euclidean to non euclidean geometry, or simple to complex number. We find that we exist in a world that is highly constrained (3D and flat - and scaled) and then generalise by successively removing those constraints to discover if self-consistent regularity still exists.

And you can see what happens when you do this with quarternions and octonions. The regularity frays. Properties like division erode as you generalise the dimensionality. Instead of producing crisp algebraic answers, the meaning of the algebra becomes vague.

So the most general maths can cease to model crisp properties that were there in the original "empirical" view.

When this happens, many say maths has just wandered off into the wilderness - or a landscape in string theory's case.

But my philosophical approach is different. I am saying that generalisations lead back to vague potential. And the way to rescue the situation is by also building the global constraints - the selection rules that represent the idea of "self-consistency" - back into the maths explicitly. So maths with scale.

"Science develops because people question or ideas of reality not because we model it."

Ideas are models - ideas formalised.

I apologize for saying things were meaningless - but your use of language I found inpenetrable -plus you took a lecturing tone. So I felt I was being lectured to with non-specific vague words. This was a sincere reaction and I felt very frustrated.

I still don't exactly know what your language means and that is why i gave up. I think clarity of expression is necessary and lack of clarity is a sign that the person does not know what they are talking about.

For instance you just told me what I mean - as if I don't know what I mean. That is condescending. I have no desire to fight with anyone and I am totally open minded. But you have not been clear as far as I am concerned and you have been lecturing. That is also not very interesting.
 
Last edited:
  • #65
wofsy said:
I think clarity of expression is necessary and lack of clarity is a sign that the person does not know what they are talking about.

.

I accept I can be irritating. All I can say is that I was also feeling irritated.

Also I believe that any lack of clarity is due to the unfamiliarity of the ideas I am attempting to communicate rather than my alleged deficiencies as a communicator.

Yes, these ideas I am expressing do indeed come from a different community - a rather small band of systems thinkers such as Salthe and Pattee. And I understand how opaque they can seem. It took many years of discussion for me to come round to some of them. And we are also talking about work in progress - current research.

Anway, I have tried to create introductions to some of the key ideas like Vagueness - see this thread.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514&highlight=vagueness
 
  • #66
Ok So now that we realize that we are all sincere and serious here and are not trying to be dogmatic and contentious it would greatly interest me to understand how you view some of the examples that I suggested. Why not start with the examples of fields of mathematics that do not arise from attempts to explain empirical data. A simple one that would could all talk about without taking a math course first might be the discovery of hyperbolic plane geometry in the 18'th century.

My understanding is that people for centuries felt that Euclidean geometry was intrinsic to the idea of geometry itself - that the parallel postulate was indispensable to the idea of space.

I believe that Kant event thought that Euclidean geometry was an a priori synthetic idea meaning that it was not an empirical model but rather an intrinsic feature of our experience of spatial relations ships. But like logic which you seem to agree is intrinsic, Kant thought that Euclidean geometry was intrinsic.

Many others agreed with him and realized that if this were really true then the parallel postulate should be provable from the simple axioms of space that describe the way lines intersect and how they separate a plane. One axiom said that two points determine a line. Another said that a line separates a plane into two half planes. A third said that two lines in a plane can intersect in at most one point.

These guys already knew that parallels must exist - not empirically because that would be impossible to test - because they knew that two lines that intersect a third at right angles must be parallel. They just couldn't prove that they were unique. It was uniqueness that got them.

This lead them to question their intuition/picture of straight really meant. gauss finally came up with a model of plane geometry where lines were actually curves and where the parallel postulate failed. In his geometry there were infinitely many parallels through any point.

After that people thought that there were two possible intrinsic geometries of space and only after they realized this did they actually try to test it out - under the assumption of course that our picture of space that is derived from sense experience actually must obey geometrical laws. Gauss went out and measured large triangles on the Earth to see he he could detect angle defects away from 180 degrees.

So you need to take this Kantian or perhaps Platonic - you would know better than I - way of looking at things and tell me how it was only just discovering empirical relationships - generalizing observations - through models. This to me, and I know for sure for gauss and his colleagues - was an investigation into the intrinsic nature of our ideas of space. The empirical modelling part was not central to the investigations and came afterwards when Gauss realized that if one believed - by either philosophy or faith - that experience actually exhibits the laws of geometry that one should then be able to test for the two possibilities.

Let's make this the starting point and take this paragraph as a first step to get thing going.
 
Last edited:
  • #67
My take here starts by saying it is a false dichotomy to think the situation would be EITHER empiricism OR platonism (or constructivism or intuitonalism, or however else we want to phrase this traditional divide between "looking out" and "looking in"). Instead - logically - it must always be BOTH. As the complementary extremes of "what can self-consistently be".

This is what happens because I chose asymmetric dichotomisation as the foundation of my logic. This is of course the unfamilar bit, even though it starts from ancient greek metaphysics (Anaximander, Aristotle), was messed about a bit by the likes of Hegel, and reappears in modern times with Peirce.

Now asymmetric dichotomisation says that any (vague) state of possibility or potential can only be (crisply) divided if that act of separation goes in two exactly "opposite" directions. And by opposite, this is not symmetric as in left/right or other kinds of symmetry breakings which have just a single scale. It must be an asymmetric breaking that is across scale and so results in completely unlike outcomes (as opposed to merely mirror reflections of the same thing).

If you are with me so far, then the classic examples of asymmetric dichotomies in metaphysics are local-global, substance-form, discrete-continuous, stasis-flux, chance-necessity, matter-mind, vague-crisp, subjective-objective, atom-void, space-time, location-momentum (and the list goes on, but these are among the "strong ones").

You can see that each is both the very opposite of the other, and yet also logically mutual or complementary. That is because each is defined actively as the exclusion of the other. Pure substance would be a stuff that has absolutely no form, and form is that which has absolutely no substance. (Even Plato had to have the BOTH of the forms and the chora).

So this is an emergentist and interactions-based logic or causality (a logic being a generalised model of causality in my book). You cannot have one side arise into being, into existence (or persistence) without also forming the other. As one arises (in thought or reality) by becoming everything that the other is not.

As I say, Anaximander was the first to articulate a vagueness => dichotomy => hierarchy approach to modelling causality, the logic of reality. Aristotle then polished it up (as in the law of the exclude middle). Today, you can see mathematical sketches of the idea in the symmetry breaking models of condensed matter physics, in hierarchy theory, and even in some basic stabs at maths notation.

Check out Louis Kauffman's musings on this...
http://www.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Peirce.pdf

The laws of form are another stab...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laws_of_Form

A gateway to Peirce's writings (which are only a precursor to what I'm talking about)...
http://www.cspeirce.com/

And others currently treading some of the same ground (though I would have many criticisms of Kelso's actual approach)...
http://www.thecomplementarynature.com/

Anyway, I hope you can appreciate that this is like swapping in, swapping out, a complete computational architecture. There is standard logic based on atomism, mechanicalism, locality, and other good stuff which is like your classic sturdy von Neumann serial processing engine. It works, no question. Then over here in left field, there is an attempt to build an architecture of thought, a way of modelling, that is founded on very different basic computational principles. It is like the attempt to get neural networks off the ground. Some kind of global, holistic, hierarchical version of logic. And while it looks promising, it is still a long way from commercialisation.

But anyway, let's take these still developing ideas and apply them to the question you asked.

Again, for me on the grounds of logic (all reality always works this way) I would come with the expectation that the story is going to be not either/or but instead both, and interactionist. So yes, strong dichotomies always emerge, and then the whole point is that they emerge because their existence is self-consistent in the wider view. They are mutually causal, or synergistic as asymmetric extremes.

Therefore it does seem that the creation of mathematics has this basic divide. There is either the pure development of ideas, or the discovery of ideas from observation. And my logic would force me to expect a mutually emergent story. The firming up of ideas inside a person's head allows them to make more detailed observations of the world, which in turn allow for more development of ideas inside their head. And these two parts of the action are driving each other ever further apart in scale. As the observations get ever smaller, ever finer, ever more particular, so the ideas get ever more general, ever more global and universal, ever more lacking in picky detail.

Now to take the specific example of non-euclidean geometry. The tale of the discovery follows this dichotomous logic. At first, forms got separated from substances in a way that divided the flat 3D world of immediate experience. Then as mathematicians realized that just three dimensions is a rather particular choice, and likewise just flat space was a rather particular choice, they could make a leap of generalisation to allow infinite dimensionality and any curvature. Their ideas became less particular, and so more general.

At the same time, this step in one direction brought with it a matching step in the ability to make ever finer "observations". It became possible to model some world with some particular curvature or number of dimensions. Maths could start exploring imaginary worlds of any crisply chosen design (and science could then use this new technology to test our actual world against the new variety of predicted designs).

So dichotomisation is the logic by which humans stepped back to see more. And then I would go further - from epistemology to ontology. Dichotomisation also is how the world probably actually emerges.

Taking non-euclidean geometry, we can see for example that "flat space" is precisely the average, the sum over histories, of curved space. If you have a dichotomous spectrum from purely locally hyberbolic space (disconnecting sea of points) to purely global hyperspheric space (curvature which makes a continuous or perfectly closed space) then flatness is the average, the equilibrium outcome, of these extremes "in interaction".

Of course this is still a hypothesis as I'm not sure how to go about constructing a mathematical proof of the idea. But I am just sketching the kind of answer I would expect to be the case if dichotomous logic is a valid logic.

There is another argument about why there would be just three spatial dimensions. But I can save that for some other time as it is even more left-field if Peircean semiotics is unfamiliar terrain.

To sum up, all my arguments stem from applying a different computational architecture. And it is not an arbitrary choice as - dichotomously - there would have to be exactly two deep models of logic/causality. Standard logic is one pole, and now I am working with people in developing the other pole. I see this as great news for good old fashioned atomistic logic as it cements its authority in place. It can be "right" because there is also the asymmetric view now making it "right" - that is, together they exclude the middle, all other possible approaches to logic.

So dichotomies rule. And the division over whether maths is derived from intuition or perception is a classic example of how both in interaction, creating a virtuous spiral of development, is the answer.

Then the logic of our minds is also the logic of reality itself. Dichotomies or symmetry breakings are also how things happen "out there" - how systems develop into being, complex hierarchies arising out of vaguer potentials because they are the self-consistent way a vagueness can be stabily, self-persistently, divided.

I am sure this is still indigestible. But just focus on some dichotomy and see for yourself if you can break it down differently.

Local-global is the most fundamental dichotomy I believe - pure scale. Though (dichotomously) it is then paired with an equally fundamental dichotomy vague-crisp. One talks about what exists, the other how what exists has developed.

But substance-form is the Athenian set-piece debate. Or you could back up a bit to consider the weaker dichotomies of stasis-flux or chance-necessity or atom-void.
 
Last edited:
  • #68
I am digesting your words - thinking about them - will reply when I have something cogent to say.
 
  • #69
Last edited by a moderator:
  • #70
JoeDawg said:
The entire argument is based on correspondence to observation. There is nothing special about math in this sense. It needs to be corroborated. 2 humans plus 2 humans can equal 5 if one gets pregnant. Therefore 2+2=5. It is just generally true, when you categorize things together in groups that 2+2=4.

Math is about generalizations, that is where its strength lies. But there is no math statement that stands on its own. Its correspondence to observation is what makes it a valid generalization. Observation is what math is built on.


If 2+2 = 5 because one gets pregnant and thus creating another human being, the equation would be 2+3 = 5; unless you don't consider the baby inside the womb to be a human being, but then why would you at the same time say that 2 humans plus another 2 humans equal 5?


-----------------------


Basic arithmetic comes from our concept of units and quantity. 1 + 1 = 2 is simply 1 full unit of what we are considering, plus another full unit, equals 2 of those units. Other more abstract concepts can be deduced from previously deduced logical principles, we can't expect the Engilsh language to be capable of encompassing any idea there could ever be. Not all propositions refer to the most fundamental logical principles (but they could be deduced from other fundamental logical principles)
 
  • #71
emyt said:
If 2+2 = 5 because one gets pregnant and thus creating another human being, the equation would be 2+3 = 5; unless you don't consider the baby inside the womb to be a human being, but then why would you at the same time say that 2 humans plus another 2 humans equal 5?

Why would you? well that is the point. The kind of system you create will depend on what you want to do with it. If you want to describe procreation as part of your system, then 1+1=3, and 2+2=5, etc...

Your math depends on correspondence. There are mathematical systems that don't include the concept of zero. There are systems that are based on one, a few, more than a few.

And this is why you literally have to create new math to describe experiene which is quite alien to what you normally experience, for example, quantum reality. Because different things are important to you.

Saying, why, and what is important, is just part of defining your system.
 
  • #72
JoeDawg said:
Why would you? well that is the point. The kind of system you create will depend on what you want to do with it. If you want to describe procreation as part of your system, then 1+1=3, and 2+2=5, etc...

Your math depends on correspondence. There are mathematical systems that don't include the concept of zero. There are systems that are based on one, a few, more than a few.

And this is why you literally have to create new math to describe experiene which is quite alien to what you normally experience, for example, quantum reality. Because different things are important to you.

Saying, why, and what is important, is just part of defining your system.

Actually I'm pretty sure it would look like this :

M⋃F → B(male union with female leads to baby or 1 union with 1 leads to 3)?
 
  • #73
Sorry! said:
Actually I'm pretty sure it would look like this :

M⋃F → B(male union with female leads to baby or 1 union with 1 leads to 3)?

Except when it doesn't.

You could also describe it:

1+1= 2 1/2

Or you could add up the cells in each body.

Or mathematically represent the genetic information.

Its all about what you consider relevant. Abstract reasoning allows you to make whatever distinctions you like. This is why math can be very precise. The only limit is your assumptions, and what you consider relevant, that is, what the math corresponds to.
 
  • #74
If, in your system, get 2+2=5 then what you are adding are not numbers! As a consequence of the properties of numbers, 2+2 always equal 4, and hence if 2+2=5 you are not dealing with numbers. This is not a flaw in the mathematical system, but in your ability to properly model the situation with mathematics. If this is a consequence in your system, then, clearly, the total amount of human beings cannot properly be computed by adding.
 
  • #75
Jarle said:
If, in your system, get 2+2=5 then what you are adding are not numbers!
They are numbers, they just don't correspond to the same 'things'. Which is the point.
This is not a flaw in the mathematical system, but in your ability to properly model the situation with mathematics.
Its not a flaw, its a different model.
If this is a consequence in your system, then, clearly, the total amount of human beings cannot properly be computed by adding.
And how do you confirm this?
 
  • #76
They are numbers, they just don't correspond to the same 'things'. Which is the point.

No. As a consequence of the definitional properties of numbers 2+2=4 is always correct. 2+2=5 is false statement when dealing with numbers, and thus is the statement is correct, they is not numbers.

This is not a flaw in the mathematical system, but in your ability to properly model the situation with mathematics.

Its not a flaw, its a different model.
Well, a model with dissatisfactory accuracy, which was the point...

If this is a consequence in your system, then, clearly, the total amount of human beings cannot properly be computed by adding.

And how do you confirm this?

Obviously by observing that 2+2=5 is a result in the system, which is untrue for numbers.
 
  • #77
Jarle said:
Obviously by observing that 2+2=5 is a result in the system, which is untrue for numbers.

Sigh.

And where does the definition of 'numbers' come from?
 
  • #78
JoeDawg said:
Sigh.

And where does the definition of 'numbers' come from?

Try peanos axioms for example. And ZFC defines numbers based on the concept of sets. This is a rigorous construction of the natural numbers.
 
  • #79
Math works in our reality because we define our physical concepts in mathematical terms. Mathematics is an extremely effective tool for describing physical theories for exactly this reason. Because physical laws seem to follow certain laws, we are naturally encouraged to apply our mathematical concepts too it, and with great accuracy.
 
  • #80
Jarle said:
Try peanos axioms for example.

And what is an axiom?

Its an assumption.

Why would we choose one axiom over another?

Because some axioms have a broader scope, they describe a wider range of experience.

Math is about generalizations, we draw these generalizations from observing consistency in the world, the greater the scope of the axiom, the more we can use it, and the more we do use it.

1+1=3 is useful, if you are talking about sex. But its not useful when you are discussing apples. 1+1=2 is useful for apples, as well as a large range of things we as humans consider relevant.
 
  • #81
JoeDawg said:
And what is an axiom?

Its an assumption.

Why would we choose one axiom over another?

Because some axioms have a broader scope, they describe a wider range of experience.

Math is about generalizations, we draw these generalizations from observing consistency in the world, the greater the scope of the axiom, the more we can use it, and the more we do use it.

1+1=3 is useful, if you are talking about sex. But its not useful when you are discussing apples. 1+1=2 is useful for apples, as well as a large range of things we as humans consider relevant.

An axiom is not an assumption as in the context of "taking it for granted". The concept of an axiom is a definition. When we are postulating an axiom, then we are defining whatever we are talking about. We are not talking about something we think we know something about, and then saying something we might think is true, and then take it for granted. An axiom is an assumption made in order to explore the consequences, and this is a critical point.

Math is about making generalizations, but it does not base itself upon empirical evidence, although it is inspired by it. Mathematics is (luckily) based upon rigorous definitions, which make silly statements like 1+1=3 meaningless if you are talking about numbers.
 
  • #82
Jarle said:
although it is inspired by it.
Inspired? What does that even mean?
which make silly statements like 1+1=3 meaningless if you are talking about numbers.
I think I see the problem here, you've decided that certain axioms of math have some sort of Platonic existence. But what 'numbers' are, is whatever they are defined to be. Now, some definitions are more useful... empirically, and those are the ones we keep, use, modify, and refine. However, it is via observation that we decide which axioms are useful, and which are meaningless. You can't generalize from nothing, first you have to have instances, and then you develop rules based on those instances... this is how logic and math work. Oh, and your patronizing tone is actually quite amusing. I don't disagree with most of what you said, I just don't think it means what you think it does.
 
  • #83
Hehe, I think we have lost track of objectivity here. This debate has obviously come to a halt, I guess we have to agree to disagree. I won`t discuss anything but arguments.

However, I will say this: It doesn`t matter how we are choosing our axioms here, what is important is that we follow those we have chosen. In any reasonable definition of numbers, (read: axioms), 2+2=4.

I am patronizing?

Sigh.

And where does the definition of 'numbers' come from?

:smile:
 
Last edited:
  • #84
Jarle said:
In any reasonable definition of numbers, (read: axioms), 2+2=4.

And reasonable means... whatever Jarle agrees with.

Like I said... patronizing.
 
  • #85
JoeDawg said:
And reasonable means... whatever Jarle agrees with.

Like I said... patronizing.

You aren`t really discussing, are you?
 
  • #86
JoeDawg said:
And reasonable means... whatever Jarle agrees with.

Actually Jarle has been taking the more reasonable line here. Yes the idea of numbers may be a generalisation from experience, but it is also a maximally general one. As far as we can know. From the prime test, which is the self-consistency of the algebraic structures we find we can spin from the number system.

The "1+1=3 when we are talking about making babies" is a childish debating point. It is a description using numbers to talk about some specific kind of biological event. It is not a self-consistent consequence of the numbers themselves.

I certainly believe that we model reality. And also that our concept of number can be challenged. Axioms are always questionable.

But it becomes just silly to not understand that axioms are generalisations that can then have matchingly crisp or definite consequences. So you can't just try to assign your own private meanings to the objects of that system of morphisms as JoeDawg wants. The actual model consists of both its axioms and its consequences.

As ever, you have to keep your eye on the dichotomies at the centre of these things. o:) That is why maths moved on to category theory in its search for its fundamental ground. Structure-preserving change, patterns or symmetries that can persist.
 
  • #87
apeiron said:
The "1+1=3 when we are talking about making babies" is a childish debating point. It is a description using numbers to talk about some specific kind of biological event. It is not a self-consistent consequence of the numbers themselves.
I was never advocating that is was a replacement for 1+1=2, nor that we should throw out mathematics.

The point was simply that we derive our math from experience. The reason it is self-consistent is because we have specifically created it to be so, and moved from using numbers that only really work in specific cases, like with babies, to number systems that cover a wider amount of instances and with great precision. 1+1=3 may be descriptive, but only in a limited sense. 1+1=2 is also limited, however, integers are not as precise as decimals. And fractions also function differently. We have found ways to convert from one to the other, but each has problems and limitations.

And as we add more to math we specifically seek ways to make it consistent with what we already have. Its only self-consistent because that's the standard by which it is judged useful, and usefulness is about correspondence to reality.
 
  • #88
If you dislike the babies argument, consider a universe where Bose-Einstein condensates were more common than in ours. In that universe, the development of mathematics may have favored axioms that result in the theorem 1+1=1 versus the more exotic 1+1=2 branch (if anthropomorphic consciousness is even possible in such a universe).
 
  • #89
JoeDawg said:
I was never advocating that is was a replacement for 1+1=2, nor that we should throw out mathematics.

The point was simply that we derive our math from experience. The reason it is self-consistent is because we have specifically created it to be so, and moved from using numbers that only really work in specific cases, like with babies, to number systems that cover a wider amount of instances and with great precision. 1+1=3 may be descriptive, but only in a limited sense. 1+1=2 is also limited, however, integers are not as precise as decimals. And fractions also function differently. We have found ways to convert from one to the other, but each has problems and limitations.

And as we add more to math we specifically seek ways to make it consistent with what we already have. Its only self-consistent because that's the standard by which it is judged useful, and usefulness is about correspondence to reality.

Though I have been trying to stay out of this until I understand the philosophical points you are making my gut still objects to the idea that reality and mathematics are somehow disjoint. It seems to me that pure sensation has no intrinsic structure. So to say that you are generalizing from something without structure seems impossible. Controlled observation can only give us clues to the structure of reality. But reality is not something we directly experience or observe. Though a fusion of thought and observation we lift the veil of sense experience.
 
  • #90
slider142 said:
If you dislike the babies argument, consider a universe where Bose-Einstein condensates were more common than in ours.

If your reality were a Bose-Einstein condensate, where would the notion of a this one, as distinct from that one, derive? It would seem you would only feel like saying 1=1 at best? Experience would not yield a 1 plus a 1.
 
  • #91
JoeDawg said:
The reason it is self-consistent is because we have specifically created it to be so, and moved from using numbers that only really work in specific cases, like with babies, to number systems that cover a wider amount of instances and with great precision.

So you are arguing against yourself here. It seems there was some innate and inevitable trend to be discovered. A path that leads from the vaguely useful to the crisply useful, from the particular to the universal.

Of course, human civilisation did not actually start with a mathematics based on babies and then progress to something better.

Psychologically, the first and most natural dichotomy was probably the distinction between the one and the many. Or figure and ground, event and context, signal and noise. The idea of symmetry and then the symmetry breaking.

And anthropologically, if we want to focus on utility, the origins of maths probably had most to do with the cycles of the days and the seasons. Cycles of death and renewal. So more geometry than algebra. Though perhaps they did notch off sticks to count off cycles of the moon.

Counting became important in ancient agricultural civilisations with hierarchical ownership. Counting boards and tally sticks to keep track of the goats and sheafs of wheat. But I don't think even the Summerians recorded 1 goat + 1 goat as making 3. Or derive from that the further truth that if I have 3 goats and give you 1, then that must leave me also with only 1.

Again, mathematical systems must follow a certain path - the dichotomy defined by category theory. You must have the fully broken symmetry of the local and the global, the one and the many, the object and the morphism. Yes this is derived from experience - and also appears to be a truth about reality. Which is why maths works.

The mistake you keep making is then to just focus on one half of the dichotomy, of the broken symmetry. The number 1 does not stand alone. It is defined only in relation to its context. Which is why 1 has a stabilised meaning and cannot float free as something that could be defined anyway we choose.

Of course there is then a further epistemological wrinkle to all this. Out there in reality, symmetries are not truly "broken". Instead the breaking apart is merely approached in the limit. However in maths, as a modelling choice, we do treat symmetries as properly broken. So we treat the number 1 as not the limit of the act of separating the one from the many, but as actually - axiomatically - a thing which is separate, isolate, discrete. So maths is in fact unreal in this crucial regard. It appears to say something about reality which cannot in fact be.
 
  • #92
wofsy said:
It seems to me that pure sensation has no intrinsic structure.
In as far as its a function of biology, I would say it does, but I'm not sure what you mean here. The human mind instintively separates experiences into events and objects.
So to say that you are generalizing from something without structure seems impossible. Controlled observation can only give us clues to the structure of reality. But reality is not something we directly experience or observe. Though a fusion of thought and observation we lift the veil of sense experience.
Well, I would say reality is what we experience, both with regards to thinking and observation. The source of reality is the mystery.
 
  • #93
apeiron said:
It seems there was some innate and inevitable trend to be discovered. A path that leads from the vaguely useful to the crisply useful, from the particular to the universal.
Utility is relative. Consistency in experience gives us the foundation. The direction and scope are up to us. Narrowing the scope when needed just gives you a better picture of what you want to see... like a fractal.
Of course, human civilisation did not actually start with a mathematics based on babies and then progress to something better.
It would have been more basic than that, but the arbitrariness of the example is also important to my point. I think many people want there to be some ultimate math, like a ToE, but math is what it is used for.
And anthropologically, if we want to focus on utility, the origins of maths probably had most to do with the cycles of the days and the seasons. Cycles of death and renewal. So more geometry than algebra. Though perhaps they did notch off sticks to count off cycles of the moon.
The ancient Egyptians invented geometry to deal with the problem created by the Nile flooding the land. It was good for the land, but it made it difficult to allot farmland. The flooding destroyed all landmarks. Geometry solved this problem. It was also useful with regards to astronomy, and the building of tombs. But no perfect circles exist.
Again, mathematical systems must follow a certain path - the dichotomy defined by category theory.
One doesn't need math to have categories or dichotomies. Math just formalizes what our minds and bodies already do.
The mistake you keep making is then to just focus on one half of the dichotomy, of the broken symmetry. The number 1 does not stand alone. It is defined only in relation to its context. Which is why 1 has a stabilised meaning and cannot float free as something that could be defined anyway we choose.
I agree there has to be context, which is why I used procreation as context. It's simplistic and not broadly useful, but it makes the point. Without context all math is just squiggles on a page.
Of course there is then a further epistemological wrinkle to all this. Out there in reality, symmetries are not truly "broken". Instead the breaking apart is merely approached in the limit. However in maths, as a modelling choice, we do treat symmetries as properly broken. So we treat the number 1 as not the limit of the act of separating the one from the many, but as actually - axiomatically - a thing which is separate, isolate, discrete. So maths is in fact unreal in this crucial regard. It appears to say something about reality which cannot in fact be.
The map is not the territory.
 
  • #94
JoeDawg said:
In as far as its a function of biology, I would say it does, but I'm not sure what you mean here. The human mind instintively separates experiences into events and objects.

Well, I would say reality is what we experience, both with regards to thinking and observation. The source of reality is the mystery.

biology is an explanation of experience - there may be other explanations - these are not what experience is - if you are saying that all ideas generalize experience then from this point of view you are just making a statement about biological theory.

Different people attach different intellectual constructs to experience of the outside world. Does this mean that they have different instincts? Does this mean that there are multiple realities?

The Impressionist era artists, particularly, Monet and Cezanne, tried to eliminate intellectual constructs from their images. They rejected the idea that such things as perspective and the theory of light actually are part of experience. They viewed these things as intellectual overlays. Their goal was to record experience at the moment of sensation just before the division into objects occurs. This is what Cezanne meant when he said that when he paints he tries to learn from nature. This is what I meant by unstructured experience. This is why their pictures often appear flat and are not supported by a geometrical skeleton as in classical art. At that time, people believed that pure experience was individual and even racial. from your point of view, they would say that there are as many realities as there are individuals. And I get the impression that this is what you are saying.

To me, whether experience is instinctively organized or not - and I am not sure how anyone knows this - that does not mean that experience is not separable into is cognitive constructs and sensory elements. To me the intellectual constructs are those things which are not experienced and the sensory data is what is given - that which is directly experienced.
 
Last edited:
  • #95
Well I think it is because our world is about relations between things. Why object that has mass of 1 kg has twice smaller mass then object of 2 kg? If you say it has four times smaller mass, what would you say comparing it to object that has mass of 4 kg? Nature of course does not care about numbers, they are symbols made by us in our modest attempt to explain our existence through relations between entities.
 
  • #96
wofsy said:
biology is an explanation of experience - there may be other explanations - these are not what experience is - if you are saying that all ideas generalize experience then from this point of view you are just making a statement about biological theory.
It seems to be the case that Ideas are distinct from Experiences.
And it also seems to be the case that certain Ideas are linked to certain Experiences.
Experiences however, seem to have more detail and specificity. Ideas seem more vague.

If you want to accept the radical empiricism of Berkeley and state that matter doesn't exist and such... yes, that is another 'explanation'... but accepting the conceit of the common understanding of modern science and physicalism, yes, all ideas generalize experience.
Different people attach different intellectual constructs to experience of the outside world. Does this mean that they have different instincts? Does this mean that there are multiple realities?
Defining reality can be confusing. Often people equate reality with existence, which is fine, but it ignores the fact that experience sometimes contradicts existence. At which point you have two 'realities'. Dreams are a good example of this. Last night I flew through an alien city... does the alien city exist the way my computer does... well no, but it does, or did, exist.

So yes, in that sense everyone has their own 'reality' following them around. And those realities all seem to come from the same source... existence.

As to instincts... there are biological instincts and learned instincts, so yes different people can have different instincts. An example of the latter instinct would be something you are trained to do, and therefore do automatically without thinking.
At that time, people believed that pure experience was individual and even racial. from your point of view, they would say that there are as many realities as there are individuals. And I get the impression that this is what you are saying.
In terms of experience sure, but not ontologically. Its true we can't know for certain whether 'its all just a dream', but this is where being reasonable comes in. I see no reason to doubt that there is a common source for experience.
To me, whether experience is instinctively organized or not - and I am not sure how anyone knows this - that does not mean that experience is not separable into is cognitive constructs and sensory elements. To me the intellectual constructs are those things which are not experienced and the sensory data is what is given - that which is directly experienced.
Problem there is 'true sensory experience' is not self-reflective. Think of how animals and babies seem to live in the moment. Any analysis of experience, and certainly taking the time to paint it on canvas, would entail cognitive constructs. Even talking or thinking about an experience... puts it within a constructed framework. Meaning is cognitive. Experience just is, and then it's gone.
 
  • #97
wofsy said:
To me the intellectual constructs are those things which are not experienced and the sensory data is what is given - that which is directly experienced.

The idea that experience is given - the ineffability of qualia - is not something that would be supported by psychology and neuroscience. Experience is also constructed.

The terms I prefer to use here are "ideas" and "impressions" as it helps preserve the constuctedness of both aspects of awareness. One is not being favoured over the other in term of veridity (or lack of it).

Now what is the nature of the actual divide (I mean dichotomy) that you are sensing here? The instinctive separation you want to make?

It is between the general and the particular, the model and the measurements. Or as in Grossberg's neural nets, the long term and the short term memories.

So in all these ways of saying the same thing, we have something that acts as the longer lived context - the idea that constrains. And then we also have the moment to moment impressions, the fleeting train of events, that constructs some particular state of experience.

And the two scales of mental activity are in interaction. They are not separate processes but instead separate levels of process.

So ideas are the established habits of memory, anticipation and thought which serve to give shape to impressions. They make sense and organise each moment. Awareness is created top-down.

But equally, impressions over time build up the ideas. The brain learns by generalising from what it thinks happened (the experiences it constructed) and so builds broader, sturdier, habits of interpretation/perception.

So all this activity is subjective. There is no direct objective access to reality. But, being a systematic approach, the subjective collection of ideas~impressions does come to model reality very well for our purposes.

And then maths/science/philosophy are activities that try to repeat this basic cognitive formula on a still broader social scale. Societies have purposes and evolved models of reality that serves them.
 
  • #98
apeiron said:
The idea that experience is given - the ineffability of qualia - is not something that would be supported by psychology and neuroscience. Experience is also constructed.

While this is arguably true, its also more complex than that...
Experiences and Ideas exist on the level of consciousness. They are, in a sense, immediate.
Neuroscience and psychology work on the level of explanation.
So you can indeed describe experience as unconstructed. Its only after experience has been assessed and compared that we get the sciences, and then we work backwards for an explanation. It is then that we can view experience as constructed.

Which is not to say that neuroscience and psychology don't offer good explanations, but they are heavily dependent on that 'ineffable qualia', which is our primary mode of being.

Ideas are more obviously constructed, since they involve internal (mental) processes, not external sources.
 
  • #99
JoeDawg said:
So you can indeed describe experience as unconstructed. Its only after experience has been assessed and compared that we get the sciences, and then we work backwards for an explanation. It is then that we can view experience as constructed.

I understand what you mean but this is what I call the introspectionist fallacy.

In fact paying attention to your experiences is a highly artificial and learned skill. Animals and babies can't do it. And it takes a lot of practice and scaffolding for even modern Western adults.

You can argue that there are degrees of construction. So the naked sensation of redness is perhaps less obviously mediated than your perception that a ship on the horizon is a large object a long way away.

Yet still the very act of stopping and contemplating "redness" is a highly constructed - and constructing - action. Your brain has to suppress attention to much else to manage to make it seem like the redness of something red is filling your awareness.

Or to use a better example, think of the tricks that an impressionist painter goes through to see the distant hills as purple not brown or green. Cut out a little square in white card and hold it up to physically block out the contextual information that is fooling your appreciation of the pure actual colour.

Yes, some things may be less mediated, less apparently constructed. But in the end, all experience is the result of some act of mediation, some constructive effort and not about naked witnessing.
 
  • #100
apeiron said:
In fact paying attention to your experiences is a highly artificial and learned skill.
Well, sure. But that is not really what I'm referring to.
Animals and babies can't do it.
And this would be the example of 'experience'. Quite a lot of our adult life is constructed, but that's because we build ideas around 'sensations'. This is why differentiating between ideas and experience is important. Pleasure and pain, for instance, are immediate. They don't even need to be localized in time or space, within our minds, although quite often they are... and in that case part of the experience is constructed.
Yet still the very act of stopping and contemplating "redness" is a highly constructed
Contemplating yes, but experiencing no. Obviously if you are calling it red, you're attaching an idea to it. But there are lots of times, when we see something for the first time, we don't place it... within a framework, at least not immediately.

Impressionist painters are trying to simulate raw experience... on canvas. Not something I think you can really do successfully, but they try.
Yes, some things may be less mediated, less apparently constructed. But in the end, all experience is the result of some act of mediation, some constructive effort and not about naked witnessing.
Like I said, the fact biology 'constructs' a sensation in the mind is, I think, quite a different thing. Biology is an explanation. We as adults may reflect on sensations, almost immediately, and certainly our brains seem to want to categorize everything. But before we learn to do this, and on occasion when something intense or unexpected happens, we do have a kind of raw experience. And that is the sort of thing I am talking about. Adrenaline junkies crave this, and so do people who meditate.

A person's first orgasm, for instance, can completely shatter their reality. It's only after, when they organize thoughts around it, that it becomes 'constructed'.
 
Back
Top