tom.stoer said:
Is there an idea how a simple picture of a theory "w/o Lagrangian" would look like? What about it's fundamental objects or d.o.f.? What essentially "defines" such a theory? (a QFT can be defined via Lagrangian + quantization or via a Hamiltonian + a Hilbert space with inner product)
Its easier for me to eludicitate specific examples.
Again, as prime example consider 2d CFTs. The point is that some of them ("minimal models") can be solved purely by consistency, and this does not require any lagrangian as input. The input is the existence of a stress tensor (hamiltonian if you like) with a central charge in its OPE, plus basic consistency requirements like crossing symmetry, modular invariance, perhaps unitarity. That's enough to determine the spectrum (partition function), and all correlations functions.
As said, this is independent of whether a lagrangian exists or not. Often lagrangians do exist in the sense that they define the theory in the UV, and then there is a RG flow to the IR where the theory becomes conformal. Under the RG flow many objects become strongly quantum corrected/renormalized, so the UV desription is not be useful for doing actual computations for the CFT. Right at the conformal RG fixed point, there may not exist a useful lagrangian formulation at all! So despite there may be a lagrangian definition of the theory in the UV, it may be of almost no help for solving the theory in the IR.
Other, related example: massive soliton scattering theories in 2d. Some of them can be obtained by perturbing CFTs. Some of them are integrable and have a factorized S-matrix, and can be solved just by solving the consistency condition of the S-matrix (crossing relations, Yang-Baxter eqs, etc). In fact there exists a huge variety of quantum integrable systems whose scattering matrices can be exactly determined without ever needing a lagrangian formulation. What is common to them is an underlying algebraic structure, typically Lie algebras, which is strong enough as to fix the theories solely on the basis of consistency.
Third example: N=2 gauge theory in d=4. Certainly there exists a definition of the theory at high energies where it is weakly coupled, namely in term of an asymptotically free SU(2) gauge theory, say. In this region one can write down a well-defined lagrangian, in terms of weakly coupled local, "fundamental" degrees of freedom.
However at low energies, this description breaks down because the theory becomes strongly coupled. In fact one knows that at some point, the gauge fields will decay into monopole-dyon pairs, and should not be considered as "fundamental" any more; rather they can be viewed as bound states of monopoles and dyons (at high energies it is the other way around; so what about the notion of "fundamental"). Certainly the original lagrangian in the UV is not a good way to describe the physics in this regime, involving gauge fields which do not even exist as good quantum operators in the IR. Non-perturbative phenomena like the decay of a gauge field into a monopole-dyon pair cannot be easily captured in terms of the UV lagrangian.
The whole point of Seiberg and Witten was to de-emphasize the role of an underlying lagrangian, and rather to focus on global consistency conditions in order to determine the effective action in a direct manner.
This works so miraculously well because of the properties of extended SUSY, which restricts quantum corrections and also allows to make non-perturbatively exact statements via the BPS property.
One can say that most of the progress in non-perturbative physics in the last 15 years was precisely because one did not think in terms of lagrangians. Typically the trick is to use some minimal input (algebraic symmetries, SUSY and BPS property, integrability) and then solving the theory (or part of a theory) via consistency conditions.
This is also the current way to think about certain theories in 6d (eg non-abelian non-criticial strings), for which a lagrangian formulation is either not known or even does not exist. The art is to make use of BPS properties etc in order to make some rough statements about properties of the theory, without having a complete definition at hand. Probably this applies to what is called M-theory as a whole, which many criticize because there is no known fundamental, first principle definiton. Again, the art is to obtain non-trivial results even in the absence of a complete definition.