(The paper surprise referred to is 87 pages, I'll try to get time to skim some of it during the next days and get back on that.)
Tom, I guess I don't disagree with anything particular your wrote.
I just have some minor comments.
tom.stoer said:
So there is a paradigm shift we see in modern theoretical physics: stronger focus on mathematics, less stress on phenomenology. This is a rather strange situation, but I see no way out.
I still think it's important to distinguish between not only physics and mathematics, but also between mathematical modelling and mathematics itself.
You're right about the paradigm shift, and it's in particular why I chose to focus stronly on the guiding principles, logic of reasoning and methodology, as this is the only thing you can assess in different programs. The "mathematics itself" is not really something to comment on, beyond consistency issues and level of stringency. To discuss CHOICES of axioms is not a mathematical problem. To discuss "unification" of mathematical branches is also indeed interesting, which some mathematicians do. I find that interesting, but it's somehow not what theoretical physics should be about IMO.
So My focus is really on inference models! In a sense this is reall not physics! It's actually about learning models. This is how I secretly think of many things, and it certainly have applications outside of theoretical physics. This is best IMO seen as ET Jaynes puts it - an extension to logic. The normal language for this is probability theory, usually in some bayesian form or so. There are also other inference rules, such as entropic reasoning.
If you listened to Ariel Caticha's talk on perimeter not too long ago about nature of laws, he points out during the first explanation that "he is not doing physics, he is doing inference".
This is quite different from mathematics. Inference models can be tested without physics. It can be tested in different ways.
One of my conjectures which I share with Ariel and those that work in this direction, is that the laws of physics are really just "rules of inference". And that physical processes, and observations, backreactions from environment etc, can all be described abstractly in terms of inference processing, where each subsystems constantly tries to infer and learn and take control of it's environment.
It's in this light, I critique some of the current researhc programs. From this point of view, I simply find their methodology to not be quite rational. (ie. from the point of view of inference! not phenomenology).
After all, physicists do make inference on nature, this is what we do when we model and construct experiments. I put this on par with physical processes, where one atom makes inference about a neighbouting atom for example.
All this is, in line with the paradigm shift you mention. However it's not just "mathematics" - it's inference, or mathematical models for inference or learning. An inference model is judged not by truthness of theorems or consistency, it's judged on it's fitness. A good inference models, simply makes efficient and good inferences.
tom.stoer said:
Coming back to my example regarding the early days of quantum mechanics. I still think that the situations are comparable, but on a different level. String theory is a broader framework addressing different issues, but we already know a lot of magic numbers and structures to be addressed within this framework: U(1)*SU(2)*SU(3), 6 flavors / 3 generations, Higgs particle (?) Weinberg angle, Yukawa couplings, 4 dimensions, ...
I agree that there are these "magic things" but you refer more or less to the structure of the forces, particle families etc. I too think this calls for some unification, but just because string theory is one of the few "mainstream-candidates" doesn't mean I think it's even close to the only option.
/Fredrik