Wooden Neurons: Will They Be Conscious?

[singleton]

Look at consciousness from a behaviorist's point of view. We infer that certain people or animals are conscious based on their behavior. But there is a trap there. Take for example a person who is conscious but 100% paralyzed due to a medication or a brain injury. Others have no way of identifying conscious activity (without a functional MRI, that is) and for all appearances that person is not a consious being , exhibits absolutely no behavior whatsoever or any apparent recognition of surroundings, yet the person is conscious. So behaviorism isn't the answer.

I would say that basing belief of others' consciousness based on behaviorism breaks down with a much simpler argument: if we sufficiently programmed a humanoid-like (appearance wise) robot that was intelligent but without any consciousness. From a behavioral standpoint it does all it needs to do and could act just as 'complicated' as a conscious human could.

 

[octelcogopod]

I would say the more aware of one's own computation. Though I realize this definition is highly informal but since units for that field are—at least by my knowledge—not yet defined it is hard to give a good formal definition.

But then again, I would say humans are not in any shape or form aware of their own computation.
The computation the brain does is a purely physical thing, it's neurons, chemicals and electrical signals in the brain, while the choices humans make on a subjective level is not really the computation itself, but rather a side effect of that computation.

A good example would be if a human wants to eat an apple.
He hasn't eaten for a substantial period, there is an apple on the table, and nothing is really stopping him from eating it, if he thinks "hey I haven't eaten in awhile I'm hungry and that apple looks good" how much of that is actual choice?
His stomach already sent signals to the brain, he already liked apples since he was a kid, which makes the brain perceive the apple as an edible and good object before he ever decided to, and he probably already ate several apples which helped the brain become what it is.

I would say that really you can't choose something before your brain has been given any kind of input to process some kind of logical answer within itself regarding the thing in question.

Hence, my conclusion would be that any self awareness regarding choice and self computation would rather be your brain being able to process more information at the same time, which would in practical term mean that a "more conscious" person would probably have a brain that would be a lot more picky about apples.
I say this because (and without going too off topic) the brain in general really does seek to have perfection to whatever it thinks perfection is, and I do believe that the more information the brain has and can process about something, especially at the same time, the more nuances are picked up, and the more imperfections are noticed and NOT discarded, maybe like shape, age, color or whatever else.

However something to note is that I believe any of this is involuntary on the subjective level, it's more controlled by the physics of the brain and to some extent the sensory system of the body too.. Always a slave to those things I would say.

 

[vanesch]

Look at consciousness from a behaviorist's point of view. We infer that certain people or animals are conscious based on their behavior. But there is a trap there. Take for example a person who is conscious but 100% paralyzed due to a medication or a brain injury. Others have no way of identifying conscious activity (without a functional MRI, that is) and for all appearances that person is not a consious being , exhibits absolutely no behavior whatsoever or any apparent recognition of surroundings, yet the person is conscious. So behaviorism isn't the answer. But then the same dilemna appears when evaluating whether a very complex network of computer circuits or a complex network of living beings is conscious. You see vast swarms of bees or birds acting in concert, is the individual bird any more or less conscious than the entire swarm unit of bees?? Is there a quantum unit of consiousness, will it ever be possible to measure whether ANY system has more or less units than another??

Indeed. In fact, the question is a very old philosophical one, and is sometimes called "the hard problem" of consciousness, or the mind/brain problem.

There are two stances on it:
- behaviourist/materialist, who claim that "if it walks like a duck, and talks like a duck, it is a duck", and the duck is the prototype of "human consciousness". It is the similarity in behaviour that makes us suppose that other human beings are "conscious" (have a subjective experience). The Turing test is an example of this kind of reasoning, just as is the Chinese room. But there's a confusion here between *intelligence* (= capacity to solve problems) and "consciousness".

- dualist, who takes that subjective experience (consciousness), although coupled to the material world, is nevertheless something else. The "philosophical zombie" is an illustration here. Essentially, dualist arguments are anti-materialist arguments, in that they argue that behaviour or material organization ALONE cannot be taken as irrefutable proof that there is a subjective experience.

I'm personally seduced by the dualist arguments, I have to say. Of course, there is sometimes a confusion between the dualist position (which is just a refusal of the behaviourist position), and a mystical/religious position of "soul" and so on, which is often used by materialists to attack the dualist comments. Dualism doesn't mean mysticism or religion, however. It is just the recognition that subjective experience is not "provable" externally by material, behavioural means.

An argument I always like to use against materialists is that they are too antropocentric, and cannot imagine different forms of consciousness: "does it hurt a rock when it is broken ?"

No matter how silly this question might be at first sight, if you analyse what "causes pain" in a "conscious being", then it is very difficult to give a fundamental reason why a rock cannot be suffering pain from being broken, while you do suffer pain if you break your leg.

 

[Moridin]

Let us say that pain is something that results from a particular type of electro-chemical reaction. If a rock does not have this electro-chemical reaction, there is no pain.

If qualia is an incoherent concept, then all p-zombies are as well. Pain is not something that you can just strip off a person's mental life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences This solves the "hard" problem of consciousness quite nicely. One of the most used counters against dualism is that it is vague and lacks primary attributes (or "substance" as it was earlier called).

There are various other arguments, such as Mary the color scientist etc. but they are not that convincing. Mary has been in a black and white room and can only observe the outside from a black and white monitor. She knows all the the physical facts about colour, including every physical fact about the experience of colour in other people, from the behavior a particular colour is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings that register that a colour has been seen etc.

The question is if she will learn something new when she steps out. The dualist would say yes, but are pretty much unable to state what in more than a vague sense. The materialist would simply argue that if she knows everything about it, this grants her omniscience in that area, and will learn nothing knew.

Besides the vagueness of the term dualist and what it is suppose to be that is experience this qualia, I think it is about a being reserved against reductionism in human experience and behavior. p-zombies and so on seems to be intuition pumps.

 

[sysreset]

Hence, my conclusion would be that any self awareness regarding choice and self computation would rather be your brain being able to process more information at the same time, which would in practical term mean that a "more conscious" person would probably have a brain that would be a lot more picky about apples...the brain in general really does seek to have perfection to whatever it thinks perfection is, and I do believe that the more information the brain has and can process about something, especially at the same time, the more nuances are picked up, and the more imperfections are noticed and NOT discarded, maybe like shape, age, color or whatever else.

I guess my dog, who would eat a rotten apple right out of the trash, is conscious, but less conscious than I.

I notice that a lot of the posts seem to touch upon (but do not explicity state) a link between consciouness and senses such as sight, taste, or sound. "More consciousness" could be imagined to enhance our existing 5 senses, or be imagined to create new ones...

It is interesting to speculate what the side effects of "more consciousness" would be. Is more consciousness better or worse? Would I become super-picky about apples, or more appreciative of the same apples? Or would I become unaware of apples because I am busy with other thoughts?

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Vanesch,

An argument I always like to use against materialists is that they are too antropocentric, and cannot imagine different forms of consciousness: "does it hurt a rock when it is broken ?"

I'm not disagreeing with anything you said, just thought I'd point this one thing out...

People who accept the standard computational paradigm of consciousness intuitively make the mistake of believing the phenomena of various conscious experiences such as the experience of pain, or the experience of heat or orgasm should naturally correlate to those experiences we have. They reason that this behavior we exhibit, such as flinching and subsequent avoidance of pain, is an evolutionary reaction which aids our survival. This is a type of category error which is almost as difficult to understand as the category error of the color red being a property of something we’re looking at. Obviously, the color red doesn’t exist as a property of an object – it is a phenomenon which is created within our brains.

The category mistake I’m referring to is the belief that the computational model allows for qualia to have some kind of influence over our behavior. It doesn’t - and this has some rather drastic implications.

The movement of a switch has nothing to do with what qualia may be experienced. Nor should the subsequent operation of numerous switches have any correlation to specific qualia. Qualia do not influence the operation of switches. Qualia are subjectively experienced and are not objectively measurable. But the operation of a switch is influenced by the application of electric charges, mechanical forces or other objectively measurable influences.

If qualia don’t influence the operation of switches, they can not influence behavior and they can’t come to our aid when we experience a negative influence such as pain. The experience of pain can not influence what switch or set of switches are going to activate so there is no evolutionary benefit to qualia given the computational model. There is no need to associate the qualia of a bad experience with the behavior of avoidance of pain for example. Given the computational model, qualia have no influence over the physical substrate which creates it. Therefore, qualia are epiphenomena given the assumption that consciousness is computational. And if qualia are epiphenomena, then there is no reason for it to reliably correlate to our behavior.

In the case of your broken rock example, the rock breaks because there are internal stresses in the rock which are higher than what can be resisted. There’s no reason for a rock to experience pain if it does the rock no good. Why shouldn’t the rock experience pleasure at being broken? How about an orgasm?

If our behavior can not be influenced by qualia, I’d rather go through life experiencing constant orgasms than pain, frustration, and sadness.

Edit for clarification: The 'category mistake' made by computationalists is that qualia, which is not an objectively measurable phenomena, can have an influence on objectively measurable interactions.

 

[DaveC426913]

I guess my dog, who would eat a rotten apple right out of the trash, is conscious, but less conscious than I. ...

Is more consciousness better or worse? Would I become super-picky about apples...

I'm not sure that your dog's table manners are about consciousness at all. Organisms eat foods they can eat and avoid foods they think will be bad. Your dog will not be harmed by rotten apples. The lowliest of creatures - with no consciousness whatever - will pick foods they can eat.

I once read an article about some highly intelligent birds that were able to abstract situations to a surprising degree. They would not simply hide food from competitors, they would deliberately set up decoys. It could be shown, too, that this was not merely instinctive behaviour, as the birds did not set up the decoys when no other birds were watching.

The article attempted to categorize different levels of consciousness:

I know - "I have a treat"
I know I know - "I know I have something of value and will hide it for later"
I know you know - "I know you saw me place the treat under that rock and can deduce your own logic about it."
I know you know I know - (ah I can't remember this one)

Consciousness thus is described as an ability to empathize - to not merely conceive of your own thoughts, but to recognize that others perceive their thoughts too, and that there's a connection.

 

[Shooting Star]

I guess my dog, who would eat a rotten apple right out of the trash, is conscious, but less conscious than I.

So you are implying that consciousness is something quantifiable just one-dimensionally, even though the method of measuring it may or may not be known to us presently?

 

[sysreset]

So you are implying that consciousness is something quantifiable just one-dimensionally, even though the method of measuring it may or may not be known to us presently?

I was actually just making a slightly tongue-in-cheek remark in response to octelcogpod's earlier post equating "more consciousness" with, for example, being "more picky about apples." But you are correct. We don't know how to measure consciousness, and even if we did, it would very likely be a multidemensional phenomenon.

But my flippant remark does touch on something that is more serious, which is the consciouness of animals. I think when discussing whether machines can ever achieve consciousness one must first explore what is the nature of animal consciousness, which is certainly different than human consciousness. Strictly speaking about senses, animals can have more enhannced awareness than humans. For dogs, obviously the sense of smell and hearing are so many magnitudes higher than humans it makes their "experience" a bit hard to comprehend.

 

[Quatl]

Will any physical system that reproduces the functions of a human brain be conscious?

If you accept the actual definition that society uses for consciousness, then the answer is no. It seems to me that most folks define consciousnesses: "The sum of all mental processes and experiences that only humans possess."

Though to be fair to you, the answer really does depend on what the word means. "Consciousness" is one of those unfortunate words that has no specific meaning. The term is a horrid conflation of various concepts that, to me, seem only related to each other through a concept like "things that humans feel about experiences." Until it does you can't answer questions like "Does this meat possesses consciousness?"

It would be just as productive to ask if a given structure possesses "fruglyalitousness," which is a word I've just made up that means: "the specific quality that no thing possesses."

In summery neither your complex wooden thingy nor Humans are conscious.

Which is why this thread has joined all other discussions this topic throughout time and space, in the fate of becoming an attempt to agree on a definition that will satisfy everyone involved.

 

[Shooting Star]

In summery neither your complex wooden thingy nor Humans are conscious.

"Most" humans are conscious by definition. You can try to work out what can be meant by "most". If you are shifty enough, you can say that now defining consciousness has become equivalent to defining "most", and the discussion has remained at the same degree of irresolution.

I don't want to enter into semantics now, but I don't subscribe to your summary. Do you?

 

[Quatl]

"Most" humans are conscious by definition. You can try to work out what can be meant by "most". If you are shifty enough, you can say that now defining consciousness has become equivalent to defining "most", and the discussion has remained at the same degree of irresolution.

I don't want to enter into semantics now, but I don't subscribe to your summary. Do you?

Actually I do, but not in the sense that I think you're asking. I think that Consciousness is not very coherent. I know that I have experiences, some of which even seem to be about experiencing other experiences. I assume that most other humans are similar, and furthermore that other things seem to have them too, in varying degrees.

I think it is more useful to use the word only as loosely as it is defined. That is as a broad category used to describe various reported or observed symptoms of mental function/action/experience/structure.

Then we can ask intelligent questions about various items in the category, which we might be able to actuality define, and thus make testable predictions about.
...
Now one way of asking these questions is really purposeless, and that is to ask if a given thing has some particular subjective experience or not. That question isn't answerable in any way other than giving into our own sense of plausibility. (Plausibility often misleads us about truth.) Basically you either "like" that idea or you don't.

 

[DaveC426913]

If you accept the actual definition that society uses for consciousness, then the answer is no. It seems to me that most folks define consciousnesses: "The sum of all mental processes and experiences that only humans possess."

I've never heard of such a strange way of defining consciousness.
It is not human-centric and it is not the sum of experiences.


A much more appropriate way of defining it IMO is the degree to which an entity is able to distinguish itself from its surroundings, or self-recognition - to have the concept of "me".

Very illuminating experiments have been done putting critters in front of a mirror. Conscious critters are able to recognize themseelves in a mirror. Because of the way the experiment iis set up, it can be shown that they do not simply recognize "another" like themselves, they recognize that that critter is "me", and those other ones are not me.

Humans, dolphins and chimps show this ability.

Dogs and cats (and human babies while we're at it) show this abiltiy to a much smaller degree, suggesting they they are just in the twilight of consciousness.

 

[moving finger]

What if you have 10 foot neurons made of wood with mechanical clockwork innards, and they shoot different types of metal balls to each other to send messages. What if they have some mechanical method for reproducing every other function of a neuron? What if they are arranged in exactly the same way the neurons in the brain are? Will that group of wooden neurons be conscious?

What if you take a group of 100 million people and have each one perform the duties of a neuron? Will that system be conscious?

Seems to me you would have to say that it would be conscious, as strange as that sounds.

Yes, agreed. The fact that it does sound strange explains precisely why it is counter-intuitive, which also explains why so many people (supporters of Searle's Chinese Room argument and Ned Block's Chinese Nation argument) reject the idea as nonsensical - they simply do not have the mental capacity to overcome their limited imaginations.

The China brain does create a mental state. This is yet another one of those intuition pumps that fall to bits when analyzed, just like the Chinese room. Our intuition that it is impossible is just a bias against non-neuron minds, furthered by the implausibility by the scenario. There is a natural desire to locate the mind at a specific point, because the mind feels like one thing.

Agreed.

I've never heard of such a strange way of defining consciousness.
It is not human-centric and it is not the sum of experiences.


A much more appropriate way of defining it IMO is the degree to which an entity is able to distinguish itself from its surroundings, or self-recognition - to have the concept of "me".

Very illuminating experiments have been done putting critters in front of a mirror. Conscious critters are able to recognize themseelves in a mirror. Because of the way the experiment iis set up, it can be shown that they do not simply recognize "another" like themselves, they recognize that that critter is "me", and those other ones are not me.

Humans, dolphins and chimps show this ability.

Dogs and cats (and human babies while we're at it) show this abiltiy to a much smaller degree, suggesting they they are just in the twilight of consciousness.

I think consciousness must be more than simply the ability of self-recognition. We could program a simple machine (equipped with video camera) to "recognise itself" when it views itself in a mirror, but it does not follow that such a machine would necessarily possesses consciousness. Conclusion - be careful about jumping to the conclusion that an animal (or even a human baby) possesses consciousness (as we understand it) simply from the fact that they are able to recognise themselves.

 

[Shooting Star]

A much more appropriate way of defining it IMO is the degree to which an entity is able to distinguish itself from its surroundings, or self-recognition - to have the concept of "me".

Very illuminating experiments have been done putting critters in front of a mirror. Conscious critters are able to recognize themseelves in a mirror. Because of the way the experiment iis set up, it can be shown that they do not simply recognize "another" like themselves, they recognize that that critter is "me", and those other ones are not me.

Is a cockroach a conscious organism? Is a snake?

 

[DaveC426913]

Is a cockroach a conscious organism? Is a snake?

I would say no.

 

[DaveC426913]

I think consciousness must be more than simply the ability of self-recognition. We could program a simple machine (equipped with video camera) to "recognise itself" when it views itself in a mirror, but it does not follow that such a machine would necessarily possesses consciousness.

Point taken.

 

[Shooting Star]

Humans, dolphins and chimps show this ability.

Dogs and cats (and human babies while we're at it) show this abiltiy to a much smaller degree, suggesting they they are just in the twilight of consciousness.

You are giving examples of what we call very intelligent life. And they need not be so, as moving finger has pointed out.

If snakes and cockroaches are not conscious according to you, give a few more examples so that we may be able to understand, not what is generally accepted to be meant by consciousness, but your notion of consciousness. This is how ultimately people communicate, so don’t think this is a challenge of some kind.

Always, invariably, in a discussion of this sort, concepts get mixed up and shift meanings, the notable ones being:

Consciousness
Display of consciousness
Self awareness
Theory of mind
Intelligence

(and ultimately)​

Life.

 

[Shooting Star]

I forgot to mention another nemesis:

Freewill.

 

[DaveC426913]

You are giving examples of what we call very intelligent life. And they need not be so, as moving finger has pointed out.

If snakes and cockroaches are not conscious according to you, give a few more examples so that we may be able to understand, not what is generally accepted to be meant by consciousness, but your notion of consciousness. This is how ultimately people communicate, so don’t think this is a challenge of some kind.

Well, I guess my definition of consciousness revolves around whether an organism is capable of conceiving of the concept of "me".

My earlier suggestion about looking in a mirror is not a definition of consciousness (wasn't meant to be), but an indicator. We can't know what any animal is actually thinking, so we do experiments to see what they might be thinking. It's behaviour indicates that it is capable or understanding itself as a distinct entity. I would not say that a flight-survival instinct or a "recoil from pain" reaction constitutes an organism understanding itself as a distinct entity.

As for the robot designed to recognize itself, we can know what they are thinking (which is: nothing) so we know that, in this case, our test gives a false positive. That's OK.


I'd say a human baby (<6 months) is arguably not conscious. If he pokes himself in the eye with his own toe, he doesn't even know it was a part of his own body. It takes him months to understand himself as an independent entity.


If snakes and cockroaches are conscious then IMO that drastically dilutes the definition of the word. We'd now have a hard time defining a difference between "life" and "consciousness", which makes it kind of useless.

A counter-question: What lifeforms are not conscious?

 

[Shooting Star]

If snakes and cockroaches are conscious then IMO that drastically dilutes the definition of the word. We'd now have a hard time defining a difference between "life" and "consciousness", which makes it kind of useless.

A counter-question: What lifeforms are not conscious?

I have not so far asserted that cockroaches are conscious. Actually, we have not unified in our efforts to arrive at some workable "definition" or understanding of the word consciousness. (Each of us has given our views touching on the subject, some of them quite insightful.) Let that be the priority now. Maybe it will not be resolved, but all these postings won't have gone in vain. Also, discussing too much is wasteful, and that’s why both snakes and human babies may be analyzed later.

I won't answer your counter-question, because it is actually the point which I said would inexorably be raised at some point in the discussion (in my last posts).

But let us not deviate into life and freewill just now (until absolutely unavoidable); otherwise there would be no end to this discussion.

We have more or less agreed that there are degrees of consciousness. Let’s start thinking about whether it can be quantified or at least categorised, so that we can draw a distinction between the more and the less conscious, or different types of consciousness.

 

[DaveC426913]

I won't answer your counter-question, because it is actually the point which I said would inexorably be raised at some point in the discussion (in my last posts).

It helps us "bracket" the definition. If we all agree cockroaches aren't conscious then we have dramatically narrowed down our grey zone (some people - even some on this board - believe that atoms are conscious!). Now we know it is - as you say - simply a matter of degree.

 

[Shooting Star]

Fine. You lead with a sort of definition of consciousness. (It will be pretty subjective, but so will be everybody else's.) You have already, but make it a bit more formal this time, and a bit hard to refute. Let the others add or subtract to it. If the going gets too bad, we'll sadly have to abandon the efforts here.

In Physics we are doing quite well without really knowing what is matter.

 

[DaveC426913]

I don't know if it can be tested as easily as it can be defined so...

My definition of consciousness is the ability of a creature to "know" that it is, itself an individual, distinct from others of its kind.

 

[Shooting Star]

But suppose it is just one of a kind?

 

[DaveC426913]

But suppose it is just one of a kind?

Feel free to modify.

 

[Evo]

When you say "reproduces the function of a human brain",
we are not able to do that because we are not even aware of how the human brain functions. This is so far out there. A computer is limited to what has been programmed into it and is therefor limited. So I can't see a computer ever completely reproducing the entire functions of a human brain, when we don't have the understanding to program that into it.

 

[sysreset]

Equivalent to defining consciousness is defining how an organism can prove to you that it is conscious.

In other words, how can I prove to you that I am conscious?? I claim that I am conscious, but the next poster (who may actually be a forum-bot-machine) claims that no, I am NOT conscious, but instead HE is. How can we prove which one is the conscious organism and which one is the non-conscious machine?

 

[Shooting Star]

When you say "reproduces the function of a human brain",
we are not able to do that because we are not even aware of how the human brain functions. This is so far out there. A computer is limited to what has been programmed into it and is therefor limited. So I can't see a computer ever completely reproducing the entire functions of a human brain, when we don't have the understanding to program that into it.

Our understanding, or the lack, of how a human brain works need not prevent us from recognizing another fellow conscious being. If you interact with that being long enough, and the impression you get that you are interacting with another "human" or "humanlike being", isn't that what matters? We do not know how we survive, yet we do, as I've said somewhere else. (It works the other way too. I know that that there are certain entities with whom I interact and they are nothing but morons, but society forces me to acknowledge otherwise.) And some theory or technology being so far out there is not any rationale for its rejection.

Also, you tacitly admit that as soon as we have a complete understanding of the human brain, and if we can incorporate the same functions into the computer, then by definition it will become conscious. I see no reason to object, even if you had meant something else.

Equivalent to defining consciousness is defining how an organism can prove to you that it is conscious.

In other words, how can I prove to you that I am conscious?? I claim that I am conscious, but the next poster (who may actually be a forum-bot-machine) claims that no, I am NOT conscious, but instead HE is. How can we prove which one is the conscious organism and which one is the non-conscious machine?

Since exactly when you have burdened the members of the society you live into prove to you individually that each of them is conscious? It's you who has granted them that status, by extrapolating your own experiences and responses to their own by objective observation.

If the forum-bot is able to fool you for the rest of your life, then for all practical purposes he'd be conscious to you. That's more or less the Turing test. I am not asserting that this is the last word, but we must recognize that there are degrees and categories of consciousness, as there are of humans and life forms. Consciousness is not a one-dimensional parameter.

Another appeal to at least arrive at a "loose" and workable definition of consciousness without too much of dissension.

 

[moving finger]

Equivalent to defining consciousness is defining how an organism can prove to you that it is conscious.

In other words, how can I prove to you that I am conscious?? I claim that I am conscious, but the next poster (who may actually be a forum-bot-machine) claims that no, I am NOT conscious, but instead HE is. How can we prove which one is the conscious organism and which one is the non-conscious machine?

That's quite a challenge. I have been thinking on the subject for a considerable time - there is (as far as I know) no infallible "test" of consciousness that would allow us to prove whether another entity was indeed conscious. The most we can do is to say that the entity exhibits signs of consciousness (such as the self-recognition example above), but there is always the possibility that such signs are a false-positive.

The implication this has in a wider context is : We have no way of knowing for sure whether any other species (or indeed another member of our own species) is indeed conscious.