Would Your Choice Change If You Could Choose Again?

[out of whack]

P1: Part with libertarian free will cannot be subject to causality (def).
P2: All matter is subject to causality (def).
C: Part with libertarian free will is not material.

The conclusion follows from your premises but these premises are debatable. You would need to prove P2 in particular, it is not true by definition. A number of quantum theorists would argue it and philosophically, causality is unproven (and possibly unprovable). But this is not my point of contention of course. Even if we believe that free will must be immaterial and that dualism must apply, the thought experiment will just illustrate this premise. A proof must still be made some other way.

Only free as libertarian free, not as compatibilist free.

Right. Compatibilism is a deliberate effort to restrict the definition of free will to only what is compatible with determinism. Fair enough. From the wording of the initial post I don't think this is moving finger's interpretation of the topic. It's not the interpretation I have been using either.

 

[Moridin]

A number of quantum theorists would argue it and philosophically, causality is unproven (and possibly unprovable). But this is not my point of contention of course. Even if we believe that free will must be immaterial and that dualism must apply, the thought experiment will just illustrate this premise. A proof must still be made some other way.

Quantum effects are negligible on our level. Besides, random does not give you free will. To claim that causality is invalid on our level destroys the scientific project.

 

[moving finger]

As we have seen?

I was referring to the many attempts that you made to show that free will might entail something other than dualism - and each time I argued that what you were describing was simply dualism in another guise (eg your reference to "magic ingredient").

You state without proof that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical.

Incorrect. I have never said "that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical". In fact just the opposite is true - what most people mean by a belief "free will" entails a belief in some form of dualism (ie something which does not supervene on the physical).

Given dualism, all sorts of things should happen differently the second time, including the decision in question.

Agreed

Denying dualism, we also deny the possibility that the decision was free and everything will repeat the same way, including this decision.

Thus you agree that belief in free will entails belief in dualism. Excellent.

'nuff said.

 

[out of whack]

Quantum effects are negligible on our level. Besides, random does not give you free will. To claim that causality is invalid on our level destroys the scientific project.

I don't know at what level consciousness arises. I agree with your second sentence but not your third: science gives scientific certainty and not irrefutability, it is useful even without philosophical proof of causality.

I was referring to the many attempts that you made to show that free will might entail something other than dualism - and each time I argued that what you were describing was simply dualism in another guise (eg your reference to "magic ingredient").

Ah, our brilliant version of an "Is too!" "Is not!" debate. No proof was given either way.

Incorrect. I have never said "that what permits free will requires something that supervenes on the physical". In fact just the opposite is true - what most people mean by a belief "free will" entails a belief in some form of dualism (ie something which does not supervene on the physical).

I think you are using the word "supervene" to mean its opposite. If dualism does not supervene on the physical then it does not occur as something additional or extraneous to the physical. It would have to be of the same kind as everything else that is physical, but you seem to take the opposite stand.

Thus you agree that belief in free will entails belief in dualism. Excellent.

'nuff said.

You conveniently skipped the sentence just before the one you quoted: "But by claiming that free will implies dualism, your experiment contains this implicit assumption." It is your claim, not mine, and is not even relevant. I'll say it again: I do not care how you decide that free will must be implemented because my argument is a different one, which you prefer to ignore.

'nuff heard.

 

[moving finger]

I think you are using the word "supervene" to mean its opposite. If dualism does not supervene on the physical then it does not occur as something additional or extraneous to the physical. It would have to be of the same kind as everything else that is physical, but you seem to take the opposite stand.

I have no idea what you mean here. If X does not supervene on Y then by definition a change in X does not entail a change in Y; whereas if X supervenes on Y then by definition any change in X entails a change in Y (this is my understanding of the term supervenience).

You seem to be suggesting the opposite; please tell me I have misunderstood your above post?

Substitute "human choices" for X, and "the physical" for Y in the above.

IF human choices supervene on the physical then my suggested "play it again" experiment would (from the definition of supervenience) result in the same outcome each time (ie no free will). The only possible reasons why there might be a different result each time in such an experiment (ie possible evidence of "free will" in human choice) is either because human choices do NOT supervene on the physical (which lack of supervenience implies dualism, no matter how much you wish to call it something else) or because quantum indeterminism is true (but such indeterminism is no source of free will).

 

[out of whack]

I have no idea what you mean here.

We must read a different dictionary, or read it differently. Random House Webster:

su-per-vene (sue puhr veen') v.i. <-vened, -ven-ing>
1. to take place or occur as something additional or extraneous

I think you were saying that what permits free will requires something that [take place or occur as something additional or extraneous] to the physical, and call this situation dualism.

[Substitutions mine:]

If X does not [take place or occur as something additional or extraneous] on Y then by definition a change in X does not entail a change in Y; whereas if X [take place or occur as something additional or extraneous] on Y then by definition any change in X entails a change in Y (this is my understanding of the term supervenience).

Your conclusions do not follow from the definition. Whether X occurs either as part of or in addition to Y, X may or may not still have an effect on Y. If X has no effect of any kind on any Y that is considered real, then X could not be considered real (a concept beyond the concept of being extraneous or additional, or even part of).

Clearly we understood the word differently.

 

[moving finger]

We must read a different dictionary, or read it differently. Random House Webster:

su-per-vene (sue puhr veen') v.i. <-vened, -ven-ing>
1. to take place or occur as something additional or extraneous

Clearly we understood the word differently.

Clearly one of us is out of whack.
This is a philosophy thread. I suggest you maybe check the philosophical meaning of supervenience, rather than the common English usage. Wikipedia is a good place to start (though you will find the same definitions in most good philosophical texts).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience

Wikipedia gives an example directly relevant to our discussion:

"if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state."

Which, as you will see, is in perfect agreement with my interpretation of supervenience.

 

[vanesch]

To the OP:
imagine that we can physically analyse the brain and body of the person making a "free choice" in such a way, that we can *predict* what he will do as a function of a certain stimulus: that is: if we have a good enough description of all his neurons, nerves, physico-chemical states of these neurons and so on, it is conceivable that we know that when we are going to apply a certain set of vibrations to his ear (which sound like "do you like coffee, or would you like tea ?"), and we analyse the propagation of the resulting nerve pulses throughout his brain, that we can come up with several possibilities:

1) the nerves going to the throat and so on are going to be fired to say "I'd like some tea please!"
2) they are going to make the person utter: "Coffee please!" ;
3) most probably they are going to say "could you please get all those wires and electrodes out of my brain !"

Joking aside, it might be that the brain configuration is clearly such that it will be 1) or 2). But it might also be that the model we have of the brain will give us RANDOMLY 1) or 2) depending on some sensitive initial conditions, such as the exact Na/K ratio in an axion or something like that, and that, with the precision we have, we cannot determine whether it will be 1) or 2). It could even be so chaotic, that we have to go down to quantum-mechanically forbidden precision to be able to decide between 1) and 2).

So I'd say, if we ever can have brain modeling such that we CAN find out, given the structure of the brain, with certainty, that it is 1) or 2), then for sure our brain is a "deterministic machine", like a computer.

But even if we are in the "chaotic case", are we now going to say that our free will is dependent on "very small changes in initial conditions, beyond the physically measurable ?" Is that "free will" or "random choice" ? Did we "freely decide", or "threw some dice and acted upon that ?"

Isn't the "sensation" of having choosen what the physics of our brain "did", not just a mental illusion ? EVEN if it is "random" ? Because it is difficult to consider that our "free will" resides in the ultra-precise dose of Na/K in an axion, no ?

So EVEN if we "rewind" and have the universe "identical" we have a problem in interpretation. But there's an extra difficulty with the concept itself of "rewinding the universe":

Consider that we throw a dice. We find 5. Now "rewind the universe" and throw the dice again. Do we find 5 again ?

Now do the same with a quantum-mechanical system. Consider a radioactive atom during one half-life time. Imagine it decays during this time. Now, "rewind the universe" and do that again. Is it going to decay again ?

 

[moving finger]

To the OP:
imagine that we can physically analyse the brain and body of the person making a "free choice" in such a way, that we can *predict* what he will do as a function of a certain stimulus: that is: if we have a good enough description of all his neurons, nerves, physico-chemical states of these neurons and so on, it is conceivable that we know that when we are going to apply a certain set of vibrations to his ear (which sound like "do you like coffee, or would you like tea ?"), and we analyse the propagation of the resulting nerve pulses throughout his brain, that we can come up with several possibilities:

1) the nerves going to the throat and so on are going to be fired to say "I'd like some tea please!"
2) they are going to make the person utter: "Coffee please!" ;
3) most probably they are going to say "could you please get all those wires and electrodes out of my brain !"

Joking aside, it might be that the brain configuration is clearly such that it will be 1) or 2). But it might also be that the model we have of the brain will give us RANDOMLY 1) or 2) depending on some sensitive initial conditions, such as the exact Na/K ratio in an axion or something like that, and that, with the precision we have, we cannot determine whether it will be 1) or 2). It could even be so chaotic, that we have to go down to quantum-mechanically forbidden precision to be able to decide between 1) and 2).

So I'd say, if we ever can have brain modeling such that we CAN find out, given the structure of the brain, with certainty, that it is 1) or 2), then for sure our brain is a "deterministic machine", like a computer.

But even if we are in the "chaotic case", are we now going to say that our free will is dependent on "very small changes in initial conditions, beyond the physically measurable ?" Is that "free will" or "random choice" ? Did we "freely decide", or "threw some dice and acted upon that ?"

Isn't the "sensation" of having choosen what the physics of our brain "did", not just a mental illusion ? EVEN if it is "random" ? Because it is difficult to consider that our "free will" resides in the ultra-precise dose of Na/K in an axion, no ?

So EVEN if we "rewind" and have the universe "identical" we have a problem in interpretation. But there's an extra difficulty with the concept itself of "rewinding the universe":

Consider that we throw a dice. We find 5. Now "rewind the universe" and throw the dice again. Do we find 5 again ?

Now do the same with a quantum-mechanical system. Consider a radioactive atom during one half-life time. Imagine it decays during this time. Now, "rewind the universe" and do that again. Is it going to decay again ?

I do not disagree with anything you say here.

But what you are saying boils down to :
EITHER everything is deterministic (in which case where does Free Will start?)
OR some things are indeterministic (as per quantum indeterminacy) - but in that case are we saying that free will arises from quantum uncertainty? - no surely not.

 

[Q_Goest]

If every atom or molecule is only affected by some deterministic or indeterminate event, then what is the purpose of ‘free will’ and why does it seem to correspond to the sensation of making a choice?

Let’s simplify for a second and postulate a computational model. Switches in the deterministic machine all do what they’re supposed to, due to electric currents that cause them to change state. However, we could also postulate a random switch such that it may at any time switch states with no input whatsoever. We could make a sentient machine that was deterministic or we could make one that was not deterministic depending on which switches we chose to build the machine from.

With either of these machines, I have to wonder, “What is the purpose of free will?” Does either machine use this phenomena to change the state of one of it’s switches? No, obviously not.
- The switches in the deterministic machine change because there is an electrical voltage applied to it.
- The switches in the random machine change without cause.

For the simplistic case of random or deterministic switches, we have no reason to suppose that free will is anything but an epiphenomena with no causal influence over the physical substrate it supervenes on. Since this is true, why does free will seem to correspond with making a choice?

We have this idea that our mental representation should correspond to reality for some reason, but there’s no reason whatsoever to presuppose that sensations should reliably correspond to anything given this simplistic computational model. Any mechanism made up of deterministic and random switches is driven by the actions and applied voltages of the switches, not some sensation that we have a choice to make.

This is another one of those categorical errors many (not all) philosophers seem to consistently make. They make the ungrounded assumption that the sensation of free will should correspond to making choices, but there’s no reason they should correspond. By that I mean there is no reason to have the sensation of free will as opposed to some other sensation. If the sensation of free will does not influence anything, just as any qualia can’t influence any action of any switch given the above computational model, why should any of these sensations correspond to our behavior?

In answering that, you have to accept all qualia such as the sensation of free will are epiphenomena that have no influence but for some reason these epiphenomena always seem to correspond to the behavior. I could equally well say that I experience the color red or feel a sharp pain in my foot when I have to make a choice since any sensation of qualia has no influence whatsoever over the physical substrate. Free will is no different. There is no reason to postulate that free will has an influence given the above model and thus there is no reason it should correspond to making a choice. I have to conclude that the model is faulty.

 

[moving finger]

If every atom...

I take it from the above that you do not believe in the (philosophical) Libertarian form of Free Will (as opposed to the Compatibilist form)? If so, that accords with my belief.

 

[vanesch]

This is another one of those categorical errors many (not all) philosophers seem to consistently make. They make the ungrounded assumption that the sensation of free will should correspond to making choices, but there’s no reason they should correspond. By that I mean there is no reason to have the sensation of free will as opposed to some other sensation. If the sensation of free will does not influence anything, just as any qualia can’t influence any action of any switch given the above computational model, why should any of these sensations correspond to our behavior?

In answering that, you have to accept all qualia such as the sensation of free will are epiphenomena that have no influence but for some reason these epiphenomena always seem to correspond to the behavior. I could equally well say that I experience the color red or feel a sharp pain in my foot when I have to make a choice since any sensation of qualia has no influence whatsoever over the physical substrate. Free will is no different. There is no reason to postulate that free will has an influence given the above model and thus there is no reason it should correspond to making a choice. I have to conclude that the model is faulty.

Exactly !

In other words, it seems that we can take it that free will is an illusion. Now, we can of course also define free will to be "the subjective illusion to have free will", and in that case, we have free will

 

[MrXow]

you would definitely choose the coffee again because the first time you obviously wanted it more than the tea and if time was reset you would still want it more

 

[out of whack]

Clearly one of us is out of whack.

Hey, hey, you're not allowed to use the same crack twice in the same thread. There's got to be a forum rule about that somewhere...

This is a philosophy thread.

It's in English.

I suggest you maybe check the philosophical meaning

I counter-suggest you maybe say which meaning you use when it departs from common English. I will read the reference you posted.

But to end on a positive note, I also agree with you, vanesh and Q_Goest that free will does not dictate our actions. It appears to be an after-the-fact sensation instead.

 

[Q_Goest]

movingfinger, Vanesch – My point is only that the computational model seems to be faulty, and any model of reality based on computationalism will similarly be faulty. If we are to hold onto our model of computationalism, regardless of whether or not we assume deterministic or random causation, we must explain why we should have a reliable correspondence between qualia (such as the sensation of free will) and behavior. If you agree that everything I’ve pointed out is true, then how does one reconsile the seemingly inescapable observation that qualia reliably correspond to behavior?

The only way I know is provided by elimitavists like Dennett who states, “So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all.” (Ref: Quinning Qualia) However, Dennett’s logic lacks rigor.

Instead, try this:

Liking to ask questions that confound common sense, philosophers have asked: does consciousness confer any advantages that could explain why evolution would so carefully have nurtured it? And if not, do we really have to trouble ourselves with consciousness? Common sense responds, "Try driving behind a guy who’s asleep, and see if consciousness has any advantages."

Philosophers (ROCs in particular)* reply: "Oh, we didn’t mean that kind of advantage; or if we did, we didn’t mean conscious as opposed to being asleep. A zombie keeps his eyes on the road, and his visual computational center contributes to his driving safely, which his prudential computational center mandates." And the ROCs continue: "What we meant was, does a perfect driver who is experiencing the trip have any survival advantage over a perfect driver who is not experiencing anything? And our answer is No."

Well, right – if that was the choice put before Evolution. Makes you wonder, why are there not more computers in our planet’s illustrious history? Why all these conscious beings? According to a neglected screenplay called Valley of the Lost Microchips, long ago a fertile vale in South America was in fact riddled with computers, dumped there by an alien civilization that had grown weary of technology. The problem was, they just sat around. They were of no use to anyone until the dinosaurs came along and ate them.

Ref: Kearns, “Could Daniel Dennett be a Zombie?”
* ROC = Reducer Of Consciousness of whom Dennett takes this position.

For any computational model with only deterministic or random elements, there is no evolutionary advantage whatsoever. This should be self evident since for such a computational model, qualia, including the sensation of free will, has no influence whatsoever.

I’m merely trying to point out that I disagree with this model. It doesn’t work. The computational paradigm of mind has more holes in it than a dam made from Swiss cheese with a million mice using it for a home. Computationalism relies on functionalism which doesn't rely on any physical laws, but is a concept created by Hillary Putnam in the 1960's whom now disavows the concept. If the originator of functionalism says he was wrong, and if functionalism is only a concept without basis on physical law, then computationalism is in a lot of trouble.

I'd contend that the original question presented by the OP is faulty. I believe that there is a reason for qualia, a reason for the sensation of free will, and we can’t model these phenomena using a computational model.

Try this model instead. Strong emergence, downward causation. The phenomena of consciousness is strongly emergent and is causal. For example, let’s just say it is actually our DNA and it’s interaction with ribosomes which is the physical substrate on which consiousness supervenes, and as these molecules are used to manufacture hormones that affect our behavior, they can do so in a non-deterministic way which is caused by the phenomena of consciousness and all of our qualia. Such a model would then predict that the generation of hormones is not random, not deterministic, but caused by the phenomena created by that physical substrate as a whole. This is just one example of strong emergence and downward causation that would eliminate the computational model of deterministic and random switches and put some meaning back into such things as free will and qualia. Further, such phenomena would confer an evolutionary advantage over the computational model using only deterministic and random elements.

Ok, running for cover now! lol

 

[moving finger]

It's in English.

I guess that's why I referred to an English version of the philosophical definition.

I counter-suggest you maybe say which meaning you use when it departs from common English. I will read the reference you posted.

Sorry, I guess I took it for granted that participants in a philosophy thread would understand the philosophical meaning of supervenience. My mistake.

But to end on a positive note, I also agree with you, vanesh and Q_Goest that free will does not dictate our actions. It appears to be an after-the-fact sensation instead.

We all seem to agree on this at least.

 

[vanesch]

movingfinger, Vanesch – My point is only that the computational model seems to be faulty, and any model of reality based on computationalism will similarly be faulty. If we are to hold onto our model of computationalism, regardless of whether or not we assume deterministic or random causation, we must explain why we should have a reliable correspondence between qualia (such as the sensation of free will) and behavior.

Ha, that's the one-million-dollar question of course. It is also known as the "hard problem" or as "the mind-brain problem".

For the moment, it is still a philosophical discussion, but we will soon run into very practical problems because of it: when we will have build intelligent machines which "seem to have qualia". It is impossible to find out whether a physical structure has a subjective world "attached" to it or not, except for your own. It is impossible to know whether a machine is behaving "as if" it had qualia (but is "just a machine") or REALLY has qualia. It is impossible to know whether a stone "feels pain" when we break it.

Our hypothesis of other people having qualia (and not being zombies) simply comes about because of analogy: because they seem to behave in very similar ways as you do yourself. And as you, yourself KNOW that you have a subjective experience (have qualia), you assume somehow that the situation must be symmetrical.

But it is entirely possible that you (I ?) are (am) totally alone. That everybody, and everything, around you never had the slightest bit of subjective experience except yourself. This then solves the issue in a certain way. There are no qualia, except for your own.

It might also be that only CERTAIN physical structures have subjective experience emerge. For instance, only men. Not women. They are zombies. It can't be the opposite because there's at least one guy having subjective experiences (me - although to you, I could be a zombie trying you to trick you into thinking that I do have subjective experiences). Or only those men which are born on an even date. Or whatever other arbitrary criterium. But there is no observational way to find out, ever.

 

[moving finger]

This is another one of those categorical errors many (not all) philosophers seem to consistently make. They make the ungrounded assumption that the sensation of free will should correspond to making choices, but there’s no reason they should correspond. By that I mean there is no reason to have the sensation of free will as opposed to some other sensation. If the sensation of free will does not influence anything, just as any qualia can’t influence any action of any switch given the above computational model, why should any of these sensations correspond to our behavior?

In answering that, you have to accept all qualia such as the sensation of free will are epiphenomena that have no influence but for some reason these epiphenomena always seem to correspond to the behavior. I could equally well say that I experience the color red or feel a sharp pain in my foot when I have to make a choice since any sensation of qualia has no influence whatsoever over the physical substrate. Free will is no different. There is no reason to postulate that free will has an influence given the above model and thus there is no reason it should correspond to making a choice. I have to conclude that the model is faulty.

You seem to assume that "the sensation of free will" does not influence anything (ie is an epiphenomenon).
But its not clear to me why you assume this?
Can you defend your assumption here?

 

[Q_Goest]

Vanesch said: It is also known as the "hard problem"

Actually, what I’m talking about is reliable correlation, not the hard problem. The hard problem only asks why we should have any experience at all, not why that experience should reliably correlate.

For both Vanesch and movingfinger or anyone else willing to discuss…

The sensation of free will, just like any qualia, is not objectively measurable in any way. There is nothing we can measure which says “here is free will” or “here is the color red” or pain, or any qualia.

I would like to propose that anything that is not measurable can have no measurable affect on that which is measurable. Just too much like magic, right? (Note: There is a way around this by suggesting strong emergence and downward causation as given in my previous post, but for now, let’s focus on computationalism.)

Let’s look at what our basis is for consciousness.
1) For the case of a computational model, switches for example (or any classical interaction which can be duplicated in a control volume*) are influenced not by qualia, but by the voltage applied to them.

I take statement 1 to be undeniable. I don’t see any way to argue that some unmeasurable phenomena is causing switches to operate. That’s just absurd. Hence, the qualia are an epiphenomena which are impotent in causing any physical change given the computational model.

That fact isn’t so bad as what gets derived from this conclusion. The real kicker. The one everyone here is overlooking, though there are many people who DO see this next issue as a real problem. It is sometimes as hard to understand as trying to explain to a 5 year old that the color red doesn’t exist as a property of a color of paint. I’m taking this time to point out this is a hard thing to understand so anyone reading can give this some real consideration.

Since qualia can’t influence any physical change, why should they correlate to what we sense? The odds they should “reliably correlate” with an experience are stacked against us. In fact, the odds they should reliably correlate are so astronomically low, we should be sitting here dumbfounded. There is no reason for them to reliably correlate (meaning that pain should feel like something that we should try to avoid or that free will should relate to making a decision).** For example, a person with synesthasia may experience the quale “turquoise” when hearing the sound “one” (ie: the number one). They associate color with numbers. This is very unusual of course, because we all associate color with some wavelength of light. Similarly, we associate pain with a negative experience such as a cut or a burn. We could equally associate the color turquoise with a cut or burn since regardless of what quale we experience, we will still try to avoid what caused that particular quale. We could equally experience an orgasm, but the end result would be identical, in that we would try to avoid what caused the orgasm – the behavior can not be influenced by what we experience!

Because regardless of what quale we experience, in the case of computationalism, there is no influence whatsoever as stated in 1) above. To calculate the odds that any given quale should correlate to a given behavior, we only need to take the actual number of experiences, which is 1, and divide by the number of possible experiences, which is an extremely large number. In fact, there is no real limit to the number of possible experiences we should have, so the odds that there is a reliable correlation between some quale and the experience approaches zero. That’s (just another) problem that computationalism has no way to avoid. Note that I’m not the only one pointing this out. Dennett seems to recognize this as I’ve quoted Kearns above, but Dennett would rather eliminate all qualia than admit there is an issue.

* Control volumes in the sense of a volume of space which has a distinct boundary or surface on which boundary conditions can be applied. The control volume concept is a specific concept used by engineers in fluid mechanics and thermodynamics to describe what is occurring within some volume of space, but the same concept can, and has been expanded upon in one form or another to consider any classical mechanical interaction. Note this concept can’t be used below a certain scale.

** The standard objection to this is that they simply do, and we don’t know why any more than we know why qualia exist. However, the issue isn’t that simple to dismiss as I point out the odds for reliable correlation are astronomically low.

 

[vanesch]

Let’s look at what our basis is for consciousness.
1) For the case of a computational model, switches for example (or any classical interaction which can be duplicated in a control volume*) are influenced not by qualia, but by the voltage applied to them.

I take statement 1 to be undeniable. I don’t see any way to argue that some unmeasurable phenomena is causing switches to operate. That’s just absurd. Hence, the qualia are an epiphenomena which are impotent in causing any physical change given the computational model.

Yes, I subscribe to this. Well, it is possible to subscribe to this, at least.

I understand what you are saying, I think. The question is: why are qualia, which cannot influence the physical state, determined by the physical state. A kind of violation of action-reaction.

Because regardless of what quale we experience, in the case of computationalism, there is no influence whatsoever as stated in 1) above. To calculate the odds that any given quale should correlate to a given behavior, we only need to take the actual number of experiences, which is 1, and divide by the number of possible experiences, which is an extremely large number.

... unless you go to a many-worlds situation, where to each thinkable set of qualia, also corresponds an existing world in the multiverse Then, as I try often to point out, the problem of "why ?" becomes "which ?" or a problem of haecceity: "why THIS one? "

It is also one of the reasons for my preference of MWI, although I have to say that I fully recon that it is totally speculative, but I like the idea that a physical theory finally points our nose in an ignored philosophical problem... even if it turns out not to be right in the end, it was in any case a fun idea.

 

[moving finger]

For both Vanesch and movingfinger or anyone else willing to discuss…

The sensation of free will, just like any qualia, is not objectively measurable in any way. There is nothing we can measure which says “here is free will” or “here is the color red” or pain, or any qualia.

I do not fully agree. Something which has only subjective properties is by definition not open to study through objective means. However, if we can identify the neural correlates of various states of consciousness, we may also be able to identify particular neurophysiological patterns which correspond to (correlate with) components of a “quale”. Such neural correlates would have objectively measurable properties.

I would like to propose that anything that is not measurable can have no measurable affect on that which is measurable.

interesting proposition, but as I argue above, it may be the case that we can identify some neural correlates of particular quales, in which case we have something we can measure and something which can be linked in a causal chain.

 

[moving finger]

Yes, I subscribe to this. Well, it is possible to subscribe to this, at least.

I understand what you are saying, I think. The question is: why are qualia, which cannot influence the physical state, determined by the physical state. A kind of violation of action-reaction.

We need to be careful with how we use the term qualia.
When you refer to a "quale", are you referring to an entire neurophysiological state (ONE aspect of which is that it produces some subjective properties - whereas the state itself also has objectively measurable properties)
Or, in using the term "quale", are you referring instead to ONLY the subjective properties of an entire neurophysiological state?
If the latter, then a quale is NOT an object per se, but is instead simply one of the properties of an object, and there is no reason (imho) why we should necessarily expect ALL properties of a physical object to be able to influence the physical world (ie some properties may be epiphenomenal).

 

[Rade]

...The sensation of free will, just like any qualia, is not objectively measurable in any way. There is nothing we can measure which says “here is free will”...

I do not agree. Free will is nothing more than volitional thinking. Thinking is not automatic or instictive or involuntary action--such as the digestion of food in stomach. To think is an act of choice, it is the act of integrating perceptions into concepts via a process called abstraction, and this process can be measured as an electro-chemical event by study of neutrons. So, not only can free will be measured, it also can be quantified. Here is one study that shows how activation of neurons as a free will response in relation to visual clues can be quantified:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1200/is_26_167/ai_n14839703

 

[Q_Goest]

vanesch said: The question is: why are qualia, which cannot influence the physical state, determined by the physical state. A kind of violation of action-reaction.

Yes. Interesting way of putting it. Regarding MWI, I’m not sure how that could be used to explain the correlation, but I enjoy your thinking.

movingfinger said: Something which has only subjective properties is by definition not open to study through objective means. However, if we can identify the neural correlates of various states of consciousness, we may also be able to identify particular neurophysiological patterns which correspond to (correlate with) components of a “quale”. Such neural correlates would have objectively measurable properties.

True. I fully agree that the ability to objectively measure a physical state, and that such a state might be having an experience is in fact possible. All views of consciousness accept this per the supervenience thesis including quantum mechanical, single cell neuron, EM field theories and all others. However, the computational paradigm has other limitations that some theories don’t have. The computational paradigm also assumes qualia emerge from classical mechanical interactions which are reducible to local, causal interactions at a macroscopic level. Thus, the computational model rules out any kind of strong emergence and any kind of downward causation unless 1) is shown to be false, which is impossible.

interesting proposition, but as I argue above, it may be the case that we can identify some neural correlates of particular quales, in which case we have something we can measure and something which can be linked in a causal chain.

Exactly. However, we must also realize that once we’ve allegedly identified these qualia by observing the classical level interactions of neurons, and of course, assuming we could exactly simulate those interactions using deterministic and random switches, we still have a problem.

The problem is that the switches in the computational model operate exactly as I’ve stated in 1) above:

1) For the case of a computational model, switches for example (or any classical interaction which can be duplicated in a control volume*) are influenced not by qualia, but by the voltage applied to them.

Once we realize that it is the voltages and not the qualia produced which is creating the behavior, we are stuck with qualia as being nothing but an epiphenomena. And once we’re stuck with qualia being an epiphenomena, we are stuck trying to explain why they should reliably correspond.

True story:
When I was just 4 or 5, I remember seeing a brightly polished, stainless steel pot on the stove. Mom was cooking dinner. The pot was shiney and reflective as a mirror. I remember bringing my face closer to it and watching my head suddenly get as large as a cantalope. But even when backing a few feet away, my head would get all skinny and almost disappear. I went back and forth several times, watching the reflection change shape just like one of those carnival mirrors. That was all well and good, but I was a strange child and decided to kiss the pot. The choice was all mine of course, and my mother came running as she heard the scream of her child in the kitchen and found him with scalded lips.

“Are you ever going to do that again,” my mother asked.

“Are you nuts? I’m never getting near that thing again!” I decided.

I felt pain (qualia – a bad experience).
I jumped back and screamed (behavior).
I felt a desire never to kiss another boiling hot pot again (qualia – free will).
I never kissed another pot again (behavior).

If we assume the computational model is correct, then we can:
a) do away with qualia – it isn’t needed to explain anything.
or
b) Suggest that qualia can be anything since the experience is not influencing behavior. (qualia does not need to reliably correspond)

From a) above, Dennett wishes to proceed with doing away with qualia, and he makes the implicit assumption that computationalism is true as he writes “Quining Qualia”.

From b) above, I’d like to also suggest qualia can be anything, and thus we have a problem as qualia DO seem to reliably correspond (quite literally). When pain occurs we exhibit behavior which resembles pain instead of something wonderful. If there is no correlation, I could quite literally love the pain of kissing boiling hot pots, but it would make no difference whatsoever in my behavior. I would still avoid kissing hot pots because the behavior is related to the action of voltages on switches and the qualia has no influence on that.

Similarly, I can experience the color turquoise when making a decision and wonder what the hell such a color has to do with not wanting to kiss pots any more. In the end however, when offered a chance to kiss another hot pot, the color turquoise could appear and I would say “Are you nuts?” My behavior is influenced only by voltage being applied to switches in the case of computationalism (or more appropriately, it is influenced only by classical signals). If it is only influenced by the voltage of an applied signal, there is either no reason to have an experience of free will when making a decision, or there is no reason to have any reliable correlation between the experience and the behavior.

We need to be careful with how we use the term qualia.
When you refer to a "quale", are you referring to an entire neurophysiological state (ONE aspect of which is that it produces some subjective properties - whereas the state itself also has objectively measurable properties)

Yes, exactly. We have a physical state (what you’re calling a neurophysiological state) and people readily assume this physical state produces some subjective properties which should correlate to the physical one. But I don’t see any valid argument that suggests these two states should correlate reliably given the computational model.

Hi Rade:

Free will is nothing more than volitional thinking. Thinking is not automatic or instictive or involuntary action--such as the digestion of food in stomach. To think is an act of choice, it is the act of integrating perceptions into concepts via a process called abstraction, and this process can be measured as an electro-chemical event by study of neutrons. So, not only can free will be measured, it also can be quantified.

I agree with anything you’ve said here. But note that what you’re talking about is the behavior of making a decision, not the sensation or experience of free will. When a switch changes position, or any group of switches change position, why should that correlate to the sensation or experience of making a decision. And if you say that experience we have with making a decision is X, then why can’t it be Y or Z? What difference would it make if we experienced Y or Z given the computational model? Please also read the above.

 

[moving finger]

1) For the case of a computational model, switches for example (or any classical interaction which can be duplicated in a control volume*) are influenced not by qualia, but by the voltage applied to them.

I think the problem with this statement, as I tried to explain above, is that it seems to implicitly assume that "qualia" are objects, rather than particular properties of objects.

If a "quale" is indeed an object which is influenced by other objects, then I agree we would expect that "quale" in turn to have some causal influence on other objects.

However, if what we call a "quale" is simply a particular (subjective) property of an object (which object has other objective properties apart from the "quale"), then imho there is no a priori reason why the "quale" (being simply a property rather than an object) should necessarily have any causal efficacy at all.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi mf.

I think the problem with this statement, as I tried to explain above, is that it seems to implicitly assume that "qualia" are objects, rather than particular properties of objects.

Statement 1 is meant to say that qualia are a phenomena analogous to Brownian motion. The difference being that Brownian motion is an objective phenomena which reliably corresponds to the underlying mechanism. Brownian motion should correspond, even though it is an epiphenomena. It should correspond because there is an objectively measurable affect which molecules can have on a particle of dust.

So we could say that qualia are phenomena which have some kind of subjective property. For example, very high (or low) temperatures appear to produce the phenomena we call "pain". Similarly, the temperature of an object might produce any subjective experience whatsoever, such as an orgasm or the experience of turquoise, but they don't. Calling the phenomena of qualia a "property" isn't incorrect, but I want to be sure we agree on what this means.

However, if what we call a "quale" is simply a particular (subjective) property of an object (which object has other objective properties apart from the "quale"), then imho there is no a priori reason why the "quale" (being simply a property rather than an object) should necessarily have any causal efficacy at all.

So are you saying here that qualia should not have any causal efficacy (ie: is an epiphenomena)? If so, I'd agree that the computational model predicts this. And if this is the case, then the point we should be asking is why such phenomena should reliably correspond - or why they should exist at all, since an animal or human has no evolutionary advantage over a zombie animal or human.

 

[vanesch]

True story:
When I was just 4 or 5, I remember seeing a brightly polished, stainless steel pot on the stove. Mom was cooking dinner. The pot was shiney and reflective as a mirror. I remember bringing my face closer to it and watching my head suddenly get as large as a cantalope. But even when backing a few feet away, my head would get all skinny and almost disappear. I went back and forth several times, watching the reflection change shape just like one of those carnival mirrors. That was all well and good, but I was a strange child and decided to kiss the pot. The choice was all mine of course, and my mother came running as she heard the scream of her child in the kitchen and found him with scalded lips.

“Are you ever going to do that again,” my mother asked.

“Are you nuts? I’m never getting near that thing again!” I decided.

I felt pain (qualia – a bad experience).
I jumped back and screamed (behavior).
I felt a desire never to kiss another boiling hot pot again (qualia – free will).
I never kissed another pot again (behavior).

If we assume the computational model is correct, then we can:
a) do away with qualia – it isn’t needed to explain anything.
or
b) Suggest that qualia can be anything since the experience is not influencing behavior. (qualia does not need to reliably correspond)

To explain the externally observed actions (by your mother, say), indeed you do not need qualia. Probably the wirings of your neurons are such, that if the temperature of your lips rise, signals will be sent to your muscles to get them out of that situation, and a strong memorisation of the sensory information related to the situation will be stored in your brain. This will have as a consequence that next time similar sensory information is captured, that certain actions will not be performed anymore (like kissing a pot on a stove).

But all this can be done by a computer too. There's no need to invoque concepts such as "pain". Imagine you've designed a small robot piloted by your PC, with sensors such that when the temperature of a sensor reaches 50 degrees, it will now avoid next time a similar situation. You can, if you wish, call such a programmation "pain reaction". But do you really believe that your PC got hurt ?

So we are confronted to the difficulty that it is possible to explain all kinds of behaviour mechanistically, and that at no point we need "qualia" for that (unless we jokingly decide to call them that way). Your *mother* only assumed that it "really hurt" because she can imagine HERSELF doing the same thing, and, herself having subjective experiences, can imagine herself feeling pain, and then, by analogy, assume that her child has a similar experience.

You can say: "yes, but I TOLD her that it hurt". Now, imagine that you write a 5-line C-program that prints "aw! that hurt!" on the screen when you press the space bar. Even though your PC TELLS YOU that it hurts when you press the space bar, you won't assume that it "really feels pain", would you ?
Now, imagine that we've trained a kid in such a way that when we cut his hair, he screams that it hurts ! Do we believe him, or do we think he's kidding us ?

From a) above, Dennett wishes to proceed with doing away with qualia, and he makes the implicit assumption that computationalism is true as he writes “Quining Qualia”.

You can probably do away with qualia in order to explain *behaviour*. That still doesn't mean that we've explained a subjective experience !

From b) above, I’d like to also suggest qualia can be anything, and thus we have a problem as qualia DO seem to reliably correspond (quite literally). When pain occurs we exhibit behavior which resembles pain instead of something wonderful. If there is no correlation, I could quite literally love the pain of kissing boiling hot pots, but it would make no difference whatsoever in my behavior. I would still avoid kissing hot pots because the behavior is related to the action of voltages on switches and the qualia has no influence on that.

Exactly. So it seems to be a *property* of subjective experiences to be related to certain (which ?) physical phenomena, without them influencing it. Like it is a property of the sun to attract the earth. Call it "the law of the qualia" ...

Similarly, I can experience the color turquoise when making a decision and wonder what the hell such a color has to do with not wanting to kiss pots any more. In the end however, when offered a chance to kiss another hot pot, the color turquoise could appear and I would say “Are you nuts?” My behavior is influenced only by voltage being applied to switches in the case of computationalism (or more appropriately, it is influenced only by classical signals). If it is only influenced by the voltage of an applied signal, there is either no reason to have an experience of free will when making a decision, or there is no reason to have any reliable correlation between the experience and the behavior.

Except that this seems to be the case, so we could elevate it to some kind of law of subjective nature.

Yes, exactly. We have a physical state (what you’re calling a neurophysiological state) and people readily assume this physical state produces some subjective properties which should correlate to the physical one. But I don’t see any valid argument that suggests these two states should correlate reliably given the computational model.

Again, this being so then implies that there *is* such a connection, although we don't have a deeper underlying model for it that goes further than the postulate that "this is how subjective worlds behave". In the same way as we don't have a more fundamental explanation for why the laws of (objective) nature are the way they are, but it just happens to be so. Which is why we make this postulate.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi vanesch,
I like your write up. Have a few reactions to it (in italic) and then some quotes I’d be interested in hearing your thoughts on.

To explain the externally observed actions (by your mother, say), indeed you do not need qualia. Probably the wirings of your neurons are such, that if the temperature of your lips rise, signals will be sent to your muscles to get them out of that situation, and a strong memorisation of the sensory information related to the situation will be stored in your brain. This will have as a consequence that next time similar sensory information is captured, that certain actions will not be performed anymore (like kissing a pot on a stove).

But all this can be done by a computer too. I agree that behavior can be mimicked by a computer There's no need to invoque concepts such as "pain". Imagine you've designed a small robot piloted by your PC, with sensors such that when the temperature of a sensor reaches 50 degrees, it will now avoid next time a similar situation. You can, if you wish, call such a programmation "pain reaction". But do you really believe that your PC got hurt ? no, don’t disagree with anything here.

So we are confronted to the difficulty that it is possible key phrase, “it is possible” to explain all kinds of behaviour mechanistically, and that at no point we need "qualia" for that (unless we jokingly decide to call them that way). Your *mother* only assumed that it "really hurt" because she can imagine HERSELF doing the same thing, and, herself having subjective experiences, can imagine herself feeling pain, and then, by analogy, assume that her child has a similar experience. agree. Computationalism does not attempt to give any value to qualia

You can say: "yes, but I TOLD her that it hurt". Now, imagine that you write a 5-line C-program that prints "aw! that hurt!" on the screen when you press the space bar. Even though your PC TELLS YOU that it hurts when you press the space bar, you won't assume that it "really feels pain", would you ? I don’t think a computer could ever experience anything.

Now, imagine that we've trained a kid in such a way that when we cut his hair, he screams that it hurts ! Do we believe him, or do we think he's kidding us ? You are appealing to my intuition about what my hair should be experiencing here. Maybe hair can experience something! If my hair’s experience is not subjectively measurable and is only an epiphenomena, then how am I supposed to determine if my hair is in pain or not?

I don’t think cutting hair can cause pain because it doesn’t have the proper physical substrate. Unfortunately, computationalists are forced to say that if the physical states of hair could be shown to correspond to physical states that cause pain, then cutting hair causes pain. They are forced to conclude this because of the concept of functionalism as originally provided by Putnam, though he now disavows this concept. If functionalism is proven false, then computationalism is false also. Arguments provided against functionalism often point out this problem that computationalism has. Putnam, Searle, Bishop and many others have pointed out this issue, and could show you why pain isn’t just caused by cutting hair, but cutting hair also causes every single experience imaginable. The arguments proposed are valid in my opinion. If computationalism is correct, cutting hair should create any and all experiences. Experiences don’t reliably correspond given computationalism. Putnam, Searle, and Bishop have been countered by Chalmers, Christley, Copeland and others - but that for another thread.

You can probably do away with qualia in order to explain *behaviour*. That still doesn't mean that we've explained a subjective experience ! agree. Note the difference between computationalism and other theories of consciousness which argue that qualia serves a purpose and is not just an epiphenomena.

Exactly. So it seems to be a *property* of subjective experiences to be related to certain (which ?) physical phenomena, without them influencing it. Like it is a property of the sun to attract the earth. Call it "the law of the qualia" ... Not sure why you’re referencing gravity. Gravity produces objectively measurable phenomena. Per computationalism, qualia doesn’t.

Except that this seems to be the case, so we could elevate it to some kind of law of subjective nature. I agree, “it seems to be the case”. “Why?” is a burning question.

Again, this being so then implies that there *is* such a connection, although we don't have a deeper underlying model for it that goes further than the postulate that "this is how subjective worlds behave". In the same way as we don't have a more fundamental explanation for why the laws of (objective) nature are the way they are, but it just happens to be so. Which is why we make this postulate. All other underlying laws of nature are measurable. I accept that Plank’s constant is what it is, simply because, but Plank’s constant is measurable and has a measurable affect. Brownian motion is measurable and is caused by an underlying mechanism. In each case we have reliable correlations. Saying “it just is the way it is” doesn’t say there is a reliable correlation if there is nothing measurable. It says we don’t know and we CAN’T EVER know. I don’t believe nature left us with this circumstance.

Take Chalmers for example as he talks about the possibility of strongly emergent phenomena:

As long as the existence of these phenomena is deducible in principle from a physical specification of the world (as in the case of cellular automaton), then no new fundamental laws or properties are needed: everything will still be a consequence of physics. So if we want to use emergence to draw conclusions about the structure of nature at the most fundamental level, it is not weak emergence but strong emergence that is relevant. [Referring to consciousness]
...
I think that even if consciousness is not deducible from physical facts, states of consciousness are still systematically correlated with physical states. [This is simply the restatement of the supervenience thesis]
...
In our world, it seems to be a matter of law that duplicating physical states will duplicate consciousness; but in other worlds with different laws, a system physically identical to me might have no consciousness at all [a physically identical system might be a p-zombie]. This suggests that the lawful connection between physical processes and consciousness is not itself derivable from the laws of physics but is instead a further basic law or laws of its own. The laws that express the connection between physical processes and consciousness are what we might call fundamental psychophysical laws.

Ref: Chalmers, “Strong and Weak Emergence”

Do you agree with this? If some phenomena (ex: consciousness) is not deducible in principal from the physical specification of the world then do you agree that this new phenomena must be strongly emergent or must rely on some other “fundamental psychophysical laws”? He points out cellular automatons as being weakly emergent because such things as CA's produce phenomena which are objectively measurable.

Note that Chalmers is a computationalist.

On the other hand, Henry Stapp is a particle physicist, so I think you can appreciate the fact he has a similar background and education to your own. Stapp however, feels that computationalism is faulty. He sees the same problems you and Chalmers talk about, the same problems we’re talking about here when he states:

One could imagine modifying classical mechanics by appending to it the concept of another kind of reality; a reality that would be thought like, in the sense of being an eventlike grasping of functional entities as wholes. In order to preserve the laws of classical mechanics this added reality could have no effect on the evolution of any physical system, and hence would not be (publicly) observable. Because this new kind of reality could have no physical consequences it could confer no evolutionary advantage, and hence would have, within the scientific framework, no reason to exist. This sort of addition to classical mechanics would convert it from a mechanics with a monistic ontology to a mechanics with a dualistic ontology. Yet this profound shift would have no roots at all in the classical mechanics onto which it is grafted: it would be a completely ad hoc move from a monistic mechanics to a dualistic one.

Ref: Stapp, “Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness but Quantum Mechanics Can”

What do you think of Stapp’s perspective on this? Why should we “graft” on an ad hoc theory such as Chalmers’ “psychophysical laws” if in fact, there is no way to objectively measure the predictions made by these laws?

 

[ValenceE]

Hello to all,


I don’t think that the so-called free will, however you might describe it, is affected by the resetting of all parameters to a previous state.

Imo, so-called free will is a process that has no material self identity, coming in existence through our mental / emotional selves in the act of conscious decision making and therefore cannot be reset or affected by anything acting upon it.

In the proposed thought experiment, so-called free will would arise when the choice has funnelled down to coffee or tea, maybe being the first time it would be called upon during the morning, all other behaviour being mechanical-like.

However, imo, we are lacking information about the complete mental disposition of the subject and cannot derive the outcome as lightly as saying that a repeat choice = determinism, pure and simple.

What if, the night before, the person had just bought a new brand of tea that some friends raved about and that the choice was made, as he decided then, that he would have this tea for breakfast. It could be possible that, being awake for a little while, the subject didn’t quite connect with last night’s decision before the coffee or tea choice came up, and, then, thought to himself “oh yeah, let’s try this new tea “ thus choosing tea over coffee.

In this scenario, being put back in the morning’s setting would bring the same choice, not due to the determinism of the punctual situation, but from a previously made choice the night before, with a good time span between the two. Could we apply determinism here?

Or what if, the second time around, just before he would remember last night’s decision, his cat would spring by and take him out of the on going process, putting him in a different mental setting, leading him to do as he always does… take coffee. After a few sips he could then reconnect and think to himself “ shoot !, I wanted to try this new tea …”

Couldn’t this be two possible outcomes based on the same re-enactment ?


VE

 

[vanesch]

Take Chalmers for example as he talks about the possibility of strongly emergent phenomena:

Ref: Chalmers, “Strong and Weak Emergence”

Do you agree with this? If some phenomena (ex: consciousness) is not deducible in principal from the physical specification of the world then do you agree that this new phenomena must be strongly emergent or must rely on some other “fundamental psychophysical laws”? He points out cellular automatons as being weakly emergent because such things as CA's produce phenomena which are objectively measurable.

Yes, this is exactly what I also think. Subjective experiences are something which is strictly not derivable from "objective physical laws".

On the other hand, Henry Stapp is a particle physicist, so I think you can appreciate the fact he has a similar background and education to your own. Stapp however, feels that computationalism is faulty. He sees the same problems you and Chalmers talk about, the same problems we’re talking about here when he states:


Ref: Stapp, “Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness but Quantum Mechanics Can”

Well, I also agree with Stapp! I don't see the contradiction, in fact. If I understand both well, then:
- Chalmers says that subjective experience is a "strongly emergent phenomenon" which is not deducible from objective physical laws ;
- Stapp says that in order to "model" subjective experience, we would need a dualist world, with an ad hoc postulated link from the "objective world" into the "subjective world".

I fail to see the difference: the second is a way to model the emergence of the first.

What do you think of Stapp’s perspective on this? Why should we “graft” on an ad hoc theory such as Chalmers’ “psychophysical laws” if in fact, there is no way to objectively measure the predictions made by these laws?

Just to have an ontological proposition which can resist all the objections to the materialist/behaviourist vision, without doing away with their advantages (no "mind over matter" difficulty in the observable physical laws), maybe ?

The reason why there are no objectively measurable predictions, is that this is not science, but meta-science (philosophy ?). So it is a good story which can reconcile our subjective experiences with objective physics. But we won't be able to verify it through scientific means. We should maybe accept that science and the scientific method has its limits too: it is limited to the objectively observable. We're talking here about something else, falling outside of this scope.

 

[moving finger]

Hi mf.

Statement 1 is meant to say that qualia are a phenomena analogous to Brownian motion. The difference being that Brownian motion is an objective phenomena which reliably corresponds to the underlying mechanism. Brownian motion should correspond, even though it is an epiphenomena. It should correspond because there is an objectively measurable affect which molecules can have on a particle of dust.

So we could say that qualia are phenomena which have some kind of subjective property. For example, very high (or low) temperatures appear to produce the phenomena we call "pain". Similarly, the temperature of an object might produce any subjective experience whatsoever, such as an orgasm or the experience of turquoise, but they don't. Calling the phenomena of qualia a "property" isn't incorrect, but I want to be sure we agree on what this means.

Good point. My choice of the word "property" was poor, and I agree that "phenomenon" is a better word to use.

However, I am still not sure that qualia are epiphenomenal.

So are you saying here that qualia should not have any causal efficacy (ie: is an epiphenomena)? If so, I'd agree that the computational model predicts this. And if this is the case, then the point we should be asking is why such phenomena should reliably correspond - or why they should exist at all, since an animal or human has no evolutionary advantage over a zombie animal or human.

I think I am saying that qualia perhaps do not have any causal efficacy (ie it is perhaps an empirically observed fact), rather than they should not have any causal efficacy (ie a provable fact).

Agreed, why "should" any epiphenomenon exist at all, if by definition it has no causal efficacy? There is no answer to this - imho "why do they exist" is not a relevant question in the case of epiphenomena. There is no "purpose" to an epiphenomenon, it simply exists. An epiphenomenon is simply an empirically (perhaps subjectively) observable phenomenon of the world; it perhaps has no "purpose", but having no "purpose" does not rule out existence. Not everything in the world needs to have a "purpose", thus asking the question "why does it exist?" is not necessarily a relevant question for everything in the world.

As for qualia - are they epiphenomenal or not? I'm not sure. As you say, if they are epiphenomenal then a conscious human would have no evolutionary advantage over a zombie. Why then are we conscious rather than zombies? One of only two reasons : EITHER qualia are epiphenomenal, but zombies are physically impossible (ie qualia, though epiphenomena, are not contingent, they are a physically (nomically) necessary part of the world); OR qualia are not epiphenomenal. At the moment, I cannot decide which.

 

[moving finger]

I don’t think that the so-called free will, however you might describe it, is affected by the resetting of all parameters to a previous state.

Imo, so-called free will is a process that has no material self identity, coming in existence through our mental / emotional selves in the act of conscious decision making and therefore cannot be reset or affected by anything acting upon it.

Cool. What you are proposing is that free will does not supervene (in the philosophical meaning of supervenience) on the physical - ie dualism. I have no problem with this, so long as you understand you are advocating dualism.

we are lacking information about the complete mental disposition of the subject and cannot derive the outcome as lightly as saying that a repeat choice = determinism, pure and simple.

The simple fact that "we lack information" is no obstacle to performing the thought experiment, which is an "in principle" experiment (not necessary to be achievable in practice).

What if, the night before, the person had just bought a new brand of tea that some friends raved about and that the choice was made, as he decided then, that he would have this tea for breakfast. It could be possible that, being awake for a little while, the subject didn’t quite connect with last night’s decision before the coffee or tea choice came up, and, then, thought to himself “oh yeah, let’s try this new tea “ thus choosing tea over coffee.

The only way this could happen (given the constraints of the thought experiment, and barring quantum uncertainty) is if the "didn't quite connect" part does NOT supervene on the physical world - which once again is dualism.

Or what if, the second time around, just before he would remember last night’s decision, his cat would spring by and take him out of the on going process, putting him in a different mental setting, leading him to do as he always does… take coffee. After a few sips he could then reconnect and think to himself “ shoot !, I wanted to try this new tea …”

The entire physical world is reset - remember - including the cat. If everything supervenes on the physical then the cat would not "spring by" the second time round if it did not also "spring by" the first time round.

There are no two ways about it. The ONLY way (apart from quantum indeterminism) to arrange for a different outcome the second time around is if some component (eg the "will") does NOT supervene on the physical (ie dualism).

MF

 

[Delphian]

Due to the sheer volume of responses to this thread, I haven't had the time to read them all yet. So many or all of what I say may only be reiterations, in which case forgive me for wasting your time.

Questions like this, and philosophy in general, are unanswerable unless every term used that shows the slightest ambiguity have their meanings predecided and agreed upon.
For example, even the phrasing of this situation leaves no generally agreeable answer.

The spiritualist might explain this by pointing out that if the will is indeed free then it is unrewindable. Since your experiment resets my will, it obviously assumes that it is not free.

Then see it as an alternate universe or reality. Nothing changes, it is a duplicate, they occur simultaneously, there is no 'rewinding,' and nothing is forced upon your will, leaving it "free." this was the OP's intent i think.

That brings us to the meaning of the term "free will." Free of what what exactly? If 'ultimate' freedom is implied, this means there is no intervening factors, such as taste, time, place, preference, etc. And the decision becomes a mental coin toss, where the subject has complete apathy whatever the outcome. By definition then, surely the decision has a 50% chance of having different outcomes. It would be as random as a literal coin toss. (Does this undo the entire free will idea? is this a paradox of "free" will then?)
If by free, you mean free of influence by a will that is not your own, then the subjects own personal bias' reigns. At the moment of choosing in one reality, in the other reality the exact same moment occurs, every decision you have ever made leading up to that moment remains the same, every single mitigating factor in the room with you and every room have you ever seen. your decision will not change in that very second.

If the experiment was to be altered however..

Take the time it takes for the subjects brain to make a snap decision as an 'instant.' a point in time of no measurable magnitude.

Then setting one of the realities any amount of time, however infinitely large or small, forwards or backwards could result in a different decision, as it is then NOT the same reality. Something has changed which lead you to be there earlier or later than you should have been. The conditions of the experiment have changed, it is not a fair test and as a result the decision COULD change, thought it might not either way.

 

[moving finger]

That brings us to the meaning of the term "free will." Free of what what exactly? If 'ultimate' freedom is implied, this means there is no intervening factors, such as taste, time, place, preference, etc. And the decision becomes a mental coin toss, where the subject has complete apathy whatever the outcome. By definition then, surely the decision has a 50% chance of having different outcomes. It would be as random as a literal coin toss. (Does this undo the entire free will idea? is this a paradox of "free" will then?)
If by free, you mean free of influence by a will that is not your own, then the subjects own personal bias' reigns. At the moment of choosing in one reality, in the other reality the exact same moment occurs, every decision you have ever made leading up to that moment remains the same, every single mitigating factor in the room with you and every room have you ever seen. your decision will not change in that very second.

I think that a believer in (libertarian-style) free will would say that, even if one were to carry out the experiment and reset the conditions back to exactly how they were, the "will" would still be free to choose either tea or coffee - the outcome would not be predictable by another observer - in other words the "will" does not supervene on the physical. This leads to dualism.

If the experiment was to be altered however..

Take the time it takes for the subjects brain to make a snap decision as an 'instant.' a point in time of no measurable magnitude.

Then setting one of the realities any amount of time, however infinitely large or small, forwards or backwards could result in a different decision, as it is then NOT the same reality. Something has changed which lead you to be there sooner or earlier than you should have been. The conditions of the experiment have changed, it is not a fair test and as a result the decision COULD change, thought it might not either way.

Unfortunately this does not provide for any escape from the problem, unless one once again advocates either dualism or quantum uncertainty. The fact that we are dealing with a thought experiment means that we need only be able to reset the scene "in principle", and not in practice. An infinitesimal time period would be impossible to reset in practice, but not in principle.

There is no escaping the conclusion that the "will" either supervenes on the physical (in which case resetting the physical also resets the "will"), or it does not (in which case the will can operate independently of the physical, but at the cost of opening the door to dualism).

 

[Delphian]

There is no escaping the conclusion that the "will" either supervenes on the physical (in which case resetting the physical also resets the "will"), or it does not (in which case the will can operate independently of the physical, but at the cost of opening the door to dualism).

Then your question has no answer.
Unless you would like to choose one of these two as a given state in the experiment.

 

[ValenceE]

moving finger...

Cool. What you are proposing is that free will does not supervene (in the philosophical meaning of supervenience) on the physical - ie dualism. I have no problem with this, so long as you understand you are advocating dualism.

On the contrary, coming in existence ONLY during the mental thought process of making a conscious choice, 'free will' is intimately tied to the physical. No dualism here.

The only way this could happen (given the constraints of the thought experiment, and barring quantum uncertainty) is if the "didn't quite connect" part does NOT supervene on the physical world - which once again is dualism.

Why ?... why is NOT supervening the only way this could happen ?

There are no two ways about it. The ONLY way (apart from quantum indeterminism) to arrange for a different outcome the second time around is if some component (eg the "will") does NOT supervene on the physical (ie dualism).

Same here... why ? How can we say without a doubt that the thought processes including 'free will' couldn't both supervene and, WHILE supervening, possesses their own realm ?




VE

 

[moving finger]

why ? How can we say without a doubt that the thought processes including 'free will' couldn't both supervene and, WHILE supervening, possesses their own realm ?

Simple.

If A supervenes on B (in the philosophical sense of supervenience, see Wikipedia) then any change in A entails a change in B (definition of supervenience).

Thus, if we reset B to be the same as it was at a previous time, it follows that A will also be reset.

Let B = the physical world, A = human "will". Now in absence of (quantum) indeterminism, the physical world operates deterministically, hence resetting B will result in replay of the physical. If human "will" supervenes on the physical, it follows that replay of the physical will result in replay of human "will".

The only way to avoid the above conclusion is to introduce (quantum) indeterminism (but that alone doesn't lead to free will), or to claim that human "will" does not supervene on the physical.

 

[mtsweetpow]

Personally, I like to mix up my rational for making decisions. I drink a fair amount of coffee and tea and to the best of my self conscious being i cannot describe why I would choose one or the other.

Avoiding the desire to equate an answer to the question, I propose that free will is not inherant or oppositly, unachievable.

Rather, it is a phenomina that ebbs and flows based on pabst, present and predicted future conditioning of the brain.

While thinking to yourself, is each successive topic or thought dependent on those in the pabst?

I challange that free will can be learned, that it is a product of our consiousness.

It becomes apparent when giving credit to the creators of improvisational music, dance, mechanical design... that the human mind has an ability when prompted correctly to create new logic, new creation, new perception drastically different than the predicted or known outcome.

My humbly proposed (cant wait to hear responses!) answer is that a person more aware of and practiced in the ways of the minds conscious abilities will be more apt to free will and thus more likely to choose tea in the event of a time shift and deletion of elapsed experiences.

 

[mtsweetpow]

Personally, I like to mix up my rational for making decisions. I drink a fair amount of coffee and tea and to the best of my self conscious being i cannot describe why I would choose one or the other.

Avoiding the desire to equate an answer to the question, I propose that free will is not inherant or oppositly, unachievable.

Rather, it is a phenomina that ebbs and flows based on pabst, present and predicted future conditioning of the brain.

While thinking to yourself, is each successive topic or thought dependent on those in the pabst?

I challange that free will can be learned, that it is a product of our consiousness.

It becomes apparent when giving credit to the creators of improvisational music, dance, mechanical design... that the human mind has an ability when prompted correctly to create new logic, new creation, new perception drastically different than the predicted or known outcome.

My humbly proposed (cant wait to hear responses!) answer is that a person more aware of and practiced in the ways of the minds conscious abilities will be more apt to free will and thus more likely to choose tea in the event of a time shift and deletion of elapsed experiences.