Pythagorean said:
Is there any evidence, in the first place, that consciousness is something unique to humans/mammals/living things (whatever your personal bias)
Not unique to humans and mammals, but unique to living things. This is just how we use the term. Consciousness is attributed via evaluation wrt certain behavioral criteria. Nonconscious things are so called because they don't behave/respond in certain ways. This has been associated with certain structural characteristics, and so we're fairly confident in identifying hubcaps, tennis racquets, etc. as being nonconscious, nonintelligent, nonliving things (as differentiated from the behavior, or lack thereof, of unconscious, unintelligent, or once alive but now dead things).
Pythagorean said:
My assumption may align with yours; I think that consciousness results from the higher complexity; I wouldn't be surprised if a single-celled organism had some limited form of consciousness, but rocks and tires don't seem to. However, that's not reasonable to just state it and leave it there. We still have to prove either philosophically that it must be, or empirically that it is.
The word, consciousness, is just a communicative convention. It's just a label associated with certain behaviors and physical forms. It doesn't require any empirical justification, or philosophical proof, other than that. We know that rocks and tires aren't conscious because of how we conventionally use the term. It's either that, or, consciousness is just a superfluous collection of letters with no particular communicative utility.
But I think I understand what you're saying. We want better, more comprehensive definitions of certain terms like consciousness, intelligence, life, etc. The OP asks, ... "how is it that some matter is conscious? For example people?" Well, this is an open question, afaik. But at this point it seems to me to be primarily a problem for empirical science (insufficient data), not philosophy.
He asks, " ... theoretically couldn't all matter be conscious?" Well, no, because consciousness is a scale (complexity) dependent phenomenon. That's how the term is used. We call something conscious if its behavior closely approximates certain criteria, and 'life' is the only physical regime where such behavior is evident.
Pythagorean said:
The major difficulty is that already, you can't prove that any other humans are conscious unless you define it behaviorally ...
This isn't a major difficulty because ultimately that's how any term (whether it refers to a relatively persistently ponderable object or a behavior) is unambiguously defined. It's been refined and incorporated into science as the practice of defining terms 'operationally'. Consciousness refers to behavior. And structural associations follow. If it looks like a duck, etc., etc., then we call it a duck. Consciousness isn't applicable to hubcaps or rocks because, afaik, they've never behaved in a manner that even remotely approximates any of the criteria that we associate with consciousness.
Pythagorean said:
... (which isn't satisfactory to most philosophers).
Then how would most philosophers define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?
My guess is that we're not going to have a deep understanding of the emergence of life and consciousness unless a fundamental wave dynamic(s) is incorporated into physics as a first principle(s). (Even then, it might be impossible to simulate the emergence of relatively simple particulate phenomena.) In this view, life and consciousness (like baseballs, proteins, atoms, etc.) are nothing more than artifacts of countless iterations of a fundamental wave dynamic(s).