Is Matter Conscious? - Can All Matter Be Conscious?

[Pythagorean]

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

You can say the same thing about physics. Who's to say there isn't invisible gremlins grabbing masses and pulling them towards other masses every time we measure the force of gravity?

It's a useless proposition, despite me not being able to prove it, because we have no access to the invisible gremlins or how they work. We don't know how masses attract each other, we just know they do. It helps explains why other things occur, though (specifically, all the rules that were developed in astronomy prior to Newton generalizing to the law of gravity.

I don't see this as a very different kind of generalization. Evolution (as I mentioned previously) is yet another generalization that compiles a lot of individual empirical facts into a theory.

Then how would most philosophers define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?

My guess is that we're not going to have a deep understanding of the emergence of life and consciousness unless a fundamental wave dynamic(s) is incorporated into physics as a first principle(s). (Even then, it might be impossible to simulate the emergence of relatively simple particulate phenomena.) In this view, life and consciousness (like baseballs, proteins, atoms, etc.) are nothing more than artifacts of countless iterations of a fundamental wave dynamic(s).

I generally agree with your post. But to the question you ask "how would most philosopher define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?" my answer is that most philosophers don't see consciousness as a behavioral thing. We all generally have an emotional attachment to our consciousness from the very beginning of our conscious life. I was born a dualist, it's only through long-term exposure to the scientific method and neuroscience that I became a physicalist. It wouldn't have been very easy to convince me otherwise at the time.

Ok let me ask you: if 2 atoms 1mm apart move 2mm apart, is this emergence?

it depends... do they interact? If they do, then yes. What emerges is force. Gravitational force does not exist without two masses. You can't talk about it with one mass.

If they don't interact, then no, superposition holds; if they're the same kind of particle, the dynamics of the whole system can be described with just one of them.

 

[ThomasT]

I generally agree with your post. But to the question you ask "how would most philosopher define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?" my answer is that most philosophers don't see consciousness as a behavioral thing.

Well, if consciousness isn't a behavioral thing, then what is it? How/what do you think most philosophers think about consciousness?

We all generally have an emotional attachment to our consciousness from the very beginning of our conscious life.

Of course, but this isn't at all what we're talking about. We're talking about the general meaning of consciousness, and, wrt the OP, whether matter is conscious. The answer is that some matter is consious. That is, consciousness is evident wrt certain scales of material behavior.

 

[Pythagorean]

Well, if consciousness isn't a behavioral thing, then what is it? How/what do you think most philosophers think about consciousness?

I shouldn't say most philosophers. I mean most philosophy-based arguments against physicalism that I encounter on the philosophy forum here.

They generally refer to the non-behavioral aspects such as the subjective experiences we perceive (i.e. qualia).

 

[ThomasT]

That qualifies as evidence in my books.

And yes it is. Thanks Dave. The object or goal was to count instances of conscious behavior (much like photomultipliers count instances of photonic behavior). To date, wrt thousands of individual experiments with my hubcaps and my tennis racquets, I've counted exactly zero (0) instances of conscious behavior.

 

[pftest]

You can say the same thing about physics. Who's to say there isn't invisible gremlins grabbing masses and pulling them towards other masses every time we measure the force of gravity?

It's a useless proposition, despite me not being able to prove it, because we have no access to the invisible gremlins or how they work. We don't know how masses attract each other, we just know they do. It helps explains why other things occur, though (specifically, all the rules that were developed in astronomy prior to Newton generalizing to the law of gravity.

I don't see this as a very different kind of generalization. Evolution (as I mentioned previously) is yet another generalization that compiles a lot of individual empirical facts into a theory.

Yes i agree we can say the same about physics, because physics doesn't tell us whether the objects it describes are conscious or not. There is no need to talk about invisible gremlins, because we have a perfectly natural invisible consciousness that is present in our bodies in conjunction with the laws of physics. Physics has nothing to do with materialism (the idea that consciousness requires brainlike complexity) and offers no support for it. It describes how matter behaves but leaves open whether it is conscious.

I have no problem with having a theory based on lots of individual empirical facts, but we have no empirical facts of unconscious matter. When we get down to it, the only empirical fact we have is that of conscious matter, ourselves. Regardless of how used everyone is to the idea of it, nonconscious matter is the postulation of a new type of matter. It is not extrapolated from a known phenomenon, whereas conscious matter is.

it depends... do they interact? If they do, then yes. What emerges is force. Gravitational force does not exist without two masses. You can't talk about it with one mass.

If they don't interact, then no, superposition holds; if they're the same kind of particle, the dynamics of the whole system can be described with just one of them.

When was there a situation with only 1 mass in the entire universe, and no forces and interaction?

To me it seems like there is only a quantitative difference between 2 atoms 1mm apart and 2 atoms 2mm apart.

 

[ThomasT]

I shouldn't say most philosophers. I mean most philosophy-based arguments against physicalism that I encounter on the philosophy forum here.

They generally refer to the non-behavioral aspects such as the subjective experiences we perceive (i.e. qualia).

But you haven't answered my question. If consciousness isn't based on behavior, than how can we ascertain if some object is conscious or not?

 

[pftest]

And yes it is. Thanks Dave. The object or goal was to count instances of conscious behavior (much like photomultipliers count instances of photonic behavior). To date, wrt thousands of individual experiments with my hubcaps and my tennis racquets, I've counted exactly zero (0) instances of conscious behavior.

What do you accept as an instance of conscious behavior?

 

[Pythagorean]

But you haven't answered my question. If consciousness isn't based on behavior, than how can we ascertain if some object is conscious or not?

You can't!

That's why saying it's not based on behavior is an argument tactic from dualist arguments, which was my point.

 

[Pythagorean]

To me it seems like there is only a quantitative difference between 2 atoms 1mm apart and 2 atoms 2mm apart.

Ah, well your problem is that you're assuming point particles, spherical cows, or far-field effects, which are only very simple special cases.

 

[ThomasT]

What do you accept as an instance of conscious behavior?

Ok, this can get a bit complicated. Let me ask you these questions. Do you think that your friends are conscious? At least when you're interacting with them. If you have pets, are they sometimes conscious? Do you think that your front door is conscious? Is your microwave oven, or your refrigerator conscious?

 

[ThomasT]

You can't!

But we evaluate and determine whether or not things are conscious all the time in the course of our ordinary navigations through our world.

That's why saying it's not based on behavior is an argument tactic from dualist arguments, which was my point.

I don't understand this.

 

[pftest]

Ok, this can get a bit complicated. Let me ask you these questions. Do you think that your friends are conscious? At least when you're interacting with them. If you have pets, are they sometimes conscious? Do you think that your front door is conscious? Is your microwave oven, or your refrigerator conscious?

I have an intuition about which things are and arent conscious yes. But of course this intuition can be flawed. Some people think fish can't feel pain, others think they can. Some think insects arent conscious, others think they are. I remember reading that a few hundred years ago people generally thought that animals were nothing more than clocklike mechanisms.

 

[Pythagorean]

But we evaluate and determine whether or not things are conscious all the time in the course of our ordinary navigations through our world.

Yes, based on their behavior alone!

edit: alone is perhaps too strong, since we also infer from our own internal behavior.

I don't understand this.

Conveniently enough, pftest just utilized it:

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

 

[ThomasT]

I have an intuition about which things are and arent conscious yes. But of course this intuition can be flawed. Some people think fish can't feel pain, others think they can. Some think insects arent conscious, others think they are. I remember reading that a few hundred years ago people generally thought that animals were nothing more than clocklike mechanisms.

Ok so you're saying that the word 'conscious' is ambiguous, ill-defined. I think I basically agree with you. So the answer to the OPs questions are that the word consciousness has no particular meaning. Is matter conscious? What does conscious mean? Maybe it doesn't refer to anything. Just a bunch of letters. Might as well ask, is matter qouisdflkjsd?

 

[ThomasT]

Yes, based on their behavior alone!

edit: alone is perhaps too strong, since we also infer from our own internal behavior.

Ok, so why would most philosophers be opposed to a behavioral defintion of consciousness?

 

[Pythagorean]

I specified my choice of words was wrong, but to answer your question (or not) I don't know what their motivation is.

Maybe just because it's an argument that supports their conclusion?

Why don't you ask pftest or Jimmy Snyder?

 

[pftest]

Ok so you're saying that the word 'conscious' is ambiguous, ill-defined. I think I basically agree with you. So the answer to the OPs questions are that the word consciousness has no particular meaning. Is matter conscious? What does conscious mean? Maybe it doesn't refer to anything. Just a bunch of letters. Might as well ask, is matter qouisdflkjsd?

Ive defined it in this post: https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3006049&postcount=117

But earlier you said you didnt find evidence of consciousness in hubcaps, so this means you know what consciousness looks like. So I asked you what it looks like, what you accept as evidence of consciousness.

I think i know the answer to that however ("consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour"), and if I am right, then it was a case of circular reasoning:

- first assume that consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour
- then conclude we don't find consciousness in non-humanlike behaviour

Or in short: we don't find humanlike behaviour in non-humanlike behaviour.

 

[pftest]

Ok, so why would most philosophers be opposed to a behavioral defintion of consciousness?

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem i have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness. If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons. If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others. This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation. So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

 

[DaveC426913]

A few rules we're going to have to hammer out:

1] We can't move the goalposts willy nilly. Even if we don't know what causes consciousness, we have to come to an agreement on what we mean by the word.

2] We must have a definition that can be tested.

 

[Q_Goest]

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem [philosophers in general] have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness. If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons. If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others. This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation. So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

Kudos to pftest. Totally agree with all this.

Just a minor observation in general. Many people here are defining "consciousness" as a state of self awareness. That's not what is generally being referred to in cognitive science. When consciousness is talked about, the term is generally referring to phenomenal consciousness, which constitutes a large number of different phenomena including qualia, experience, the 'feelings' we have, the sense of self awareness, etc... these are all phenomena that are subsets of consciousness in general. So when things such as bugs or microscopic organisms are talked about as having "consiousness" that doesn't necessarily pick out the phenomena of self awareness. It can also pick out any of those other phenomenal experiences such as the experience of qualia, feelings, etc... From that perspective, such things as house flys can be assumed to have conscious experiences. It might be debatable whether or not a single cell organism or a plant for example, is experiencing anything, although it's been suggested that even bacteria seem to behave (in certain circumstances) as if they were experiencing something.

 

[DaveC426913]

I'd like to start with some known examples, so I can understand what the rest of you are thinking. We'll make a differntial diagnosis later.
A human is conscious; we all agree.
Does a cat have consciousness?
Does a lizard have any consciousness?
Does an earthworm have any consciousness? (even if very dim)

 

[Q_Goest]

We must have a definition that can be tested.

The only 'test' I'm aware of is the Turing test, which really isn't a test for consciousness at all.

I'd like to start with some known examples, so I can understand what the rest of you are thinking. We'll make a differntial diagnosis later.
A human is conscious; we all agree.
Does a cat have consciousness?
Does a lizard have any consciousness?
Does an earthworm have any consciousness? (even if very dim)

Does an earthworm feel pain? (pain is an aspect of conscious experience)

 

[DaveC426913]

The only 'test' I'm aware of is the Turing test, which really isn't a test for consciousness at all.

I wasn't suggesting a definitive test. But the definition comes first...

Does an earthworm feel pain? (pain is an aspect of conscious experience)

An earthworm will enthusiastically recoil from a prick. Is that pain?

 

[Q_Goest]

I wasn't suggesting a definitive test. But the definition comes first...

The definition is generally understood (in philosophy, not perhaps in this forum <zing>) as meaning phenomenal consciousness which includes pain for example.

An earthworm will enthusiastically recoil from a prick. Is that pain?

I think a worm is similar enough to humans, given evolution, to believe that they have similar phenomenal experiences to us. They have a genome that is based on the same genome as ours (like all life on this planet) and they have neurons that serve the same purpose as ours do. So I think it follows that worms feel pain.

 

[Evo]

Wait a minute. Are you saying that, ignoring all we know so far, since we have not actually explicitly tested atoms for consciousness, we can't know?

Does that likewise mean that, since we have not actually tested the molecules of Mercury, we cannot say that they are the same atoms we've put in our periodic table?

No, I'm saying you guys completely missed his point. Which has been explained at least a dozen times. Go back and read. And don't try to put words in my mouth, that's lame.

 

[DaveC426913]

No, I'm saying you guys completely missed his point. Which has been explained at least a dozen times. Go back and read. And don't try to put words in my mouth, that's lame.

I'm trying to understand what you're saying. No need to be condescending about it.

Clearly I/we aren't reading the same thing into Jimmy's comment(s) that you are. If I/we apparently missed it the first 12 times, despite it being obvious to you, why do you think you pointing it out will make the 13th time count?

 

[Pythagorean]

Kudos to pftest. Totally agree with all this.

Just a minor observation in general. Many people here are defining "consciousness" as a state of self awareness. That's not what is generally being referred to in cognitive science. When consciousness is talked about, the term is generally referring to phenomenal consciousness, which constitutes a large number of different phenomena including qualia, experience, the 'feelings' we have, the sense of self awareness, etc... these are all phenomena that are subsets of consciousness in general. So when things such as bugs or microscopic organisms are talked about as having "consiousness" that doesn't necessarily pick out the phenomena of self awareness. It can also pick out any of those other phenomenal experiences such as the experience of qualia, feelings, etc... From that perspective, such things as house flys can be assumed to have conscious experiences. It might be debatable whether or not a single cell organism or a plant for example, is experiencing anything, although it's been suggested that even bacteria seem to behave (in certain circumstances) as if they were experiencing something.

From a scientific perspective (which is also a philosophical perspective) it's pointless to study things that you have no access too, so consciousness is defined behaviorally for the sake of progress. And there's generally no difference between consciousness and awareness behaviorally either. So using "awareness" you get rid of a lot of the connotations people attach to "consciousness". It's really very convenient for conversation (except for that some people won't accept that their connotative image of consciousness is flawed).

There's some interesting investigations into the cognitive potential of single-celled organisms:
http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/6/34/463.full

 

[Evo]

Clearly I/we aren't reading the same thing into Jimmy's comment(s) that you are. If I/we apparently missed it the first 12 times, despite it being obvious to you, why do you think you pointing it out will make the 13th time count?

Because hope springs eternal.

 

[Q_Goest]

From a scientific perspective (which is also a philosophical perspective) it's pointless to study things that you have no access too, so consciousness is defined behaviorally for the sake of progress. And there's generally no difference between consciousness and awareness behaviorally either.

Access consciousness (A-consciousness) is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we perceive, information about what we perceive is often access conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past (e.g., something that we learned) is often access conscious, and so on. Chalmers thinks that access consciousness is less mysterious than phenomenal consciousness, so that it is held to pose one of the easy problems of consciousness. Daniel Dennett denies that there is a "hard problem", asserting that the totality of consciousness can be understood in terms of impact on behavior, as studied through heterophenomenology. There have been numerous approaches to the processes that act on conscious experience from instant to instant. Dennett suggests that what people think of as phenomenal consciousness, such as qualia, are judgments and consequent behavior.[22] He extends this analysis by arguing that phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of access consciousness, denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem."[22] Chalmers, on the other hand, argues that Dennett's explanatory processes merely address aspects of the easy problem. Eccles and others have pointed out the difficulty of explaining the evolution of qualia, or of 'minds', which experience them, given that all the processes governing evolution are physical and so have no direct access to them. There is no guarantee that all people have minds, nor any way to verify whether one does or does not possesses one.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

I tend to agree with Chalmers on this one.

 

[Pythagorean]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

I tend to agree with Chalmers on this one.

I agree with Chalmers too (on this particular point) but my point is that we have no access to it (we can't test it) so we can't productively talk about it. You might as well talk about sniffelgarfes on purshagok.

What we can do... is infer that (using you and Dave's discussion) a worm recoiling must be having a similar experience to us when we feel pain. We also infer that two people with fully functioning retina and visual processing experience a very similar quality from red. More similar than one person's difference between red and blue.

These assumptions can be shown to hold loosely, since advertisers, children's books, etc, utilize color schemes for marketing. But it's ultimately behavior that we test these assumption through. There's no other way!

By the way, when I say behavior... the behavior of neurons counts too. You may be feeling something that you're not expressing. The assumption is that we can see what you're feeling on an fMRI (or something more sophisticated) if we've had 1000 people feel the same thing and measured the transients and they're comparable to your transients.