Is Matter Conscious? - Can All Matter Be Conscious?

[Pythagorean]

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

You can say the same thing about physics. Who's to say there isn't invisible gremlins grabbing masses and pulling them towards other masses every time we measure the force of gravity?

It's a useless proposition, despite me not being able to prove it, because we have no access to the invisible gremlins or how they work. We don't know how masses attract each other, we just know they do. It helps explains why other things occur, though (specifically, all the rules that were developed in astronomy prior to Newton generalizing to the law of gravity.

I don't see this as a very different kind of generalization. Evolution (as I mentioned previously) is yet another generalization that compiles a lot of individual empirical facts into a theory.

Then how would most philosophers define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?

My guess is that we're not going to have a deep understanding of the emergence of life and consciousness unless a fundamental wave dynamic(s) is incorporated into physics as a first principle(s). (Even then, it might be impossible to simulate the emergence of relatively simple particulate phenomena.) In this view, life and consciousness (like baseballs, proteins, atoms, etc.) are nothing more than artifacts of countless iterations of a fundamental wave dynamic(s).

I generally agree with your post. But to the question you ask "how would most philosopher define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?" my answer is that most philosophers don't see consciousness as a behavioral thing. We all generally have an emotional attachment to our consciousness from the very beginning of our conscious life. I was born a dualist, it's only through long-term exposure to the scientific method and neuroscience that I became a physicalist. It wouldn't have been very easy to convince me otherwise at the time.

Ok let me ask you: if 2 atoms 1mm apart move 2mm apart, is this emergence?

it depends... do they interact? If they do, then yes. What emerges is force. Gravitational force does not exist without two masses. You can't talk about it with one mass.

If they don't interact, then no, superposition holds; if they're the same kind of particle, the dynamics of the whole system can be described with just one of them.

 

[ThomasT]

I generally agree with your post. But to the question you ask "how would most philosopher define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?" my answer is that most philosophers don't see consciousness as a behavioral thing.

Well, if consciousness isn't a behavioral thing, then what is it? How/what do you think most philosophers think about consciousness?

We all generally have an emotional attachment to our consciousness from the very beginning of our conscious life.

Of course, but this isn't at all what we're talking about. We're talking about the general meaning of consciousness, and, wrt the OP, whether matter is conscious. The answer is that some matter is consious. That is, consciousness is evident wrt certain scales of material behavior.

 

[Pythagorean]

Well, if consciousness isn't a behavioral thing, then what is it? How/what do you think most philosophers think about consciousness?

I shouldn't say most philosophers. I mean most philosophy-based arguments against physicalism that I encounter on the philosophy forum here.

They generally refer to the non-behavioral aspects such as the subjective experiences we perceive (i.e. qualia).

 

[ThomasT]

That qualifies as evidence in my books.

And yes it is. Thanks Dave. The object or goal was to count instances of conscious behavior (much like photomultipliers count instances of photonic behavior). To date, wrt thousands of individual experiments with my hubcaps and my tennis racquets, I've counted exactly zero (0) instances of conscious behavior.

 

[pftest]

You can say the same thing about physics. Who's to say there isn't invisible gremlins grabbing masses and pulling them towards other masses every time we measure the force of gravity?

It's a useless proposition, despite me not being able to prove it, because we have no access to the invisible gremlins or how they work. We don't know how masses attract each other, we just know they do. It helps explains why other things occur, though (specifically, all the rules that were developed in astronomy prior to Newton generalizing to the law of gravity.

I don't see this as a very different kind of generalization. Evolution (as I mentioned previously) is yet another generalization that compiles a lot of individual empirical facts into a theory.

Yes i agree we can say the same about physics, because physics doesn't tell us whether the objects it describes are conscious or not. There is no need to talk about invisible gremlins, because we have a perfectly natural invisible consciousness that is present in our bodies in conjunction with the laws of physics. Physics has nothing to do with materialism (the idea that consciousness requires brainlike complexity) and offers no support for it. It describes how matter behaves but leaves open whether it is conscious.

I have no problem with having a theory based on lots of individual empirical facts, but we have no empirical facts of unconscious matter. When we get down to it, the only empirical fact we have is that of conscious matter, ourselves. Regardless of how used everyone is to the idea of it, nonconscious matter is the postulation of a new type of matter. It is not extrapolated from a known phenomenon, whereas conscious matter is.

it depends... do they interact? If they do, then yes. What emerges is force. Gravitational force does not exist without two masses. You can't talk about it with one mass.

If they don't interact, then no, superposition holds; if they're the same kind of particle, the dynamics of the whole system can be described with just one of them.

When was there a situation with only 1 mass in the entire universe, and no forces and interaction?

To me it seems like there is only a quantitative difference between 2 atoms 1mm apart and 2 atoms 2mm apart.

 

[ThomasT]

I shouldn't say most philosophers. I mean most philosophy-based arguments against physicalism that I encounter on the philosophy forum here.

They generally refer to the non-behavioral aspects such as the subjective experiences we perceive (i.e. qualia).

But you haven't answered my question. If consciousness isn't based on behavior, than how can we ascertain if some object is conscious or not?

 

[pftest]

And yes it is. Thanks Dave. The object or goal was to count instances of conscious behavior (much like photomultipliers count instances of photonic behavior). To date, wrt thousands of individual experiments with my hubcaps and my tennis racquets, I've counted exactly zero (0) instances of conscious behavior.

What do you accept as an instance of conscious behavior?

 

[Pythagorean]

But you haven't answered my question. If consciousness isn't based on behavior, than how can we ascertain if some object is conscious or not?

You can't!

That's why saying it's not based on behavior is an argument tactic from dualist arguments, which was my point.

 

[Pythagorean]

To me it seems like there is only a quantitative difference between 2 atoms 1mm apart and 2 atoms 2mm apart.

Ah, well your problem is that you're assuming point particles, spherical cows, or far-field effects, which are only very simple special cases.

 

[ThomasT]

What do you accept as an instance of conscious behavior?

Ok, this can get a bit complicated. Let me ask you these questions. Do you think that your friends are conscious? At least when you're interacting with them. If you have pets, are they sometimes conscious? Do you think that your front door is conscious? Is your microwave oven, or your refrigerator conscious?

 

[ThomasT]

You can't!

But we evaluate and determine whether or not things are conscious all the time in the course of our ordinary navigations through our world.

That's why saying it's not based on behavior is an argument tactic from dualist arguments, which was my point.

I don't understand this.

 

[pftest]

Ok, this can get a bit complicated. Let me ask you these questions. Do you think that your friends are conscious? At least when you're interacting with them. If you have pets, are they sometimes conscious? Do you think that your front door is conscious? Is your microwave oven, or your refrigerator conscious?

I have an intuition about which things are and arent conscious yes. But of course this intuition can be flawed. Some people think fish can't feel pain, others think they can. Some think insects arent conscious, others think they are. I remember reading that a few hundred years ago people generally thought that animals were nothing more than clocklike mechanisms.

 

[Pythagorean]

But we evaluate and determine whether or not things are conscious all the time in the course of our ordinary navigations through our world.

Yes, based on their behavior alone!

edit: alone is perhaps too strong, since we also infer from our own internal behavior.

I don't understand this.

Conveniently enough, pftest just utilized it:

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

 

[ThomasT]

I have an intuition about which things are and arent conscious yes. But of course this intuition can be flawed. Some people think fish can't feel pain, others think they can. Some think insects arent conscious, others think they are. I remember reading that a few hundred years ago people generally thought that animals were nothing more than clocklike mechanisms.

Ok so you're saying that the word 'conscious' is ambiguous, ill-defined. I think I basically agree with you. So the answer to the OPs questions are that the word consciousness has no particular meaning. Is matter conscious? What does conscious mean? Maybe it doesn't refer to anything. Just a bunch of letters. Might as well ask, is matter qouisdflkjsd?

 

[ThomasT]

Yes, based on their behavior alone!

edit: alone is perhaps too strong, since we also infer from our own internal behavior.

Ok, so why would most philosophers be opposed to a behavioral defintion of consciousness?

 

[Pythagorean]

I specified my choice of words was wrong, but to answer your question (or not) I don't know what their motivation is.

Maybe just because it's an argument that supports their conclusion?

Why don't you ask pftest or Jimmy Snyder?

 

[pftest]

Ok so you're saying that the word 'conscious' is ambiguous, ill-defined. I think I basically agree with you. So the answer to the OPs questions are that the word consciousness has no particular meaning. Is matter conscious? What does conscious mean? Maybe it doesn't refer to anything. Just a bunch of letters. Might as well ask, is matter qouisdflkjsd?

Ive defined it in this post: https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3006049&postcount=117

But earlier you said you didnt find evidence of consciousness in hubcaps, so this means you know what consciousness looks like. So I asked you what it looks like, what you accept as evidence of consciousness.

I think i know the answer to that however ("consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour"), and if I am right, then it was a case of circular reasoning:

- first assume that consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour
- then conclude we don't find consciousness in non-humanlike behaviour

Or in short: we don't find humanlike behaviour in non-humanlike behaviour.

 

[pftest]

Ok, so why would most philosophers be opposed to a behavioral defintion of consciousness?

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem i have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness. If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons. If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others. This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation. So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

 

[DaveC426913]

A few rules we're going to have to hammer out:

1] We can't move the goalposts willy nilly. Even if we don't know what causes consciousness, we have to come to an agreement on what we mean by the word.

2] We must have a definition that can be tested.

 

[Q_Goest]

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem [philosophers in general] have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness. If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons. If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others. This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation. So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

Kudos to pftest. Totally agree with all this.

Just a minor observation in general. Many people here are defining "consciousness" as a state of self awareness. That's not what is generally being referred to in cognitive science. When consciousness is talked about, the term is generally referring to phenomenal consciousness, which constitutes a large number of different phenomena including qualia, experience, the 'feelings' we have, the sense of self awareness, etc... these are all phenomena that are subsets of consciousness in general. So when things such as bugs or microscopic organisms are talked about as having "consiousness" that doesn't necessarily pick out the phenomena of self awareness. It can also pick out any of those other phenomenal experiences such as the experience of qualia, feelings, etc... From that perspective, such things as house flys can be assumed to have conscious experiences. It might be debatable whether or not a single cell organism or a plant for example, is experiencing anything, although it's been suggested that even bacteria seem to behave (in certain circumstances) as if they were experiencing something.

 

[DaveC426913]

I'd like to start with some known examples, so I can understand what the rest of you are thinking. We'll make a differntial diagnosis later.
A human is conscious; we all agree.
Does a cat have consciousness?
Does a lizard have any consciousness?
Does an earthworm have any consciousness? (even if very dim)

 

[Q_Goest]

We must have a definition that can be tested.

The only 'test' I'm aware of is the Turing test, which really isn't a test for consciousness at all.

I'd like to start with some known examples, so I can understand what the rest of you are thinking. We'll make a differntial diagnosis later.
A human is conscious; we all agree.
Does a cat have consciousness?
Does a lizard have any consciousness?
Does an earthworm have any consciousness? (even if very dim)

Does an earthworm feel pain? (pain is an aspect of conscious experience)

 

[DaveC426913]

The only 'test' I'm aware of is the Turing test, which really isn't a test for consciousness at all.

I wasn't suggesting a definitive test. But the definition comes first...

Does an earthworm feel pain? (pain is an aspect of conscious experience)

An earthworm will enthusiastically recoil from a prick. Is that pain?

 

[Q_Goest]

I wasn't suggesting a definitive test. But the definition comes first...

The definition is generally understood (in philosophy, not perhaps in this forum <zing>) as meaning phenomenal consciousness which includes pain for example.

An earthworm will enthusiastically recoil from a prick. Is that pain?

I think a worm is similar enough to humans, given evolution, to believe that they have similar phenomenal experiences to us. They have a genome that is based on the same genome as ours (like all life on this planet) and they have neurons that serve the same purpose as ours do. So I think it follows that worms feel pain.

 

[Evo]

Wait a minute. Are you saying that, ignoring all we know so far, since we have not actually explicitly tested atoms for consciousness, we can't know?

Does that likewise mean that, since we have not actually tested the molecules of Mercury, we cannot say that they are the same atoms we've put in our periodic table?

No, I'm saying you guys completely missed his point. Which has been explained at least a dozen times. Go back and read. And don't try to put words in my mouth, that's lame.

 

[DaveC426913]

No, I'm saying you guys completely missed his point. Which has been explained at least a dozen times. Go back and read. And don't try to put words in my mouth, that's lame.

I'm trying to understand what you're saying. No need to be condescending about it.

Clearly I/we aren't reading the same thing into Jimmy's comment(s) that you are. If I/we apparently missed it the first 12 times, despite it being obvious to you, why do you think you pointing it out will make the 13th time count?

 

[Pythagorean]

Kudos to pftest. Totally agree with all this.

Just a minor observation in general. Many people here are defining "consciousness" as a state of self awareness. That's not what is generally being referred to in cognitive science. When consciousness is talked about, the term is generally referring to phenomenal consciousness, which constitutes a large number of different phenomena including qualia, experience, the 'feelings' we have, the sense of self awareness, etc... these are all phenomena that are subsets of consciousness in general. So when things such as bugs or microscopic organisms are talked about as having "consiousness" that doesn't necessarily pick out the phenomena of self awareness. It can also pick out any of those other phenomenal experiences such as the experience of qualia, feelings, etc... From that perspective, such things as house flys can be assumed to have conscious experiences. It might be debatable whether or not a single cell organism or a plant for example, is experiencing anything, although it's been suggested that even bacteria seem to behave (in certain circumstances) as if they were experiencing something.

From a scientific perspective (which is also a philosophical perspective) it's pointless to study things that you have no access too, so consciousness is defined behaviorally for the sake of progress. And there's generally no difference between consciousness and awareness behaviorally either. So using "awareness" you get rid of a lot of the connotations people attach to "consciousness". It's really very convenient for conversation (except for that some people won't accept that their connotative image of consciousness is flawed).

There's some interesting investigations into the cognitive potential of single-celled organisms:
http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/6/34/463.full

 

[Evo]

Clearly I/we aren't reading the same thing into Jimmy's comment(s) that you are. If I/we apparently missed it the first 12 times, despite it being obvious to you, why do you think you pointing it out will make the 13th time count?

Because hope springs eternal.

 

[Q_Goest]

From a scientific perspective (which is also a philosophical perspective) it's pointless to study things that you have no access too, so consciousness is defined behaviorally for the sake of progress. And there's generally no difference between consciousness and awareness behaviorally either.

Access consciousness (A-consciousness) is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we perceive, information about what we perceive is often access conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past (e.g., something that we learned) is often access conscious, and so on. Chalmers thinks that access consciousness is less mysterious than phenomenal consciousness, so that it is held to pose one of the easy problems of consciousness. Daniel Dennett denies that there is a "hard problem", asserting that the totality of consciousness can be understood in terms of impact on behavior, as studied through heterophenomenology. There have been numerous approaches to the processes that act on conscious experience from instant to instant. Dennett suggests that what people think of as phenomenal consciousness, such as qualia, are judgments and consequent behavior.[22] He extends this analysis by arguing that phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of access consciousness, denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem."[22] Chalmers, on the other hand, argues that Dennett's explanatory processes merely address aspects of the easy problem. Eccles and others have pointed out the difficulty of explaining the evolution of qualia, or of 'minds', which experience them, given that all the processes governing evolution are physical and so have no direct access to them. There is no guarantee that all people have minds, nor any way to verify whether one does or does not possesses one.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

I tend to agree with Chalmers on this one.

 

[Pythagorean]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness

I tend to agree with Chalmers on this one.

I agree with Chalmers too (on this particular point) but my point is that we have no access to it (we can't test it) so we can't productively talk about it. You might as well talk about sniffelgarfes on purshagok.

What we can do... is infer that (using you and Dave's discussion) a worm recoiling must be having a similar experience to us when we feel pain. We also infer that two people with fully functioning retina and visual processing experience a very similar quality from red. More similar than one person's difference between red and blue.

These assumptions can be shown to hold loosely, since advertisers, children's books, etc, utilize color schemes for marketing. But it's ultimately behavior that we test these assumption through. There's no other way!

By the way, when I say behavior... the behavior of neurons counts too. You may be feeling something that you're not expressing. The assumption is that we can see what you're feeling on an fMRI (or something more sophisticated) if we've had 1000 people feel the same thing and measured the transients and they're comparable to your transients.

 

[Q_Goest]

I agree with Chalmers too (on this particular point) but my point is that we have no access to it (we can't test it) so we can't productively talk about it.

Please see Dennett, http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm" ", then figure out which aspect of qualia you side with.

 

[Pythagorean]

Please see Dennett, http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm" ", then figure out which aspect of qualia you side with.

I don't have a side, I try not to "put my party before my country" (i.e. I try not to pick sides and prefer to just look at each argument).

As I've stated before, I believe qualia do exist. I agree with Dennet that people have connotation attached to qualia, just like they do with consciousness, which makes discussion of the subject difficult. But they're not completely inaccessible:

For instance, my first sip of breakfast orange juice tastes much sweeter than my second sip if I interpose a bit of pancakes and maple syrup

This can be completely explained by desensitization of the dopamine response in a neuroscience context. Sensations are less intense the more you're exposed to them and there's physical actions in the neuron coupling that account for this.I disagree with this...

The mistake is not in supposing that we can in practice ever or always perform this act of purification with certainty, but the more fundamental mistake of supposing that there is such a residual property to take seriously, however uncertain our actual attempts at isolation of instances might be.

based on my comments in last paragraph.

If the use of "intensity" is not satisfactory, because it indicates quantitative instead of qualitative, I posted much evidence (published papers) of how neural transients represent different qualitative states in the other thread that you and I participated in recently.

(1) ineffable

(2) intrinsic

(3) private

(4) directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness

Once again, as in the orange juice example above, qualia aren't completely ineffable.

If we can do something like in Strange Days (transfer experiences via technology) through neural sitmulation, then they're not intrinsic either.

If you're hooked up to a sophisticated version of an fMRI, they aren't private.

I'm not sure what 4) means, but I wouldn't say immediately. We live in the future, integrating information from the past. Our qualia are a combination of the direct neural stimulus and our expectations (that come from a long history of neural stimuli).I don't really want to read the rest of this anymore; I think Dennet should study more neuroscience to ground his physicalist arguments. You and I have already had the discussion about "switching cables".

Is there any particular intuition pump you're interested in, because at this point I feel like I'm wading through a bunch of mental masturbation.

 

[Q_Goest]

From a scientific perspective (which is also a philosophical perspective) it's pointless to study things that you have no access too, so consciousness is defined behaviorally for the sake of progress. And there's generally no difference between consciousness and awareness behaviorally either.

I take this to mean that it’s pointless to study things (qualia or any phenomenal experience) that science does not have access to, so phenomenal consciousness should be defined (or studied) from the behavioral perspective “for the sake of progress”. Further, there no difference between phenomenal conscoiusness and behavior. If that’s not what you mean, please rephrase.

This can be completely explained by desensitization of the dopamine response in a neuroscience context. Sensations are less intense the more you're exposed to them and there's physical actions in the neuron coupling that account for this.

Dennett would agree that behavior, and thus "sensations" (ie: qualia), can be completely explained in physical terms just as you’ve suggested. Chalmers on the other hand, would point out that although you’ve provided a description of the physical interactions, and thus the behavior, you’ve not even begun to touch on an explanation of the experience. This is the whole "easy" versus "hard" part of consciousness that Chalmers talks about. You've explained the easy part by describing the physical interactions but you've not even touched on the hard part.

Once again, as in the orange juice example above, qualia aren't completely ineffable.

Ineffable: incapable of being expressed or described in words;inexpressible: ineffable joy.

I think you’ve misunderstood the point of qualia being ineffable. I can’t think of a single person or publication that would contest that qualia are effable, so either you’ve misunderstood what it means or your ideas regarding qualia being effable are well outside the mainstream.

Overall, your perspective is closer to that of Dennett’s than of Chalmers. In his paper “Quinning Qualia” Dennett argues that qualia, though they may seem to be something that needs an explanation, is suggesting that the physical interactions of neurons, and the subsequent behavior is all that needs to be explained, similar to what you’ve suggested here:

By the way, when I say behavior... the behavior of neurons counts too. You may be feeling something that you're not expressing. The assumption is that we can see what you're feeling on an fMRI (or something more sophisticated) if we've had 1000 people feel the same thing and measured the transients and they're comparable to your transients.

If I’ve misunderstood your opinions, feel free to clarify. However, the reason I’m sticking my $.02 in here is more to help shed some light on what the literature has to offer as it seems most people aren’t aware of what’s being said and the various philosophical arguments that have been made.

 

[ThomasT]

I use a theoretically neutral definition of consciousness:

Consciousness = having experiences

Examples of experiences are those that all of us are familiar with: seeing, hearing, smelling, etc.

This is an adequate enough definition for all of us to understand what we are talking about.

Insofar as the word consciousness doesn't refer to objects in the world at large and their behavior, then it doesn't refer to anything that can be scientifically studied. Come to think of it, that makes for a certain job security for the philosophers who talk about consciousness as something that things have or experience rather than something that things do.

We must be very careful in defining consciousness in terms of what it looks like, since this is essentially the same as assuming a conclusion, by deciding up front which things are and are not conscious.

That's the point of defining terms. Reasoning isn't necessarily involved. We're just saying what a certain term refers to. You're defining it as "looking like" your subjective experience. I'm defining it as "looking like" certain behaviors.

If we agree that it looks like human brain activity, then of course things without it won't be conscious. If we agree that it looks like electrons, then of course everything with electrons is conscious.

That's right.

But earlier you said you didn't find evidence of consciousness in hubcaps, so this means you know what consciousness looks like. So I asked you what it looks like, what you accept as evidence of consciousness.

I think i know the answer to that however ("consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour"), and if I am right, then it was a case of circular reasoning:

- first assume that consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour
- then conclude we don't find consciousness in non-humanlike behaviour

Or in short: we don't find humanlike behaviour in non-humanlike behaviour.

Defining a term isn't making an argument. It's simply saying what that term will refer to when you use it. When you use the word consciousness it refers to your subjective experience. I'm fine with that. I'm using it to refer to behavior that's unique to living organisms. So we can refer to all nonliving things as nonconscious. We can extend the set of referents for the term consciousness to include any and all living organisms. Within that set we can differentiate human, fish, worm, protazoan, etc. conscious behavior, developing a hierarchy of conscious behavior.

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem i have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness.

Yes of course. And we're essentially asking what's the origin of life. By definition, it emerges at a certain level of complex wave interaction in particulate media. Exactly what that is and how it happens are open questions.

If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons.

Yes, if we defined it that way. But we don't.

If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

Yes of course. That's why we define terms. So we know what they refer to. Some terms just refer to other terms or operations thereon. Some terms refer to objects available for public scrutiny and behaviors thereof. Consciousness, in your lexicon, refers to subjective experience. And I agree with you that using that definition we have no way of ascertaining whether anything is conscious or not, except ourselves.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others.

Not if we define it as you suggest. But the de facto meaning of the term is behavioral. Any scientific definition of it has to be also.

This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation.

I disagree. Ultimately everything is "rooted in observation".

So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

Not if we define it nonbehaviorally, no.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I got cut shaving with a fresh steel blade. I told that shaver, in no uncertain terms, that if it cut me again, it was done for. I finished shaving and it did not cut me again. It must have understood me and changed its behavior; evidence that the shaver must be conscious?

It's just a cheap Bic however, so it's too stupid to realize that it's done for anyway, after a few shaves.

 

[Pythagorean]

I take this to mean that it’s pointless to study things (qualia or any phenomenal experience) that science does not have access to, so phenomenal consciousness should be defined (or studied) from the behavioral perspective “for the sake of progress”. Further, there no difference between phenomenal conscoiusness and behavior. If that’s not what you mean, please rephrase.


Dennett would agree that behavior, and thus "sensations" (ie: qualia), can be completely explained in physical terms just as you’ve suggested. Chalmers on the other hand, would point out that although you’ve provided a description of the physical interactions, and thus the behavior, you’ve not even begun to touch on an explanation of the experience. This is the whole "easy" versus "hard" part of consciousness that Chalmers talks about. You've explained the easy part by describing the physical interactions but you've not even touched on the hard part.


Ineffable: incapable of being expressed or described in words;inexpressible: ineffable joy.

I think you’ve misunderstood the point of qualia being ineffable. I can’t think of a single person or publication that would contest that qualia are effable, so either you’ve misunderstood what it means or your ideas regarding qualia being effable are well outside the mainstream.

Overall, your perspective is closer to that of Dennett’s than of Chalmers. In his paper “Quinning Qualia” Dennett argues that qualia, though they may seem to be something that needs an explanation, is suggesting that the physical interactions of neurons, and the subsequent behavior is all that needs to be explained, similar to what you’ve suggested here:


If I’ve misunderstood your opinions, feel free to clarify. However, the reason I’m sticking my $.02 in here is more to help shed some light on what the literature has to offer as it seems most people aren’t aware of what’s being said and the various philosophical arguments that have been made.

Q_Goest, I typed up a large response and it got wiped out in the log-in process... I don't know how many times that's happened to me. I will make another attempt it at it later, that was rather discouraging.

 

[DaveC426913]

Q_Goest, I typed up a large response and it got wiped out in the log-in process... I don't know how many times that's happened to me. I will make another attempt it at it later, that was rather discouraging.

Gawd I hate that. Regularly Ctrl-C'ing has become as automatic as blinking for me.

 

[Maui]

I prefer we focus on a single simple example of emergence.

Reduce consciousness to its constituents. What is it made of?

The emergence of space and time (if they emerged) arent good examples since they would not counter the idea that consciousness traces back to at least the big bang (a muddy and poorly understood phenomenon), and that no emergence has been happening in nature ever since. So let's focus on non-linear behaviour. Id like to understand what it is that emerges there.

A universe.

The "particle" picture of atoms is only a very crude(classical) approximation, well okay i'll say it - it is wrong, but for some reason(why?) it works up to a point and allows for a visialization that is only half-true.


The unification of physics is headed towards a supersymmetric unified field picture and the so called "particles"(particles don't exist) are excitations of the field. In this picture, you are an excitation of the field, everything is. The math says so, experiments confirm it, so in short, the coffin is ready for your pre-conceived notions of the world.

As for the illusory appearance of particles, that is not to do with any physical kind of emergence, since it is merely about how they appear to a conscious observer.

But they appear "physical" and we label them so, but "physical", if we get to he bottom of it, is an ambiguous term.
"Physical" is that which is observed. What's really there is a totally separate issue.

You said that there is no evidence for consciousness in rocks. That means you are looking for a particular type of evidence and you did not find it. Thats why i asked what it is that you accept as evidence of consciousness?

The scientific rigor calls for observational and empirical evidence. Since for 200 000 years we've not been able to find any, we can dismiss this proposition as very highly unlikely. Philosophically though, without applying the scientific rigor, anything could be conscious.

 

[Maui]

Because hope springs eternal.

I got the solid impression that Jimmy Snyder was saying that we were jumping to conclusions?

And critically speaking, when was the last time that we didn't, even if you were to consider all of science? When was the last time that our theories were based on COMPLETE information? Whose thoughts and decisions were ever based on complete information in our history? We always make progress by making conclusions based on INcomplete information, then we test them and we keep the conclusions for as long as they hold. Rocks are not conscious(conscious in the same way as we are) is a conclusion that has held for tens of thousands of years.

 

[brainstorm]

What we can do... is infer that (using you and Dave's discussion) a worm recoiling must be having a similar experience to us when we feel pain. We also infer that two people with fully functioning retina and visual processing experience a very similar quality from red. More similar than one person's difference between red and blue.

A worm recoiling could be experiencing the same thing as a boxer who gets punched in the heat of a fight or the same thing as a child confronted by a hissing crocodile. It could also just experience impulses the way a muscle in your body does, by reacting with contraction.

My interest is in whether brain/nerve tissue could act as a transmitter/receiver of informational signals and thereby transmit/receive thoughts and consciousness to and from other bodies and/or media. My basic assumption is that esp and consciousness transfer is impossible, but it would really depend on exactly what causes consciousness, wouldn't it?

If consciousness was simply an electronic pattern that could transfer between various media, would it have compatibility issues like software and operating systems on various kinds of computer hardware? Could it just be something as general as electromagnetism is conscious of whatever kinds of signals reach it from elsewhere and depending on the system in which the electromagnetism is present, it experiences different signals and has different avenues of expression open to it?

How would you measure consciousness in some medium that cannot express thought or action? If you operationalize "conscious" by comparing various signals to those measured in living humans that aren't brain-dead, then wouldn't you consistently mistake dead things as being unconscious even if they were somehow conscious? Isn't consciousness just a completely subjective research object?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Philosophically though, without applying the scientific rigor, anything could be conscious.

So, philosophically speaking, my previous post, quoted below and intended to be absurd, is not absurd (philosophically speaking of course). The honored tradition of philosophy must be rolling in its grave.

I got cut shaving with a fresh steel blade. I told that shaver, in no uncertain terms, that if it cut me again, it was done for. I finished shaving and it did not cut me again. It must have understood me and changed its behavior; evidence that the shaver must be conscious?

 

[Maui]

So, philosophically speaking, my previous post, quoted below and intended to be absurd, is not absurd (philosophically speaking of course). The honored tradition of philosophy must be rolling in its grave.

That philosophy is not part of my philosophy in any way. As with everything else, there's good and bad philosophy. There is good and bad science and it's Nature that decides where your science and philosophy stand. Science is evolving(it's in an evolution phase all the time), so at least theoretically, our knowledge might change at any time. IMO, there is at least 0.0000139% chance that rocks might be conscious (and this idea fairs better than the notion that the Sun is God, for which we also have no experimental evidence). I'd say that "the Sun is God" sounds like a stupid idea when compared with "rocks might be conscious".

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Science is evolving(it's in an evolution phase all the time), so at least theoretically, our knowledge might change at any time. IMO, there is at least 0.0000139% chance that rocks might be conscious (and fairs better than the notion that the Sun is God)

1.39*10^-5 probability? Where did you get that? I suppose that one might run a randomized trial where subjects shaved their faces daily with a standardized type shaver and fresh steel blades. One group would threaten their shavers with extinction the first time they got cut, and the comparison group would not. Suppose this trial showed that the group that threatened their shavers had significantly reduced frequency of additional cuts compared to those that did not threaten their shavers.

Would you conclude that the shavers must be conscious? If not, could you reach any other conclusion other than that results were spurious or that the trial was flawed in some way?

 

[Maui]

1.39*10^-5 probability? Where did you get that? I suppose that one might run a randomized trial where subjects shaved their faces daily with a standardized type shaver and fresh steel blades. One group would threaten their shavers with extinction the first time they got cut, and the comparison group would not. Suppose this trial showed that the group that threatened their shavers had significantly reduced frequency of additional cuts compared to those that did not threaten their shavers.

Would you conclude that the shavers must be conscious? If not, could you reach any other conclusion other than that results were spurious or that the trial was flawed in some way?

That's my secret why i never get cut - i shave under constant threats and curses on my part. It works.

But come on, "steel blades might be conscious" is better than "the Earth is flat" and somewhat more plausible(IMO). "The Earth is flat" is now too old and not even funny any more.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

But come on, "steel blades might be conscious" is better than "the Earth is flat" and somewhat more plausible(IMO). "The Earth is flat" is now too old and not even funny any more.

You didn't answer my question. If confronted with the results of my hypothetical trial and not allowed to conclude that the trial was flawed or that the result was spurious (a statistical anomaly), how would you explain the result?

 

[Maui]

You didn't answer my question. If confronted with the results of my hypothetical trial and not allowed to conclude that the trial was flawed or that the result was spurious (a statistical anomaly), how would you explain the result?

Instead of assuming that the blades were conscious, i would probably assume that God is making fun of me. Or that a demon has obssessed the blades. Why would I assume the blades are conscious?

In what way is the proposition "blades are conscious" better than "Batman has obssessed my blades"?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Instead of assuming that the blades were conscious, i would probably assume that God is making fun of me. Or that a demon has obssessed the blades. Why would I assume the blades are conscious?

Hmmm. Interesting answer. I would assume that threatening your shaver with extinction is a way to release nervous energy which might help in reducing the probability of additional cuts. (But funds for more study would be required from the funding agencies.)

 

[Maui]

Hmmm. Interesting answer. I would assume that threatening your shaver with extinction is a way to release nervous energy which might help in reducing the probability of additional cuts. (But funds for more study would be required from the funding agencies.)

I was assuming none of the subjects expressed behavioral differences before/after the threats(mild form of threatening), hence my answer.

 

[ThomasT]

Would you conclude that the shavers must be conscious?

No.

If not, could you reach any other conclusion other than that results were spurious or that the trial was flawed in some way?

Yes. And of course that was your point.

 

[Pythagorean]

I take this to mean that it’s pointless to study things (qualia or any phenomenal experience) that science does not have access to, so phenomenal consciousness should be defined (or studied) from the behavioral perspective “for the sake of progress”. Further, there no difference between phenomenal conscoiusness and behavior. If that’s not what you mean, please rephrase.

There is definitely a difference in phenomenological models vs. mechanistic models. Nuclear physics still uses phenomenological models "the liquid drop model". Light had a lot of phenomenological identities which lead to particle/wave duality (a false duality that comes out of human thinking, and is often a result of phenomenological models). Bohr had the "orbital model" of atoms (comparing them to planets). Thompson's "plum pudding" model of the atom.

The common theme in phenomenological models that you may notice is that new, strange phenomena are described in terms of familiar concepts. Such models are accepted as framework models and are productive at describing things with testable accuracy, but always carry an intrinsic disclaimer with them.

But if you are pedantic enough about it, you could even argue that mechanistic models are phenomenological themselves. We use plots in science to transcribe information about variables (like energy, frequency, current) directly into space (a plot with axes).

So to me, there is no dichotomy, here. Thing that are understood phenomenologically can become understood mechanistically (and vice versa).

Dennett would agree that behavior, and thus "sensations" (ie: qualia), can be completely explained in physical terms just as you’ve suggested. Chalmers on the other hand, would point out that although you’ve provided a description of the physical interactions, and thus the behavior, you’ve not even begun to touch on an explanation of the experience. This is the whole "easy" versus "hard" part of consciousness that Chalmers talks about. You've explained the easy part by describing the physical interactions but you've not even touched on the hard part.

Completely explained. Yes. But Chalmers seems to be asking for more than just explained. He wants to be able to... what... feel somebody's emotions based on a description of what their neurons are doing to be satisfied?

I'm not claiming that I can make you experience the qualia by just talking about neurons... that seems to be the implication. That would be strange for me to claim.

As I've said repeatedly, what I believe is that I can make you feel my qualia by making your neurons behave in a particular way.

Ineffable: incapable of being expressed or described in words;inexpressible: ineffable joy.

I think you’ve misunderstood the point of qualia being ineffable. I can’t think of a single person or publication that would contest that qualia are effable, so either you’ve misunderstood what it means or your ideas regarding qualia being effable are well outside the mainstream.

I don't think they're ineffable. I think they're difficult to describe in words, but they're obviously not ineffable because we can talk about them, we can assign neural behaviors to them and differentiate between different kinds of qualia.

But what I mean is that they're not intrinsically ineffable. Any ineffability comes from a lack of understanding on our part. Understanding will come (is coming...) and (for instance) we will find the fundamental unit of qualia and decompose particular qualia into such fundamental units, which we can mix and match to produce other qualia... or such.

Overall, your perspective is closer to that of Dennett’s than of Chalmers. In his paper “Quinning Qualia” Dennett argues that qualia, though they may seem to be something that needs an explanation, is suggesting that the physical interactions of neurons, and the subsequent behavior is all that needs to be explained, similar to what you’ve suggested here:

I don't know what that means. "all that needs to be explained". Nothing needs to be explained. People want things explained. Different people are going to have different approaches to understanding subject matter. Some like more holistic/phenomenological models, some like only reduced models, some (like me) like to look for links between the two types of model.

If I’ve misunderstood your opinions, feel free to clarify. However, the reason I’m sticking my $.02 in here is more to help shed some light on what the literature has to offer as it seems most people aren’t aware of what’s being said and the various philosophical arguments that have been made.

This is understandable. I feel the same way about the last 20 years of brain research.