AnssiH
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Careful said:**
I think one of the more meaningful definitions is that there exists a singular experience over some system consisting of many parts. Like, panpsychisms assert that everything is conscious, that there is consciousness simply because reality "hits the brain", and every physical reaction is a case of conscious experience to the object that is doing the reacting. **
Ok, a coarse grained thing. Fine, why don't you just put in some central information processing system in, like in a computer ?
Because even if we have labeled something as "central system", it doesn't mean this system experiences whatever occurs to one of its parts. Calling something central is literelly just a label we put on an object, it doesn't mean it is an object in a metaphysical sense any more than any 1000 randomly selected atoms are. It is just a collection of logic gates, which are collections of other things, etc... It's not different from a sewer system then. This whole idea about a "CPU" knowing what happens to one of its ports is just as non-sensical as saying a city knows what is happening in one of its parking lots. We are just tossing around semantical concepts, and in particular our way of seeing world as objects is the problem here.
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The obvious problem with this is that we cannot define what is an object. Naive realist could say that a neuron too, has a subjective experience, but that would just mean a colony of molecules is having a subjective experience. A brain having a subjective experience is not trivial to explain because here too an arbitrary collection of atoms is having the experience. Why? **
Euh, I am not sure wheter each part of the brain or the colony has the *same* experience.
Yeah they don't, but there is a singular experience that the whole colony is having, which is not the experience of any single part of the colony. Plainly put, stimulating one part of the brain causes us a conscious experience of something, and stimulating a completely different part of the same brain also causes a conscious experience of something. Neither of the parts need to know about each others, yet there is a subjective experience of both stimulations.
Obviously there is connection between these areas, but it doesn't mean we are some sort of special neuron somewhere where everything is ultimately focused (and even if you supposed we are, neuron too has many parts, and in the end you start thinking we are some sort of special atom or some infinitely small area inside the atom or something). It just means it is wrong to understand the reality of consciousness in the form of something happening to some "object", for the whole idea about objects is arbitrary. I.e. there is a phenomenal self. There is no object that is conscious, but more properly conscious experience is occurring as a process or interaction between the so-called objects.
And conscious experience is really the only case where we could say there is a singular experience about the activity happening to a large collection of so-called "things".
It can be hard to see this at first because we are so used to seeing the world as objects. We use that language every day, "my car broke down" when something goes loose in the engine. The engine doesn't have a singular expeirence about something going loose in it, just like the car doesn't have a singular experience about something going wrong in the engine, just like the traffic system doesn't have a singular experience about one car breaking down. A logic gate doesn't have a singular experience of the neurons flowing around it, and the CPU doesn't have such experience of one of its gates going up, a computer doesn't experience what the CPU is doing, and the internet doesn't experience what your computer is doing. This whole business of classifying "objects" into a hierarchical structure is just not getting us anywhere with consciousness, it's just panpsychism. Incoherent and meaningless.
Panpsychism gets into immediate trouble in defining what is the granularity in what sense "objects" metaphysically exist, for you do not have a conscious experience of what is happening to an individual neuron in your brain.
**So that's why consciousness could be defined as a "singular experience that occurs to a colony of things", and for that reason it should be seen as the emergent function of the colony; a function that the whole system has while none of its parts have it. Just like ice is not slippery because it is made of slippery atoms, but because friction is an emergent function of colonies of atoms. (IF that's the way your semantical mind chooses to see it)**
But I am sure that ice has not the experience of slipperyness.
Certainly not. Consciousness is just one instance of "emergent functions". Not all emergent functions are consciousness. Emergent function too is not something that metaphysically exists, but merely a method to classify/comprehend reality.
The important thing to understand is that world is full of systems that have a function which none of its parts have. The problem that especially panpsychists have is that they suppose if the brain is conscious, so then must all of its parts be. It is just like thinking atoms are metaphysically made of "matter" instead of understanding what we call matter is an emergent function of the elements of an atom. A large pile of electrons is not like sand, and fire is not made out of fire (contrary to the old belief :)