Bystander said:
Keep in mind that at 36k the flight "envelope" has become quite restricted due to air density and temperature --- doesn't take a whole lot of control surface movement to exceed the airframe capabilities.
If the avionics allow it...
So in an attempt to answer such speculation, here's the control logic for Airbus (A320 in this case) fly-by-wire:
http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Flight_Control_Laws
The flight mode of Normal Law provides five types of protection: pitch attitude, load factor limitations, high speed, high-AOA and bank angle. In addition, Low Speed Protection is available in certain phases of flight. Normal Law flight mode is operational from take-off and remains active until 100 feet above the ground during the landing phase. Failure of certain systems or multiple failures will result in degradation of Normal Law to Alternate Law (ALT 1 or ALT2)...
Load Factor Protection automatically limits the control inputs so that the aircraft remains within
AOM "g" limitations and
Pitch Attitude Protection limits the aircraft attitude to a maximum of 30° nose up or 15° nose down.
High Angle of Attack Protection, which protects against stalling and the effects of windshear has priority over all other protection functions. The protection engages when the angle of attack is between α-Prot and α-Max and limits the angle of attack commanded by the pilot's sidestick to α-Max even with full sidestick deflection.
So, indeed, when working properly, the avionics will prevent stalls and too much up or down pitch. But what if it isn't working properly? Air France 447 was an Airbus A330, which has the same anti-stall protection, yet it stalled for several minutes as it fell out of the sky...
Alternate Law 1 (ALT1) combines Normal Law lateral mode with Alternate Law pitch modes. Low Energy Protection is replaced by Low Speed Stability meaning that the aircraft no longer has automatic stall protection. At low speed, a nose down demand is introduced based on IAS (instead of AOA) and Alternate Law changes to Direct Law. In addition, an audio "STALL" warning is introduced. α-Floor protection is not available so conventional pilot stall recovery action is required.
Load Factor and Bank Angle Protections are retained. High Speed and High Angle of Attack Protections enter Alternate Law mode. Pitch Attitude Protection is lost.
ALT1 control law degradation will result from some faults in the horizontal stabilizer, a single elevator fault, loss of a yaw-damper actuator, loss of slat or flap position sensors or a single air data reference fault. Dependent upon the failure, autopilot may not be available.
In Alternate Law 2 (ALT2), Normal Law lateral mode is lost and is replaced by roll Direct Law and yaw Alternate Law. Pitch mode is in Alternate Law. Load factor protection is retained. In addition to those protections lost in ALT1 (Pitch Attitude and Low Energy Protection), Bank Angle Protection is also lost. In some failure cases, High Angle of Attack and High Speed Protections will also be lost.
As is the case with ALT1, some failure cases that result in ALT2 will also cause the autopilot to disconnecnt. ALT2 is entered when both engines flame out, with faults in two inertial or two air-data reference units, with faults to all spoilers, certain aileron faults or with a pedal transducers fault.
So under alternate flight controls laws, which occur due to certain failures, the types of pilot-induced departures from controlled flight we are discussing become possible. Worse, the "feel" (sensitivity, etc.) of the controls is different, which makes the plane even harder to fly. Air France 447 was in "Alternate Law 2" mode, climbing at
7,000 fpm and at an angle of attack of 30 degrees prior to its first stall. With the co-pilot still applying full back control input with the plane stalled, the angle of attack increased to 40 degrees as it fell out of the sky.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447
I'm looking for examples of incidents where Airbusses overstressed their airframes due to too much elevator (what could happen at high speed in a microburst)...[edit]
Here's one: A bizarre incident in 2008 where an A330 was at cruising altitude when an "inertial reference unit" failed. Like the one on your phone and video game controller, the inertial reference unit tells the flight control computers the plane's attitude. Instead of reporting that they were flying straight and level, it started sending random, brief, but large pitch indications, which caused the flight control computer to respond with strong elevator input. The pilots were able to land safely.
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/unusual-attitude/2008/10/qantas-a330-upset-caused-by-in/