I Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[Buzz Bloom]

So you need to make up your mind which definition of "emergent" you want to use.

but the individual properties and behaviors of the bicycle and the rider are certainly not irrelevant to the emergence of smooth forward motion from both together.

Hi Peter:

Thanks for your post.

I agree that the definition I posted from Wikipedia is a much clearer definition than the one I used before I looked at the Wikipedia's definition. I apologize, and I will try to be more careful with my definitions.

I have to agree with the logic of the second quote above also. I also have to agree that "irrelevant" is too strong a word. I need some time to think about vocabulary to choose a better word to use that will explain the distinction I have in mind.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[Lord Jestocost]

This thread has me wanting to understand what people really mean by super-determinism undermining science/free-will...

Gerard ’t Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant pats. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism."
[Italics in original, LJ]

That means: In a superdeterministic universe a conscious being could only observe the deterministic unfolding of the world, it would be nothing else but a spectator being unable to make any choices.

 

[Minnesota Joe]

Gerard ’t Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant pats. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism."
[Italics in original, LJ]

Interesting quote, thanks.

That means: In a superdeterministic universe a conscious being could only observe the deterministic unfolding of the world, it would be nothing else but a spectator being unable to make any choices.

What would a conscious being observe or fail to observe in a superdeterministic universe that they wouldn't observe or fail to observe in a deterministic universe? (ETA: Besides weird correlations.)

The problem is that the word "determinism" already implies that observers are controlled by deterministic laws. Whether or not determinism is false would be a separate discussion.

It seems to me that what "super" adds to "determinism" is the break down of statistical independence in certain cases. It isn't clear to me that we have to talk about "free will" at all.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

The problem is that the word "determinism" already implies that observers are controlled by deterministic laws.

Only in case the term "determinism" refers to mental phenomena (or mind), too.

 

[Minnesota Joe]

Only in case the term "determinism" refers to mental phenomena (or mind), too.

If it doesn't apply to everything, then you could say "determinism is false" instead. Because there is something that is not determined by prior physical states + laws.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

I thought the following might be of some interest in this context.

Regarding "free will", the approximately 16,000 word Wikipedia article (the longest I have come across so far)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will​

seems to cover all of the vocabulary related to this phrase , in particular "deterministic/determinism", starting with the ancient Greeks, and also with respect to quantum mechanics. The term "superdeterminism" does not appear in this article. However, Wikipedia has a separate article

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism​

which discusses this concept as defined specifically in the context of quantum mechanics.

In quantum mechanics, superdeterminism is a loophole in Bell's theorem, that allows one to evade it by postulating that all systems being measured are causally correlated with the choices of which measurements to make on them.​

 

[Minnesota Joe]

I thought the following might be of some interest in this context.

Regarding "free will", the approximately 16,000 word Wikipedia article (the longest I have come across so far)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will​

seems to cover all of the vocabulary related to this phrase , in particular "deterministic/determinism", starting with the ancient Greeks and also with rewspect to quantum mechanics. The term "superdeterminism" does not appear in this article. However, Wikipedia has a separate article

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism​

which discusses this concept as defined specifically in the context of quantum mechanics.

In quantum mechanics, superdeterminism is a loophole in Bell's theorem, that allows one to evade it by postulating that all systems being measured are causally correlated with the choices of which measurements to make on them.​

Yes, and this link to a paper by super-determinist Sabine Hossenfelder I gave earlier has a whole section on why free will is irrelevant to super-determinism (Gerard 'T Hooft is a reviewer on that paper interestingly):

In summary, raising the issue of free will in the context of Superdeterminism is a red herring. Superdeterminism does not make it any more or less difficult to reconcile our intuitive notion of free will with the laws of nature than is the case for the laws we have been dealing with for hundreds of years already.

I think the issue is that if superdeterminism is true, then determinism is true. And since some theories of QM are indeterministic, the superdeterminist might highlight determinism by way of contrast, giving the impression that is what it is all about. But really superdeterminism is just one of several theories of QM where observer actions are determined.

 

[PeterDonis]

Gerard ’t Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant pats. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism."
[Italics in original, LJ]

I think 't Hooft is conflating superdeterminism with plain determinism. The statement that "the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws" is just ordinary physicalism--physical laws govern everything--plus the belief that all physical laws are deterministic. (Whether QM actually is deterministic is a different question.)

Superdeterminism, as I understand it, is the additional claim that the initial conditions in a deterministic universe are fine-tuned so that the physical laws we infer from experimental results are different from the actual physical laws. For example, the initial conditions would be fine-tuned so that all of the measurement settings in EPR experiments are carefully set up to produce correlations that make it look like something nonlocal is happening, when actually the underlying physical laws are just ordinary local deterministic ones.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Zeilinger seems to be saying that humans are not a part of the nature:
"If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are."

Humans are part of "nature", but is everything in "nature" "physical"?

From: "Does Some Deeper Level of Physics Underlie Quantum Mechanics? An Interview with Nobelist Gerard ’t Hooft" by George Musser https://blogs.scientificamerican.co...interview-with-nobelist-gerard-e28099t-hooft/

"GM [George Musser]: Did you ever meet John Bell?

GtH [Gerard ’t Hooft]: I think it was in the early ’80s. I raised the question: Suppose that also Alice’s and Bob’s decisions have to be seen as not coming out of free will, but being determined by everything in the theory. John said, well, you know, that I have to exclude. If it’s possible, then what I said doesn’t apply. I said, Alice and Bob are making a decision out of a cause. A cause lies in their past and has to be included in the picture." [Bold by LJ]

 

[mattt]

This sums up very nicely what I think about this subject:

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2013/07/you-probably-have-no-free-will-but-dont.html?m=1

 

[PeterDonis]

Suppose that also Alice’s and Bob’s decisions have to be seen as not coming out of free will, but being determined by everything in the theory.

"Determined by everything in the theory" is not the same as "determined by the same things that determine the state of the measured particles". The independence assumption that Zeilinger is calling "free will" only requires that the latter is not the case; it does not require that the former is not the case.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Accepting causal determinism: So we have two chains of physical events which share no common origin.

 

[mattt]

Of course the hard work is on the "superdeterminism camp" to show how these types of correlations can arise in their superdeterministic models.

I have not read Sabbine's paper on it yet...

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Humans are part of "nature", but is everything in "nature" "physical"?

Hi Jestocost:

This is an interesting question that requires definitions that I have not yet noticed being discussed in this thread.

A important constituent of a human, like Alice and Bob, is the mind. But the mind is not made of physical stuff. The mind primarily is a part of the functional behavior of the nervous system, including the brain. Is behavior part of nature? Is behavior completely physical? In particular is making a conscious choice (possibly an illusion) physical, in contrast with it causing physical actions?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[A. Neumaier]

But the mind is not made of physical stuff.

Just like software is not made of physical stuff. But physical stuff is needed to embody software, and the correct or faulty execution of the software is governed by physical law. Mind is of a similar nature.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Just like software is not made of physical stuff. But physical stuff is needed to embody software, and the correct or faulty execution of the software is governed by physical law. Mind is of a similar nature.

Hi Neumaier:

I was attempting to ask questions without assuming free will or determinism is part of reality, or not. When you say, "Mind is of a similar nature," are you (a) advocating free will is real, or (b) advocating determinism is real, or (c) advocating that they are not mutually exclusive, or (d) none of the above?

I am just making guesses regarding the your views on the three questions I asked in post #165, and you may want to correct me. You seem to be saying: (1) that behavior is part of nature, (2) that behavior is not completely physical, and (3) making a conscious choice is (at least partially) physical.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

The mind primarily is a part of the functional behavior of the nervous system, including the brain.

In other words, it's part of the functional behavior of physical things. The functional behavior of physical things is physical behavior and is "part of nature". The mind as functional behavior of the brain and nervous system is no different from the web browser I'm using to post this as functional behavior of my computer and the network of which it is a part, or the functional behavior of my car in getting me from one place to another.

 

[A. Neumaier]

When you say, "Mind is of a similar nature," are you (a) advocating free will is real, or (b) advocating determinism is real, or (c) advocating that they are not mutually exclusive, or (d) none of the above?

You seem to be saying: (1) that behavior is part of nature, (2) that behavior is not completely physical, and (3) making a conscious choice is (at least partially) physical.

Free will is real, and can be explained in terms of functional behavior, as explained in my comparison with computer programs in an earlier post of this thread. It is not physical, in the same way that branches in computer programs are not physical. But its realization in a human is based on mechanisms that can be completely understood in terms of physics, just as the execution of a branching statement by a computer.

Since experimental results suggest strongly that many choices are executed slightly before they become conscious, consciousness seems to be more a narration mechanism based on physical input rather than as input that modifies the physics.

Thus there is no conflict with determinism. In any case, free will is never random, so the nondeterminism of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics doesn't explain free will. On the other hand, my thermal interpretation of quantum mechanics, which I believe to be faithful to experimental practice, is fully deterministic.

 

[PeterDonis]

experimental results suggest strongly that many choices are executed slightly before they become conscious

I think these results (I assume you're referring to, for example, the Libet experiments) should be interpreted very cautiously. There is a lot of back and forth in the literature about what they actually mean.

Also, even if it turns out that consciousness is an "input" to action rather than just a "narration mechanism", that still doesn't mean consciousness must be outside of physics.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In other words, it's part of the functional behavior of physical things. The functional behavior of physical things is physical behavior and is "part of nature". The mind as functional behavior of the brain and nervous system is no different from the web browser I'm using to post this as functional behavior of my computer and the network of which it is a part, or the functional behavior of my car in getting me from one place to another.

Hi Peter:

As I did in post #167 with @A. Neumaier, I am here guessing what your answers would be to the three question in post #165.
1. You are very clearly saying that function is a part of nature.
2. It is also clear that you are saying that function is at least partially physical. It not clear if you are saying function is all physical, or only partly physical.
3. My guess is you are saying making a conscious choice it least partially physical, but it is not clear if you mean it to be all physical or only partially physical.

Also like Neumaier, it is unclear what your view is regarding free will and determinism.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[A. Neumaier]

like Neumaier, it is unclear what your view is regarding free will and determinism.

You should read the whole discussion, and not just the newest items!

 

[A. Neumaier]

I think these results (I assume you're referring to, for example, the Libet experiments) should be interpreted very cautiously. There is a lot of back and forth in the literature about what they actually mean.

I was specifically asked about my opinion, and explained what these experiments mean to me. Of course, my views on this are controversial, as anything in this area.

Also, even if it turns out that consciousness is an "input" to action rather than just a "narration mechanism", that still doesn't mean consciousness must be outside of physics.

In both cases it should be considered as emergent from, but outside of, physics.

 

[PeterDonis]

You are very clearly saying that function is a part of nature.

Function of a physical thing is, yes.

It is also clear that you are saying that function is at least partially physical. It not clear if you are saying function is all physical, or only partly physical.

This is a matter of choice of words, not substance. I don't think it's useful to try to split hairs over whether the function of a physical thing is "physical" or "partially physical" or not. Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system. That's the substance.

My guess is you are saying making a conscious choice it least partially physical, but it is not clear if you mean it to be all physical or only partially physical.

Same response as above, just substitute "conscious choice" for "mind".

Also like Neumaier, it is unclear what your view is regarding free will and determinism.

And my response is the same as his: read the thread.

 

[PeterDonis]

In both cases it should be considered as emergent from, but outside of, physics.

I don't think I would say that things that are emergent from physics are "outside physics" (although I might say that physics is not always the best discipline to use to study them), but this is a matter of choice of words, not substance. I think we agree on the substance.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

This is a matter of choice of words, not substance.

Hi Peter:

I interpret the above quote as that you are saying that there are different ways for using different words to describe a concept. I do not disagree with this. My problem is I have no confidence that my understanding of your words is correct. I understand that this issue is much like understanding QM. The words may help one to think about how QM works, but only the math communicates accurately, if not completely.

My understanding is that philosophy (which includes the concept of free will) is not supposed to be like that. I also understand that professional philosophers have historically chosen new words and phrases and/or new definitions of words and phrases in part to make it difficult for people who are not professional philosophers to understand what is written. There were historical periods when that was a safe way of communicating.

I accept with disappointment that you may well feel that you have no reason to have any real interest regarding whether or not I understand your words.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

My problem is I have no confidence that my understanding of your words is correct.

Yes, this is always a problem when using imprecise ordinary language. It is possible to give words precise technical definitions in particular domains, but you have to have something other than just words, such as math, to ground the definitions.

My understanding is that philosophy (which includes the concept of free will) is not supposed to be like that.

If you mean that philosophy is supposed to have precise definitions of words, and not to have to fall back on math for precision, as above, that can only be done if you have something other than the words to ground the precise definitions. And that's the case much more seldom in philosophy than most philosophers like to think. It's not impossible to have precise groundings for definitions of words without math, but it's a lot more difficult.

I accept with disappointment that you may well feel that you have no reason to have any real interest regarding whether or not I understand your words.

I'm certainly interested in having communication that leads to understanding, but I also know that goal is never perfectly achievable.

My advice would be to think very carefully about how you would ground your definition of a word before using it. If you can't ground it in math (for example, by grounding the words "quantum state" in a particular mathematical expression that appears in a particular mathematical framework), you need to think hard about how else you can ground it. For example, when you use the word "physical", how would you ground your definition of that word?

 

[PeterDonis]

My advice would be to think very carefully about how you would ground your definition of a word before using it.

And, from the other end, to think about what the grounding is of someone else's use of particular words. For example, consider this quote of mine:

Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system.

Do you understand what the grounding is for each of the key terms in this--"mind", "functional behavior", "brain", and "nervous system"?

 

[Buzz Bloom]

For example, when you use the word "physical", how would you ground your definition of that word?
...
Do you understand what the grounding is for each of the key terms in this--"mind", "functional behavior", "brain", and "nervous system"?

Hi Peter:

I will take a look for the definition in my antique (1962) Merriam Webster for "physical" (adj.), but for the present the following from Wikipedia seems like a good start.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical​

Physical property, any aspect of an object or substance that can be measured or perceived without changing its identity.​

A more elaborate discussion is in:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_property .​

Also used in this article is "material property", but that is not defined. Only an example is given.

Regarding the four other terms, I can find and I can use the found defintions for these also. The problem regrding communication, in my opinion, is not "grounding", but attempting to understand if there is agreement or disagreement regarding the concepts associated with the words or phrases. When reading an article this can be difficult because the writer may not have felt any reason to define the terms used. In a conversation (writen or spoken) one can ask for clarity in the form of definitions, or in the form of questions of interpretation with respect to examples. Both methods are useful and can resolve disagreements by (a) agreeing, (b) agreeing to disagree, or by (c) agreeing about an interpretation with respect to a few examples.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[Buzz Bloom]

For example, when you use the word "physical", how would you ground your definition of that word?

Hi Peter:

I now have some definitions from 1962 MW.

Def 1 was characterized as archaic and obsolete.

Def 2a:

of or belonging to all created existences in nature : relating to or in accordance with the laws of nature​

Def 2b:

of or relating to natural or material things as opposed to things mental, moral, spiritual, or immaginary​

Def 3a:

of, relating to, concerned with, or devoted to natural science​

Def 3b:

of or relating to physics : characterized or produced by the forces and operations of physics : employed in the processes of physics​

There were more definitions that had no relationship with our discussion.

I have no issues with using any of the four defintions I quoted above. However, since there are nuances between them, you might want to choose a subset for the purpose of our discussion. Or perhaps you might want to propose something not included in the four quoted definitions.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

I will take a look for the definition in my antique (1962) Merriam Webster for "physical"

That's not going to be a good approach, for two reasons: first, dictionaries give ordinary usage, not physics usage; and second, dictionaries only define words in terms of other words, so you're just pushing the problem onto a different word or phrase. For example, the phrase "without changing its identity"--what is "identity" and what counts as "changing its identity"?

When I talk about "grounding" for words, I'm not talking about dictionary definitions. I'm talking about grounding in something other than words. Dictionary definitions are just more words.

Also, you didn't read what you quoted from me very carefully, since "physical" is not one of the words I asked you if you knew the grounding for. Go look at the words I did ask about.

The problem regrding communication, in my opinion, is not "grounding", but attempting to understand if there is agreement or disagreement regarding the concepts associated with the words or phrases.

But you can't do that by just piling on more words. You have to have some other way of picking out the concepts. That's what I mean by "grounding". If you have a mathematical equation, you can point to that. If you have an actual object or set of objects that embodies the concept, you can point to that. If you have an objectively defined measurement procedure, you can point to that.