Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Doctordick]

Hi Les,

Sorry about the great delay in this response though I have many excuses: it's spring and the house needs paint, it's spring and when I can't paint, storms are either taking out my ISP or the power to my house, it's spring and, when I have nothing else to do, my wife finds lots of things which need doing. So it's spring and I can't get here as often as I can in the winter! At any rate, a lot of posts lie between your answer to me and this post; I appologize.

I’ll focus on the points where either I think I have something to add, or where I disagree.

When I perused your post, I didn't see any disagreement but I will comment if I come across something which appears to be disagreement when I analyze it with care.

I would just make a small distinction here to ensure we are talking about the same things. Red, as a label, can be attached in two different ways. One could be the mere recognition of red as a particular wave length of EM. That’s something a computer or the hypothetical zombie could do. In other words, the ability to label something red doesn’t have to mean a quale has occurred.

What I am talking about is whatever it is that you yourself are thinking of when you use the word (as you say, what red "is like" to you): what I am trying to understand (that is, the problem of understanding itself) is how to relate your experience of the universe to my experience of the universe. The only things I have to go on are the thoughts which your attempts to communicate generate in my mind. What I am trying to express in my reaction expressed here is the fact that "red as a particular wave length of EM" is fundamentally a proposed solution to the problem: i.e., it is an expression of belief in a particular physicalist explanation of reality (his conclusion as to what you mean when you use the word red). As many have said, that perspective seems to be lacking some important aspects of reality.

A computer[/color] or zombie doesn’t have this second level of awareness, it only has the first.

I won't argue with you with regard to a "zombie" as that is how a zombie is defined; however, the statement that a computer will never "experience qualia" is an unsupported assertion which is certainly not settle-able at this moment.

It is awkward and difficult for people to grasp. I think a better way to describe consciousness is to say some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us.

Lot's of things are difficult for people to grasp, particularly new concepts, and one needs all the help one can find. Your phrase "some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us" certainly once again reflects acceptance of some aspects of the physicalist explanation. The acceptance that the spatial references are undoubtedly valid representations are, in themselves, a proposed solution to fundamental aspects of the problem. Physicalists don't offer to defend these solutions beyond laughing at anyone who would suggest they need defense.

As far as I can tell, the main reason for the qualia approach was to avoid the philosopher’s paranoia of being attacked for homuncular regress. That is, if there is something aware of being aware, then there must be something more central to that which is aware of being aware of being aware . . . ad infinitum.

Again, you are bringing up issues which are, to me, unimportant. All I have in mind is a problem I have solved: my problem was "how is a solution to be arrived at?" I needed a starting point as a basis for a logical analysis. After considerable thought, I came to the conclusion that there was only one valid starting point. One must begin with totally undefined representation of the information one has to work with. For forty years, I have been unable to communicate that simplistic concept to anyone. At the moment the concept of qualia (as understood by others) seem to possesses some of the critical properties of my starting point. And I have hopes (slim I will admit) that I might be able to communicate some of my thoughts to another. Three of those critical properties are; first, whatever they actually are on a fundamental basis is undefined (that is, qualia seem to be a sufficiently vague concept to be thought of as undefined in a fundamental sense); second, they seem to qualify as playing the roll of the source of the information one has to work with (at least that part which is real and not a figment of our imagination); and third, there exists no way to prove that a label being used in communication makes any guarantee that the quale being referred to is exactly the same for the two communicating individuals (that is, no communications exist which are not based upon some solution to the problem of understanding what one is dealing with). This may not be the purpose for which qualia were invented but, it seems to me, the term provides a lever to get my perspective into another mind. (As I have said many times, I think communication itself is the real fundamental problem here.)

Experience is like that. It is a sort of conscious singularity which cannot be disintegrated without losing it. That’s why, IMO, we have difficulty communicating our experiences.

From my perspective, I don't think it is possible to communicate our experiences; what we do communicate are the relationships between those labels we have invented to represent our experiences in the hope that the other individual possesses a similar collection of experiences and can relate (which I think is exactly what you are saying a little further on). I think our successes appear to be astounding and that success needs an explanation. Others seem to think the success is a trivial issue, or is beyond human comprehension or is simply not worth thinking about (or uninteresting as some have said)[/color]. Any half way decent reason not to think about it seems to serve the purpose.

So if you ask me, the better definition of consciousness is that is the awareness of being aware.

I would put forth the idea that the issue is really somewhat immaterial. As far as I am aware (used in the colloquial sense) I cannot be absolutely sure that any particular entity is or is not "aware". To me it is just another "squirrel" concept offered up by my intuitive side without logical defense. Another unsupported solution to that fundamental problem we were all faced with.

Yes, that is pretty much what most qualia advocates are saying. There is a personal, inner realm to consciousness. The accumulation of each of our experiences is what creates the “me” of consciousness.

As Paul would say, the thinker exists. Yes, I would agree with that; however, I have a slightly different perspective on it. Behind any explanation of anything there is something which must be accepted without support. That aspect of the situation can never be argued away; what we want to do is to minimize what must be taken on faith. I am willing to accept the fact that I exist and I will also accept the fact that I can imagine things. I will even go a little further: I am willing to accept the idea that there is something else that is not "me" and not imagined by me (other things and other minds). These things I accept on faith and consider basic to any argument about anything. Any attempt to "prove" these things need to be proved is "without foundation" to use a hackneyed phrase.

Yes, but just because qualia are the means for my contact with reality doesn’t mean they are all of reality, except for me.

True; but think about that for a moment. If you include (in your definition of qualia) the qualia you have not experienced (those experienced by others which may or may not be experienced by you together with qualia you might come to experience) then how can you claim the concept omits some aspect of reality. Think of these "quale" as elements of the abstract set which I refer to as "A". Then "B" (a finite collection of elements taken from "A") is a collection of qualia and can be seen as "an experience" without making any commitment as to exactly what those quale are. And finally "C" (a finite collection of "B"s) becomes the collection of all your experiences (the fundamental basis of any argument or explanation of anything). The existence of the elements of "A" are the foundation itself and include the quale of "being aware", "imagining things" and billions upon billions of other things. Specifing what these things are is exactly what constitutes that solution we are searching for.

Some of my friends and I have had that old debate about if there is one reality or many realities. My opinion of anyone who says there are many realities is that they are being too subjective. Reality is what is real, and what is real is what exists or can exist. It has nothing to do with me except I am one small part of the whole of existence.

What you are trying to do is to express a solution to a problem you have not carefully set forth. What I am trying to do is to set the problem forth in an exact manner so that we can discuss the relevant issues intelligently.

Now if you were to say qualia are the means by which I, as consciousness, know reality, and therefore to ME qualia “constitute” my sole link to reality . . . then yes, I could agree to that.

That is all I am asking! That and a little willingness to see things from an abstract perspective so that we can discuss these quale without making assertions as to exactly what they are. As soon as we begin to make assertions, we are essentially proposing a solution and not simply refining or clarifying the problem. Again, I don't think I am disagreeing with anything you say, I am simply trying to state the fundamental starting point as clearly as possible without making any assumptions as to what the solution might be. This is the essence of abstract thought. We have to be able to work in the abstract or we can't comprehend the problem. Too many people are indifferent to the problem; all they want is the answer (which by the way, we all know is 42 ). As you say, "Introspectionists should make sense", suppose we see if we can do that.

And then, some comments on all the stuff in between:

Unlike the word sensation, qualia is specifically designed to refer to an aspect that cannot be attributed to neural processing.

Attributing anything to "neural processing" amounts to acceptance of the solution from whense the concept of "neural processing" arrises.

Let me ask you a somewhat difficult question: what happens if you try to understand the world without using language?

Everyone on this forum thinks they understand things (though it is certainly possible some might be in error ) and, however we got here, I am pretty sure most of us began without "language". So, what happens "if you try to understand the world without using language?" Most of us seem to have been able to do it (or at least we think we have). My point is that it has to be a solveable problem as most everyone has managed to solve it in some respect or another. What I cannot understand is the universal opinion that the problem cannot be solved when so many have solved it!

I do realize it's a difficult question and not everyone even knows what it means, let alone answer it.

Well, I think I know exactly what it means and I have an answer I would like to talk to someone about; but I cannot communicate that answer without a language and some subtle concepts not in common usage. The answer requires one be able to think about the problem in the abstract and I feel "qualia" provides a usefull reference label for the foundation elements (that which comprises the set "A" from whense our experiences, set "C", arises).

It seems to me qualia is just the activity of a conscious mind when it perceives the world; it has nothing to do with how the subject relates to it.

I would say that "how the subject relates to it" is the subject's personal solution to "understanding the world". What I want to show people is an analytical solution to the problem, but, before I can start, I need to communicate to them an abstract way of seeing the problem in the absense of language. I need language to do that and I need the concept of "things unidentified by language". If "qualia" fit the bill, so be it.

What is the exact reason we have this huge blank in our personal histories?

I would say that it is due to the fact that we had no "understanding of the world" to relate to (or rather, we had no "understanding of the world" we have bothered to remember). The onset of language is the first indicator that we have discovered usefull relationships internal to the "qualia" which constitute our experiences (we are discovering a solution to the problem of understanding the world).

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Faust]

Everyone on this forum thinks they understand things (though it is certainly possible some might be in error )

I do realize it's a difficult question and not everyone even knows what it means, let alone answer it.

Well, I think I know exactly what it means and I have an answer

Well, it is certainly possible you might be in error

 

[Les Sleeth]

I don't think I have much more to add to this debate. My last response to Faust using the "integration" model of consciousness is pretty much where I stand. It stems from me observing my own consciousness, how it works for me day to day, and what I experience when my mind becomes still in meditation. So I have just two comments on your post.

I won't argue with you with regard to a "zombie" as that is how a zombie is defined; however, the statement that a computer will never "experience qualia" is an unsupported assertion which is certainly not settle-able at this moment.

I didn't say a computer will "never" experience. I simply said it doesn't now. But if you ask me I'd say it never will because I don't think consciousness is the result of neural or any other kind of complexity. Consciousness is the background awareness. How do I know that? Well, I practice experiencing it every day. It is simple, unified, whole and consequently it has to "absorb" things, the way an ocean absorbs a drop of rain, to receive information. And just the way that drop in the ocean contributes, so too is information generalized into consciousness, which is why it changes and learns only very gradually.

However, the intellect is not consciousness, it is a tool of consciousness. While consciousness has to stay "whole," the intellect can be used multifacetedly. You don't need an intellect to be conscious, you need it to calculate, to analyze, to formulate language, to communicate. If you threw out the intellect, you would still be conscious, just not smart.

What I've learned is, if you want to be more happy, sensitive, loving, alert . . . then learn the secret of how to be more conscious. If you want to be smarter . . . then develop intellectual skills. Two different things totally.

Your phrase "some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us" certainly once again reflects acceptance of some aspects of the physicalist explanation. The acceptance that the spatial references are undoubtedly valid representations are, in themselves, a proposed solution to fundamental aspects of the problem.

Not necessarily. I don't agree that just because something is part of physicalness, is can't be part of something nonphysical. I don't know how familiar you are with the theories of substance monism, but one idea is that all that exists is a form of some most basic and highly mutable existential "stuff" that has always existed and always will.

So consciousness would be a form of it and so would physicalness; they would be described, in this theory, as exactly the same existential stuff, but subject to different conditions. For example, physicalness might be the result of highly compressed existential stuff, and possibly consciousness could be the result of a quantity of oscillating, peripherally polarized, centrally evolving existential stuff. Same stuff, different conditions.

Anyway, since this stuff is supposed to abide in an infinitely extended continum, spatial characteristics are part of the very foundation of all existence. There's no need to insist that traits they have in common makes them both physical since the common traits might reflect something even more basic.

 

[Doctordick]

Well, it is certainly possible you might be in error

Isn't that what I just said? If it is so, I would love to have someone point out my error.

And Les, I am sorry but I don't think you understood anything I said. Maybe I confused you by talking about issues that had nothing to do with what I was trying to communicate.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Fliption]

I don't "think it means", it's one of the definitions given in most dictionaries.

I wasn't implying anything by pointing out the difference in definitions. I was just pointing out the difference as the major factor for why I wasn't following what you were saying. How many dictionaries your definition is in isn't relevant to me.

I didn't define illusion, I just mentioned the word has two slightly different meanings. I didn't make it up, it's in the dictionary. So when a person uses the word, it can be hard to know which meaning they are referring to. That's all I said, everything else you read was not there.

You were saying that to a neurologist explaining qualia was no different than explaining a false belief. I am claiming that you say this because you define illusion to mean false belief. If we don't define illusion that way, then the statement you made about neurologists can no longer be made.

At this point you mentioned "cop-out" three times. If you keep accusing people of copping-out, it's no surprise they don't bother explaining things to you.

I don't use the term to be offensive. My apologies if you took it that way. I'm simply using it as a term to mean the position doesn't address the issue. I don't intend to imply that you do this on purpose.

Because "qualia" is supposed to exist inside my mind. Trust me, I know what's in there, and there's no "qualia" to be seen anywhere. Unless "qualia" means something I already know by another name.

Yes, you likely call it something else.

Yes, there is, but the explanation is a bit complex. But I'm sure this will sound as a cop-out to you.

Well, since I consider myself to be a reasonably intelligent and open minded person, the reasons for your statement being true would either be

1) It really is a cop out. or
2) You don't know how to explain it.

Since I give most people the benefit of the doubt on their ability to explain their positions, I am left with number 1 most everytime. But I would love to hear how you can do this.

No, but you can always claim that people assert false beliefs as a cop-out. That is satisfying enough as you certainly know.

But asserting it and backing up that assertion with sound reasoning are two different things. I believe I can do the latter.

"Can everything be reduced to pure neurology". I see the beginnings of a thread there...

You could say yes but you'd have no way to explain how.

So how does it look like? Can you describe it to me? I have a strong suspicion that it looks a lot like something I refer to as "the world". But I may be mistaken.

The world? Yes, qualia is part of the world. I think that too!

Having this discussion is fruitless until we get past one of the previous points that I commented on. If you believe that you can actually see what I see when I see blue then you obviously know something that know one else in the world knows. Until I understand this, I don't think trying to describe qualia is going to go very far.

 

[Fliption]

You will think this is sophistry, but I cannot observe my own qualia the way the concept is explained to me. The best I can make of the claim that qualia can be observed is that people are misinterpreting what they observe. They observe one thing and make verbal report that are not consistent. It's as if they see four objects and claim that "four" and "objects" are separate aspects of their experience. That to me is nonsense; you can't see objects without seeing how many of them there are, and you can't see "how many" without seeing how many "what".

Les commented on this and I just wanted to confirm that as being correct. I understand what you're saying... "four" cannot be seen. Yet you agree it is a useful concept to use in a sentence like "I see four of them" don't you? Likewise, I am simply using the word qualia to refer to a feature of the world that I observe.

"It is raining" is a perfect example of how language forces us to assign a subject to a phenomenon even when one doesn't exist. "It" certainly doesn't "rain", but we have to use the indefinite subject to account for the rules of grammar, not for the phenomenon of rain itself.

So you think that lanagauge has universal rules that humans simply discovered? Or does it make more sense to say that the awareness of a subject, the perception of an "I", is what drove the rules of language to be what they are?

Seems more reasonable to chose the latter.

If you don't think the question is beside the point (I think it has everything to do with it but I realize it's not obvious), why is it that we can't remember anything that happened before a certain age, despite the fact that we were conscious then? What is the exact reason we have this huge blank in our personal histories?

The best explanation I can think of is that we are not really conscious, only proto-conscious. Fully consciousness only arrives once you master language, which curiously enough happens around the same age when we form our first memories. Curious, isn't it?

I don't think it has anything to do with language. Are you suggesting that language was invented by unconsciousness zombies? How did language ever get started if not by a consciousness person who required verbal tags to label experienced objects?

What makes more sense to me is that the brain develops it's ability to sort through and categorize it's experiences(and therefore memorize and have the ability to reference it) at the same time the brain develops it's ability to think. The idea that the brain's ability to memorize is correlated with it's ability to think shouldn't be that radical of an idea should it?

 

[Tournesol]

i.e. I'm constrained to play your word game by your rules? No thanks.

The power of legal argument in court comes from an agreed upon authority that sanctions the form and enforces the consequences. You have no authority for your word game except your ability to persuade suck... er, students to accept yours.

*We* are playing the same word game...philosophical debate.

 

[Tournesol]

No-one can ever offer an explanation which is not itself another bunch of words

Huh? What about pictures, diagrams, animations?

*you* said

"I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences."

as though sentences (or , trivially diagrams) were different from meanings.

This is a bit misleading. Perspectives cannot be right or wrong; the most you can expect from a perspective is a degree of consistency.

And a completely inconsitent perspective can still be right ?

If the question can only be answered by opinions, then it cannot be answered to everyone's satisfaction. That is clearly the case here.

No, it is your unsupported assertion that it is all a matter of opinion, perspective, etc.

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do

Quote:
You don't need to have qualia to have a problem of qualia -- which, in the case of zombies, is purely a matter of belief, and not of perception or sensation , and not therefore of *illusion*.

According to any dictionary definition, "illusion" can also mean "false beliefs".

I don't think David Copperfield is paid to induce false beliefs in people...

Anyway, perhaps you explain the difference between

a) learning about giraffes fro the first time by seeing one in a zoo

b) learing about giraffes for the first time by being told about them

as far as I can see, you are committed to saying that a) and b) are
both cognitive and non-phenomenal, but (a) is accompanied by a false
cognitive belief that there *is* something phenomenal going on
(inasmuch as you are not committed to saying it is all a matter of opinion).

Now does anyone think functionalists are foolish enough to argue that people have the subjective illusion that they have subjectivity? That would be foolish beyond belief. Surely they must mean something else.

Don't ask me, I've neve seen a concincing version of functionalism. Pehpas it just is a rubbish philosophy.

You "know" qualia are illusions, don't you ?

I know nothing, I just happen to look at things from a perspective in which subjectivity and objectivity are the same thing, and the notion that they are different is a false belief (that is, an illusion). I'm one of the few people I know of who disagree with both Chalmers and Dennett at the same time, while also agreeing with both to a limited extent.

I am not sure that is even coherent.

How can you deny their existence when yo don't know what the word means ITFP? make your mind up!

I deny its existence based on the fact that I don't need to know what the concept means to understand my own mind. That is because I have a personal account of my own mind which has no room for more concepts, whatever name they happen to have.

How can you refute the possibility that "qualia" is an unfamiliar way
of expressing a concept you already employ ?

There's a neurological mechanism that makes people believe in giraffes...

Surely. That mechanism is called "seeing a giraffe". Has anyone seen qualia yet?

Since qualia are defined as "the way things seem to us", everything you have ever seen, heard, etc has been accompanied by qualia.
Loosely speaking, it could be said that you have never seen anything else !

 

[Faust]

Well, since I consider myself to be a reasonably intelligent and open minded person, the reasons for your statement being true would either be

1) It really is a cop out. or
2) You don't know how to explain it.

In other words, heads you win, tails I lose, right?

Having this discussion is fruitless until we get past one of the previous points that I commented on. If you believe that you can actually see what I see when I see blue then you obviously know something that no one else in the world knows.

Heads you win, tails I lose, again. From your perspective, I can only answer your question by claiming to know something no one else in the world knows, which would be a confession of lunacy on my part. But if instead I choose to represent the perspective of people with whom you disagree with, then I'll be simply "copping out".

The best I can tell you at this point is, your perspective is bogus because it leads nowhere worth going. Let's turn the game around and give you a chance to make your case. Suppose I agree with you that I cannot see what you see; I don't agree, but let's say so for sake of argument. What's next now? Enlighten me, please. Tell me some great discovery that can be made based on the notion that I cannot see what you see.

 

[Tournesol]

The falsehood of most versions of physicalism ?

 

[Tournesol]

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

Another cop out. Don't get me wrong. It could be true. The problem is that everyone who ever claims this, always ends their post with this statement. No one ever explains how this is the case. Even though it may allow one to keep their world view intact, claiming it is so doesn't make it so.
QUOTE]

how true

 

[Faust]

*you* said "I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences." as though sentences (or , trivially diagrams) were different from meanings.

And you think they are not? You think the meaning of sentences is just a bunch of other sentences?

And a completely inconsitent perspective can still be right ?

Consistency is in the eye of the beholder. Certainly people who hold a perspective fail to see glaring inconsistencies.

your unsupported assertion that it is all a matter of opinion, perspective, etc.

I didn't say it's all a matter of opinion, but I would say it's all a matter of perspective.

I don't think David Copperfield is paid to induce false beliefs in people...

Look, I'm tired of discussing what the word "illusion" means. If you don't like what the dictionary says, take it up with the publishers. I certainly don't have any authority over the English language and I can't be blamed for the confusion it creates.

Anyway, perhaps you explain the difference between

a) learning about giraffes fro the first time by seeing one in a zoo

b) learing about giraffes for the first time by being told about them

as far as I can see, you are committed to saying that a) and b) are
both cognitive and non-phenomenal, but (a) is accompanied by a false
cognitive belief that there *is* something phenomenal going on
(inasmuch as you are not committed to saying it is all a matter of opinion).

This is so far removed from what I said, I don't even know how to comment.

Don't ask me, I've neve seen a concincing version of functionalism. Pehpas it just is a rubbish philosophy.

Every philosophy is rubbish, except our own. And I'm not arguing for functionalism, only saying you can't prove functionalism is wrong from a phenomenalist perspective. You can't make a chess movement in a game of checkers and claim your opponent's piece.

How can you refute the possibility that "qualia" is an unfamiliar way of expressing a concept you already employ ?

Sorry, I don't know what your question means.

Since a qualia are defined as "the way things seem to us", everything you have ever seen, heard, etc has been accompanied b qualia.
Loosely

If there is no "way things seem to us", then qualia doesn't exist. Can you prove there is a way things seem to us? I'm inclined to believe there are only two things: "the way things are" and "errors of perception". You could perhaps make a case that qualia is what allows errors of perception to occur, but this is opening a can of worms. If you want to open it, I can certainly help the worms come out

 

[Tournesol]

You will think this is sophistry, but I cannot observe my own qualia the way the concept is explained to me. The best I can make of the claim that qualia can be observed is that people are misinterpreting what they observe. They observe one thing and make verbal report that are not consistent. It's as if they see four objects and claim that "four" and "objects" are separate aspects of their experience. That to me is nonsense; you can't see objects without seeing how many of them there are, and you can't see "how many" without seeing how many "what".

We can conceive of "how many" separately from "what" , likewise we can
conceive of "how it seems" from "what it is". Abstraction are aspects of things
which can be conceived seapately, even thought they cannot be separated in reality. All you have shown is that qualia are abstractions, and as such no more invalid than numbers.

To me all you are saying above is that I am aware of everything I am aware of. Why in the world does a tautology matter?

Say what you like about tautologies , they are always true.

Because I interpret any statement with the word qualia as being essentially tautological.

Including
"qualia exist"
"qualia don't exist"
"qualia dream uneasily"

I really fail to see how your statement could be anything but nonsense.

 

[Faust]

Say what you like about tautologies , they are always true.

Now this is true sophistry. I define God as "that which exists", then say "God exists", and claim it's absolutely true that God exists, end of story.

Are we really having this conversation?

I really fail to see how your statement could be anything but nonsense.

Well, you have two options: keep trying, or claim it's a cop-out. Let me know what you decide, although I think I already know.

 

[Tournesol]

How can you refute the possibility that "qualia" is an unfamiliar way of expressing a concept you already employ ?

Sorry, I don't know what your question means.

It is another way of saying what *you* said in #321:

Unless "qualia" means something I already know by another name.

 

[Faust]

It is another way of saying what *you* said in #321:

So we're just going round and round in circles. I first asked what makes "qualia" different from "sensory perception". I was given the answer that philosophers invented "qualia" just so they can talk about the aspect of sensory perceptions physicalism can't account for. Now you're saying qualia and sensory perception are the same thing. What can I conclude other than someone is playing word games here?

This discussion is really getting nowhere.

 

[Fliption]

In other words, heads you win, tails I lose, right?

If a person clings to an unreasonable position or a position they cannot defend then what other option does that person allow themselves to have other than "heads you win, tails I lose?" I'd really be interested to hear how anything else is justified.

Heads you win, tails I lose, again. From your perspective, I can only answer your question by claiming to know something no one else in the world knows, which would be a confession of lunacy on my part. But if instead I choose to represent the perspective of people with whom you disagree with, then I'll be simply "copping out".

This is just propaganda that doesn't help us at all. I haven't claimed anything you've said is a cop out. I have only said that in the past, theories like the one you are proposing have been cop-outs because the people have always espoused them but then never explained how they can be true. It's like claiming that GOD exists to explain black holes and then not having to explain anything else. Don't you think this is a cop-out? It's meaningless. And as of now, you haven't laid out any reasoning to defend your position either. You did mention a few things about memory earlier and I responded to those but you have ignored those responses and instead chosen to post highlevel propaganda comments.

The best I can tell you at this point is, your perspective is bogus because it leads nowhere worth going. Let's turn the game around and give you a chance to make your case. Suppose I agree with you that I cannot see what you see; I don't agree, but let's say so for sake of argument. What's next now? Enlighten me, please. Tell me some great discovery that can be made based on the notion that I cannot see what you see.

I did not mean to imply that you and I aren't seeing the same blue. The point is that you can never know that I am seeing the same thing as you. It is a point of epistomology, not ontology. The implication of this fact is that the physicalist's objective view of the world cannot explain the existence of information that cannot be shared. The existence of subjectivity is a problem for that worldview. The implications of this topic is basic philosophy.

 

[Tournesol]

Now you're saying qualia and sensory perception are the same thing.

I did not say they were. I asked you how you could be sure that you were not aready recognising qualia, but under a different name.

Inasmuch as you still haven't answered that question (or the giraffe question) you seem to be evading the whole issue of accounting for your
own experience.

 

[Tournesol]

Now this is true sophistry. I define God as "that which exists", then say "God exists", and claim it's absolutely true that God exists, end of story.

Are we really having this conversation?

Ontological arguments may aspire to be tautologies, (and they may fail
since "that which exists" may be an idiosyncratic definition of God),
bu that doesn't mean there is anything wrong with tautologies.

Well, you have two options: keep trying, or claim it's a cop-out. Let me know what you decide, although I think I already know.

Actually, I don't think you understand what "tautology" means.

 

[Faust]

The implication of this fact is that the physicalist's objective view of the world cannot explain the existence of information that cannot be shared

Do you think a physicalist would agree with you on that?

Oh, I forget, they don't agree because they cop out.

 

[Fliption]

Do you think a physicalist would agree with you on that?

Oh, I forget, they don't agree because they cop out.

They would probably agree that subjectivity is not accounted for. They would probably then go on to argue that it isn't a problem because it's just an illusion and doesn't really exists. That's a cop-out because it doesn't explain anything. It's taking an easy way out in order to keep the world view intact. Got anything besides propaganda?

 

[Faust]

Got anything besides propaganda?

Well, I can see why you say no one ever explains things to you.

 

[Fliption]

Well, I can see why you say no one ever explains things to you.

Because I call them on their weak arguments?

Come on guy give me some reason to believe this language idea and let's move beyond this nonsense. I've already pointed out that I used the cop-out term in general and wasn't referring to you specifically. Explain why you think you're view is more reasonable than the other views being presented here.