Are semantic representations innate?

[Q_Goest]

Thinking about this a bit more… Our sensations of the world consist of input from our 5 senses, 1. sight, 2. sound, 3. touch, 4. smell, & 5. taste. Individually, these senses are actually made up of numerous individual sense from specific receptors. For example, the eye has rods and cones, perhaps millions of these, each of which send signals into the brain, either directly or indirectly by combining signals locally in the eye. So even for a single experience of sight, we find this sensation is made up of an enormous number of individual inputs from the individual rods and cones of the eye.

The next step is for the brain to take all these sensory inputs, and create a unified experience from them. This is no small feat. All of these sensations from different sensory organs, all contribute to a single, unified experience. How the brain combines all these individual sensations into a seamless whole isn’t really understood, so this issue has been given the name, “the binding problem”.

But the binding problem may actually skip a step. We may hear something at the same time we see something, at the same time we feel something. The resulting unified experience however, also includes “#8. Other bodily sensations”. I’d propose that these other bodily sensations arise when we associate a meaning with the first 5 sensory inputs. Take for example, the sensation of hearing a roar, seeing a lion, and feeling claws cut into your skin. The resulting sensations elicit the “other bodily sensation” of fear and panic. These other bodily sensations also contribute to the unified experience we have of the world, but bodily sensations often (always?) exist because of the sensory input which generate some kind of meaning.

In the case of the lion, our mind/brain associates various sensory inputs to a mental model of the world, and is able to predict an outcome. That predicted outcome generates the further bodily sensations of fear and panic. So already, with this unified experience, we have an equivalence function of sorts in the brain which takes the sensory input and equates it to something, producing a bodily sensation. And this bodily sensation is bound up into the entire experience of the world.

This experience of the world then, is more than a mental representation. We might imagine a mental representation of a lion attacking us without any bodily sensation of fear or panic. I don’t think there’s anything inconsistent about that.

Let’s define the mental representation that we have as part of our unified experience of the world as that experience created by the five senses. For now, let’s say it is devoid of other bodily sensations. Certainly, the unified experience we have of the world includes other bodily sensations. But I don’t think we need to associate these bodily sensations with the mental representation of the world.

So if we break up the experience we have of the world into a mental representation of the world (which arises through the unification of our senses) and the meaning of this mental representation, then that would seem to point to the unified experience containing meaning only after we associate other bodily sensations to this unified experience. The ‘equivalence function’ I keep after then, is this equating of the mental representation to other bodily sensations which provides meaning.

How does that sound so far? Please feel free to pick it apart. We can talk about “concepts” and other higher mental experiences later.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

I didn't say anything like "the problem of consciousness isn't real". I said that there's no point in objecting that bacteria don't have consciousness if we don't even know that other humans have consciousness.

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[CaptainQuasar]

since we are the ones that build and program the computers why wouldn't we know whether they are programmed to know 'what' they are doing?

I see no reason to think that a clever psychologist couldn't figure out a test to determine whether an animal knows 'what' it is doing or not. (as though it weren't obvious). we will someday be able to look at the wiring of the animals brain and determine whether it does or not. all well within empirical science.

To put it in your terminology, I wasn't saying that computers and animals do not know the "what", I question whether humans know the "why" any better than a computer or animal could, or if it's just that we usually have more complex "what"'s.

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[Q_Goest]

I didn't say anything like "the problem of consciousness isn't real". I said that there's no point in objecting that bacteria don't have consciousness if we don't even know that other humans have consciousness.

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oh - ok. lol

I assume you know what a p-zombie is? That's a hypothetical person with no consciousness. Someone who just acts as if they're aware of everything, but with no more experience than a rock. Although such a person is logically possible, I disagree they are naturally possible. If the phenomenon of consciousness is supervenient on my physical brain, then we would be hard pressed to suppose that the phenomenon doesn't also exist for very similar physical substrates.

To put it in your terminology, I wasn't saying that computers and animals do not know the "what", I question whether humans know the "why" any better than a computer or animal could, or if it's just that we usually have more complex "what"'s.

Here, it sounds as if you may be mixing up the concept of phenomenal consciousness and behavior. You're using the terms "what" and "why" in the colloquial way.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

I assume you know what a p-zombie is? That's a hypothetical person with no consciousness. Someone who just acts as if they're aware of everything, but with no more experience than a rock. Although such a person is logically possible, I disagree they are naturally possible. If the phenomenon of consciousness is supervenient on my physical brain, then we would be hard pressed to suppose that the phenomenon doesn't also exist for very similar physical substrates.

Yes, I know what a p-zombie is, I just wouldn't use obscure effete terms like that on the basis that I might sound like a foppish dandy. And not to mention, other participants in the conversation might be unfamiliar with them.

This is exactly what I meant about not being empirical, if you're going to simply assume that you know the presence of consciousness is due to a physical substrate present in humans but not in lower animals.

Here, it sounds as if you may be mixing up the concept of phenomenal consciousness and behavior. You're using the terms "what" and "why" in the colloquial way.

I'm not confusing them, I said I thought a definition of "concept" ought to be something that could be examined empirically. But go ahead, school me in what granpa meant by those terms.

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[granpa]

zombie? I get the idea but I'm not entirely sure what your point was so forgive me if I am off. but consider this:

atoms arent conscious. so if I construct a human being out of atoms is the result a zombie without consciousness?

 

[granpa]

To put it in your terminology, I wasn't saying that computers and animals do not know the "what", I question whether humans know the "why" any better than a computer or animal could, or if it's just that we usually have more complex "what"'s.

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computers know 'how' to do things
animals know 'what' they are doing
humans know 'why' they are doing it.

a young human who doesn't yet know 'why' is in a sense still animal-like. a talking animal thanks to our language module (read 'the language instinct').

if a computer learned to know 'what' it was doing then it would be an animal.
af an animal learned to know 'why' it was doing 'what' it was doing than it would be human. and it would be able to speak.

that is my opinion, FWIW.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

zombie? I get the idea but I'm not entirely sure what your point was so forgive me if I am off. but consider this:

atoms arent conscious. so if I construct a human being out of atoms is the result a zombie without consciousness?

Yeah, that's a very good point. It definitely seems like one of the first questions that the discussion of consciousness leads to.

The consciousness stuff wasn't directed at you at all, I was responding to Q_Goest's points that brought it into the discussion of concepts. I don't think it's really relevant, myself: I think an animal or a computer could have a concept without having consciousness, by actively constructing the mental models that I think are related to concepts.

What I was saying in the "what" versus "why" is, if the "what" is a mental model used for predictive purposes, what really distinguishes the "why" from it? It seems to me that the "why" is simply an attempt to make an extended and more complicated mental model. An attempt that appears to sometimes be successful, as in the case of much of science, and sometimes appears to be unsuccessful, as in the cases of when people attribute causes to supernatural forces.

Might cats not have some notion similar to supernatural forces out at the ends of the loose threads of their mental models? It seems to me that they might, and that this might qualify as a "why" in the possession of an animal.

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[Q_Goest]

Rather than go off course here, I’d be interested in your thoughts on post #31 where I try to define meaning. I don’t mind going off on a tangent for a bit to help explain some basic concepts, but would really appreciate if the focus of the thread remained on the idea of meaning and semantic representation.

Yes, I know what a p-zombie is, I just wouldn't use obscure effete terms like that on the basis that I might sound like a foppish dandy. And not to mention, other participants in the conversation might be unfamiliar with them.

I agree, and I wrestle with the same issue. When does the professional terminology get in the way of understanding an issue? However, as difficult as it is sometimes to understand, the terms are intended to aid in conveying a concept, so I try to define them when I don’t think they will be easily understood.

This is exactly what I meant about not being empirical, if you're going to simply assume that you know the presence of consciousness is due to a physical substrate present in humans but not in lower animals.

There’s something called the “supervenience thesis” which I think we should take as an axiom for the purposes of this thread. That thesis simply states there is a physical substrate that supports the phenomenon of consciousness, and any similar physical substrate should therefore also support consciousness. I don’t mind arguing this point, but let’s do that in another thread if you don’t mind.

I'm not confusing them, I said I thought a definition of "concept" ought to be something that could be examined empirically. But go ahead, school me in what granpa meant by those terms.

When you say, “.. I wasn't saying that computers and animals do not know the "what", I question whether humans know the "why" any better than a computer or animal could, or if it's just that we usually have more complex "what"'s.”
This might be misconstrued to imply that both computers and animals have some kind experience when they undergo physical changes in state. Computationalism recognizes there are physical changes of state and it’s the function of those changes (ie: functionalism) which gives rise to the phenomenon.

Computationalism does not say that ALL computers, or any computational physical system for that matter, will posess this phenomenon of consciousness. Note also that computationalism doesn’t say that computers are performing mathematical computations. That’s not what computers do – they don’t do math. They are only interpretable as doing math by a conscious person. Computationalism says that the interactions within some physical system can be simulated or symbolized in some way by using mathematics. There’s a big difference here. Again, if there’s some misunderstanding about this, perhaps we can start a new thread on what computationalism really means.

What I’d be very interested in is your thoughts on post #31. Any help there would be appreciated.

 

[granpa]

we know 'what' a mammal is. its an animal that has fur, warm blood, live young, legs directly below the body, and many other characteristics. but 'why' is a mammal 'what' a mmmal is? why are they so different from reptiles?

this is where the difference is.

 

[granpa]

you want to know the meaning of meaning?

what is the meaning of 'mammal'?

 

[WaveJumper]

atoms arent conscious.

I wouldn't go all the way to claiming this was true. Your consciousness resides in your brain which is made up of atoms. We have no way currently to verify your claim. It seems logical from your POV, but there is a chance that it can be wrong. This "emergent property" thing signifies nothing, it's an empty label made to fill up the great void in our understanding of consciousness. IMO there are 2 options that explain consciousness - you either believe in the thing that's not allowed to be talked about on science forums, or you believe in elementary particles that have a mind of their own and are able to construct a universe and wonderful beings. Pure uncaused randomness leading to energy turning into a universe that existed for 14 000 0000 0000 years governed by a set of laws of physics of a very unknown origin, that could harbour conscious life, is utter nonsense IMO.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

we know 'what' a mammal is. its an animal that has fur, warm blood, live young, legs directly below the body, and many other characteristics. but 'why' is a mammal 'what' a mmmal is? why are they so different from reptiles?

this is where the difference is.

Isn't the reason that a mammal is so different from a reptile because "mammal" and "reptile" are categories that were intentionally created by scientists to sort things with different characteristics into? That one, it seems to me, is definitely tied to semantics, and the "why" of the specific words would be tied into the linguistic history of English. But as for a more fundamental "why" if that's what you're asking, human models for why a variety of animals exist have ranged from the action of some creator god to modern science of evolution.

But is a concept that involves, say, a bear looking at a squirrel and being able to recognize "that thing probably came from the trees" or looking at a bird and thinking "that thing probably came from the sky" - is a human having the same concept plus an origin story involving either gods or scientifically-defined processes really materially different from what the bear thinks?

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[granpa]

Isn't the reason that a mammal is so different from a reptile because "mammal" and "reptile" are categories that were intentionally created by scientists to sort things with different characteristics into?

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one does not follow from the other. if categorise are random creations of peoples minds then one would expect that characteristics would be random. one would expect a continuum of different animals.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Responding to #31:

This experience of the world then, is more than a mental representation. We might imagine a mental representation of a lion attacking us without any bodily sensation of fear or panic. I don’t think there’s anything inconsistent about that.

In my framing this would be the mental model of a lion being used to either predict an occurrence involving either you yourself, or predict an occurrence not involving yourself. I would call fear or panic additional mental processes that serve to deal with anticipated occurrences involving yourself.

So if we break up the experience we have of the world into a mental representation of the world (which arises through the unification of our senses) and the meaning of this mental representation, then that would seem to point to the unified experience containing meaning only after we associate other bodily sensations to this unified experience.

This doesn't follow from the other things you've said, in my opinion. Mental representations of the world don't simply arise from a unification of our senses. Someone who is blind or deaf, for example, can have a very similar mental representation of the world, granting the same predictive capabilities, compared to someone who has all senses functional.

Lots of things feed into these mental representations that aren't simply sensory information - "communication", which I put in quotes because I'm talking about pieces of mental models that might come from other people, or something mentally symbolized via input from a computer or other inanimate object like a divination or augury - pigeon guts for instance, or even from a communication error - you might develop an idea, an addition to an existing mental representation, because you mis-heard something someone said.

Other things that would be building blocks of mental representations which don't derive from the senses would be things like logic or mathematics. And of course, as you yourself mention, things like panic or fear that appear to be the product of special mental processes or brain structures.

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[CaptainQuasar]

one does not follow from the other. if categorise are random creations of peoples minds then one would expect that characteristics would be random. one would expect a continuum of different animals.

If you believe in evolution or at least the fossil evidence it's partially derived from, there is a continuum of different animals, they just aren't all alive today. And there is certainly a continuum of characteristics within a particular species and there are organisms that don't fit into existing scientific categories. In botany, for example, just a few decades ago they had to tear everything apart and re-categorize it based upon genetic information and evolutionary theory.

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[granpa]

instead of asking what is 'meaning' maybe we should ask what is 'information'?

 

[CaptainQuasar]

Yes, good question. Perhaps another is, "is information a form of communication?" I don't know the answer to that.

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[granpa]

If you believe in evolution or at least the fossil evidence it's partially derived from, there is a continuum of different animals, they just aren't all alive today. And there is certainly a continuum of characteristics within a particular species and there are organisms that don't fit into existing scientific categories. In botany, for example, just a few decades ago they had to tear everything apart and re-categorize it based upon genetic information and evolutionary theory.

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of course there WAS a continuum but there isn't today. why? obviously many died. why? we arent talking about traits within a species. we are talking about the difference between different species.

as for recategorizing according to genetics, what if you had a car that was a ford and another almost identical one that was a chevy. are they not both cars? the fact that they came from 2 different sources is irrelevant. what about a green car and a blue car. are they not both cars? so classifying animals according to genetics may be useful for biologists but it isn't really a proper classification.

 

[WaveJumper]

instead of asking what is 'meaning' maybe we should ask what is 'information'?

The nature of our existence? The ability to find meaning in the sequence of elementary particles arranged in certain ways? How else would we make sense in a world ruled by QFT?
Music is a good representation of how we perceive information and reality. We are able to extract patterns of sound waves that make sense to us out of noise(all the possible sound waves).

 

[granpa]

information=pattern?

 

[CaptainQuasar]

of course there WAS a continuum but there isn't today. why? obviously many died. why? we arent talking about traits within a species. we are talking about the difference between different species.

as for recategorizing according to genetics, what if you had a car that was a ford and another almost identical one that was a ford. are they not both cars? the fact that they came from 2 different sources is irrelevant. what about a green car and a blue car. are they not both cars? so classifying animals according to genetics may be useful for biologists but it isn't really a proper classification.

It seems like you're saying that know that something is different is equivalent to knowing why something is different and that doesn't seem so to me. It just doesn't seem to me that even a complicated explanation involving scientific principles is a different order of thing, mentally, from a bear thinking "that bird probably came from the sky."

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[WaveJumper]

information=pattern?

In music yes. How else would you discern music from noise? Does "rhythm" ring a bell?

 

[CaptainQuasar]

information=pattern?

Oh, if you're talking information theory, yeah. But in that context it has nothing to do with concepts or minds at all, that sort of information exists without any mind to perceive it.

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[WaveJumper]

Oh, if you're talking information theory, yeah. But in that context it has nothing to do with concepts or minds at all, that sort of information exists without any mind to perceive it.

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Exactly, how would one relay information if it were not through specific patterns?

 

[granpa]

information is what is communicated


meaning=information perceived by a conscious mind?

 

[WaveJumper]

information is what is communicated


meaning=information perceived by a conscious mind?

Fair enough. If you were at te quantum level would you be able to make sense of the 100 000 atoms comprising the HIV virus and perceive it as an information carrier? Another reason why i believe a theory of everything will have to account for consciousness.

 

[CaptainQuasar]

information is what is communicated


meaning=information perceived by a conscious mind?

That seems like a good place to start but I should think there would be many examples of information that does not derive from communication.

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[granpa]

That seems like a good place to start but I should think there would be many examples of information that does not derive from communication.

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it was asked if anformation=communication. I stated that information IS what is communicated. I dodnt imply that only what is communicated is information.

 

[granpa]

Fair enough. If you were at te quantum level would you be able to make sense of the 100 000 atoms comprising the HIV virus and perceive it as an information carrier? Another reason why i believe a theory of everything will have to account for consciousness.

not everything is knowable.