Epistemic Perspective : Meanings ARE in the head

[Lord Ping]

An attributer attributing an attribute to an attributee must somehow identify the attributee in order to differentiate the attributee from all else. Therefore, the attributer must know both an identity of the attributee and the attribute attributed to the attributee.

This just shows you've not engaged with the topic at all. The whole question is "how do we refer"? How, in your words, do we "identify the attributee"? We have a name. The name refers; it has a referent; it has reference; it is "something's name". What is it that binds the name to the referent?

You suggest that if I have a name Godel (or Pliny, Socrates etc.) in my vocabulary, I know that, if "Godel" refers, Godel was the object to which "Godel" refers. Well yes, obviously. This is a tautology. A lot of tautologies are true of Godel. If he was a bachelor, he was unmarried. If he had two sons and two daughters, he had four children. But how is that going to help me specify the reference of Godel? It can't.

Imagine if you opened a dictionary and under "water" it said: the stuff to which the word "water" refers, if it refers. You would get a little pissed off, right? Of course, even the standard dictionary definition doesn't quite tell the whole story.

 

[basePARTICLE]

I wanted to add two points about meanings which are in the head. The first point is: using the memory system of the head, to store memories which carries meaning, is not an absolute necessity. This is true because I can transfer some of the information which will carry meaning onto paper and refer to that paper/notes when I need to resolve the meaning of something. I do this often.

The second point about meanings in the head, is to actually have meaning, some of that information has to transition into the physical world, the same physical world where Putnam claims meaning is grounded, as a result of his XYZ hypothesis, and subsequently transition back into the mental/head world. Once you claim that meanings are in the head, and you are constantly encountering problems in the real world, then it implies your meaning differs from the rest, even if your meaning may be correct.

From my earlier point which demonstrates memory as essential to meaning, together with the fact that a human in search of meaning can utilise external memory sources to abstract meaning, we find ourselves in a unique position to viewing meaning as a sum of histories.

---

The Putnam question may be rephrased as: A couple have identical twins and name both of them Sam. Who answers when Sam is called?

 

[Drachir]

Lord Ping in #61 you wrote:

The whole question is "how do we refer"? How, in your words, do we "identify the attributee"? We have a name. The name refers; it has a referent; it has reference; it is "something's name". What is it that binds the name to the referent?

To identify an attributee an attributer must first recognize one or more attributes of the attributee other than what the attributer intends to attribute to the attributee. We identify anything by its attributes, where the noun ‘attribute’ means a character, characteristic, property, or quality considered to be possessed by a group, person, thing, etc.

The binding of a name to a referent is in our heads. A name is bound to a referent by our creating or adopting the name as a word symbol for the referent and by remembering both that word and the identity of the referent. At a physical level the neurochemistries of short and long term memory produce the binding.

In that same post you also wrote

You suggest that if I have a name Godel (or Pliny, Socrates etc.) in my vocabulary, I know that, if "Godel" refers, Godel was the object to which "Godel" refers. Well yes, obviously. This is a tautology

A tautology is a needless repetition of an idea in different words. “Godel” (the name of a person) and Godel (the person so named) are not the same idea. Thus, there is no tautology.

 

[Drachir]

BasePARTICLE in #62 you wrote:

I wanted to add two points about meanings which are in the head. The first point is: using the memory system of the head, to store memories which carries meaning, is not an absolute necessity. This is true because I can transfer some of the information which will carry meaning onto paper and refer to that paper/notes when I need to resolve the meaning of something. I do this often.

Certainly we can store information in many ways other than in the head; however, such storage is symbolic and is meaningful only to someone who understands what the symbols represent. The memory system of the head is absolutely necessary not only for that understanding, but also for comprehending the intended meaning of a series of symbols such as those representing a sentence.

In that same post you wrote:

The second point about meanings in the head, is to actually have meaning, some of that information has to transition into the physical world, the same physical world where Putnam claims meaning is grounded, as a result of his XYZ hypothesis, and subsequently transition back into the mental/head world.

If by ‘physical world’ Putnam means the world outside the mind, then I disagree with his claim. The reasons for my disagreement, as given in my post #37 on page 3 of this thread, are:

Meaning presupposes significance. Significance presupposes signs.
Signs presuppose symbols. Therefore, meaning presupposes symbols.

The unknown can only be explained in terms of the known. Meaning of the unknown can only be given by meanings of the known. Therefore, meaning is equality with possessed symbols.

Any animal’s first assignment of meaning to a previously unknown thing requires inborn symbols (templates, pre-wiring, etc. of the brain).

New symbols representing specific combinations of possessed symbols can be formed and memorized (learning).

The neural system --- the connection between the mind and the world outside the mind --- is the epistemic foundation for all animals.

Meanings can only be in the head (brain).

In post #62 you also wrote:

From my earlier point which demonstrates memory as essential to meaning, together with the fact that a human in search of meaning can utilise external memory sources to abstract meaning, we find ourselves in a unique position to viewing meaning as a sum of histories.

In light of what I have previously written in this post, the use of external memory sources does not bear on the point you are trying to make. Furthermore, your conclusion does not follow merely from memory being essential to meaning. If meaning is to be viewed as a sum of histories, those histories must be the evolutionary changes that led to our brains having the ‘pre-wiring’ implied in our DNA. I consider the most eventful of those changes to be the one that allowed us to find meaning in our act of thinking and so enable us to think about our thinking. That is what made it possible for us to go from the cave to the moon.

 

[Lord Ping]

To identify an attributee an attributer must first recognize one or more attributes of the attributee other than what the attributer intends to attribute to the attributee. We identify anything by its attributes, where the noun ‘attribute’ means a character, characteristic, property, or quality considered to be possessed by a group, person, thing, etc.

This seems to be very much not the case in some of the counterfactual scenarios I have mentioned.

I can say straightforwardly: "If Aristotle had died aged two he would never have taught Alexander." What's the referent of "Aristotle" here? Not any object with any of the attributes I know the actual Aristotle to have had.

A tautology is a needless repetition of an idea in different words. “Godel” (the name of a person) and Godel (the person so named) are not the same idea. Thus, there is no tautology.

(1) "X" refers.
(2) X is the object to which "X" refers.

I thought (1) probably entails (2) here. Maybe it does, maybe not. It's not important. I didn't mean that it was a tautology. Sorry. It's a word people use too freely, like "fallacy," "clearly," "therefore" and "thus". In any case, the amazing God-like insight required to infer (2) from (1) doesn't tell us anything about how reference works. If I'm trying to account for reference, I can't just state that "X" refers, and thus that "X" refers to X - the whole point is to show how this is so. The whole point is to account for this everyday feature of our language.

"How do I account for the way in which I determine the reference of 'water'?"
"Ah, that's easy - it's water, dumbass."
"Shut up."

 

[basePARTICLE]

Certainly we can store information in many ways other than in the head; however, such storage is symbolic and is meaningful only to someone who understands what the symbols represent. The memory system of the head is absolutely necessary not only for that understanding, but also for comprehending the intended meaning of a series of symbols such as those representing a sentence.

In that same post you wrote:
If by ‘physical world’ Putnam means the world outside the mind, then I disagree with his claim. The reasons for my disagreement, as given in my post #37 on page 3 of this thread, are:
In post #62 you also wrote:
In light of what I have previously written in this post, the use of external memory sources does not bear on the point you are trying to make. Furthermore, your conclusion does not follow merely from memory being essential to meaning. If meaning is to be viewed as a sum of histories, those histories must be the evolutionary changes that led to our brains having the ‘pre-wiring’ implied in our DNA. I consider the most eventful of those changes to be the one that allowed us to find meaning in our act of thinking and so enable us to think about our thinking. That is what made it possible for us to go from the cave to the moon.

I have found a way to extend my brain into the world. It only works, that is arrive at a non-confusing state, when all the elements are connected. Yes at the point all the elements are connected, the meaning resounds in my head, but it is not resident! It is a consciously computable instant. I know certain of my meanings are part in my head, part outside my head.

You yourself claim the unknown can only be explained in terms of the known, making the case, where some explanations are derived from facts, to be analagous to what Putnam claims!

 

[basePARTICLE]

I would like to draw everyone's attention to four kinds of meanings:

(0) The meaning of life. (transcendental)
(1) The meaning of gravity aka the gravitational force. (physical)
(2) The meaning of loving someone other than yourself. (collective)
(3) The meaning of your own survival. (mental)

Does the argument meanings ARE in the head apply squarely to all four items?

 

[Drachir]

The Case of the Vanishing Referent

Lord Ping in #65 you wrote:

I can say straightforwardly: "If Aristotle had died aged two he would never have taught Alexander." What's the referent of "Aristotle" here? Not any object with any of the attributes I know the actual Aristotle to have had.

Aha! Another now you see it, now you don’t’ trick --- a kind of misdirection. In this counterfactual you are not referring to Aristotle Onassis; you are referring to Aristotle the person who taught Alexander. You hope that by not mentioning the identity of the Aristotle in the counterfactual, we will forget about his factual identity; however, we cannot. See what would have happened if you had straightforwardly identified your Aristotle in the counterfactual. It would have become “If Aristotle the person who taught Alexander had died aged two he would never have taught Alexander.” Then the referent of “Aristotle” is clearly the person who taught Alexander. One cannot use a name and deny its implications. This reasoning also applies to your Godel counterfactual.

I think there is something you are losing sight of in your counterfactual scenarios. Because they are counterfactual they are imaginary scenarios. That means that someone is doing the imagining and asking the reader to imagine with him. However, to imagine a counterfactual scenario, one must first know the facts on which it is based. Imagining the counterfactual scenario does not obliterate those facts from ones mind.

In post #65 you also wrote:

(1) "X" refers.
(2) X is the object to which "X" refers.

I thought (1) probably entails (2) here. Maybe it does, maybe not. It's not important. I didn't mean that it was a tautology. Sorry. It's a word people use too freely, like "fallacy," "clearly," "therefore" and "thus". In any case, the amazing God-like insight required to infer (2) from (1) doesn't tell us anything about how reference works. If I'm trying to account for reference, I can't just state that "X" refers, and thus that "X" refers to X - the whole point is to show how this is so. The whole point is to account for this everyday feature of our language.

Does “Ggyrxvh” refer? To answer that question we would first have to know whether it referred to anything or not. Therefore you have your sequence in reverse order. It should have been:
(1) X is the object to which “X” refers.
(2) “X” refers. (= “X” does refer)
No special insight or inference is required. (2) is given explicitly by (1).

 

[Drachir]

basePARTICLE, in #66 you wrote:

I have found a way to extend my brain into the world. It only works, that is arrive at a non-confusing state, when all the elements are connected. Yes at the point all the elements are connected, the meaning resounds in my head, but it is not resident! It is a consciously computable instant. I know certain of my meanings are part in my head, part outside my head.

I would like to understand what you have written, but I cannot. Perhaps the problem is mine. Meanwhile, since the brain is a mass of soft tissue encased in a rather rigid bony container, how can you extend your brain? Or do you really mean something other than physical extension of the brain. Please be so kind as to explain what you mean in each of your sentences, including the last sentence of your post:

You yourself claim the unknown can only be explained in terms of the known, making the case, where some explanations are derived from facts, to be analagous to what Putnam claims!

 

[Lord Ping]

In this counterfactual ... you are referring to Aristotle the person who [actually] taught Alexander.

Yes, though I have added "actually" (in the actual world, not the counterfactual possible world) for clarity.

“If Aristotle the person who [actually] taught Alexander had died aged two he would never have taught Alexander.” Then the referent of “Aristotle” is clearly the person who [actually] taught Alexander.

Yes.

The point is that, when imagining the counterfactual (some people think these possible worlds are as real as our own, but let's go with your suggestion that they are imaginary), something must specify who Aristotle-who-actually-taught-Alexander is. What's for certain is that it's not the person teaching Alexander in this possible world, because our guy is dead by this point.

Imagining the counterfactual scenario does not obliterate those facts from ones mind.

Sure, but those facts don't pick out the referent of the name in the possible world. So something else must pick out the referent - i.e. the essential properties it shares in the actual and possible worlds. Not contingent properties like being the teacher of Alexander.

 

[basePARTICLE]

<snip>

The unknown can only be explained in terms of the known. Meaning of the unknown can only be given by meanings of the known. Therefore, meaning is equality with possessed symbols.

<snip>
New symbols representing specific combinations of possessed symbols can be formed and memorized (learning).

<snip>
Meanings can only be in the head (brain).

<snip>.

Drachir, you equate meaning with posessed/memorized symbols. Why do you deny me, my symbols which I posess on paper, that gives meaning to some of my personal memories? (I hide these symbols from myself, simply because I do not need that sort of meaning resounding/rebounding in my head all the time, otherwise, I become dsyfunctional!).

Drachir, you yourself claim the unknown can only be explained in terms of the known.
Primarily, for something to be known, you should be able to show, it is indeed the configuration you posess in your head. To show this known case, you have to submit yourself to the external world, and compare/refine your meaning, which is essentially what Putnam claims - you are not a solipsist.

Here are two interpretations of meanings in your head:

(1) You can say meanings are in your head = you are a solipsist.
(2) You can say meanings are in your head = your head is a storage mechanism.

p.s. The difference to me reflects the division of labour between creating the meaning and discovering a meaning.

 

[Drachir]

Lord Ping in #70 you wrote:

“If Aristotle the person who [actually] taught Alexander had died aged two he would never have taught Alexander.” Then the referent of “Aristotle” is clearly the person who [actually] taught Alexander.

Yes.

The point is that, when imagining the counterfactual (some people think these possible worlds are as real as our own, but let's go with your suggestion that they are imaginary), something must specify who Aristotle-who-actually-taught-Alexander is. What's for certain is that it's not the person teaching Alexander in this possible world, because our guy is dead by this point.

Now, after agreeing to the idea of an imaginary world, you can’t get out of the habit of calling it a possible world. By the way, it does not follow that all imaginary worlds are possible worlds. But, I digress.

You are completely right where you wrote, “…something must specify who Aristotle-who-actually-taught-Alexander is”; however, that ‘something’ is you. You wrote a counterfactual about the historical fact that Aristotle taught Alexander. Intimately connected with that fact are other facts that you assume your readers to know: e.g., Aristotle was a philosopher of ancient Greece, and Alexander of Macedonia conquered most of his world.

The referent was implicit in your mind when you imagined and then wrote the counterfactual and is implicit in the mind of anyone that reads and imagines the counterfactual. The acts of imagining, writing, or reading a counterfactual do not in themselves produce an imaginary world in the minds of the writer or reader. If one chooses to imagine such a world one must have the facts, the counterfactual, the referent of the word ‘Aristotle’, and the imaginary world all in one’s mind simultaneously. What is shared by the real facts, the counterfactual, and the imaginary world it that they are all in the mind or a writer or reader.

Are you perhaps trying to have one foot in this world and another in that imaginary world? If it were possible for you to be in that other world, you would find that no one there would know anything about an Aristotle who taught Alexander. Maybe someone might know of a toddler named Alexander who died at age 2. They might think anyone a little addleheaded to ask about an Aristotle who taught Alexander. In their world Alexander became great because of his teacher Speusippos, who in that world switched at the last moment of his schooling to be a philosopher rather than an astronomer.

Why is it necessary that the referent in our world be the referent in their world? And why would failure to have a referent in their world imply something missing in our identification of the referent in our world, especially in light of all of this being in our own imaginations?

Meaning for our world is not to be found in imaginary other worlds. Meaning is in our heads.

 

[Drachir]

basePARTICLE, in #71 you wrote:

Drachir, you equate meaning with posessed/memorized symbols. Why do you deny me, my symbols which I posess on paper, that gives meaning to some of my personal memories? (I hide these symbols from myself, simply because I do not need that sort of meaning resounding/rebounding in my head all the time, otherwise, I become dsyfunctional!)

I do not deny you your symbols on paper. What I would deny is the notion that the symbols on paper or in computer memory are meanings. The meanings of the symbols and of certain combinations of symbols are in your head, in your subconscious memory. At anyone time we can only be conscious of an extremely small portion of all that is in our memory. I use external symbol storage as a backup method to prevent loss of information in the event of memory failure, whether mine or the computer’s.

In that post you also wrote:

Drachir, you yourself claim the unknown can only be explained in terms of the known. Primarily, for something to be known, you should be able to show, it is indeed the configuration you posess in your head. To show this known case, you have to submit yourself to the external world, and compare/refine your meaning, which is essentially what Putnam claims - you are not a solipsist.

Fundamentally, knowledge is recallable memory. If you cannot recall where you put something, then you do not know where it is. If you cannot recall a poem, you do not know the poem. If you cannot recall your last thought, you do not know your last thought. For something to be known you should be able to recall it from memory; no reference to the external world is required for that. Furthermore, if one has knowledge of and finds meaning in abstractions such as the class of all classes, one need not submit oneself to the external world and compare/refine ones meaning. In that case submission to the external world and comparison/refinement would be meaningless.

One can, of course, have erroneous or insufficient knowledge of something. Correction of those deficiencies often requires access to the external world. Be aware, also, that some new knowledge can be acquired by ones own thinking. Euler’s relationship e^(i*pi) –1=0
is a good example. He was able to derive and validate that relationship with his own knowledge without reference to his external world. He did not have to submit himself to his external world to compare/refine his meaning in that now famous equation. Are you sure that Putnam would essentially claim otherwise?

In that post you also wrote:

Here are two interpretations of meanings in your head:

(1) You can say meanings are in your head = you are a solipsist.
(2) You can say meanings are in your head = your head is a storage mechanism.

An interpretation gives the meaning of something. Let’s see if your interpretations give valid meanings.

A solipsist is one who believes that only the self exists and that everything else is a figment of the self’s imagination. Therefore, merely believing that meanings are in the head does not imply solipsism. Thus, since (1) is false it fails as an interpretation of meanings in ones head.

As I wrote earlier in #37

Meaning presupposes significance.

Significance implies a being to which something can be significant: the self for example. That self resides in the head, as do also consciousness, the subconscious, the memory storage mechanisms, the memory retrieval mechanisms, the memory manipulation mechanisms, etc., etc. Therefore, the head is much more than merely a storage mechanism. Therefore (2) is also false and fails as an interpretation of meanings in ones head. How about the following:

(3) You can say meanings are in your head = you are catching on to the point of this thread.

 

[basePARTICLE]

I do not deny you your symbols on paper. What I would deny is the notion that the symbols on paper or in computer memory are meanings.

Drachir, would you deny me a collection of symbols that give meaning?

He was able to derive and validate that relationship with his own knowledge without reference to his external world. He did not have to submit himself to his external world to compare/refine his meaning in that now famous equation. Are you sure that Putnam would essentially claim otherwise?

Hmm, as a solipsist, he accomplished quite a lot, but what bothers me is why are you talking about his meaning, and how did you come about to be sporting Euler in your head?

Drachir, I think there is some thing you are hiding from me, something like a hidden variable, working along with, your meanings in the head thing!

 

[Drachir]

basePARTICLE, in #74 you asked:

Drachir, would you deny me a collection of symbols that give meaning?

I cannot deny you anything, nor would I want to. If you want to think that symbols give meaning, fine. Maybe it’s just a language thing that separates us. For me a symbol is merely a token or placeholder. When we sense a symbol it stimulates our mind to find the memory (or memories) we have previously associated with that symbol. Without such previous association a symbol would be meaningless. I have never studied any language that uses the Cyrillic alphabet. Their symbols and combinations of symbols, whether written or spoken, are meaningless for me. If I were to learn the Russian language, i.e. put it into my memory, then its symbols would be meaningful to me. Perhaps my saying that symbols stand in place for meanings equates with your saying that symbols give meaning. Perhaps your use of ‘gives meaning’ is metaphoric, much as would be ‘leads to meaning’.

You also wrote:

Hmm, as a solipsist, he accomplished quite a lot, but what bothers me is why are you talking about his meaning, and how did you come about to be sporting Euler in your head?

I wrote about his meaning because it is an example of an idea whose meaning is not suggested by the world outside the mind. Euler is never far from my conscious mind because I studied advanced engineering math and at one time worked as an electronics engineer.

You also wrote:

Drachir, I think there is some thing you are hiding from me, something like a hidden variable, working along with, your meanings in the head thing!

Are you suggesting an ulterior motive? Not at all. I have been interested in epistemology since the late 50’s and its relationship to neurology since the mid 70’s. My mind is even open to presently unexplainable ways of knowing. I have always had a desire to understand all kinds of things. I think that knowledge should always be shared and frequently tested.

 

[octelcogopod]

octelcogopod in #43 you wrote:
I think you have it reversed. Spoken language facilitated abstract thought. The idea to represent a spoken word by a graphic symbol is an abstract idea that had to arise before there could ever be written language. Written language was a side effect of abstract thought.

Ah, that seems correct. But I do think that without the evolution of written symbols we would not be able to have evolved to this level of clarity in our abstract thought.
I think it may have had a snowballing effect, we started with symbols for the sun, clouds and other things we saw in nature and that snowballed to creating a proper language while both things developed at the same time (abstract thought and language.)
Certainly the way humans create symbols in their heads has gone on way before written language, but I do think the development of written language helped us get practice and gain intelligence. Same with knowledge, the more we read the more our brain understands a concept, so it's like a large web of symbols that represent meaning to each other, and this web grows with the vocabulary of the person..

In the same post you also wrote:

Words are not physical things; they are mental symbols we use to represent meanings stored in the brain. I am sure your considering words to be physical things is simply a mistake. A real inability to distinguish between physical things and mental things is a form of psychosis.

Well, what I meant by physical was that we write them down and they become ink on paper. Or we speak them out and they become audible soundwaves. I do not think we would be able to develop a language without the physical components.

In the same post you also wrote:

Fortunately we have never been without language. Bacteria communicate with a chemical language. Birds communicate aurally with their calls, visually with their body language, and with their touch language. We, too, have always communicated with visual, aural, and touch languages.

That's true.

You are right though. An abstraction would be is pretty useless if it didn’t have a word to represent its meaning. We can recall visual memories to recognize what apples, roses, sunsets, and blood have in common or to recognize what egg yolks, ripe bananas, and ripe lemons have in common without the use of words. However, without words to represent the meanings of those common properties it becomes difficult to recognize what those common properties have in common. Without words it would be impossible to recognize the meanings represented by the words ‘Physics Forums.’

Yeah, so my thought was that all abstract thought means is we separate a unique quality in reality, and see it independently of everything else.
Written language helps the brain create clear distinctions between these qualities, and in essence everything that exists is created a word for, and a meaning.
This meaning is derived from the person seeing it, hearing it, touching it and so forth, and then other words are used to describe it again, along with the inherent experience of it via the senses.

I hope that makes sense to everyone.

 

[basePARTICLE]

When we sense a symbol it stimulates our mind to find the memory (or memories) we have previously associated with that symbol. Without such previous association a symbol would be meaningless.

That is beautifully expressed as far as my neural model can tell. I would defer though, to a statement which finalized the sequence using, Without such previous association a symbol would be without referent. I accept this necessary condition.

Perhaps your use of ‘gives meaning’ is metaphoric, much as would be ‘leads to meaning’.

Very true,the term, leads to meaning, gives an indication that all paths converge at the mental state of consciously knowing, what message, a symbol or group of symbols intend to convey. Because a message is a symbol or group of symbols, the base symbols are known signals.

So we can have something called meaning, and this is where your philosophy stops, Drachir, with the claim that meanings are in the head because the base symbols are known head signals.

I agree with you, but I ask again about the hidden variables that allowed Euler entry into your book of subsequent meanings. In other words meanings are in the head does not explain everything about what we humans call - meaning.