octelcogopod said:
But still, the problem is separate in that we have explained a lot with science, but we still can't comprehend anything subjective, mental or anything related to consciousness.
What science is explaining is our representation of the world.
Amen to that
To give another twist to the "what is pain like" or better, "is there pain", consider the following gedanken experiment. Consider that there is a person, which is experiencing pain. Or at least, it's a normal person, you hit his feet with a hammer, and he tells you that it hurts. You can relate to that, and so it seems to be a reasonable assumption for you to assume that, indeed, he has pain.
Now, cut away more and more pieces of body of that person (its a *gedanken* experiment, all right ?

). Replace all functionally necessary parts of his body with machines. You start by replacing his foot, and you connect, to the nerves ending there, the right stimulus generator for them to be identical to what happens when you hit his foot with a hammer. You can consider him having each time you do that, pain.
In the end, you'll just have a big machine and a piece of brain left.
That brain is "having pain", although there's now for you no way to really know, given that the "person" has no means of expression anymore.
You can now even start to eliminate parts of the brain that are supposed not to have anything to do with feet or pain, and replace them with rudimentary processing power in order to keep the "rest of the brain functionning".
In the end you have a small piece of brain left, the "pain center" or whatever, and a machine around it. Is that small piece of brain tissue now "experiencing pain" ? Imagine you analyse its neurological structure and stimuli, and you find that yes, it is (of course, by construction) still stimulated, and reacting, exactly as it was inside of the brain of the person when he was still a "whole". You can now carefully remove more and more tissue, replacing it with more and more processors. In the end, there's nothing left, but a machine. Is it now the machine which has pain ?
Imagine you can model this on a computer. If you run this simulation program on a computer, does the computer now "have pain" ?
If you write the entire memory dump on a disk, during the entire simulation, is the disk now "having pain" ?
See, we can (in principle) model entirely the physical situation, with all physiology and input/output reactions and so on understand all that, know exactly how things are physically going to react... and you will not have found the slightest clue of what subjective experience has really been experienced - or not.
As I sometimes say, jokingly: how do you know that a stone, when you cut it, doesn't feel pain ?