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Today's hearing with the FBI.
The discussion centers around the implications of encryption technology and the proposed idea of implementing backdoors for law enforcement access. It involves perspectives on security, privacy, and the potential consequences of weakening encryption, with references to a recent hearing involving the FBI and various political figures.
Participants express differing views on the necessity and implications of backdoors in encryption technology. There is no consensus on whether such measures would enhance or undermine safety and privacy.
The discussion reflects a range of opinions on the balance between security needs and privacy rights, with various assumptions about the effectiveness and risks of encryption and backdoors remaining unaddressed.
Greg Bernhardt said:This is a 2 hour video. Got cliff notes for us![]()
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/second-crypto-war-hearing-washington/Amy Hess, the FBI's executive assistant director for science and technology, reiterated to the House Committee on Oversight & Government Reform the bureau’s decades-old fear of “going dark” because encryption will make criminal investigations more difficult.
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“We’re certainly not going to go dark,” Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah) responded. “And in many ways we’ve never been brighter.”
"Creating a technological backdoor just for good guys is technologically stupid," said Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.), a Stanford University computer science graduate. "That's just stupid."
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Conley cited upskirt photos, child pornography, and even the Boston Marathon bomber criminal case as reasons to forbid encryption without a backdoor, though he didn’t provide support in his brief remarks.
Conley also said Apple and Google are "protecting those who rape, assault, and kill" with their encryption policies. Both companies encrypt their mobile operating systems by default.
Leiu took exception to those remarks and said he was offended by Conley's assertions. Conley then proposed that a backdoor be implemented on personal devices but corporate networks be allowed to keep strong encryption with no "golden keys."