News Biden & Graham Debate Iraq: 1/7/07 on Meet the Press

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The debate between Senators Biden and Graham on Meet the Press highlighted the complexities of the Iraq situation, with Biden advocating for a political solution and Graham emphasizing the need to prevent a civil war. The discussion raised doubts about Iraq's potential for recovery, questioning whether the U.S. should continue its involvement or withdraw and let Iraqis take control. Concerns were expressed about the implications of a U.S. withdrawal, including the possibility of increased chaos and anti-U.S. sentiment. The military community's growing skepticism about the war's success was noted, alongside the challenges posed by sectarian divisions in Iraq. Ultimately, the conversation underscored the urgent need for a viable political resolution to end the ongoing violence.
  • #301
chemisttree said:
I consider Bill Richardson's stance on Iraq 'running'. Out in six months... no residual force.
That's pretty clear to me... no strawman.

Okay, there are certainly people who want immediate withdrawal, like a lone governer, but no one of consequence in the deciding body of the democrats supports this. You won't hear this from Congress or the leading Presidental candidates. In fact they have specifically addressed this issue many times. However, you will hear the Reps spin this position every time. The Bush admin has sought to portray any plan to leave, ever, as running.
 
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  • #302
Sen Jim Webb just returned from Iraq and offers his opinions and observations, on Meet the Press:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032608/

Here is the republican's version of not running:
...if you want bases in Iraq for the next 50 years, which is what the Republican leadership now is finally openly saying—Mitch McConnell said it on the Senate floor several weeks ago, “This, this should look like Korea 50 years from now”—then you’re going to have one sort of approach, which you ought to be open about it. So we’re voting for these things, where in there you have money that’s directed toward ongoing operations, but you have all these other sorts of things as well, and so, you know, the question becomes how you draw the line.[continued]
 
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  • #303
Ivan Seeking said:
Sen Jim Webb just returned from Iraq and offers his opinions and observations, on Meet the Press:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032608/
Senator Webb is far and away the most responsible voice on the war in the Democratic party. [disclosure] he's my senator [/disclosure]. He's a serious guy and makes serious critiques. You won't find him taking snide cheap shots at the US like say, all the rest of the D. party: Harry "the War is lost" Reid, Dick "www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/21/AR2005062101654.html"[/URL] Durbin . Schummer, Dean, etc., none of them belong in the same room w/ Webb.
 
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  • #304
Ivan Seeking said:
Okay, there are certainly people who want immediate withdrawal, like a lone governer, but no one of consequence in the deciding body of the democrats supports this. You won't hear this from Congress or the leading Presidental candidates. In fact they have specifically addressed this issue many times. However, you will hear the Reps spin this position every time. The Bush admin has sought to portray any plan to leave, ever, as running.

I guess you and I have a different idea of what is meant by 'no one of consequence'. I consider anyone running for president and their supporters to be 'someone'.

And... you were pretty quick with the strawman slap.
 
  • #305
The current situation in Iraq: Iraq's government rules the Green Zone in Baghdad. Most of the decrease in violence is due to US troops, segregating warring parties from each other in separate walled neighborhoods, and local militias. Refugees are beginning to trickle back into Iraq only to find their old neighborhood is completely changed and may not want them.

Iraq Calmer, But More Divided

Baghdad Safer, But It's A Life Behind Walls

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-refugees_sly_dec09,1,3438242.story

Which brings up a big question about when/if to end the surge.
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hEXlu9vmLmZ2TVuVVbn9v_gtnGnwD8TE134G1

The first test comes within the next 2 to 4 weeks when the British pull out of Southern Iraq. Although mostly Shiite, even the Shiites are broken up into local militias that have maintained somewhat of a truce. It will be interesting to see if the truce between different militia groups holds after the British troops are gone.
 
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  • #306
First, we (and really more so the Iraqis) are screwed pretty much either way, thanks Georgey. Second, the Sunnis and Shiites have been fighting forever, we didnt start that, and likely it won't stop anytime soon.
 
  • #307
binzing said:
First, we (and really more so the Iraqis) are screwed pretty much either way, thanks Georgey. Second, the Sunnis and Shiites have been fighting forever, we didnt start that, and likely it won't stop anytime soon.

Saying Sunnis and Shiis have been fighting forever is like saying Chinese and Uyghur, Roman Catholic and Orthodox, or Scottish and English communities have been fighting forever. A country's prospects for success doesn't depend on some cheap shot about a religious, ethnic or cultural division. Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'a have spent most of their millenia and a half long history under a unified political system, be it Arab, Persian or Turk, and have done so without wiping one another out. The same goes for other countries with huge Shi'a or Sunni minorities, like Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, etc.
 
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  • #308
binzing said:
First, we (and really more so the Iraqis) are screwed pretty much either way, thanks Georgey. Second, the Sunnis and Shiites have been fighting forever, we didnt start that, and likely it won't stop anytime soon.

Pelt said:
Saying Sunnis and Shiis have been fighting forever is like saying Chinese and Uyghur, Roman Catholic and Orthodox, or Scottish and English communities have been fighting forever. A country's prospects for success doesn't depend on some cheap shot about a religious, ethnic or cultural division. Iraqi Sunnis and Shi'a have spent most of their millenia and a half long history under a unified political system, be it Arab, Persian or Turk, and have done so without wiping one another out. The same goes for other countries with huge Shi'a or Sunni minorities, like Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, etc.

I tend to agree with Pelt's post more than binzing. The last serious fight between Sunnis and Shiites was over 200 years ago.

That doesn't mean that there still aren't some serious tensions between the two groups. Whether those tensions would eventually bubble up to the surface regardless of Iraq is debatable, but Iraq definitely makes the Sunni-Shiite divide one of the major fears among Arabs.

Sunni-Shiite Tension Called Region's 'Most Dangerous Problem'

Choosing a Sect

Right now, Arab states themselves are doing more to diffuse the issue than the US is:
The Sunni-Shiite Folly (the article focuses more on the US role, but mentions how Arab states have reacted to the situation).
 
  • #309
In fact, at least for the next 13 months, I'd say the Middle East is pretty much on its own to resolve its own problems, a fact that's not been lost on them. Tough to say exactly how things will play out, but US influence will probably be less important in Jan 2009 than it is today. As far as Iraq goes, that might be good - withdrawal won't be a disaster for the region as a whole. As far as the Middle East goes, it's hard to tell how reduced influence will affect the US. One thing is almost certain - Bush will be one of the most significant Presidents in US history. His policies will affect us one way or the other for decades to come.

Friendlier hands across the Gulf - Arab countries are at least as concerned about nuclear weapons in Iran as the US is, but they're not relying on the US to resolve the issue.

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/872/op5.htm - Why Egyptians think Arabs should think seriously of striking a strategic alliance with Iran.

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iN4qVW4CTNToVdVroXL2KcFT04wA - Throwing stones at Satan may seem like strange diplomacy, but it's the first time since 1991 that Iranians have been allowed to stone Satan in Saudi Arabia.

http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2007/12/21/2008_year_of_weakness_and_confusion/1583/ - Why Arab nations are looking to solve their own problems.

Middle East 2008: A fallow year - Yet another view of what's to be expected in 2008.

The End of the Bush Doctrine - How Israel sees US policy in the coming year and beyond affecting them.
 
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  • #310
The last serious fight between Sunnis and Shiites was over 200 years ago.
The Sunni/Shii conflict seems to come up in the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980's. Although oil, land and secular vs religious-based (theocracy) society was also part of the equation. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did apparently support Iraq over concern of Iran's (predominantly Shia) influence in the region.

Saying Sunnis and Shiis have been fighting forever is like saying Chinese and Uyghur, Roman Catholic and Orthodox, or Scottish and English communities have been fighting forever.
Perhaps Catholic vs Protestant (in N. Ireland) would be a more appropriate analogy.
 
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  • #311
Astronuc said:
The Sunni/Shii conflict seems to come up in the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980's.

Except when you figure that the bulk of the Iraqi Army was Shia and the front largely remained along the borders of Shia-majority Iraqi provinces.

Although oil, land and secular vs religious-based (theocracy) society was also part of the equation. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did apparently support Iraq over concern of Iran's (predominantly Shia) influence in the region.

Yet there's not much of a radar blip before the 1979 Revolution.

Perhaps Catholic vs Protestant (in N. Ireland) would be a more appropriate analogy.

Not sure how. Northern Ireland's troubles begin with a lasting ethnoreligious and political struggle between Britain and Ireland that lasted for centuries. There's no comparable political situation in the history of Arab, Persian and Turkish rule of the Middle East. I brought up those other analogies because they were apt ones; they're historical to contemporary spurts of animosity between two groups that have, for most of their history, lived peaceably with one another.
 
  • #312
My point was that they have been fighting for a long time, not about exact dates. Also, I was going to throw in the Catholic Protestant analogy (or for that matter any other similar situation) but didn't bother because it is an obvious one.
 
  • #313
binzing said:
My point was that they have been fighting for a long time, not about exact dates. Also, I was going to throw in the Catholic Protestant analogy (or for that matter any other similar situation) but didn't bother because it is an obvious one.

I'd argue there's a difference between a few fights scattered across centuries and a continuous, generational struggle.
 
  • #314
Except when you figure that the bulk of the Iraqi Army was Shia and the front largely remained along the borders of Shia-majority Iraqi provinces.
I believe most Shia were conscripted and if they didn't serve, then someone or someone's family would be killed. IIRC, the officer corps were primarily Sunni. The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units tended to be Sunni from tribes associated or allied with Saddam Hussein.

Those Shia-majority Iraqi provinces just happened to be along the border of Iran and Iraq.
Yet there's not much of a radar blip before the 1979 Revolution.
No, it seems Rezh Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein tolerated each other. There was no love between Khomeini and Hussein.

Not sure how. Northern Ireland's troubles begin with a lasting ethnoreligious and political struggle between Britain and Ireland that lasted for centuries. There's no comparable political situation in the history of Arab, Persian and Turkish rule of the Middle East.
Well, the Sunni-Shii conflict (animosity) seems to be a more recent development along the lines of the more recent troubles between Catholic and Protestant in N. Ireland.

I do think that one can find parallels of ethno-religious and political struggle in the Middle East and the British-Irish conflicts, however the situation in ME is much more complicated given the larger area and number of ethnic groups. There were periods of dominance by one ethnic group, e.g. the various Persian Empires, then the ascendancy of the Arab influence and Islam starting around 633 (and fall of the Persian Empire), then the Ottoman Empire, then the European colonialization. The various Imperial powers and European colonial powers tended to exploit populations along ethnic, tribal and/or religious lines.

I don't imply that the conflict of Sunni and Shii was inevitable nor has it been historically wide spread, but I do think that there are individuals who have exploited the perceived differences once the control of Saddam Hussein and his regime was removed.
 
  • #315
Astronuc said:
I believe most Shia were conscripted and if they didn't serve, then someone or someone's family would be killed.

The same can be said of Iran's armed forces.

IIRC, the officer corps were primarily Sunni. The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units tended to be Sunni from tribes associated or allied with Saddam Hussein.

Not only were they were Sunni, but they were heavily from Tikrit and Mosul. Neither of which changes the fact that the bulk of killing on the field occurred between Shiis.

Those Shia-majority Iraqi provinces just happened to be along the border of Iran and Iraq.

Which doesn't change the fact that the bulk of the fighting occurred in Shia-majority provinces.

No, it seems Rezh Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein tolerated each other. There was no love between Khomeini and Hussein.

Which has nothing to do with a Sunni-Shia dispute.

Well, the Sunni-Shii conflict (animosity) seems to be a more recent development along the lines of the more recent troubles between Catholic and Protestant in N. Ireland.

Much of the Sunni-Shia animosity stems from the old Tikrit and Mosul monopoly of military power after 1932. That said, it differs significantly from Northern Ireland not only in intensity over the duration but in the lack of background contest between two sovereigns driving the animosity.

I do think that one can find parallels of ethno-religious and political struggle in the Middle East and the British-Irish conflicts, however the situation in ME is much more complicated given the larger area and number of ethnic groups.

More importantly, Middle Eastern politics and borders are historically more fluid than continuous evolution seen in the Irish-British conflict.

There were periods of dominance by one ethnic group, e.g. the various Persian Empires, then the ascendancy of the Arab influence and Islam starting around 633 (and fall of the Persian Empire), then the Ottoman Empire, then the European colonialization. The various Imperial powers and European colonial powers tended to exploit populations along ethnic, tribal and/or religious lines.

Well Persia never really fell, and remained more or less a power unto itself aside from a five century interlude starting in the 11th century. A Persian Empire in one form or another existed alongside the Ottoman Empire all the way into the 20th century. Moreover, her independence found an unusual benefactor in an Anglo-Russian contest for influence in Iran.
 
  • #316
Astronuc said:
I don't imply that the conflict of Sunni and Shii was inevitable nor has it been historically wide spread, but I do think that there are individuals who have exploited the perceived differences once the control of Saddam Hussein and his regime was removed.
True. Under Hussein, Iraq was quite secular and tribal differences were perhaps more important than religious differences. Religious fundamentalism would have posed a threat to his power. With him out of the picture, and with an ineffectual puppet government in place, the influence of the clerics and tribal leaders become important, and the intricate mix of loyalties creates a volatile, dangerous situation that could destablilize the entire region. Dick Cheney knew this years ago when he explained Bush I's decision to leave Hussein in power. Somehow he managed to forget all this when he became VP, though.
 
  • #317
Astronuc said:
No, it seems Rezh Pahlavi and Saddam Hussein tolerated each other. There was no love between Khomeini and Hussein.

Well, the Sunni-Shii conflict (animosity) seems to be a more recent development along the lines of the more recent troubles between Catholic and Protestant in N. Ireland.

Pelt said:
Which has nothing to do with a Sunni-Shia dispute.

Actually, it does. The tensions stay under the surface as long as everyone knows their place. Shiites in Sunni countries sit pretty low in the pecking order.

Khomeini coming to power caused problems for all the Sunni states - he stirred up Shiites in the entire region and the Shia in Sunni countries started wanting a fairer distribution of wealth and rights. Actually, Khomeini called for the overthrow of governments that were becoming too secular and westernized, including the overthrow of Hussein, but most countries diffused the issue by improving conditions for Shiites at least a little (a lot more Shiites listened to Khomeini than Sunnis). Hussein obviously had his own way of dealing with troublesome Shiites.

If Hussein had actually won his war with Iran, he would have been immensely popular with other Sunni leaders - a nice side benefit to expanding his oil fields.

Hussein's primary motivation had nothing to do with Sunni-Shiite relations, but those relations did have a lot to do with setting up favorable conditions for an invasion.
 
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  • #318
Everyone is correct, in a way.
During the 1980's the Muslim Middle East was falling out of love with with Nasser's secular Pan-Arab nationalism, which was (and still is, to an extent) the moral basis for most of the Arab regimes. Iran's theocratical revolution presented an alternative to Nasser's secular nationalism. As such, fundamentalist Iran was deemed a risk to the stability of these regimes and the Middle East in general. That is why in the Iraq-Iran war, Iraq was backed by virtually the entire ME and the West.
Of course no theory is complete without an exception, portrayed by Syria. The reason this apparent poster boy for pan-Arab nationalism is allied with its traditional enemies, is its unnatural Allawite leadership.
 
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  • #319
I think you all have confused about Iraq. You think that there's something wrong about the ethnics in Iraq. You think that Hussein was strongly conscious about his decisions and you think so much that make you confused at last. There's not so much thing to think about.

According to me, the point that you missed is "Education". These people are all ignorant ! They shoot each other for such unsensible reasons bcs of their ignorance.

So instead of ruining their civilization, we should help them to build up their buildings and cities again. I'm so sorry bcs I used to remember Baghdad with its famous roads, carpets, Alaaddin and palaces from ancient times.

I compare Iraq with Japan just after the WWII. Japanese people wasn't ignorant at all to build it up everything again.
So all world has to use their sources to help Iraq people to build up their civilization.
 
  • #320
BobG said:
Actually, it does. The tensions stay under the surface as long as everyone knows their place. Shiites in Sunni countries sit pretty low in the pecking order.

Um, Syria?

Khomeini coming to power caused problems for all the Sunni states - he stirred up Shiites in the entire region and the Shia in Sunni countries started wanting a fairer distribution of wealth and rights.

That actually never happened. Quite the contrary. Ayatollah Khomeini never gained a Shia constituency outside of Iran (you can thank the legacy of the Safavids for this). His revolution has been an unmitigated failure in that respect. One of the main reasons why is because Arabs ain't Persians and Arab Shiis see no reason to bow and scrape before Qom when they have Najaf. On top of that, the Syrian Allawites have very little to gain by acknowledging the religious leadership of the 12er Shia. If you need a crude analogy, Shiites are like Protestants to Catholics, only the Catholics lacked any sort of episcopal structure to their faith to start with and the Shia aren't even close to ecumenical amongst themselves.

Actually, Khomeini called for the overthrow of governments that were becoming too secular and westernized, including the overthrow of Hussein, but most countries diffused the issue by improving conditions for Shiites at least a little (a lot more Shiites listened to Khomeini than Sunnis).

Most countries? Most of the theocratic Gulf States, if any, have made any moves towards improving the treatment of their Shia subjects. 5er Shiis make up the plurality of Yemeni Muslims, and they're treated brutally by the government. Pakistan and Afghanistan have enjoyed comparatively peaceful relationships between their large Shia minorities and the Sunni majority. I don't see any evidence whatsoever that the 1979 revolution accompanied societal shifts in countries with large Shia populations.

Hussein obviously had his own way of dealing with troublesome Shiites.

And Sunnis (Kurdish and Arab). Simply following Sunni tradition didn't place you in a higher caste in Baathist Iraqi society. You were from Tikrit or Mosul, a loyal Ba'athist, and probably a butcher. Your faith was simply incidental to your place of birth.

If Hussein had actually won his war with Iran, he would have been immensely popular with other Sunni leaders - a nice side benefit to expanding his oil fields.

I'm sure Hussein believed that as strongly as be believed he could split the Persian Sunnis off from the main body (another overestimation of Sunni-Shia animosity?). Neither dream came to pass, and either way the Gulf States benefited from loans to Baghdad. It remains an open question as to whether or not the GCC would've tolerated, let alone celebrated, a Baathist strategic success in that war.

Hussein's primary motivation had nothing to do with Sunni-Shiite relations, but those relations did have a lot to do with setting up favorable conditions for an invasion.

Had a lot to do with Sunni-Shia relations? The man lost Khuzestan for precisely because he gambled that an invasion would rally Sunni Arabs in Iran to his cause. In the end, nationality or fear or whatever won out and the Iranians pushed the Iraqis out two years later.
 
  • #321
Hiya Pelt, I'm glad to see someone so well versed in the history of the region. I agree there's more to this than merely religious feuds, but surely you acknowledge that, at least so far as the Iranian leadership is concerned, politics and religion are inseperable - just as politics and ethnicity are inseperable in today's Middle East.

Pelt said:
Had a lot to do with Sunni-Shia relations? The man lost Khuzestan for precisely because he gambled that an invasion would rally Sunni Arabs in Iran to his cause. In the end, nationality or fear or whatever won out and the Iranians pushed the Iraqis out two years later.
I'd say in the end http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_executions_of_Iranian_prisoners" ...
 
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  • #322
Yonoz said:
Hiya Pelt, I'm glad to see someone so well versed in the history of the region.

It's a great region to study for folks interested in a variety of things. It's the Crimea of the 21st century (at least until Crimea gets interesting again).

I agree there's more to this than merely religious feuds, but surely you acknowledge that, at least so far as the Iranian leadership is concerned, politics and religion are inseperable

Most definitely. Post-1979 Iranian grand strategy is as inherently religious as it is unrealized. Unfortunately, it hasn't changed.

- just as politics and ethnicity are inseperable in today's Middle East.

I tend to look down on this generalization, though. Ethnic identity plays on a second tier to national, tribal and even religious identity in the region. Consider Iran--it's only compelling unifying characteristic demographically is a slight majority of Persians, a 70 percent Iranic speaking population, and 90 percent adherence to some Shia tradition (adherence to the state's 12er faith is uncertain). That still leaves a Sunni Arab population just under two thirds the size of Iraq's total Sunni community (Arab and Kurd). Nevertheless, Azeris (some 16 million) formed a core base of support for Khomeini in 1979, and urbanized Azeris and Persians mingle freely. In Iran, religion is a more important source of identity than your ancestral tongue.

Ethnic identity pops up in only two internationally significant areas of the Middle East--Kurdistan (a threeway between Turks, Arabs and Kurds) and Sudan.

I'd say in the end http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_executions_of_Iranian_prisoners" ...

Ah, but consider that in 1980 MEK--who drew their fighters from Persian and Azeri communities--calculated that it would be a great idea to join forces with Hussein while the actual Sunni Arabs living closest to the cavalry didn't so much as lift a finger. If fear won out, it would be one of the rare times where a community on the out and closest to safe embrace of a future ally had more caution than an isolated, yet persistent band of malcontents in the dominant culture. 1988 might've cowered some (though MEK keeps plugging on), but Iraq had already quit Iranian territory in 1982.
 
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  • #323
It is an exciting, though sometimes terrible, unravelling of a chapter of history. Would you mind describing the parallels with Crimea? Perhaps another thread would be a better stage for that.

Pelt said:
I tend to look down on this generalization, though. Ethnic identity plays on a second tier to national, tribal and even religious identity in the region. Consider Iran--it's only compelling unifying characteristic demographically is a slight majority of Persians, a 70 percent Iranic speaking population, and 90 percent adherence to some Shia tradition (adherence to the state's 12er faith is uncertain). That still leaves a Sunni Arab population just under two thirds the size of Iraq's total Sunni community (Arab and Kurd). Nevertheless, Azeris (some 16 million) formed a core base of support for Khomeini in 1979, and urbanized Azeris and Persians mingle freely. In Iran, religion is a more important source of identity than your ancestral tongue.

Ethnic identity pops up in only two internationally significant areas of the Middle East--Kurdistan (a threeway between Turks, Arabs and Kurds) and Sudan.
Agreed - it was a generalization for simplicity's sake. "Ethnicity" is too narrow a definition, but I cannot think of a single, unified definition that accurately describes these "identity" groups.

Pelt said:
Ah, but consider that in 1980 MEK--who drew their fighters from Persian and Azeri communities--calculated that it would be a great idea to join forces with Hussein while the actual Sunni Arabs living closest to the cavalry didn't so much as lift a finger. If fear won out, it would be one of the rare times where a community on the out and closest to safe embrace of a future ally had more caution than an isolated, yet persistent band of malcontents in the dominant culture. 1988 might've cowered some (though MEK keeps plugging on), but Iraq had already quit Iranian territory in 1982.
Indeed, however in retrospect one can argue those Sunni Arabs understood the Iranian's regime's resolve in dealing with fifth columns, and realized joining Hussein's "cavalry" is a risk not worth taking, particularly for Sunnis. In that perspective - fear most definitely won out.

EDIT: On a side note, I don't know what those MEK fighters were thinking. They certainly did not "calculate" - anyone who does the maths realizes there will always be that "morning after". I suppose they were an idealist lot. Socialists...
 
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  • #324
Yonoz said:
It is an exciting, though sometimes terrible, unravelling of a chapter of history. Would you mind describing the parallels with Crimea? Perhaps another thread would be a better stage for that.

Another thread probably would be appropriate, but suffices to say that Crimea had all the major players we see today--a large Muslim continental power seeking hegemony over some strategic chokepoint (straits instead of oil), the West, Russia, and a mix of interesting peoples (around the Black Sea rather than the Persian Gulf). Only this time around the roles are reversed and the Muslim empire--this time Persia--is the bad guy from the West's point of view and the it's the Russians turn to play the enablers.

Agreed - it was a generalization for simplicity's sake. "Ethnicity" is too narrow a definition, but I cannot think of a single, unified definition that accurately describes these "identity" groups.

That's a good instinct to go with. It's even better to follow it through and eschew identities stronger than national ones. It's weird how it works out, but even Iraqis who can't stand living with other people of a different creed or ethnicity want to remain Iraqis. Chalk it up to delusions of grandeur about ruling the whole rather than simply a part. The Hakims and al Dawa would love Shi'a dominance, but will reject Iranian rule by jurisprudence--if for no better reason than they think Najaf should be the center of the Shi'a world, not some bastard Persian ghetto like Qom. They're also smart enough to calculate that they can't manage Kurds and Sunnis well enough to rule absolutely, and even smart enough to figure they can't survive as a nation separate from the whole. So, they'll aim for the Kurdish solution or, barring that, a permanent place in whatever majority governments arise. The thing to remember is while Qom wants to rule here on Earth, Najaf is not only content but hellbent on guiding religiously provided politics gives them preferential space to do so. The Iraqi ayatollahs are no revolutionaries, not one bit.

Indeed, however in retrospect one can argue those Sunni Arabs understood the Iranian's regime's resolve in dealing with fifth columns, and realized joining Hussein's "cavalry" is a risk not worth taking, particularly for Sunnis. In that perspective - fear most definitely won out.

Think about the timing. The war started barely two years after Khomeini took over the reins and not even year after the turmoil surrounding Bargazan's resignation. Iran is at its weakest, and nobody really knows how the new regime will shape up. The Cultural Revolution didn't pick up steam until April 1980, and Hussein launched his attack September of that year. The Iranian armed forces were still in disarray. It took Tehran two years to execute a successful counteroffensive, about as much time as it took the Soviets to turn it around in World War II. And we all know that before Stalingrad it was hardly a foregone conclusion how the Eastern Front would shape up. Simply put, nobody had enough time or information to accurately determine how the new regime would shape up, let alone how forcefully it could--let alone would--act after hostilities began.

EDIT: On a side note, I don't know what those MEK fighters were thinking. They certainly did not "calculate" - anyone who does the maths realizes there will always be that "morning after". I suppose they were an idealist lot. Socialists...

Once again, you calculate based on your best understanding of the information you have. MEK has the added disadvantages of calculating against a thinking adversary and with not much more access to intelligence and capacity to analyze it than your typical Persian.
 
  • #325
Pelt said:
That's a good instinct to go with. It's even better to follow it through and eschew identities stronger than national ones. It's weird how it works out, but even Iraqis who can't stand living with other people of a different creed or ethnicity want to remain Iraqis. Chalk it up to delusions of grandeur about ruling the whole rather than simply a part. The Hakims and al Dawa would love Shi'a dominance, but will reject Iranian rule by jurisprudence--if for no better reason than they think Najaf should be the center of the Shi'a world, not some bastard Persian ghetto like Qom. They're also smart enough to calculate that they can't manage Kurds and Sunnis well enough to rule absolutely, and even smart enough to figure they can't survive as a nation separate from the whole. So, they'll aim for the Kurdish solution or, barring that, a permanent place in whatever majority governments arise. The thing to remember is while Qom wants to rule here on Earth, Najaf is not only content but hellbent on guiding religiously provided politics gives them preferential space to do so. The Iraqi ayatollahs are no revolutionaries, not one bit.
As long as we're dealing with historical parallels, one can argue the political system evolving in Iraq (and its relationship with its immediate neighbours) is reminiscent of 18-19th centuries' European system of pacts and treatise (keeping with Huntington, the "ethnic group" being the reincarnation of the state). If it is so, then it might just give that region some temporary, relative peace; but it is doomed to scleratise - and seeing how, geopolitically, so many parts of the Middle East are like the Balkans magnified, one can only hope the leaderships here are not only willing, but also agile enough to keep their peoples' nationalism (or its younger sibling - "ethnicism"?) in check.

Pelt said:
Think about the timing. The war started barely two years after Khomeini took over the reins and not even year after the turmoil surrounding Bargazan's resignation. Iran is at its weakest, and nobody really knows how the new regime will shape up. The Cultural Revolution didn't pick up steam until April 1980, and Hussein launched his attack September of that year. The Iranian armed forces were still in disarray. It took Tehran two years to execute a successful counteroffensive, about as much time as it took the Soviets to turn it around in World War II. And we all know that before Stalingrad it was hardly a foregone conclusion how the Eastern Front would shape up. Simply put, nobody had enough time or information to accurately determine how the new regime would shape up, let alone how forcefully it could--let alone would--act after hostilities began.
One, or both, of us is underestimating those Iranian Sunni Arabs. I still believe it was not nationalism, but foresight, that kept them from acting, obviously their geopolitical status would be a major factor in their reasoning. Quite simply, they had more to lose by turning against the new leadership than they would gain had Saddam won. It's nearly impossible to figure out their thinking at the time, but I'll try and look it up tomorrow.

Pelt said:
Once again, you calculate based on your best understanding of the information you have. MEK has the added disadvantages of calculating against a thinking adversary and with not much more access to intelligence and capacity to analyze it than your typical Persian.
Of course. I wouldn't be so sure otherwise! :smile:
This reminds me - the title of this thread is "what to do about Iraq". Iraq's future is not as uncertain as it was a few months ago, but it's yet to be played out. So, what's your forecast for Iraq?
 
  • #326
Perhaps a separate thread on "What to do about Iran", or "What to do about the ME" would be appropriate. It's a topic or set of topics that are complex.

It would appear that tribal affiliation is a key factor in many of the ME states. The national borders are obviously arbitrary, but those borders have more or less been in place for a number of generations already.

In the near term, it would appear that Iraq will be an occupied state. In the longer term, it depends on what leader comes to power - as seems to be the case historically. And certainly there will be external pressures from outside interests.

BTW, Pelt, what is the basis of your comments? Please provide evidence to support one's statements.

With respect to the Crimea, what is the "large Muslim continental power seeking hegemony over some strategic chokepoint"? Is this a reference to the Ottoman Empire or the Tatars?
 
  • #327
Astronuc said:
It would appear that tribal affiliation is a key factor in many of the ME states. The national borders are obviously arbitrary, but those borders have more or less been in place for a number of generations already.

Just to be clear, tribal ties weigh in only amongst rural and semi-rural Arab populations (they'll still figure heavily in municipalities tallying up to 50,000 pop). Borders have stuck largely because increasing population density promoted the replacement of tribal identity with some form of provincialism bordering on nationalism (the most obvious incubator for study are Palestinian communities). Remember, this is the land of the city-state, and with few exceptions Egyptian, Libyan, Levantine and Mesopotomian metropolises have shaped lasting trends in Middle Eastern culture and society.

Tribesmen are at their weakest in the day-to-day operations of modern Arab states; for one, there's not enough of them two prop up a government (Hussein's was running nearly on empty largely because he wanted to pull in most of his people from Tikrit) Two, your buddies from the block might be loyal but they're not terribly good at their jobs. Most of them are no-shows in the first place, collecting a check for an official position while not performing much in the way of actual duties. Three, you usually want your homeboys to fill up the military ranks--that's why you see so many of these governments with military officers doubling in civil positions. Negotiating with somewhat friendly tribes solves some of your manpower problems but with the same if not greater cost in inefficiency. For the state to function even minimally, you have to draft a crapload of bureaucrats from the educated, urban classes and even take on a few as ministers.

Tribal identity plays its strongest role when small, isolated pockets like Tikrit or Qardaha feed tribesmen into the military who later impose juntas on the state. In this way, it's somewhat similar to street gangs metastasizing into organized crime rackets. Nasser, Sadat, Hussein and Hafez al-Assad seem like sophisticated types but at the end of the day they're still a bunch of wiseguys from the old neighborhood gaming the system to make a quick buck.

It's an interesting dynamic that's peculiar to the Arabized Muslim world. Tribalism continues to hold sway in the governing classes while at the same time tribal identity is slipping away from the populace at large. Then you have countries like Iran which have long traditions of sourcing the cities for leadership in national affairs and Pakistan and Afghanistan, where you have a starkly cosmopolitan national political culture set against deeply rooted and hardly fading tribal traditions.

In the near term, it would appear that Iraq will be an occupied state. In the longer term, it depends on what leader comes to power - as seems to be the case historically. And certainly there will be external pressures from outside interests.

Iraq hasn't been an occupied state since 2004. The duly elected government has saw fit to continue a relationship with the MNF to participate in reconstruction, institution-building and counterinsurgency efforts under regularized status of forces agreements; they're due for a new one in spring 2008. Nevertheless, for all legal purposes Iraq is a sovereign state, a status treated as legitimate by the international community.

BTW, Pelt, what is the basis of your comments?

A decade's worth of research and experience.

Please provide evidence to support one's statements.

Care to pick a few claims out? I don't intend to draft a paper for you, if that's what you're asking, but I'm more than happy to answers specific requests and point you to useful resources.

With respect to the Crimea, what is the "large Muslim continental power seeking hegemony over some strategic chokepoint"? Is this a reference to the Ottoman Empire or the Tatars?

The Ottomans. The Crimean Tatars wouldn't qualify as a power in any pertinent sense of the term, let alone a large one.
 
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  • #328
The definition of occupation -
Merriam-Webster said:
Occupation - the holding and control of an area by a foreign military force c: the military force occupying a country or the policies carried out by it
would indicate this statement -
Pelt said:
Iraq hasn't been an occupied state since 2004.
is incorrect.

The Blackwater fiasco and the inability of the Iraqi government to arrest, detain and hold a trial of the individuals involved indicates that the Iraqi Government is not in control, but the Bush administration through the US military is in control of the area. The immunity granted by the CPA still holds.

The duly elected government has saw fit to continue a relationship with the MNF to participate . . . .
The Iraqi government had no choice vis-a-vis the occupation. The Iraqis government cannot deal independently without tacit approval of the Bush administration.

Sovereignty implies - freedom from external control or influence, and Iraq is certainly not there yet.

On the other hand, I do agree with some, perhaps most of one's assertions.
 
  • #329
Astronuc said:
The definition of occupation -

would indicate this statement is incorrect.

How so? Neither the US nor MNF has legal authority to tell the Iraqis how to set policy, something that should be obvious to anyone moaning about the lack of an oil law over the past year.

The Blackwater fiasco and the inability of the Iraqi government to arrest, detain and hold a trial of the individuals involved indicates that the Iraqi Government is not in control, but the Bush administration through the US military is in control of the area.

By that reasoning, the US occupied Britain in 1942. Negotiating status of forces and the terms of visiting forces acts is part and parcel of of the forward deployed American national security policy. And like any such act between sovereign nations, it's subject to revision anytime a party sees fit. That said, Iraqis are http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/BCD517FD-B1F3-41EB-8CFA-B28ABC40AAFC.htm of arresting and detaining contractors, and the government is presently looking into changing the law regarding visiting forces in order to try them. I'd argue in this case they have the upper hand when it comes to renegotiating SOFAs with the United States. After all, all they have to do is change the law, and all the US can do is threaten to leave prematurely.

The immunity granted by the CPA still holds.

As subject to Iraqi interpretation. If they were to abide by the letter and spirit of the SOFA, they could still file for immnunity waivers from the Sending State(s) in order to proceed without attaching a legal dispute. If they wanted to be *****y about it, they just go ahead and try contractors without consulting with the Sending State(s). Who's going to stop them?

The Iraqi government had no choice vis-a-vis the occupation.

Of course they didn't, the interim government was set up by the Occupying Forces. That obligation to follow the occupation authority ended on July 1, 2004.

The Iraqis government cannot deal independently without tacit approval of the Bush administration.

They seem to be dealing with Syria and Iran well enough without tacit approval from the Bush Administration.

Sovereignty implies - freedom from external control or influence, and Iraq is certainly not there yet.

Does it? The US is in the driver seat of its security relationships with South Korea and Japan. The former hasn't been able to negotiate a separate peace with its northern neighbor in 50 years and Japan still operates under Section 9 of its imposed constitution.

On the other hand, I do agree with some, perhaps most of one's assertions.

Whose assertions?
 
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  • #330
Pelt said:
By that reasoning, the US occupied Britain in 1942.
The US did not invade Britain. The US military did not bomb the capital city of Britain, nor depose the government, nor did the US government exert influence in British elections. Again one's logic is faulty.

Pelt said:
Does it? The US is in the driver seat of its security relationships with South Korea and Japan. The former hasn't been able to negotiate a separate peace with its northern neighbor in 50 years and Japan still operates under Section 9 of its imposed constitution.
Yep - it does. S. Korea and Japan are there, Iraq is not - yet.


Here's a good resource to mull over - particularly "Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned", Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec07/indexengnovdec07.asp

2 Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars
Michael Vlahos

Our enemies understand that “it is in the living of war’s mythic passage that identity will be truly realized.” We, for our part, blunder blindly on, fitting ourselves to their Manichean narrative.


13 The “Armed Reconciler”: The Military Role in the Amnesty, Reconciliation, and Reintegration Process
Michael W. Mosser, Ph.D.

Experience and logic suggest general principles of the AR2 process operate in an environment of interdependent dimensions common to all cultures. In any post-conflict society, an “armed reconciler” is likely the key to making those principles succeed.


20 The Law of Occupation and Post–Armed-Conflict Governance: Considerations for Future Conflicts
Colonel David A. Wallace, U.S. Army

According to international law, “regime change” necessarily entails interim responsibility for security and governance in Iraq. Here’s what we need to know now and for future operations involving “the ‘O’ word.”


38 Armed Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: A Primer for Military Professionals
Colonel Daniel Rice, U.S. Army Reserve, and Major John Dehn, U.S. Army

Practical military considerations play into any decision to use force to initiate humanitarian intervention. Two experts review the moral and legal tradition for military professionals who will have to help in weighing alternatives.


http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/indexengsepoct07.asp

2 Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, with Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army

Looking beyond the current wars, a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Corps-Iraq calls for significant changes to the way we train and fight.


16 Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve


As the “Anbar Awakening” suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject.


32 Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired

The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.


45 Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army

A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.

I call attention to - Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve - which is a excellent summary.
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/eisenstadtengseptoct07.pdf
Anthropology 101 for Soldiers: What is a Tribe?
A tribe is a form of political identity based on common claimed descent.2
it is not necessarily a lineage group, as tribal subunits (sections or subsections)
may manufacture fictive kinship ties or alter their tribal identity or
affiliations for political, economic, or security-related reasons.3 tribes may
also be of mixed sectarian or ethnic composition. Thus, Iraq’s Shammar and
Jubur tribes have Sunni and Shi’ite branches, while Qashqa’i tribesmen in
Iran are of Turkish, Persian, Arab, Kurdish, Lak, Luri, and Gypsy origin.4

There is no such thing as a “typical” tribe. Tribes may embody diverse
kinship rules, structures, types of political authority, and lifestyles (sedentary,
semi-nomadic, nomadic),5 which may be influenced by security and
economic conditions and government policies.6 Thus, for instance, the Arab
tribes of the arabian Peninsula, Levant, and north africa tended, at least
traditionally, to be relatively egalitarian and non-hierarchical organizations
lacking a well-developed leadership structure, while the turkic tribes of the
Central Asian steppes tended to be hierarchical, highly centralized organizations
ruled by powerful chieftains.7

Although Arab tribal ideology is relatively egalitarian,
in reality, major disparities in status, power,
and wealth exist within and between tribes.8 Among
settled tribes, sheikhly families and clans tend to
form dominant lineages that are better off and more
influential than other families and clans in the tribe.9
Bedouin tribes of “common” origin are looked
down on by those of “noble” origin, while smaller
(“weak”) settled tribes are often looked down on
by larger (“strong”) settled tribes.10

Tribal Values, Processes,
and Organization11
Tribal values remain deeply ingrained in Iraqi
society and have had a profound influence on Iraqi
social mores and political culture. (This observation
holds for much of the rest of the arab world as well.)
These values include the high premium put on ingroup
solidarity (‘asabiyya), which finds expression
in loyalty to the family, clan, and tribe,12 coupled
with a powerful desire to preserve the autonomy of
the tribe vis-à-vis other tribes, non-tribal groups,
and the authorities;13 personal and group honor
(sharaf); sexual honor (‘ird), which pertains to the
chastity of the family’s female members; manliness
(muruwwa), which finds expression in personal
traits such as courage, loyalty, generosity, and hospitality;
and pride in ancestry (nasb).14

Tribal processes include traditional forms of interpersonal
and group conflict such as the blood feud,
as well as mechanisms for regulating and resolving
such conflicts: the cease-fire (atwa), blood money
(fasl), and peace agreement (sulha).15 These processes
are conducted in accordance with tribal law
(‘urf), as opposed to Sharia (Islamic) or civil law, and
are applied mainly in rural towns and villages and
some urban areas, though the precise extent to which
tribal law is applied in Iraq today is not clear.16
Organizationally, the tribes of Iraq consist of
nested (vice hierarchically organized) kinship
groups (see table 1). There are thousands of clans,
hundreds of tribes, and about two dozen tribal confederations
in Iraq today, each with its own sheikh.
(Saddam Hussein’s regime officially recognized
some 7,380 tribal sheikhs.)17

The collapse of central-government authority and
the rise in political and sectarian violence in the wake
of OIF has caused many iraqis to fall back on the
family, tribe, sect, or ethnic group for support in confronting
the daily challenges of living in post-Saddam
Iraq. As a result, tribal identities have assumed greater
salience in iraq in recent years. It would, however, be
a mistake to overemphasize the role of the tribes or to
regard the tribe as the central organizing principle of
Iraqi society today. Large parts of Iraq are inhabited
by detribalized or non-tribal populations, and tribal
identity often competes with and is overshadowed
by other forms of identity (sect, ethnicity, class, or
ideological orientation). Moreover, the demise of
the old regime has led to the rise of new social forces
and actors in Iraq—particularly islamist movements,
militias, and parties, which are playing an increasingly
important role in Iraqi politics. Recent events in anbar
province, however, demonstrate that under certain
conditions, the tribes can still be decisive actors.
. . . . there has been no
systematic effort to assess the impact of violence and
coalition and Iraqi government policies on the tribes
and the state of relations between tribal and non-tribal
groups in Iraqi society.20
. . . .

Still, other sheikhs have adjusted well to the new
rules of the game, participating in Iraq’s conflict
economy and transforming themselves, for all practical
purposes, into local warlords. Perhaps the best
example of this new type of leader is sheikh ‘Abd al-
Sattar Biza’i al-Rishawi of the Albu Risha tribe, leader
of the anbar awakening. According to published
reports, after the fall of Saddam Hussein, sheikh
‘Abd al-Sattar led a band of highwaymen who operated
near Ramadi and worked as a facilitator for AQI
on the side, providing its operatives with cars, safe
houses, and local guides. But when the AQI operatives
he was helping started working as highwaymen
too—encroaching on his ‘turf,’ cutting into his profits,
and then killing his father and several brothers—the
relationship soured, prompting the sheikh to turn on
AQI and to ally himself with coalition forces.54
Reference numbers left in.

Interesting point about the collapse of the central government authority and basically the US-lead Coalition forces, which ostensibly include Iraqi forces now, still seem to be the ones calling the shots.

Hopefully Sahawah Al Anbar and Sahawah Diyala will be successful.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/the_awakening_al_qae.php

Nice map of Diyala - http://billroggio.com/maps/Diyala-South.JPG

http://www.longwarjournal.org/maps/iraq-map-detailed.jpg


Still waiting for citations to support one's assertions. Please refer to -
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=113181
2) Citations of sources for any factual claims (primary sources should be used whenever possible).
 
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