Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

[Philocrat]

A Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of Visual Data

Types of Visual Data

The visual data are products of the entire human visual faculty and they are used for conducting and administering safe human existence. They are classified into three fundamental types:

(1) Inquisitive Visual Data (IVD)

They are newly derived visual information from diverse visual organs such as the eye, nose, tongue, ears, skin etc. Inquisitive Visual Data are administered by the ‘Inquisitive Mode of the human visual faculty or consciousness’ and they are usually earmarked as unsafe as they enter or find their ways into the human visual faculty for conscious or passive visual attention and assessment. They remain in unsafe mode until such times as when they are given visual clearance via a mechanism of understanding from the ‘Precautionary Mode’ of the human visual faculty or consciousness. Inquisitive Visual Data are life-critical in that they require high-level of visual attention both at the conscious decision-making level and at the passive decision-making level.

(2) Acquisitive Visual Data (AVD)

They are the sort of visual information administered by the ‘Acquisitive Mode of the human visual faculty or consciousness’ and they include (1) Temporary Visual Data such as qualia and ‘extra-sensory’ ones used in real time thinking or visual awareness within the conscious-level or passive-level decision system, (2) Archived or Historical Data consisting of past and present experiences stored for subsequent or future recall or remembering and (3) Hereditary Visual Data carried genetically from one generation to the next. In my own thinking, visual faculty extend to cover visual information genetically transmitted from parents to their children in the furtherance of a safe and successful life. .

(3) Precautionary Visual Data (PVD)

These are visual data that are constantly monitored and validated in real-time visual processing for continual visual accuracy. This includes life-critical visual data brought into the visual faculty via the inquisitive mode or those recalled from memory via the acquisitive mode. All visual data that enter into the visual faculty are initially earmarked as unsafe until immediately or subsequently declared safe. That is they are treated at the initial stage of first entry as unsafe. Those that are immediately visually analysed and understood are declared safe until proven otherwise. Both those that are partially understood and those not understood at all are given the same level of precautionary visual alert. And throughout their stay and administration in the acquisitive section of the human visual faculty or consciousness they are constantly visually reviewed and reassessed towards understanding them. Things understood as good and useful to our lives are earmarked for constant use to service the human life and existence. Both those things that are understood as bad and dangerous to our lives and those that are not properly or fully understood at all are earmarked as things to be feared and avoided.

Life-critical visual data such as qualia and other physical information that are critical to the human survival are given high-level visual attention at the higher conscious decision-making level. For example, all the visual information and physical parameters needed to successfully perform a substantially dangerous act as crossing a street with moving vehicles are classed under life-critical data and unfortunately this is the sort of the physical activity that we cannot afford to pay less attention to.

How Does the Purposive Theory deal with Qualia?

The Purposive Theory always invokes from the ‘Book of Nature’ the Principle of Continuing Causation to explain qualia. I have used this principle before above to reverse the logic of interpretation of God. My argument is that it is this same principle that governs the interpretation and understanding of qualia. According to the Principle of continuing Causation, the slightest causal and relational error found in things renders them structurally and functionally inconclusive, and therefore, continuous both in substance and in scope. According to this principle, qualia, like all other sustaining parts or properties of a given entity or life form, should be interpreted purposively since there is no guarantee that, as a mere part, it may form part of the final state of that entity or life form. In the Book of Nature there are two fundamental types of properties: (1) those that serve ephemeral sustaining purposes to any thing in which they are parts and (2) those that survive destruction with any thing in which they are parts. For personal convenience and simplicity, I always call those things, be they laws, relations or properties of any kind, that fall under (1) ‘Unnecessary Necessities’, and those that fall under (2) ‘Necessary Necessities’. According to the Principle of Continuing Causation, since (2) is already naturally technically over-demanding by rigorously forcing properties and their immediate governing laws to fully synchronise causally and relationally as things in which they are parts head towards their final perfect states, there is no need to worry about their explainable causal roles since they may be mutated out of place in (2) and banished into (1). That if qualia cannot be fully synchronised with the other sustaining parts of man it will be structurally and functionally abandoned within the causal and mutational pathway of the human existence.

However, this is not a way of saying that all category (1) Properties and their governing laws are completely useless in the book of nature. Rather, what it all means is that they serve only ephemeral sustaining purposes in their overall outward values. Or simply that they are merely compensatory in their overall outward values. They temporally stand for the best sustaining properties to come!

Finally, according to the principle of continuing causation, Qualia is explainable, valued and measured by the level of its functional success in the public realm. There is no life for qualia outside the public realm. For example, in terms of the road-crossing example that we mentioned above, qualia is explainable, valued, understood and measured by the number of people that succeed in crossing the road with equivalent number of dangers without being harmed. Who cares whether two road-crossers see an on-coming car differently, one seeing it as red and the other seeing it as blue! So long as by balance of probability they both succeed in (1) visually identifying the car and know that it is a car and not something else, (2) recognise it as a danger to be avoided and (3) physically escape being harmed or killed, then none of the two road-crossers owe neither themselves nor any bystander any explanation as to what qualia is or as to its exact nature. According to this principle, the only significant visual data are those relevant to the actual physical danger and not any arbitrary ones that pose no danger at all. For example, in the road-crossing case, one of the road crossers visualising and correctly recognising an on-coming car as a danger and the other one erroneously seeing and interpreting it as a sexy woman or man coming to embrace him or her. This would be very significant and according to the principle of continuing causation, if this sort of causal and relational error were to be widespread and persistent, it would trigger the mutational system to interplay and invoke corrective measures or in some very nasty cases to abandon the whole human form of life altogether.

In fact this is one of the key reasons why I think we are better off concentrating on the science of man than on the science of needs. I will expand on this later.

NOTE: Purposive Theory treats causal and relational errors in things, especial in life forms such as ours, as correctable by structural re-engineering. It does not believe in explaining things beyond their actual structural and functional limits.

 

[Royce]

The original question was; "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?"
Some of us answered, yes. They have been designated in this discussion as "physicalist" and their point is that everything that exist is either physical and thus reducible to Pure Physics or a product of physics and therefore at least in principal reducible.
Some of us answered, no and can be called "non-physicalist" or "something-others." Of this group some say that everything can not be reduced to Pure Physics because there are some things that Pure Physics does not address, investigate or acknowledge, there are somethings that exist that are outside the purview of science which of course includes pure physics. Others say that there are something that by their very nature are irreducible, to attempt to reduce them destroys them or we lose sight of what we are attempting to study in the first place.
The "something-others" point mainly to two different but related things known to exist that cannot be explained, reproduced or demonstrated by physical science and they are life itself and consciousness which includes self awareness. Some of us might add evolution also as it demonstratively moves from less complex to more complex eventuating in sentient beings such as ourselves. This indicated an arrow, direction and/or included purpose to evolution.
The "physicalist" say that all of the above are simply products of random physical processes, emergent properties inevitable due to increased complexity and that there is scientific and technological indications that in principle this is true.
The "something-others" deny that neither science nor technology have proven or demonstrated the points satisfactorily as the indications are meager, simplistic and reaching for conclusions not in evidence. They state that purpose, intent and free will inherent in life, consciousness and self awareness cannot be explained or demonstrated by the simple, inconclusive and limited, repetitive processes given by the physicalist as evidence.
This, I think, sums up this discussion to date. All of these points have been discussed at length in a number of other threads and no satisfactory conclusion or consensus has been reached either here in the PF's or out there in the real world of Philosophy and Physics although each group will claim proof just as vehemently as we do here.
It is my opinion the we, mankind, do not yet know enough or understand enough to come to a satisfactory conclusion or consensus. Science will have to expand its horizons to include non-physical phenomena in its studies before it can say for sure one way or the other. So long as science limits itself to physical and empirical studies it can not explain nor understand all of reality, especially life and consciousness.
Science has already breeched the realm of philosophy and consciousness in its exploration of Quantum Mechanics, Super String and Big Bang Theory even though many will deny that this is so. The hard questions keep rising up and slapping investigative and theoretical scientists in the face and they are finding it harder and harder to ignore.
I predict that before science can make much more substantial and significant progress it is going to have to face the hard questions of life, consciousness, awareness and their interaction with the physical realm of reality. We can not know all of reality by simply looking at one aspect of it simply because it is the easiest to study and measure.

 

[BoulderHead]

How true is the claim that everything in the whole universe can be explained by Physics and Physics alone?

‘Everything’ makes this question all-inclusive. As such, I think it too broad to withstand philosophical attack.

Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim?

I don’t believe it does.

Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?

The problem with this question is that ‘everything’ has, of a sudden, been replaced by ‘physical reality’. It now becomes unclear what exactly is asked. Still, a short answer strictly to this last question can be given as “No”, and then justified by considering that only describing things mathematically omits the aspect of experiencing physical reality. IOW, it is one thing to mathematically describe going through a loop on a roller coaster, quite another to actually experience riding such a contraption. There are other considerations, but hopefully this one will make sense to the reader.

I see in reading the replies that definitions of ‘physical’ and ‘consciousness’ proved problematic. My reply, therefore, will be pursuing a different line in order to suggest the answer to the first question is also “No”.

Originally posted by Imparticle;
I should probably note as well that we cannot tell what anything is really; we can only infer what something may be by its characteristics.

Imparticle has put forward a foundation upon which I desire to build. Those ‘characteristics’ spoken of do not necessarily have to be all-inclusive of what exists to be known about an object. For example; one can know various aspects of certain phenomena by sight, by feel, by smell, etc. Consider what a sunset might be like for us were we only in possession of the senses attributed to an earthworm; do you suppose, in such capacity, our science might lead us to conclude it was possible for us to know everything about a sunset (let alone the universe)?


I do not intend in this thread to break experience into parts as I see Les has done. That is; speaking of ‘sense experience’ as distinguished from ‘other types of experience’. This is because regardless of the source we are ultimately limited to what the totality of our bodily apparatus can deliver to us (that which can be experienced, and that which cannot). I do not find sufficient reason for assuming the sum total of what we are capable of experiencing must necessarily be the sum total of all that is. Remove one of your senses and how much less would you know? Now remove another and yet another. In this manner I think it can be seen what we may know about the universe (and therefore attempt to explain) is dependant upon the hardware we have for experiencing same, and what any given piece of hardware provides us with is not a complete knowledge at all, but a specific aspect of what may exist to be known about a particular phenomena.
This can be expanded to suggest if we should lack what is required even to detect a single aspect of something, we will not be in a position to have any knowledge of it at all (indeed, we may never even be aware we’re missing out). Now, are we simply going to assume we may possesses (now or in the future) all the apparatus needed for knowing (and then being able to explain mathematically) everything there is to know about the universe? And even if we actually were in possession of such capability, I’m not convinced it would be possible for us to know such must be the case. Neither does it seem reasonable to me that an inability, or just a simple failing, to detect any/all aspects of something should qualify to rule same out of all possible existence (although in at least the case of inability I would argue lack of knowledge makes it impossible even to imagine what might be missed). Accordingly, I am compelled to accept there may exist, not only the unknown, but even the unknowable (So to hell with all you people who would deny me a unicorn! ).

At any rate, science will no doubt develop a great many devices to aid in our ability to experience hitherto unknown facets of the universe. Theories will go, more accurate theories will come, overall ‘knowledge’ will increase, and many fantastic creations of innovation and technology will improve the lives of the living, but everything explained? You mean for example to ‘guess’ from a position of absolutely no experience, an unknown cause from its supposed effect? Cho !

*but enough of that disgusting little prophecy hour, haha*

 

[Les Sleeth]

I do not intend in this thread to break experience into parts as I see Les has done. That is; speaking of ‘sense experience’ as distinguished from ‘other types of experience’. This is because regardless of the source we are ultimately limited to what the totality of our bodily apparatus can deliver to us (that which can be experienced, and that which cannot). . . . In this manner I think it can be seen what we may know about the universe (and therefore attempt to explain) is dependant upon the hardware we have for experiencing same . . .

I don't think it can be assumed that "what we may know about the universe . . . is dependant upon the hardware we have." I say that not only because of my own experiences, but also because there is a huge body of writing by people who claim we are need not be totally dependent on our hardware. Let me try a counter "for instance."

What if we, as consciousness, are inside the CSN, and using the mechanisms of the brain and senses to experience through biology. In that case, consciousness has the innate ability to experience, and the senses/brain are simply one avenue which sends information to experience. If the ability to experience really is innate, then it might be possible to actually withdraw from the senses and see if there is something else to experience besides sensory input. I say there is, and in fact, that is exactly the source of the most reliable reports about "something more."

 

[BoulderHead]

I don't think it can be assumed that "what we may know about the universe . . . is dependant upon the hardware we have."

Ok

I say that not only because of my own experiences, but also because there is a huge body of writing by people who claim we are need not be totally dependent on our hardware. Let me try a counter "for instance."

What if we, as consciousness, are inside the CSN, and using the mechanisms of the brain and senses to experience through biology. In that case, consciousness has the innate ability to experience, and the senses/brain are simply one avenue which sends information to experience. If the ability to experience really is innate, then it might be possible to actually withdraw from the senses and see if there is something else to experience besides sensory input. I say there is, and in fact, that is exactly the source of the most reliable reports about "something more."

I would say that you may have at least partly failed to understand my meaning when I said; “regardless of the source” and “That which we can experience, and that which we cannot”, as you go on to speak of experiencing things...
I might dispute that consciousness has been successfully demonstrated to exist 100% independently of brains, but this doesn’t effect the position there are things we may experience and things we may not. Perhaps if you were to consider consciousness a metaphysical hardware item it might help?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I might dispute that consciousness has been successfully demonstrated to exist 100% independently of brains, but this doesn’t effect the position there are things we may experience and things we may not. Perhaps if you were to consider consciousness a metaphysical hardware item it might help?

Yes, I should have answered your main point which was that there may things we do not and cannot experience. And yes, if by "hardware" you mean any sort of consciousness system, physical or not, then I could agree.

 

[BoulderHead]

Yes, I should have answered your main point which was that there may things we do not and cannot experience. And yes, if by "hardware" you mean any sort of consciousness system, physical or not, then I could agree.

Well, I may not share your view of consciousness (suspecting a physical system is required), but I certainly would/do want to take into account any and all means by which experience is delivered. Whatever the extent of the ‘devices’ we posses with which to experience, it would be to just such extent I would place our limits as human beings. I’m predisposed, in these matters, to considering the mind as a metaphysical object, regardless of how I view the connection to a physical brain, and it is certainly my intention to include anything deliverable to the mind, be it conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, haha. I'll cogitate on how to word my statements so as to make this better understood in the future, though as worded I believe (hope) that it will be effective to at least get my point across to those only contemplating the physical.

 

[Philocrat]

Well, I may not share your view of consciousness (suspecting a physical system is required), but I certainly would/do want to take into account any and all means by which experience is delivered. Whatever the extent of the ‘devices’ we posses with which to experience, it would be to just such extent I would place our limits as human beings. I’m predisposed, in these matters, to considering the mind as a metaphysical object, regardless of how I view the connection to a physical brain, and it is certainly my intention to include anything deliverable to the mind, be it conscious, subconscious, or even unconscious, haha. I'll cogitate on how to word my statements so as to make this better understood in the future, though as worded I believe (hope) that it will be effective to at least get my point across to those only contemplating the physical.

Your 'devices' of experience consist in the very natural form that we take - that is, the 'human form'. One of the problems that we need to turn our attention to is for us to investigate and find out if there are natural forms wholly devoid of causal and relational limitations. I have pondered in my head over it for years and I haven't seem to find any. What I am trying to say is that the forms that things take when they are 'self-created' or 'randomly created' or even created by the so-called 'intelligent designer', carry with them all the natural limitations (relational and causal) that are specific to those forms. As a thing, by taking a form you are limiting yourself in one way or the other. This raises another fundamental question as to whether it is possible to have 'formless entities'. Can things exist without taking any specific form, e.g the human form or life form?

VISUAL PERSPECTIVE...WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

Yes, visual persepctive decsively appears as a hindrance but evidence shows that it never completely undermines successful existence...that is, things successfully occupying space and moving harmlessly about that space. Well, yes, admittedly mindless entities do aimlessly move about the space that they occupy and tend to collide and get destroyed, but the conscious ones even when they rely nearly entirely on visual persepctive, do succeed getting arround their chaotic environment. The issue about qualia should not be about 'how what we find in all the visual persepctives are identical or explainable' but solely about 'how much of the content of a given number of visual persepctives' succeed in helping the conscious beings involved lead a normal life. If for an example, three people saw a dangerous bull charging towards them, the question is not about what each man in each visual frame of reference see or what it is like to see a bull, but wholly about how each one of them in a public domain is able to see the bull, recognise not only that it is a bull but also that it is a danger to be physically avoided, and actually able to physically avoid being injured or killed by this on-charging bull. I Think that the whole argument about qualia (hard or soft problem) is fundamentally very misleading and heading intellectually in the wrong direction.

 

[BoulderHead]

This raises another fundamental question as to whether it is possible to have 'formless entities'. Can things exist without taking any specific form, e.g the human form or life form?

I think this is interesting because I must admit my complete inability to conceptualize something which doesn’t exist in either space or time. I do not know for certain if this what you’re considering, but I’m inclined to run with Schopenhauer in at least the area of thought that a multiplicity of being cannot exist under such conditions.

 

[Philocrat]

Multiciplicity of things is a mere safety device in originally defective process...and there is no guarantee that this 'habit' or possibility will have a place in the final sum totality of things. Who says that the population of things could not range between many and one? To depart many into one, yes, I can accept that, but to depart further into nothingness, that I am very much against.

Now my answer to your posting...what you are suggesting seems like perfection itself...or perhaps another kind of perfection. But what I am not sure of is whether taking a form in any creative process always involves occupying space and time. Can't you be formless and still blend in with time and space?

 

[loseyourname]

You asked me if I could function when I was unconscious. The only time I am usually considered unconsiousness is when I am asleep. So how else was I to answer your question? And you also specifically mentioned sleepwalking.

Well, let's go back to this. Sleepwalking is the only example I can think of in which a human being performs motor functions not distinguishable from those of conscious humans despite not being conscious (at least of the fact that they are performing these functions and of their surroundings). As far as I can tell, that makes sleepwalking the best example of what a human could accomplish through physical interaction with its environment without consciousness. So answer me: How long do you think such a sleepwalker would last in the wild? How successful do you think it would be in reproducing?

You definitely aren't seeing the point I'm making or the cans of worms you're opening. I am not creating a hypothetical brain. What I am trying to point out is that we have a feature that is not addressed by any physical process of the brain. Yet, all the behavior that is being referenced as "useful" can be mapped to a brain process. You are only making an assumption that consciousness is useful because that is the way it seems to be working to you subjectively. How else could you possibly know this?

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of subjectivity by asking you how we could accomplish conscious processes without being conscious. You keep saying that all of the functions I am pointing to are carried out by brain processes, but my whole point is that they are carried out by conscious brain processes. Just take the sleepwalker example and use that one alone - you can forget about every other point I've brought up. I'd like to know how a human in that situation, without being conscious of his relationship to his environment or even of that environment, could last more than a couple minutes in the wild or ever reproduce.

Now I realize the point you are trying to make. An organism could still be functionally aware of its environment and its relationship to it without being subjectively aware of anything. So why do you we have subjective awareness? Well, I contend that before you can even ask that question (if you want it to be evolutionarily meaningful), you must find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware. Now I know that you're going to contend that such traits as the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror and to learn human languages are not conscious processes. Then what is? Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware? You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth.

Yes I can easily see the fallacy here. But this is not what I am doing. I have already responded to this comment by saying that this only works if consciousness is useful to begin with! Wings are useful regardless of whatever else one might have evolved to replace wings with. But you haven't given any examples of how consciousness is useful.

I will continue to contend that I have done this. Awareness of oneself is useful. There are plenty of brain processes that don't need to be conscious. I will agree with this. Pain and pleasure are obvious examples. We can see plenty of lower-level organisms responding to positive and negative stimuli without subjectively experiencing pain or pleasure. You can even argue that prairie voles respond to neuropeptides responsible for monogamous relationships and they may very well never subjectively experience any feeling of love. I would argue that they probably do, but either way, there are many matters that are not settled. But I have pointed out several human activities crucial to survival and reproduction that are carried out consciously, and that I contend cannot be carried out unconciously. Could they be in principle? Sure, but principle is not what is being argued here. No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. If you honestly don't think consciousness helps us to strategize, then explain to me how humans can clobber a computer in the game of Go despite the thousands of times superior computing ability of the machine?

To do this, you will need to point to an activity that cannot be fully explained by some other process that has nothing to do with consciousness. Everything that has been listed here can be completely explained by physical processes of the brain that are not attributable to consciousness.

You don't seem to be willing to admit that there are any processes that have anything to do with consciousness. Despite the fact that you are consciously thinking through your response right now, you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

 

[loseyourname]

On second thought, forget about the learning of language example. Given that there are rare instances of people speaking languages that they don't remember learning, I suppose it is possible for a human to unconsciously learn a language.

I would like to point out one more thing. This discussion seems to be predicated on the notion that evolution cannot be an explanation for any trait that serves no purpose. That is not the case. A simple example that comes to mind is the long eyestalks of certain fruit flies. Though they serve no purpose, they have been selected for because the gene responsible for increased length of the eyestalk is adjacent to another gene responsible for some aspect of reproductive health (I don't remember what exactly). Evolution is not always as easy to figure out as it seems. Many traits can evolve for reasons other than their usefulness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Now I realize the point you are trying to make. An organism could still be functionally aware of its environment and its relationship to it without being subjectively aware of anything. So why do you we have subjective awareness? . . . Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware? You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth. . . . No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. . . . . you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

If you answer the question of why we are conscious by saying the question is "no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth"), you've not said anything except the classic philosophical head scratch: "that's just how it is." On the other hand, I am not sure arguing the irrelevance of consciousness to survival is the best argument either if it has to stand alone as what defines the "hard problem." I can, for example, see how I use it to help me survive.

Yet you are easily proven wrong when you contend consciousness is necessary to survival (i.e., even if it is helpful now that we have it). Look at bacteria or phages . . . do you think they are conscious? As some have pointed out in this thread, bacteria are the most successful organism (in terms of survival) on the planet. Plants too have extensively evolved apparently without benefit of consciousness. So there is no doubt that consciousness is not needed to evolve and survive. If it is not needed, I think the only way to show the significance of the fact that it did develop is to link it to a second fact which is: how can a physical system evolve non-mechanistic traits of consciousness?

If physicalism is true, then the only influences in/on evolution have been mechanics. Therefore, consciousness should be 100% mechanical. However, instead we have a few of little things like free will, creativity, selflessness (and even self sacrifice), and of course the big daddy of them all -- subjective awareness. Exactly how did mechanical processes produce such non-mechanical traits?

So I believe it is when we combine the fact that consciousness isn't necessary for survival with the non-mechanical nature of the highest traits of consciousness, that you really do have a "hard problem" for a purely physicalist theory of consciousness.

 

[loseyourname]

If you answer the question of why we are conscious by saying the question is "no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth"), you've not said anything except the classic philosophical head scratch: "that's just how it is." On the other hand, I am not sure arguing the irrelevance of consciousness to survival is the best argument either if it has to stand alone as what defines the "hard problem." I can, for example, see how I use it to help me survive.

I agree. I'm not trying to say there is no hard problem. I just don't see any reason to think of consciousness as incompatible or irrelevant to evolution (non-guided evolution, that is). I think the problem lies in explaining the nature of subjective experience, not in explaining its usefulness.

Yet you are easily proven wrong when you contend consciousness is necessary to survival (i.e., even if it is helpful now that we have it). Look at bacteria or phages . . . do you think they are conscious? As some have pointed out in this thread, bacteria are the most successful organism (in terms of survival) on the planet. Plants too have extensively evolved apparently without benefit of consciousness. So there is no doubt that consciousness is not needed to evolve and survive.

Following that line of reasoning, bacteria and plants don't have opposable thumbs, either. So there is no doubt that an opposable thumb is not needed to evolve and survive. It is, however, an important part of human evolution, as is the development of consciousness.

If it is not needed, I think the only way to show the significance of the fact that it did develop is to link it to a second fact which is: how can a physical system evolve non-mechanistic traits of consciousness?

Well, I think it has both evolutionary significance (in that conscious organisms do have increased fitness) and added significance as well. I think the initial advantage of consciousness probably had to do with developing strategies. Going back to the example of a human always beating a computer at the game of Go, there is clearly an advantage in the ability to integrate thought and sensory processes into a conscious moment, in being able to view a problem holistically. A non-conscious intelligence, such as a computer, is not able to do this. While it is entirely possible that some programmer will eventually come up with a computer capable of playing an elite-level game of Go, the computing power necessary (because of the near-infinite possibilities at each branch point of the game) is mind-boggling and well beyond the capabilities of any organic brain. It may very well be that a brain could have evolved in such a way that it could perform the strategizing functions that a human does without being conscious, but it is clear that the computational ability necessary would have been staggering and probably hundreds of millions of years off in the future. Consciousness was a far more economical, and attainable, if not necessarily a simpler, solution.

If physicalism is true, then the only influences in/on evolution have been mechanics. Therefore, consciousness should be 100% mechanical. However, instead we have a few of little things like free will, creativity, selflessness (and even self sacrifice), and of course the big daddy of them all -- subjective awareness. Exactly how did mechanical processes produce such non-mechanical traits?

Well, it's rather Newtonian to suggest that physicalism necessarily implies mechanism. I don't see this dichotomy, though the question remains an interesting and difficult question. This problem extends beyond physics. Even if you assume consciousness to be non-physical, it's still a seeming paradox that it should behave in a non-deterministic manner. It is logic, not physics, that dictates every event should have a cause, and in such a manner it should be theoretically possible to know the outcome of every event that will ever take place from a set of first causes. Physics is becoming more probabilistic than deterministic.

So I believe it is when we combine the fact that consciousness isn't necessary for survival with the non-mechanical nature of the highest traits of consciousness, that you really do have a "hard problem" for a purely physicalist theory of consciousness.

I don't see any difficulty placing consciousness in an evolutionary context. I think it is very clear, and it seems that you agree, that it is an advantage that we are conscious. I still there is a hard problem, but it is a hard problem for any theory of consciousness, not just a physicalist theory.

 

[Fliption]

So answer me: How long do you think such a sleepwalker would last in the wild? How successful do you think it would be in reproducing?

Are you saying that there isn't a brain process that is in charge of reproducing? Or are you saying that there is such a brain process and this reproductive brain process is the same process that generates consciousness?

The only reason you are linking consciousness with these brain processes is because of your own personal experience. There is no other basis to make such a link. This is part of my whole point. Sure I'll agree with you. Consciousness is useful. But I only say that because it seems useful to me too.

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of subjectivity by asking you how we could accomplish conscious processes without being conscious. You keep saying that all of the functions I am pointing to are carried out by brain processes, but my whole point is that they are carried out by conscious brain processes.

What is a conscious brain process? I contend that there is no such thing in science. Not if consciousness is defined the way it's being defined here.

Just take the sleepwalker example and use that one alone - you can forget about every other point I've brought up. I'd like to know how a human in that situation, without being conscious of his relationship to his environment or even of that environment, could last more than a couple minutes in the wild or ever reproduce.

So you have solved the hard problem. All we have to do is analyze the brain process of a sleep walking person and a person fully awake and these processes will be the processes that generate consciousness! No further study is needed. It must be so! Otherwise, we'd have to acknowledge the idea that consciousness doesn't emerge from brain processes. So rather than be open to that, let's just assume it isn't true from the very beginning.

This solves nothing.

Well, I contend that before you can even ask that question (if you want it to be evolutionarily meaningful), you must find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware.

Better yet, why don't you find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware AND subjectively aware. And then you have to show me how you can know such a thing.

If you do not see the philosophical issues here then I'm not sure what else I can say except asks "how do you know anyone other than yourself is subjectively aware?" Your science is much more advanced than mine if you can answer this.

Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware?
You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth.

I am not arguing that anything is not subjectively aware. I am telling you that you have no basis other than your own subjective experience to conclude such a thing. Based on this subjective conclusion, you are now going to extrapolate this feature to everything else and then, in addition, claim it is useful. Where is the science that suggests all this? All I've heard are statements and examples of incredulity. Nothing scientific.

But I have pointed out several human activities crucial to survival and reproduction that are carried out consciously, and that I contend cannot be carried out unconciously. Could they be in principle? Sure, but principle is not what is being argued here. No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. If you honestly don't think consciousness helps us to strategize, then explain to me how humans can clobber a computer in the game of Go despite the thousands of times superior computing ability of the machine?

OK so you agree it is possible for these processes to be unconscious in principle. But you think that this is not how it works in a human. I can buy all that. Now show me with scientific evidence the difference. This is crucial. Do not gloss over it.

You don't seem to be willing to admit that there are any processes that have anything to do with consciousness. Despite the fact that you are consciously thinking through your response right now, you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

How do you know I am consciously thinking through my response right now? Do you have a machine that you can attach to me that will tell you such things?

Again, I am not claiming it isn't useful nor am I claiming that brain processes don't have anything to do with conscousness. I am saying that you cannot claim it is useful until you solve the hard problem. Do I personally believe it is useful? Absolutely. But I once believed in Santa Claus. So do you really want to rely on subjective opinion only? Need to solve that hard problem.

 

[Fliption]

discussion seems to be predicated on the notion that evolution cannot be an explanation for any trait that serves no purpose. That is not the case. A simple example that comes to mind is the long eyestalks of certain fruit flies. Though they serve no purpose, they have been selected for because the gene responsible for increased length of the eyestalk is adjacent to another gene responsible for some aspect of reproductive health (I don't remember what exactly). Evolution is not always as easy to figure out as it seems. Many traits can evolve for reasons other than their usefulness.

Just for the record, I'm not really interested in the link to evolution. I may personally believe that consciousness is useful. Therefore, it isn't a surprise that it would have survived. I'm just saying that this belief is just that. A belief.

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs. But I am only assuming your consicous experience is something close to mine, if it exists at all.

 

[loseyourname]

Are you saying that there isn't a brain process that is in charge of reproducing? Or are you saying that there is such a brain process and this reproductive brain process is the same process that generates consciousness?

The only reason you are linking consciousness with these brain processes is because of your own personal experience. There is no other basis to make such a link. This is part of my whole point. Sure I'll agree with you. Consciousness is useful. But I only say that because it seems useful to me too.

I take it you aren't going to answer the question? I will not do you the same discourtesy.

There is a process in charge of reproducing. It is partially controlled by the brain, and partially controlled by hormone levels that are effected by factors other than brain processes. I am not saying that a reproductive brain process is linked to the production of consciousness. I am saying that an unconscious human cannot survive or reproduce as well as a conscious human. Therefore, consciousness outcompetes unconsciousness in an evolutionary battle for the environmental niche filled by the human species.

What is a conscious brain process? I contend that there is no such thing in science. Not if consciousness is defined the way it's being defined here.

Sorry about that. I was ambiguous. What I mean by "conscious brain process" is a brain process that a given organism is conscious of. Given that I am conscious of quite a few brain processes myself at this moment, I don't really feel the need to scientifically prove that such a phenomenon exists. I'm pretty certain you experience the same thing as well, so I don't feel the need to prove it to you either. If you have never been conscious of any brain processes, just tell me so, and I will agree that I have a problem.

So you have solved the hard problem. All we have to do is analyze the brain process of a sleep walking person and a person fully awake and these processes will be the processes that generate consciousness! No further study is needed. It must be so! Otherwise, we'd have to acknowledge the idea that consciousness doesn't emerge from brain processes. So rather than be open to that, let's just assume it isn't true from the very beginning.

This solves nothing.

I don't recall saying I had solved the hard problem. I do contend that I have given more than enough examples of how consciousness could be an advantage and selected for through evolution. Read through my preceding post to Sleeth, where I hope I make it clear that I am claiming nothing beyond that one thing.

Better yet, why don't you find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware AND subjectively aware. And then you have to show me how you can know such a thing.

I don't know of any organism that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware, but I can give you a pretty easy example of a hominid primate that is both - myself. If I really need to prove to you that I am, I contend you are simply being obstinate.

If you do not see the philosophical issues here then I'm not sure what else I can say except asks "how do you know anyone other than yourself is subjectively aware?" Your science is much more advanced than mine if you can answer this.

Answer me this: How does science know that if an object is dropped at sea level on the planet Earth with no air resistance, it will accelerate toward the center of the Earth at a constant rate? If by "know," you are expecting absolute certainty, science will not give you that. Science will also not prove to you that anyone other than yourself is conscious. However, the inductive process key to developing a scientific theory can help us out here. It goes something like this:

I am conscious. I am human. All humans are similar organisms to the point where they are distinguishable physiologically and behaviorally only in small details, not in holistic processes put into context. Consciousness is a holistic process (in the sense that I am conscious of myself as a holistic organism and I experience integrated moments that bring together a huge amount of sensory and thought input) and I exist in a similar context (in the same physical world, in the same species of body, etc.) as other humans. Therefore, other humans are conscious as well.

I have not nor will I ever claim that I have proven anything. By the same token, I cannot even prove that other organisms exist, or for that matter, that the physical world exists. A meaningful existence, however, must be predicated on the inductive conclusion that the world I seem to be a part of does exist. The default state of affairs is basically that all members of the same species share the same traits unless there is good reason to believe they don't. There is good reason to believe that Veronica Lake had blonde hair, whereas I don't, so that trait is thrown out the window. I have never been presented with any good reason to think that there exists a functional human being that is not conscious. If you can give me one, go for it.

I am not arguing that anything is not subjectively aware. I am telling you that you have no basis other than your own subjective experience to conclude such a thing. Based on this subjective conclusion, you are now going to extrapolate this feature to everything else and then, in addition, claim it is useful. Where is the science that suggests all this? All I've heard are statements and examples of incredulity. Nothing scientific.

You are acting as if no argument carries any weight unless it is backed by scientific confirmation. I think that is pretty clearly not the case. I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss subjective evidence - especially when it is intersubjective evidence (that is, Sleeth agrees and I'm sure you do as well that being conscious is of value to you, for survival purposes) - when discussing a subjective phenomenon.

OK so you agree it is possible for these processes to be unconscious in principle. But you think that this is not how it works in a human. I can buy all that. Now show me with scientific evidence the difference. This is crucial. Do not gloss over it.

You can badger me all you want, but I really don't feel the need to do that. I think that even you can clearly see that these processes are conscious processes, and that you cannot carry them out without being conscious. If you are able to carry out and of them without being conscious, then say so. Otherwise, I think that you are again being obstinate.

Furthermore, I have presented evidence. Both the sleepwalking human and the strategizing computer are evidence. Neither can perform functions crucial to human survival. While it is not logically inconsistent to postulate the possibility that a sleepwalker might be able to perform these functions, all the evidence runs against it. While it might be possible for a computer to perform these functions, the computing power necessary is far beyond what is attainable by the human brain.

I don't know what else you want me to do. By the standards you seem to be setting, I cannot even prove to you that I am conscious myself. Yet you respond as if I am aware of what is being discussed.

How do you know I am consciously thinking through my response right now? Do you have a machine that you can attach to me that will tell you such things?

All right, see what I mean? Where do I go with this? If you're going to squabble over something as simple as the conclusion that you are conscious of your own thought processes, how are we to hold a meaningful discussion?

Again, I am not claiming it isn't useful nor am I claiming that brain processes don't have anything to do with conscousness. I am saying that you cannot claim it is useful until you solve the hard problem. Do I personally believe it is useful? Absolutely. But I once believed in Santa Claus. So do you really want to rely on subjective opinion only? Need to solve that hard problem.

Then solve for me the hard problem of the opposable thumb. In principle, evolution could have developed a method by which all of the motor functions performed with an opposable thumb could have been performed without it. In fact, I can't even prove that an opposable thumb is useful. Although I could cut off both my thumbs and lose the ability to perform crucial functions, this is apparently no more a piece of evidence than the inability of a sleepwalker to perform functions crucial to the sustained survival of a human being. In fact, I cannot even prove that the external world exists, so any theory of the opposable thumb predicated on the assumption that such a limb is crucial to the manipulation of the external world is very seriously flawed. Man, this is a hard problem.

 

[loseyourname]

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs.

No you can't. You can only assume that what you subjectively experience as the sight of a human thumb in fact has a link to a physical organism external to your self.

 

[Fliption]

I take it you aren't going to answer the question? I will not do you the same discourtesy.

I'm not ignoring your question. I'm trying to get you to see that it is irrelevant. Apparently, I'm just not doing a very good job of it.
(Of course, even a good saleman will sell nothing to a brick wall )

I am not saying that a reproductive brain process is linked to the production of consciousness.

When you claim that a conscious brain is performing activity that an unconscious brain is not capable of because of the fact that it is conscious, you are associating that activity with consciousness itself. But it doesn't matter. From your comments below I suspect we actually agree on what I've been trying to get across.

If you have never been conscious of any brain processes, just tell me so, and I will agree that I have a problem.

I have never been conscious of a brain process. See how easy I tore down your knowledge base? Tis the nature of subjectivity.

I don't know of any organism that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware, but I can give you a pretty easy example of a hominid primate that is both - myself. If I really need to prove to you that I am, I contend you are simply being obstinate.

I really don't understand how you can say this and still believe there is a hard problem to solve. This obstinance that you speak of is the nature of the hard problem.

Answer me this: How does science know that if an object is dropped at sea level on the planet Earth with no air resistance, it will accelerate toward the center of the Earth at a constant rate?

I wasn't really trying to set up an obstinate standard of knowledge. I was only trying to make the claim for the hard problem, which is that brain processes don't entail consciousness. Your standard of induction whereby you just conclude that all solipsists are obstinate people seems to suggest a poor opinion of philosophical views. If we follow this method, I don't see why we can't inductively rationalize many philosophical problems.

I am conscious. I am human. All humans are similar organisms to the point where they are distinguishable physiologically and behaviorally only in small details, not in holistic processes put into context. Consciousness is a holistic process (in the sense that I am conscious of myself as a holistic organism and I experience integrated moments that bring together a huge amount of sensory and thought input) and I exist in a similar context (in the same physical world, in the same species of body, etc.) as other humans. Therefore, other humans are conscious as well.

I agree with this. But does this tell us anything about consciousness? My point wasn't so much focusing on whether others have consciousness or not. I was attempting to focus on the very reason you have to inductively conclude such things. Which is that we know nothing about it. No brain process can be linked to it and as I state aboved, brain processes don't even entail consciousness.

I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss subjective evidence - especially when it is intersubjective evidence (that is, Sleeth agrees and I'm sure you do as well that being conscious is of value to you, for survival purposes) - when discussing a subjective phenomenon.

I agree with this. This is all I needed to hear. If you're claiming your comments about consciousness and evolution are subjective and non-scientific then I definitely agree.

I think that even you can clearly see that these processes are conscious processes, and that you cannot carry them out without being conscious. If you are able to carry out and of them without being conscious, then say so. Otherwise, I think that you are again being obstinate.

You think I am being obstinate because you don't understand my point. I am emphasizing phrases to attempt to lead you where I'm going and it's probably a bit confusing. What you are saying is exactly what I usually say to Mentat. He pretends that he doesn't know what consciousness is so that he can avoid the hard problem. He doesn't know what subjective experience is. He does this so that our inability to define it or reductively describe it can be used to prove it doesn't exists. I say he's being obstinate and just using the hard problem itself to prove the hard problem doesn't exists. But in the end, I think you and I agree. I personally and subjectively agree with you about consciousness and evolution. I just interpreted you to put some scientific credibility behind these comments. While I might agree with them, assumption and induction is the only way we can get there.

Furthermore, I have presented evidence. Both the sleepwalking human and the strategizing computer are evidence. Neither can perform functions crucial to human survival.

Again, you realize that in principle these things can be done without consciousness. This is not intended to illustrate that consciousness isn't needed or useful. It is intended to illustrate that we cannot rely on these functions as proof of consciousness; thereby solving much of the hard problem. The linkage to consciousness is purely a subjective one we have inductively applied to everyone. Not because we can analyze a brain and see consciousness at work.

In fact, I cannot even prove that the external world exists, so any theory of the opposable thumb predicated on the assumption that such a limb is crucial to the manipulation of the external world is very seriously flawed. Man, this is a hard problem.

Now this is obstinate. You agree that the quality of knowledge we have for carbon dioxide is different from the quality of the subjective induction you use for your conclusions don't you? Unless you really think there is a hard problem of chemistry, it seems you do.

Since I'm doing such a poor job of explaining this, I'll post a link to a thread about evolution from some time ago. This thread ended up talking about evolution and consciousness. Ironically, it is the science types who claimed that consciousness had no place in the study of evolution. I participated here and disgreed with them strongly claiming that consciousness shouldn't be ignored. The thread seemed to end when Hypnagogue finally came in and straigtened things out.

I'll quote a little of his opinion here...

The reason the ommission of P-consciousness is not terribly problematic for a theory of evolution is that it is still an open issue whether or not P-consciousness is causally efficacious in any way; that is, whether or not it is epiphenomenal. If it is shown one day to be causally efficacious, then certainly it must be taken into account by an evolutionary theory, but it would seem premature to say that a theory is incomplete for ommitting a phenomenon whose causal relevance is yet to be determined.

In particular, the purported causal role of P-consciousness would seem to be readily filled by causal mechanisms that are already part of the physicalist model of reality. This is precisely why the philosophical notion of the 'zombie' is a useful one-- because it would seem that we can describe the behavior of an organism (in particular, a human) in purely physical terms without needing to invoke P-consciousness at all.

That last sentence probably includes reproduction too.

This is what I've been trying to say. Perhaps his words or maybe the discussion in this thread in general will help communicate that point.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=16648&page=12&pp=15&highlight=evolution

 

[Fliption]

No you can't. You can only assume that what you subjectively experience as the sight of a human thumb in fact has a link to a physical organism external to your self.

True. But you have already acknowledged the hard problem. I'm just trying to point out what appeared to be an inconsistency. Claiming knowledge of scientific status about something subject to a hard problem is not consistent. But I now understand that you are agreeing that this is a subjective, inductive conclusion on your part.

 

[loseyourname]

True. But you have already acknowledged the hard problem. I'm just trying to point out what appeared to be an inconsistency. Claiming knowledge of scientific status about something subject to a hard problem is not consistent. But I now understand that you are agreeing that this is a subjective, inductive conclusion on your part.

It is intersubjective and inductive. What you don't seem to realize is that all scientific knowledge is at best intersubjective and inductive. You are asking the scientific method to do something that it cannot do. This entire mess started (assuming I didn't misinterpret anything) with Sleeth and yourself claiming that consciousness has no survival or reproductive value, and so could not be fit into an evolutionary framework, whereas I claimed that consciousness did have survival and reproductive value and could be fit into an evolutionary framework.

Using solipsism to argue your case is a little silly. I will again restate the basis of my argument. There are functions crucial to both survival and reproduction that I perform while conscious. Though it may be conceivable that I could perform them without being conscious, it is not conceivable that I could perform them as well as I could while conscious. That is, I could simply drift through life as a sleepwalker or zombie and perhaps be able to eat and have sex, but I would not be as successful at performing these functions as I would be in a waking state.

Now keep in mind, this is only a hypothesis. I contend that it can be tested scientifically, but you seem to want a ready-to-publish paper detailing the results of this study. Well, I don't even know if there has been a study. I can, however, design a study that would test this hypothesis. First, we would need to find a way to induce a sleepwalking state in one group of subjects. We observe them, specifically putting them in situations in which we can test survival and reproductive success. Let's say, we have groups of husbands and wives sleepwalking, and observe whether or not they ever make any moves towards engaging in intercourse. We take people that are hungry, put them in sleepwalking mode, and see how successful they are at obtaining food. We then perform these same tests with people that are in a waking state. My hypothesis is that the group in the waking state will be more successful at performing critical functions than those in the sleepwalking group.

You seem to be contending that such a test would at best be inconclusive because I can never know whether or not the waking subjects of the study are actually conscious. I contend that solipsism as a theory holds no more creedence than theories of extreme skepticism that would hold no subjective experience as reliable, even the perception of having a body. Under such a system of skepticism, no scientific knowledge of any kind is reliable knowledge, including the laws of chemistry. So if you are going to use solipsism to argue against a test for the value of consciousness, I contend that, to be consistent, you must regard all scientific knowledge as equally flawed. If you won't allow the premise that all humans in a waking state are conscious to be the base of an experiment, then you can't allow the premise that human sense perception is inherently reliable or even that other humans exist. In fact, under these strict rules of skepticism, macro-evolution itself would not be an acceptable theory. The attempt to fit consciousness into an evolutionary framework then becomes meaningless from the outset.

 

[loseyourname]

Another thing to keep in mind is that there exist many traits for which the evolutionary significance is not known. There are cases, as in the eyestalk, where gene loci are close to each other, and the evolution of a certain trait owes only to its linkage to another trait that has survival or reproductive value. This is fairly easy to determine for monogenetic traits. A trait such as consciousness, on the other hand, requires many interconnected systems to be operational at the same time. It is an emergent, polygenetic trait, such as the ability to walk, which requires the coordination of many aspects of the nervous and skeletomuscular systems.

Another thing to consider is that certain traits evolve as byproducts of other traits that have survival or reproducive value. Take dolphin song, for example. It is not necessary, from an evolutionary standpoint, for the song of a dolphin to be as complex as it is. All of the information that needs to be transmitted from one dolphin to another could easily be transmitted using a system as simple as that of a primate. Dolphins, however, have a far more complex larynx and nasal passage than does any primate. The reason for this is that dolphins use echolocation, in addition to sight, to navigate and find food. Echolocation requires a complex vocal and auditory apparatus. This apparatus was already in place because it served the evolutionary purpose of making echolocation possible, and it just so happened that it could be used to communicate as well. As such, dolphin song is an emergent trait that emerged, by chance, from a complex system that evolved for other purposes. It is entirely possible that consciousness evolved in a similar manner. It could just be a trait that emerged, by chance, from the complexities of the human nervous system, which evolved for separate purposes (initially for navigating through trees and complex social and child-rearing behavior, later for problem-solving).

One such trait that I would argue is an example of this phenomenon in humans is culture. Culture does not serve any obvious survival or reproductive purpose. In fact, given the gross prejudice and even warfare that exists because of cultural differences, I think it could be argued that culture is detrimental to species fitness. The development of language and complex social behavior, however, did serve an obvious survival purpose. Culture simply could have emerged from language and social behavior as a secondary trait with no real survival value of its own.

 

[Fliption]

Did you not read anything I wrote? It seems you just regurgitated your last post which I spent several paragraphs already responding to. I even linked another thread where at least a handful of people disagree with what you are saying.

It is intersubjective and inductive. What you don't seem to realize is that all scientific knowledge is at best intersubjective and inductive. You are asking the scientific method to do something that it cannot do.

I understand that science is an inductive process. But you must admit that much less can be said about consciousness scientifically then can be said about acid neutalization. Do you not agree with this? You have already acknowledged the hard problem so what is it that you think still needs to be solved with consciousness that doesn't exists for acid neutalization? And why can't I refer to this problem without being called obstinate and silly? If you want to claim that the hard problem is the result of being obstinate then don't pretend I'm the only one you need to address. You have quite a task in front of you.

This entire mess started (assuming I didn't misinterpret anything) with Sleeth and yourself claiming that consciousness has no survival or reproductive value, and so could not be fit into an evolutionary framework, whereas I claimed that consciousness did have survival and reproductive value and could be fit into an evolutionary framework.

See the thread I linked. I argued in that thread that it should be included in the framework only because I know that it cannot be properly addressed until the hard problem is solved. I argued for this approach as opposed to the "let's just ignore it and maybe it'll go away" approach that the science folks seemed to defend.

Also, I've already explained that my point wasn't so much to debate whether consciousness is useful or not. Yet somehow this point continues as is demonstrated below.

Using solipsism to argue your case is a little silly. I will again restate the basis of my argument.

This is because you do not understand the relevance of this point beyond someone just being obstinate.

There are functions crucial to both survival and reproduction that I perform while conscious. Though it may be conceivable that I could perform them without being conscious, it is not conceivable that I could perform them as well as I could while conscious. That is, I could simply drift through life as a sleepwalker or zombie and perhaps be able to eat and have sex, but I would not be as successful at performing these functions as I would be in a waking state.

And this is just further proof of that. I've already responded to this. Do you think I do not agree with something so obvious as this? Again, I am making a philosophical point about consciousness. Continuing to post examples, like sleepwalkers, that demonstrate the absurdity of believing consciousness is not useful can do nothing but convince me personally. They do nothing to change the philosophical issues themselves. My points still stand regardless of what I personally believe.

Now keep in mind, this is only a hypothesis. I contend that it can be tested scientifically, but you seem to want a ready-to-publish paper detailing the results of this study.

You seem to be contending that such a test would at best be inconclusive because I can never know whether or not the waking subjects of the study are actually conscious.

Please see your own acknowledgment of the hard problem and point in that direction for any obstinance you see. It is my source.

I don't understand why you keep referring to my comments about consciousness as being obstinate as if consciousness is no different from any other scientific endeaver. Yet you acknowledge the hard problem.

 

[loseyourname]

Did you not read anything I wrote? It seems you just regurgitated your last post which I spent several paragraphs already responding to. I even linked another thread where at least a handful of people disagree with what you are saying.

I've already seen that thread. Calm down.

I understand that science is an inductive process. But you must admit that much less can be said about consciousness scientifically then can be said about acid neutalization. Do you not agree with this? You have already acknowledged the hard problem so what is it that you think still needs to be solved with consciousness that doesn't exists for acid neutalization? And why can't I refer to this problem without being called obstinate and silly? If you want to claim that the hard problem is the result of being obstinate then don't pretend I'm the only one you need to address. You have quite a task in front of you.

Of course consciousness is more difficult to study scientifically then acid neutralization. I never claimed otherwise. All I have claimed in this thread - the only thing - is that consciousness probably can be accounted for in an evolutionary framework as something that would naturally be selected for because of the advantages it offers over non-consciousness. Everything else being brought up is a tangent, in particular since you seem to agree with me on the only point I am trying to make.

See the thread I linked. I argued in that thread that it should be included in the framework only because I know that it cannot be properly addressed until the hard problem is solved. I argued for this approach as opposed to the "let's just ignore it and maybe it'll go away" approach that the science folks seemed to defend.

Also, I've already explained that my point wasn't so much to debate whether consciousness is useful or not. Yet somehow this point continues as is demonstrated below.

But that's the only point I'm trying to make. If you have nothing to debate regarding that, why did you ever reply to me in the first place?

This is because you do not understand the relevance of this point beyond someone just being obstinate.

I don't see it as being relevant. I have explained why. If you read the texts (the few that are available) regarding scientific treatments of consciousness, they don't find the concerns of solipsists to be of any relevance either. There is concern as to whether or not subjective experience can ever be given a full account of on a physical basis, but there is certainly no concern over assuming other humans to be conscious. In fact, all of the major studies I know of have been conducted on chimps, because it is illegal to do these experiments on humans.

And this is just further proof of that. I've already responded to this. Do you think I do not agree with something so obvious as this? Again, I am making a philosophical point about consciousness. Continuing to post examples, like sleepwalkers, that demonstrate the absurdity of believing consciousness is not useful can do nothing but convince me personally. They do nothing to change the philosophical issues themselves. My points still stand regardless of what I personally believe.

Well what is your point and how does it stand in opposition to mine? My point is that consciousness is useful and that we can conduct a study that would give confirmation of its usefulness. That is scientific. So do you now agree that it is possible to confirm the usefulness of consciousness scientifically? Or will you say that it is not possible because we can't know that the subjects being studies are conscious. I don't think you realize the consequences of doing this.

I don't understand why you keep referring to my comments about consciousness as being obstinate as if consciousness is no different from any other scientific endeaver. Yet you acknowledge the hard problem.

I've never said it's no different. One thing I will say is that is becoming increasingly difficult to carry on a discussion with you. You continue to ignore most of my questions, while straightforward answers would probably facilitate a greater understanding of exactly what your position is. I have misunderstood it enough and I am tired of trying to figure out what the point is that you are making.

I will end this by reiterating the only point I was ever trying to make. There is nothing, in principle, that disallows the accounting for of consciousness in an evolutionary framework. That is all. I think it clearly provides a survival and reproductive advantage over a non-conscious version of the same organism. That is, a conscious human will be more successful than a non-conscious human. As such, it is sensible that natural selection would result in the evolution of conscious humans. Furthermore, I have pointed out that a particular trait does not necessarily need to have a survival or reproductive value in order to be accounted for through natural selection. I make no claim beyond these.

I thought at first that you disagreed, whereas now I'm pretty sure that do agree with me on this. This is my position. If you can give me any reason to believe that solipsism is a more tenable position than pure epistemological skepticism, I might listen. As it is, you have done nothing but to say that we can be more certain of scientific theories than we can be of the conclusion that other humans are conscious. I would like to know why this is. If relying on our sensory perception to be accurate is not too big of a leap for you, then why is believing another human being when he says that he subjectively experiences, in addition to the inductive conclusion drawn from the fact that we are of the same species and have the same general nervous and bodily capabilities? What good reason is there to believe that every single human being that has ever lived, other than yourself, is a liar?

 

[Fliption]

I've already seen that thread. Calm down.

Calm Down? What makes you think I need to calm down?

I thought at first that you disagreed, whereas now I'm pretty sure that do agree with me on this. This is my position. If you can give me any reason to believe that solipsism is a more tenable position than pure epistemological skepticism, I might listen. What good reason is there to believe that every single human being that has ever lived, other than yourself, is a liar?

I've already responded to this. I'm not arguing for solipsism. Explaining subjective experience with a physical theory is difficult for the exact same reason that solipsism cannot be disproven. I was simply using solipsism as an attempt to demonstrate the philosphical issues you have claiming scientific facts about consciousness. Of course, if you deny the hard problem then at least you'll be consistent.

Well what is your point and how does it stand in opposition to mine?

I've never said it's no different. One thing I will say is that is becoming increasingly difficult to carry on a discussion with you. You continue to ignore most of my questions, while straightforward answers would probably facilitate a greater understanding of exactly what your position is. I have misunderstood it enough and I am tired of trying to figure out what the point is that you are making.

You don't know what my point is? I've tried to explain it. I posted a thread where you could read the objections of others to your theory. I even cut and past a relevant section of Hypnagogue's post in that thread and and stated at the end of it that "This was the point I was trying to make". His post didn't make any sense to you either? I haven't seen any acknowledgment of anything that I've referenced for you, trying to make you understand my point and realize that it isn't just me that has an issue with the way you callously call things scientific. All of these references have just been ignored.

I've told you that I have not answered your questions because they are not relevant. They do not change the philosophical issue. They wouldn't change them even if I wanted them to.

So you won't mind if I don't explain my point again. I've referenced enough that you can research the philosophy if you choose to.

 

[Fliption]

It's interesting to me how even people who claim to be science enthusiasts don't even agree on what is scientific. And they have the nerve to go into a philosophy forum and bash metaphysics.

 

[Egmont]

It's interesting to me how even people who claim to be science enthusiasts don't even agree on what is scientific. And they have the nerve to go into a philosophy forum and bash metaphysics.

If I may offer a third opinion, I don't think loseyourname was bashing metaphysics, he was simply restating something not everyone seems able to understand.

Explaining subjective experience with a physical theory is difficult for the exact same reason that solipsism cannot be disproven.

Solipsism can be disproven, only the reasoning is a bit complicated to understand, because it involves a somewhat novel approach in philosophy: linguistic analysis (I mean novel in the context of 3,000 years of philosophy; the approach is more than a century old already)

Imagine someone claiming that the world is filled with "gnooks". You ask the person what a gnook is, and they say a gnook is an entity that can't be perceived in any conceivable way; they can't be seen, touched, or heard. Can you convince this person that gnooks don't really exist except in their flawed imagination? It's impossible.

The miracle of linguistic analysis, which is still too young a discipline and has not yet found its way into popular culture, is that it helps us realize most traditional philosophical dilemmas are nothing but arguments about the existence of gnooks. They are pseudo-dilemmas, not real philosophical problems, and the reason they are still popular is because people often fail to understand how language confuses them. They think any sentence that seems gramatically correct is a valid philosophical proposition, and that is just not the case.

Solipsism is a case in point. The "hard problem" of consciousness is just another. No modern philosopher takes those issues seriously, but of course not all philosophers are modern.

 

[Fliption]

If I may offer a third opinion, I don't think loseyourname was bashing metaphysics, he was simply restating something not everyone seems able to understand.

I didn't say that loseyourname was bashing metaphysics. I was just pointing out the somewhat less sturdy than expected foundation on which those that do bash metaphysics base all their conclusions on.

And exactly what is it that he was explaining that few understand? I understand his point perfectly well. He just doesn't appear to understand the philosophical issues he creates. Having an opposing philosophical issue is one thing. Ignoring them altogether is very different.

Solipsism is a case in point. The "hard problem" of consciousness is just another. No modern philosopher takes those issues seriously, but of course not all philosophers are modern.

Well, having a different philosophical opinion is one thing. Claiming that opinion is correct and everyone else is just stuck in the stone ages is something quite different. Anytime you wish to actually argue the point go ahead. But this probably isn't the thread for it.

I would guess that probably 99% of the people who are interested in this topic are not what you would call "modern" so be prepared for that. I'd be interested to see if there is anything to it or if it's yet another cop-out language theory that attempts to avoid the issues.

 

[vanesch]

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs. But I am only assuming your consicous experience is something close to mine, if it exists at all.

I'd like to jump in here. As said in this thread, if we put aside the hypothesis that my own subjective experiences are not in any way related to an existing world, and that the ONLY thing I know for sure is that *I* am conscious and that I have subjective experiences, whatever they may mean - as in "I think therefor I am" - if we can put that hypothesis aside because it leads us a priori nowhere and we take for granted that there is a world out there, then there *IS* still a problem with conciousness in my opinion. If, as said before, we proceed by induction, and we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness". All that is allright. But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it. Yes, we can measure brain processes. We can correlate certain brain activities with awake people, and assume they have something to do with conciousness.
But can we make one day a machine that is conscious ? And if so, how would we know ? Of course you don't expect to see "brain processes" in, I don't know, a computer. We cannot hide our ignorance anymore behind the simple induction of: "I'm concious, he looks like me, so probably he's conscious too."
Behaviouralism is probably not the right way to go, because we can mimick a lot of "conscious behaviour" with cleverly designed a-consious algorithms. I take it that my PC is not conscious (but HOW do I really know that ?). But it can simulate quite some behaviour that is "Turing test like". And wait for 20 or 30 more years, and machines will really behave "as if" they are concious. Are they ? Aren't they ? Up to now, we have no scientific clue as how to investigate this. I think this is THE fundamental, difficult issue, if any, that the physical sciences have to consider, if they want to claim (as I think they should do) to understand everything in this world, at least in principle.
A related question is: are higher animals conscious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?
Ignoring the existence of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[loseyourname]

The reason the ommission of P-consciousness is not terribly problematic for a theory of evolution is that it is still an open issue whether or not P-consciousness is causally efficacious in any way; that is, whether or not it is epiphenomenal. If it is shown one day to be causally efficacious, then certainly it must be taken into account by an evolutionary theory, but it would seem premature to say that a theory is incomplete for ommitting a phenomenon whose causal relevance is yet to be determined.

In particular, the purported causal role of P-consciousness would seem to be readily filled by causal mechanisms that are already part of the physicalist model of reality. This is precisely why the philosophical notion of the 'zombie' is a useful one-- because it would seem that we can describe the behavior of an organism (in particular, a human) in purely physical terms without needing to invoke P-consciousness at all.

Look Fliption, I told you I already went through this thread. I may have even participated in it, though I don't really remember. I have participated in other threads questioning the relevance of consciousness to evolution. I'll try to answer this again.

All I am doing is going out on a limb here to propose that p-consciousness is epiphenomenal, and I've also proposed a way to test this hypothesis. The hypothesis proposes that not only is p-consciousness efficacious, but it provides a clear advantage for a human organism. The test is not meant to be proof, which seems to be your quabble. It is confirmation of a hypothesis, meant only to show that consciousness is not in principle excluded from evolutionary analysis. Sleeth has proposed in his empirical induction thread that third-person testing may not be the only scientific way to test a hypothesis, in particular a hypothesis regarding a subjective phenomenon. I agree with him and I am basing further explanation on that idea. Proof of my hypothesis, in the traditional third-person sense employed by the scientific method, is not available unless the hard problem is solved. Confirmation, however, is possible, and even something approaching proof may be sought if we allow one small assumption that is not so much of a leap from the assumptions on which the epistemology of science is based in the first place. There are consciouness studies being performed at both Cal Tech and USC which are based on this simple assumption - that all humans, and even chimps in the case of these studies, are conscious. The researchers don't seem to be concerned that their work is unscientific, and neither am I. Here are links to the labs I am speaking of:

http://www.klab.caltech.edu/

http://ilab.usc.edu/

The reason I tell you to calm down is that you seem to be getting rather exacerbated and you're beginning to be a tad bit insulting. I understand fully what you are saying, and I understand the points you are trying to make. What I did have trouble understanding initially is how they were relevant to the points I was making and whether or not you agreed with the bulk of what I was saying. It is frustrating that it took so long for me to figure these things out, because it would have happened a lot sooner had you simply answered the few questions I asked. I will admit that I am rather frustrated that no person on an internet forum anywhere, and particular on this one, seems to ever give a direct answer to a direct question. They instead call the question irrelevant and restate what they have already stated. When an answer would further my understanding of another's position, it is not irrelevant, even if that other does not consider it pertinent to the point he is making. A good discussion is facilitated by open lines of communication. Even if you don't see the importance of a particular question or example, it is best to address it. Answering questions will always further a discussion, whereas questioning questions only causes it to go in circles.

Another thing - please don't bemoan what you find as the deplorable behavior of scientific minded persons on a metaphysics forum. Address my arguments and my examples and my questions. I am the only person you are having this discussion with. There is no need for you to point out that my position may be inconsistent with that of other posters. I am not denying the philosophical perpelxedness of the hard problem. My only position on that matter is that the hard problem of consciousness can be circumscribed by a scientific investigation in the same way that Descartes' problem of the evil demon can be circumscribed. Just as we must assume that human sense perception is basically reliable and that there is indeed an external world that we can have knowledge of, we must assume that other humans are indeed conscious. Neither proposition can be proven, but what can be had is functional knowledge built from a set of basic assumptions. Any epistemic system must have a certain set of foundational principles, and one of the principles for the system I am proposing is that all humans are conscious. What we can derive from this assumption is the same thing we can derive from any scientific enquiry - functional knowledge that can reasonably be believed to closely approximate the truth.

The examples of Descartes' evil demon, the gnooks that Egmont speaks of, and my own hard problem of the opposable thumb are simply meant to illustrate the fact that philosophy is capable of posing any number of unsolvable, sometimes paradoxical questions and problems, none of which are of too much concern to a scientific researcher. This seems to be where we disagree. You think it is an important question that must be solved, I think it is not. It is obvious at this point that our respective positions on this will not be reconciled. We are both intelligent people and intelligent people sometimes disagree. There is nothing further to be argued on this particular matter.