Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

[Fliption]

That is plain wrong. I've never experienced the Earth from outerspace, but I know it looks blue.

How did you come to know it is blue? Since you haven't seen it yourself then you probably learned it some other way. 1)Someone told you 2)You read it in a book 3) saw a picture of it on tv. Any will do. But they are all experiences. My statement stands. ALL your knowledge comes through experience.

Do you have nationality? Does "nationality" exist?

If I have it, then it exists as a concept that one can have. This is just word games that are meaningless to me.

You don't need consciousness to be able to have beliefs about it - all you need is to know what consciousness is.

But this directly contradicts what you were saying before. That the fact that everyone using the word consciousness was proof that solipsism was wrong and everyone really IS conscious. This is the contradiction I was attempting to point out.

Your god example is very different because now you seem to have switched your tune and no longer believe that having a conception of it equates to actually having it.

But I don't really think you have switched your tune. I'm just asking for clarification.

What hard problem?

The one that the scientist stranded all alone on an island has noticed while he studies in his laboratory... all alone.

The crux of this seems to be that you claim that the hard problem is created by the semantic traps we fall into when communicating with one another. I'm claiming that the hard problem exists within each individual person and the communication issues are simply a byproduct of the hard problem itself.

No, that is like taking a boat to work after a major flood and then saying, over the phone to a lazy colleague, "what do you mean you can't get here? I did!"

Rest assured nobody will take you where you don't want to go. Certainly not me.

Didn't understand this. A bit cryptic.

You clearly misunderstand the point of analytic philosophy. I suggest you read up on the subject. Russell, Wittgenstein, Frege, are always a good start.

Hmm well whenever someone says things like this I usually will concede the point regardless of how much I have studied it because there's always the possibility that I don't understand. That's really why I'm discussing it. It seems like complete nonsense but part of me knows that there must be some reason why every 3 months some character comes in here swearing by it.

As info, I have read on this topic. I have read Wittgenstein. I will admit to you that from what I read, it's all word games. I've seen papers where people have tried to use Wittgenstein to prove materialism correct. I just think this is another attempt to avoid the issue. That's the way it appears to me. I will gladly consider any points and concede to them if they make sense to me though. I promise you that.

Well, you can say whatever you want. You can claim that the Earth is flat, that the bible provides a literal account of biological history, that the United States is about to be taken over by the UN. You can make arguments out of knowledge, or you can make arguments out of ignorance. The choice is always yours.

Your statement above is just plain wrong.

But why is it wrong? Because it is a piece of knowledge that I cannot objectively justify with everyone else around me? Do you realize how much this sounds like the same argument some of the more extreme materialists in this forum make? Some of them even use this very point to deny that they have subjective experiences just to avoid having to concede that there is something about their existence that they cannot explain.

 

[vanesch]

to be physical means to be able to objectively observe and study, then this alone leaves consciousness out.

To me, "physical" means: has a necessary description in a physical theory, based on mathematical reasoning, allowing to predict outcomes of experiments. Conceptually integrated in physics, if you want to.

cheers,
patrick.

 

[Fliption]

To me, "physical" means: has a necessary description in a physical theory, based on mathematical reasoning, allowing to predict outcomes of experiments. Conceptually integrated in physics, if you want to.

cheers,
patrick.

Probably the same as the one I used. A physical thing is objectively(or is it inter-subjectively) observable.

 

[Egmont]

How did you come to know it is blue? Since you haven't seen it yourself then you probably learned it some other way. 1)Someone told you 2)You read it in a book 3) saw a picture of it on tv. Any will do. But they are all experiences. My statement stands. ALL your knowledge comes through experience.

That is beside the point. The point is that most of our knowledge comes from experiencing verbal descriptions of phenomena rather than direct experience of the phenomena themselves. But if you want to think there's no essential difference between reading Masters & Johnson and experiencing the real thing, please don't let me stand in your way

If I have it, then it exists as a concept that one can have. This is just word games that are meaningless to me.

What is a word game?

But this directly contradicts what you were saying before. That the fact that everyone using the word consciousness was proof that solipsism was wrong and everyone really IS conscious.

You completely misinterpreted my argument. You were born a few decades ago, the word "conscious" existed way before you arrived on this planet. People have been using it quite effectively in their daily communication. If at some point in your life you decided you thought about what the word means and discovered that everyone who uses the word "conscious", except you, is in fact not conscious, you would be a fool. At best it would simply mean you did not understand what people meant when they used the word "conscious".

That is, in a simple presentation, the argument against solipsism. It is a foolish idea. You may well define "conscious" in a way that makes it possible, even if only in principle, that you are the only conscious being in the universe. But if you do that, the rest of us may simply ignore you. People are conscious, period. They say so themselves, and they are the ones who invented the word. If you think they might not be, that only means you don't know what they are talking about.

I don't agree with it but part of me knows that there must be some reason why every 3 months some character comes in here swearing by it.

That doesn't mean anything. I suppose people come here more often than that swearing you must accept Jesus as your personal savior. You should only accept an idea if it makes sense to you, not because a lot of people claim it's true.

I will not tell you analytic philosophy provides you a lot of answers (it does, but saying that would make me sound like a preacher), but I can tell you are very confused. That means there must be something wrong with your approach.

I have read Wittgenstein. I will admit to you that from what I read, it's all word games.

This is a clear sign of your confusion. Wittgenstein is, quite simply, the most influential philosopher of the last century. The man practically reinvented philosophy with his concept of Sprachspiele ("language games", as it's often poorly translated in English). To dismiss his work as "all word games" is akin to dismissing Beethoven's symphonies as "a bunch of noise" or Van Gogh's paintings as "blobs".

I've seen papers where people have tried to use Wittgenstein to prove materialism correct.

You can't prevent people from putting a good idea to not-so-good uses. But a lot of what people like you perceive as proofs for the correctness of materialism are not what you think they are. The problem is not proving that materialism is correct, the problem is explaining why it seems correct. Because, like it or not, materialistic ideas are among the few certainties we have in life. So that's where analysis comes in, to demonstrate how materialistic may seem true in a non-materialistic universe (you knowledgeable ones out there, please allow me a bit of poetic license; I know I'm misrepresenting the position, but that's the best I can do in this context)

Do you realize how much this sounds like the same argument some of the more extreme materialists in this forum make? Some of them even use this very point to deny that they have subjective experiences just to avoid having to concede that there is something about their existence that they cannot explain.

I haven't seen anything like that, on this forum or anywhere else. Of course there are always the fools shouting from their soapboxes, but no one takes them seriously. Do you have a case in point?

 

[Fliption]

That is beside the point. The point is that most of our knowledge comes from experiencing verbal descriptions of phenomena rather than direct experience of the phenomena themselves. But if you want to think there's no essential difference between reading Masters & Johnson and experiencing the real thing, please don't let me stand in your way

I'm not claiming there isn't difference in the quality of knowledge based on how the knowledge is experienced. I'm only claiming that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind. It seems you agree with this now. Experiencing verbal descriptions versus direct experience. So this seems inconsistent with this quote that I was responding to:

I think I only disagree that we know for sure it exists because we "experience" it.

Given that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind, I can make this statement about anything.

What is a word game?

Defining words in whatever way required to make a specific ontological point. Especially when most reasonable people don't have the same definition.

That is, in a simple presentation, the argument against solipsism. It is a foolish idea. You may well define "conscious" in a way that makes it possible, even if only in principle, that you are the only conscious being in the universe. But if you do that, the rest of us may simply ignore you. People are conscious, period. They say so themselves, and they are the ones who invented the word. If you think they might not be, that only means you don't know what they are talking about.

Ok, I understand you and agree. But help me understand how this statement above is consistent with this one below.

You don't need consciousness to be able to have beliefs about it - all you need is to know what consciousness is.

My original question was how can you claim that people are conscious because they are the ones that invented the word and then claim that they don't need consciousness to have beliefs about the concept? I still see inconsistency. Maybe I'm not understanding the point of the latter quote?

You should only accept an idea if it makes sense to you, not because a lot of people claim it's true.

That's exactly what I'm doing. But unlike many, I will attempt an open minded discussion to be sure of my own position. I see that as a good thing.

but I can tell you are very confused. That means there must be something wrong with your approach.

Now if we could only pinpoint what that "something wrong" is.

This is a clear sign of your confusion. Wittgenstein is, quite simply, the most influential philosopher of the last century. The man practically reinvented philosophy with his concept of Sprachspiele ("language games", as it's often poorly translated in English). To dismiss his work as "all word games" is akin to dismissing Beethoven's symphonies as "a bunch of noise" or Van Gogh's paintings as "blobs".

You misunderstood. I'm not talking about Wittgenstein's philosophical contributions in its entirety. I am talking about the specific application of it that I have seen to this specific topic of the hard problem. That is what I say appears to be word games. So now that the clear signs of my confusion are not true, am I still confused?

You can't prevent people from putting a good idea to not-so-good uses. But a lot of what people like you perceive as proofs for the correctness of materialism are not what you think they are.

When the paper itself claims that "therefore materialism is correct", I'm not sure how else to interpret it.

The problem is not proving that materialism is correct, the problem is explaining why it seems correct. Because, like it or not, materialistic ideas are among the few certainties we have in life. So that's where analysis comes in, to demonstrate how materialistic may seem true in a non-materialistic universe

I don't disagree.

(you knowledgeable ones out there, please allow me a bit of poetic license; I know I'm misrepresenting the position, but that's the best I can do in this context)

Ok, I forgive you.

I haven't seen anything like that, on this forum or anywhere else. Of course there are always the fools shouting from their soapboxes, but no one takes them seriously. Do you have a case in point?

Wow, there's a ton of this here. Just do a search on any topic on consciousness here and you'll see it. On my very first search I found this quote from a member named Mentat:

"You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"? I'm not denying the existence of something that has a clear definition, and which obviously plays an important role in the phenomenon at hand; I'm denying the existence of something that has no coherent definition and which needn't play any role the discussion.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman)."

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=20842&page=1&highlight=subjective

 

[Egmont]

I'm not claiming there isn't difference in the quality of knowledge based on how the knowledge is experienced. I'm only claiming that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind. It seems you agree with this now. Experiencing verbal descriptions versus direct experience.

Perhaps you don't realize, but you are simply playing a game with words here. You are defining "experience" in a way most people would disagree with you. Your proposition may be right, but it is irrelevant to anyone who disagrees with your definition.

Given that all knowledge comes from experience of some kind, I can make this statement about anything.

Well, you have defined "experience" as "acquisition of knowledge", and then made a tautological assertion. Of course you are correct, no point arguing it.

Defining words in whatever way required to make a specific ontological point. Especially when most reasonable people don't have the same definition.

What do you mean by "reasonable people"?

My original question was how can you claim that people are conscious because they are the ones that invented the word and then claim that they don't need consciousness to have beliefs about the concept? I still see inconsistency.

There is no contradiction. I didn't say people are conscious because they invented the word, I said you can't say they are not conscious because you did not invent the word. That is, it's not that solipsism is false, but rather if you lived in a solipsist universe where people describe themselves as conscious, the word "conscious" would have a different meaning. Solipsism is not possible in a solipsist universe. That logical fact has been overlooked for centuries.

You think those are "word games", and that is pretty much what they are. Many philosophical problems arise when people take a word in one context and apply to another where it means a completely different thing. That's why linguistic analysis has become so important to philosophy.

Now if we could only pinpoint what that "something wrong" is.

Simple: it's the fact that you pose questions that can't possibly be answered, not even in principle. It's a habit of thought as old as philosophy itself.

Case in point: you define "consciousness" in a way that makes it impossible to know if other people are conscious, then clain you are absolutely sure you are conscious but you have no way to be sure if other people are conscious too. Of course not, you have introduced an unsolvable problem in your definition, how can you think the fact that you can't solve it has any relevance whatsoever? When other people define "consciousness" in a way that doesn't create unsolvable problems, you say "ha, but this is not the right way to define consciousness, because it doesn't lead to unsolvable problems".

I say, this is confusion, and the reason is simple: if "consciousness" were such an intractable concept, no one would be able to communicate the fact that they are conscious. When we use the word in daily conversation, there's no mystery at all. When you stop to think what the word means is when you get confused. Which is only natural, since we don't know what most of the words we use really mean anyway. Try and figure out what a simple word like "number" means. Or a word like "simple", for that matter. Or a word like "matter". Or a word like "word"...

You misunderstood. I'm not talking about Wittgenstein's philosophical contributions in its entirety. I am talking about the specific application of it that I have seen to this specific topic of the hard problem. That is what I say appears to be word games.

That is because this "hard problem" is but a plays with words. If you don't acknowledge the value of language to solve problems, you should not acknowledge its value to pose them.

At a minimum you should acknowledge that this "hard problem" is nowhere to be seen, except as a result of defining some words in a particular way. I live with my consciousness just fine and see no "hard problems" with it. There are things about my consciousness that I don't understand, but then again there are things about my hair that I don't understand, and I don't think we have a hard problem of hair.

"You are saying that I don't "solve the problem" by denying that "..." exists, right? Yet, as I pointed out in my previous posts, "..." doesn't have any meaning (since it cannot be defined outside of the plainly circular and illogical), so what really is left to be "solved"? I'm not denying the existence of something that has a clear definition, and which obviously plays an important role in the phenomenon at hand; I'm denying the existence of something that has no coherent definition and which needn't play any role the discussion.

To assume the existence of "subjective experience" a priori, and then try to define and understand it, is to create a top-bottom argument (which is inevitably useless...a strawman)."

Exactly where is Mentat claiming that materialism is true? I don't see it anywhere. In my understanding, he's saying he doesn't understand what "subjective experience" is to the point where he can clearly assert it exists. What could possibly be wrong with that?

 

[Fliption]

Perhaps you don't realize, but you are simply playing a game with words here. You are defining "experience" in a way most people would disagree with you. Your proposition may be right, but it is irrelevant to anyone who disagrees with your definition.

Well, you have defined "experience" as "acquisition of knowledge", and then made a tautological assertion. Of course you are correct, no point arguing it.

I don't believe I am doing that at all. I think most everyone who participates in this forum would agree with what I have stated. I suspect this because I've seen this discussed many times before and it was pretty clear that everyone understands this.

I would be glad to hear a definition of experience that would render my statement false. One that isn't a tautology.

What do you mean by "reasonable people"?

Don't worry. I'm not trying to slide anything by you here. I suspect most everyone that contributes here is reasonable. But if I leave that word out, it leaves the door open for a response about some wacko christian nutjob. I'm sure you know what I mean

That logical fact has been overlooked for centuries.

Or perhaps it isn't relevant to the real issue behind solipsism?

You think those are "word games", and that is pretty much what they are. Many philosophical problems arise when people take a word in one context and apply to another where it means a completely different thing. That's why linguistic analysis has become so important to philosophy.

You won't get an argument from me here. I'm always inserting into threads my opinion that semantic confusion is the only thing people are debating rather than the ontology they think they are debating. This whole physical versus non-physical thing is my favorite one.

Simple: it's the fact that you pose questions that can't possibly be answered, not even in principle. It's a habit of thought as old as philosophy itself.

What question have I posed that cannot be answered?

Case in point: you define "consciousness" in a way that makes it impossible to know if other people are conscious, then clain you are absolutely sure you are conscious but you have no way to be sure if other people are conscious too. Of course not, you have introduced an unsolvable problem in your definition, how can you think the fact that you can't solve it has any relevance whatsoever?

I have a particular feature of my existence that I observe. I can then observe that I'm not sure anyone else has this same feature. I can inductively decide they probably do. But the nature of this feature forces me to decide this inductively and it is this nature that results in the inability to reductively understand it. I don't see where definitions change any of this that I've written.

When other people define "consciousness" in a way that doesn't create unsolvable problems, you say "ha, but this is not the right way to define consciousness, because it doesn't lead to unsolvable problems".

Not because they haven't created an unsolvable problem. Because they aren't describing the feature that I observe.

I say, this is confusion, and the reason is simple: if "consciousness" were such an intractable concept, no one would be able to communicate the fact that they are conscious. When we use the word in daily conversation, there's no mystery at all. When you stop to think what the word means is when you get confused. Which is only natural, since we don't know what most of the words we use really mean anyway. Try and figure out what a simple word like "number" means. Or a word like "simple", for that matter. Or a word like "matter". Or a word like "word"...

Words are simply defined or described reductively by using other words. Ultimately it is all circular. This is a fact whether we're talking about swiss cheese or consciousness. So why should I observe a hard problem with consciousness and not with swiss cheese?(I don't see a hard problem with swiss cheese btw.) It is because the hard problem I see has nothing to do with language.

That is because this "hard problem" is but a plays with words. If you don't acknowledge the value of language to solve problems, you should not acknowledge its value to pose them.

Explain what this means, please.

At a minimum you should acknowledge that this "hard problem" is nowhere to be seen, except as a result of defining some words in a particular way. I live with my consciousness just fine and see no "hard problems" with it. There are things about my consciousness that I don't understand, but then again there are things about my hair that I don't understand, and I don't think we have a hard problem of hair.

There are things about my consciousness and my hair that I don't understand. But the difference is that the current paradigm can in principle answer my hair questions. The current paradigm is not equipped to reconcile the issue I see with my consciousness. I do not need to know what your definitions are to observe my own existence and attempt to understand it using the same reductive approach I use to understand everything else.

Exactly where is Mentat claiming that materialism is true? I don't see it anywhere.

That's not what I was trying to find an example of. I was trying to show you someone who denies the existence of subjective experience.

In my understanding, he's saying he doesn't understand what "subjective experience" is to the point where he can clearly assert it exists. What could possibly be wrong with that?

You said you'd never seen anyone do it and so I am showing you someone doing it. I didn't say there was anything wrong with it. This is just an example of a person who denies the existence of something to avoid the hard problem it results in. Chalmers himself said the only way around the hard problem is to deny the existence of subjective experience. The problem with Mentats argument is that he denies it based on the inability to provide a scientific definition of it. What I've tried to point out to him is that a scientific definition would mean that it could be reductively explained, which is exactly what we're saying cannot be done. So he's basically using the hard problem to deny that the hard problem exists because he's still measuring it against the old materialist paradigm which claims that something must be reductively defined in order for it to really exists. This same argument could be made against the existence of all fundamental things. Which is absurd, at least to me.

 

[vanesch]

Case in point: you define "consciousness" in a way that makes it impossible to know if other people are conscious

The whole point is that this impossibility comes not because of a formal definition, but seems to be a property of the subjectively observed phenomenon we are trying to pinpoint with the word. And _that_ property is the contents of the "hard problem".
You seem to think that a concept can only have existence when we have a word for it, and when we have a clear definition of that word. That is at least what you accused me of, when I used a new word "bewustness" for it.
The point is that concepts related to "things in the world" DO have a meaning, even if we cannot pinpoint it with a word which has a formal definition. In fact, it is a necessity that we cannot give a formal definition of the word, because otherwise we would just be doing formal logic, unrelated to the "thing in the world" we wanted to describe in the first place. It is only apprimatively, and in theoretical physics, that you can start to come close to bring into relation a formally defined word with a "thing in the world".

Back to consciousness: I assume that you experience subjective experiences, that you are aware of your existence, that you feel pain etc... I assume that, because I *DO* experience this. This subjectively clearly existing phenomenon and all that goes with it, I indicate it with the word "consciousness". I call the phenomenon of my awareness of existence, of the fact that I do feel pain etc... my consciousness. I am absolutely sure that that phenomenon exists, especially when I put my hand in boiling water.
I assume that other human beings have also similar experiences, and so I assume that they are "conscious".
The vagueness of my description does not indicate that the subjective experiences themselves are vague. It is simply that I don't have a good formal theory of the thing. However, I do know some things about it. Instead of always having to write tens of sentences of what I vaguely mean, in the hope that the other human being reading them starts associating with my vage description HIS subjective experiences that - I assume - have some similarity to mine, I put a word on it: consciousness. And as I am not the very first person to do that, I assume that I don't even have to give this vague definition, but that people instinctively know what is more or less meant.

If you are NOT conscious, of course, those descriptions are incomprehensible.

The point now is, that no matter the vagueness of the "definition" (it isn't a real formal definition - as I pointed out - it is a description with the hope that the reader will have an aha experience), there are some clear properties of the thing I describe with that word: namely that it is NOT an explanatory concept of behaviour. It is not introduced for that. It might, or might not, intervene in certain aspects of behaviour.

The trouble with that "thing" is that 1) I have it (I know that I am conscious) and probably most humans have it and 2) that it seems to be impossible to find out if something ELSE than a human has it because we have no idea at all how it influences the workings of an entity, if it influences it at all.

These two elements, namely knowing that something exists in several copies, and having fundamentally no clue as how to recognise it, it the hard problem I think Fliption talks about.

This hard problem has been "solved" in 2 ways:
saying that the "thing" doesn't exist, or saying that you know how to recognize it on behavioural basis.

Both approaches are wrong: I subjectively know it exists, eliminating the first "solution", and as I pointed out, there is not necessarily a link to behaviourism, which has not been mentioned at all in my vague defining phrases.

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[vanesch]

Probably the same as the one I used. A physical thing is objectively(or is it inter-subjectively) observable.

Well, my hope is that one day, I don't know, 300 years from now, we might know enough of brain functions to interconnect 2 or more brains. Probably it is only in that circumstance that consciousness might become materialistic: if we can share conscious experiences inter-subjectively. It would probably even be more fun if we could do it with machines .
But my fear is that something fundamental might forbid such a linking.
And the fact is that I will be long dead before it could ever happen, so maybe I'm just wasting my time thinking about it

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[Egmont]

I don't believe I am doing that at all. I think most everyone who participates in this forum would agree with what I have stated.

Yes, we do tend to believe everyone agrees with our views, until we find out they don't...

I would be glad to hear a definition of experience that would render my statement false. One that isn't a tautology.

I'm quite sure you would disagree with any definition of experience that would imply your statement is false.

What question have I posed that cannot be answered?

"Are other people conscious?"

You said you can guess but you can't know for sure. Guessing is not answering.

I have a particular feature of my existence that I observe. I can then observe that I'm not sure anyone else has this same feature. I can inductively decide they probably do. But the nature of this feature forces me to decide this inductively and it is this nature that results in the inability to reductively understand it. I don't see where definitions change any of this that I've written.

I'm quite sure you don't see it, which is why I think you need to learn about analytic philosophy. Then you'd see it.

Words are simply defined or described reductively by using other words.

Is that so? What does a word like "thing" reduce to?

Ultimately it is all circular. This is a fact whether we're talking about swiss cheese or consciousness.

You are terribly mistaken about that. Terribly mistaken.

So why should I observe a hard problem with consciousness and not with swiss cheese?(I don't see a hard problem with swiss cheese btw.) It is because the hard problem I see has nothing to do with language.

To start with, the "hard problem" can only be formulated in language. If you're trying to unscrew a light-bulb and it won't come out, then you're having a problem which exists even if you don't talk about it. With this "hard problem" though, as soon as we quit talking about it, it disappears, and that is because... well, I've said it too many times already.

There are things about my consciousness and my hair that I don't understand. But the difference is that the current paradigm can in principle answer my hair questions. The current paradigm is not equipped to reconcile the issue I see with my consciousness.

Exactly how do you know that with so much certainty? If you're following David Chalmers, this is his reasoning in a nutshell: any explanation of consciuosness will fail, because we can always look at it and say it doesn't make intuitive sense. But this is, in essence, no different from rejecting any explanation that the Earth is round because any fool can see it is obviously flat.

It is a sad fact of life that when most people believed the Earth was flat, the ones who knew it had to be round were simply ignored rather than heard. There are quite a few voices talking about how consciousness is not what most people think it is, but they won't be heard for as long as they can still cling to their old, outdated beliefs.

I do not need to know what your definitions are to observe my own existence and attempt to understand it using the same reductive approach I use to understand everything else.

I don't see you "observing your own existence" in that sentence, I only see words, and they do not make much sense. (by the way, I'm sure my words don't make much sense to you either; it's the whole problem with language, once you understand how it works you realize there's very little you can say that makes much sense)

That's not what I was trying to find an example of. I was trying to show you someone who denies the existence of subjective experience. You said you'd never seen anyone do it and so I am showing you someone doing it.

If you pardon my sincerity, you strike me as a very naive person. If you are absolutely sure Mentat has subjective experiences but denies it, then you are simply saying he must be lying to avoid acknowledging the certainty of your position. But at the same time you make the claim that it's impossible for you to know if anyone else (including Mentat!) has subjective experiences, and that necessarily implies he may not be lying after all. To be consistent with your own position, you should interpret Mentat's comments as evidence that some people may not have subjective experiences, but you take it as evidence that he's not intellectually honest.

I doubt you can understand the problem with your argument. If you could, you wouldn't be arguing it in the first place. Yet a problem exists.

Chalmers himself said the only way around the hard problem is to deny the existence of subjective experience.

Chalmers himself also says even zombies would believe they have subjective experience, that even zombies would have a hard problem of consciousness despite the fact that they don't have consciousness.

Methinks Chalmers is extremely confused.

The problem with Mentats argument is that he denies it based on the inability to provide a scientific definition of it. What I've tried to point out to him is that a scientific definition would mean that it could be reductively explained, which is exactly what we're saying cannot be done.

Methinks you are also extremely confused. You claim the hard problem can't be solved because any solution would imply it can be solved. That is like saying you have a nut that can't be cracked, and when someone manages to crack the nut right in front of your eyes you say, "ha, but you didn't really crack it, you just smashed it into pieces, it's not the same thing"

So he's basically using the hard problem to deny that the hard problem exists because he's still measuring it against the old materialist paradigm which claims that something must be reductively defined in order for it to really exists.

That is a gross misrepresentation of the materialist position. What the materialists say is simply this: if you claim something exists then you must prove it. Materialists believe in the existence of many things which cannot be "reductively defined", such as for instance the laws of physics. What materialists don't believe is that things like fairies exist simply because a few people insist they have seen them.

This same argument could be made against the existence of all fundamental things. Which is absurd, at least to me.

It would be absurd indeed, if that is what they were saying. But as I said, you don't really understand what they are saying. You clearly did not understand what Mentat said in that quote.

 

[Egmont]

The whole point is that this impossibility comes not because of a formal definition

You are smart and I think you can understand what I'm trying to say. And you are right, coming up with a formal definition won't help at all.

but seems to be a property of the subjectively observed phenomenon we are trying to pinpoint with the word. And _that_ property is the contents of the "hard problem".

Would you agree with me then, that whatever _that_ property is, it's something that can't be communicated? And would you also agree that Chalmers and his followers think they are successful at communicating what the "hard problem" is about?

You seem to be close to grasping that the world is full of hard problems, but none of them are about things we can talk about. I hope you give the issue some more thought; you would be glad you did.

Now keep this in mind: there is something we can't talk about, but I can't tell you what that something is, you have to figure out by yourself. Anything I can describe to you in words is not something we can't talk about. I have no way to talk about this thing, but there is a way to see it, and it's possible to guide people so they can also see it for themselves.

You seem to think that a concept can only have existence when we have a word for it, and when we have a clear definition of that word. That is at least what you accused me of, when I used a new word "bewustness" for it.

I didn't accuse you of anything. All I said was, if I started talking about bewustness with you without fully understanding what you mean by it, we would end up disagreeing at some point. Which is exactly the situation concerning most philosophical issues.

The point is that concepts related to "things in the world" DO have a meaning, even if we cannot pinpoint it with a word which has a formal definition.

You are absolutely correct, but is "consciousness" one such thing or not? That is, is "consciousness" a concept that is related to "things in the world", or is it not?

In fact, it is a necessity that we cannot give a formal definition of the word, because otherwise we would just be doing formal logic, unrelated to the "thing in the world" we wanted to describe in the first place.

I am really impressed with that statement. Serious. So you see, we need a lot of concepts which lack formal definition in order for our communication to be meaningful, but at the same time concepts without a formal definition cannot be subject to scientific study. Doesn't that make you think? Doesn't it sound like science is only true to the extent that it restricts itself to formal logic?

It is only apprimatively, and in theoretical physics, that you can start to come close to bring into relation a formally defined word with a "thing in the world".

I hope we get a chance, one day, to talk about why I think physics doesn't have as much to do with "things in the world" as we usually think. The truths of physics, from my perspective, seem to come from formal logic, not from the nature of reality. But that's a discussion way ahead.

The vagueness of my description does not indicate that the subjective experiences themselves are vague.

But it does indicate that there's a huge gap between the experience and the description, doesn't it? And the issue is, that gap just can't be closed, period.

If you are NOT conscious, of course, those descriptions are incomprehensible.

So can we take the fact that someone understands our descriptions of consciousness as proof that they are conscious?

The trouble with that "thing" is that 1) I have it (I know that I am conscious) and probably most humans have it and 2) that it seems to be impossible to find out if something ELSE than a human has it because we have no idea at all how it influences the workings of an entity, if it influences it at all.

You are correct about that, but as stated it is a problem like any other. Like any scientific problem, it will take time to be worked on, a final, absolute answer will never be found, but there's nothing preventing us from learning a lot more than we currently know.

This hard problem has been "solved" in 2 ways: saying that the "thing" doesn't exist, or saying that you know how to recognize it on behavioural basis. Both approaches are wrong: I subjectively know it exists, eliminating the first "solution", and as I pointed out, there is not necessarily a link to behaviourism, which has not been mentioned at all in my vague defining phrases.

That really depends on what you mean by behaviourism. Using a computer to send messages to an internet forum on metaphysics sounds like "behaviour" to me. Granted, mention to behaviour is absent in your description, but the description itself is manifested behaviour of a conscious entity (yourself)

This is what many people don't see. Consciousness is related to behaviour, but in a very abstract way. The more abstract a concept, the harder it is to think about it, and the easier it is to get confused and see problems where they don't exist.

 

[Fliption]

Yes, we do tend to believe everyone agrees with our views, until we find out they don't...

I'm quite sure you would disagree with any definition of experience that would imply your statement is false.

Well then let's see if they do. The reason I say that they do is because I can't think of a definition that would render my statement false and still resemble in any way the concept that people refer to when they say 'experience'. Rather than just assume I won't agree with the definition, let's see one. Seriously. I'm curious.

"Are other people conscious?"

You said you can guess but you can't know for sure. Guessing is not answering.

Heh well Vanesch has postulated some pretty wild stuff that may occur some time in the future when we are long gone that could solve this. I think my only point is that you can't know the answer to this question within materialists constraints. It is this paradigm that creates the problem; Not reality. As I said to Vanesch earlier, if his ideas ever did happen, then I think the concepts 'physical', 'non-physical', 'materialism' and therefore 'hard problem' may not really mean much anymore.

I'm quite sure you don't see it, which is why I think you need to learn about analytic philosophy. Then you'd see it.

You can't tell me what's wrong with it?

Is that so? What does a word like "thing" reduce to?

Quote from the dictionary:

"An entity, an idea, or a quality perceived, known, or thought to have its own existence"

That was easy.

And I can look up each word in the definition above and eventually we'd find that all definitions are circular.

You are terribly mistaken about that. Terribly mistaken.

Apparently this is easier to say than it is to prove.

To start with, the "hard problem" can only be formulated in language. If you're trying to unscrew a light-bulb and it won't come out, then you're having a problem which exists even if you don't talk about it. With this "hard problem" though, as soon as we quit talking about it, it disappears, and that is because... well, I've said it too many times already.

Yes I see what you mean. You know, I think we may be having some semantic problems here . I agree that unlike the light bulb, the hard problem is manufactured. But I believe it is manufactured by attempting to place constraints on reality. If we stop placing constraints on it, then these problems go away. I'm not saying that a structure to knowledge shouldn't exists. Just that we should pay more attention to making sure that that structure reflects reality instead of the other way around.

It is a sad fact of life that when most people believed the Earth was flat, the ones who knew it had to be round were simply ignored rather than heard. There are quite a few voices talking about how consciousness is not what most people think it is, but they won't be heard for as long as they can still cling to their old, outdated beliefs.

Point taken. I can agree that Chalmers may be wrong. If I thought there was no possibility of that than I wouldn't be here in this forum discussing it. As I said earlier, I'm here discussing this with you because I do wonder if you have a point. But as you said, I shouldn't accept it until it makes sense to me. But, to your point, I will always concede that I may be wrong. I haven't seen anyone show how Chalmers is wrong but I have no certain argument against the "world is flat" example. The good thing about this lesson is that it applies to everyone .

If you pardon my sincerity, you strike me as a very naive person. If you are absolutely sure Mentat has subjective experiences but denies it, then you are simply saying he must be lying to avoid acknowledging the certainty of your position. But at the same time you make the claim that it's impossible for you to know if anyone else (including Mentat!) has subjective experiences, and that necessarily implies he may not be lying after all. To be consistent with your own position, you should interpret Mentat's comments as evidence that some people may not have subjective experiences, but you take it as evidence that he's not intellectually honest.

Naive? Why would you call someone who's words you admit you don't understand naive? You obviously assume you know my exact position. There is no inconsistency here. I do not assume that Mentat is lying. I have told him himself that his position is the result of one of two things. 1) He has no subjective experience. 2) He does and he is lying to avoid the conclusions. Now, in this thread you and others here have established that we clearly can know that others are conscious through induction. And I'm just saying that if this is true then it means number 2 above is the likely choice for Mentat. But I have never and will never claim he is definitely one or the other.

I doubt you can understand the problem with your argument. If you could, you wouldn't be arguing it in the first place. Yet a problem exists.

Another example of something that is apparently easier to say than to prove. I see a trend.

Chalmers himself also says even zombies would believe they have subjective experience, that even zombies would have a hard problem of consciousness despite the fact that they don't have consciousness.

Yes, this one stumped me too. It doesn't make any sense on the surface. I debated Hypnagogue on this very point in a thread and he eventually was able to get across to me the reason Chalmers makes this statement. You might want to take a look at that. Here's the link.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=20842&page=3&pp=15&highlight=zombie+p-consciousness
It started on page 3 and ended on Page 6. The posts between me and Hypnagogue are the most relevant.

Methinks you are also extremely confused. You claim the hard problem can't be solved because any solution would imply it can be solved. That is like saying you have a nut that can't be cracked, and when someone manages to crack the nut right in front of your eyes you say, "ha, but you didn't really crack it, you just smashed it into pieces, it's not the same thing"

I claim it can be solved. It can go away completely if we change the paradigm. And the nut cracking example is nothing like what my position is. That example just demonstrates someone being petty and unreasonable. My point is exactly the same as what Vanesch is saying. An attempt to solve this problem on the part of materialists that avoids or claims the non-existence of something that I personally know exists is not going to be sufficient. I don't understand why this is considered an unfair position to take.

That is a gross misrepresentation of the materialist position. What the materialists say is simply this: if you claim something exists then you must prove it. Materialists believe in the existence of many things which cannot be "reductively defined", such as for instance the laws of physics. What materialists don't believe is that things like fairies exist simply because a few people insist they have seen them.

OK here's a question for you. IF Materialism is wrong, do you think the evidence of it being wrong should meet the standards of materialism? Why should it?

It's like this dialogue:

Person 1: Your map is wrong because it leaves out a left turn.
Person 2: No, there is no left turn. See look here at the map.

Also, are you insinuating that "fairies" are like subjective experience? Because if you agree that it is natural for a materialists to deny subjective experience, then this is the exact opposite of what you were saying earlier. As a matter of fact, you claiming that you've never seen anyone deny subjective experience is the only reason I posted this example of Mentat.

It would be absurd indeed, if that is what they were saying. But as I said, you don't really understand what they are saying. You clearly did not understand what Mentat said in that quote.

Mentat is not a "they". His views are far more extreme than most of the other professed materialists posting here. As information, I've spent hundreds of posts communicating with Mentat so I have a very clear understanding of what his views are.

 

[drag]

Greetings !

What a huge thread... By my old vurtual acquaintance Flipton.

Anyway, where's the option for "no explanation" ?

Live long and prosper.

 

[Fliption]

Greetings !

What a huge thread... By my old vurtual acquaintance Flipton.

Anyway, where's the option for "no explanation" ?

Live long and prosper.

Wow. Haven't seen you in a while Drag.

 

[selfAdjoint]

We have here a Philip K. Dick situation. We have two beings; both agree they have A-consciousness. Alice says she also has p-consciousness, and asks Bob if he does. He denies it. Which is the zombie? Since according to Chalmers zombies don't have p-consciousness but believe they do, Alice's statement doesn't rule out that she is a Zombie. On the other hand, Dennet, for example is not seriously called a Zombie although he denies the separate existence of p-consciouness. So maybe Bob isn't a Zombie either. Seems to me that the whole concept of Zombie is ill-defined. But it is a simple deduction from the idea of separate p-consciousness, so if it is fails to be well-defined so does separate p-consciousness.

My suggestion: p-consciousness is what an organism experiences while it is performing A-consciousness. And A-consciousness at any level produces a corresponding level of p-consciousness. If you can distinguish red from orange then you can form, and believe that you experience, a concept of redness. But if you can only tell bright from dark, then you feel yourself to be experiencing brightness and darkness.

 

[Fliption]

Seems to me that the whole concept of Zombie is ill-defined. But it is a simple deduction from the idea of separate p-consciousness, so if it is fails to be well-defined so does separate p-consciousness.

I think the situation you have presented is not due to an ill-defined term. It is an illustration showing that A-consciousness does not entail P-consciousness. If we begin our analysis of definitions with the assumption that A-consciousness must entail P-consciousness then of course we will conclude ill defined terms.

Also, I think Chalmers claims that a zombie could claim that it has P-consciousness. But it doesn't necessarily have to. It could very well claim the opposite. This makes sense because we can program any computer to say it has P-consciousness whether it does or does not. So the claim that one has P-consciousness can be completely explained by actions in A-consciousness. P-Consciousness is not required.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Also, I think Chalmers claims that a zombie could claim that it has P-consciousness. But it doesn't necessarily have to. It could very well claim the opposite. This makes sense because we can program any computer to say it has P-consciousness whether it does or does not. So the claim that one has P-consciousness can be completely explained by actions in A-consciousness. P-Consciousness is not required

As it was previously stated here, the Zombie could not only state that it had p-consciousness, but believe it to be so. We are presumed able to read the mind of a Zombie for purposes of discussion, I guess. If that is so, seeing that our only evidence for p-consciousness at all is introspection, we are all in the position of such a Zombie, and thus p-consciousnesss becomes an epiphenomenon, which makes no detectable difference in our inner lives, to say nothing of our behavior.

 

[Fliption]

As it was previously stated here, the Zombie could not only state that it had p-consciousness, but believe it to be so. We are presumed able to read the mind of a Zombie for purposes of discussion, I guess. If that is so, seeing that our only evidence for p-consciousness at all is introspection, we are all in the position of such a Zombie, and thus p-consciousnesss becomes an epiphenomenon, which makes no detectable difference in our inner lives, to say nothing of our behavior.

Much of this was discussed in the thread I referenced above. My conclusion from that thread was that it is possible for a zombie to believe it has P-consciousness, but it need not necessarily be the case. In fact I would argue that it would never be the case, so my inner life is quite detectable. The zombie argument still holds because it illustrates that the behavior of someone claiming P-Consciousness can be completely explained by actions of A-consciousness. In other words, P-consciousness is sufficient to produce this behavior but it isn't necessary. It only makes an epistemic point about our access to explain P-consciousness. It is saying that if you copy all of my A-consciousness and inprint it onto another copy, we have no reason to believe that this copy will not say the same things that I say. But if I were born a zombie, I doubt very seriously I would believe in P-consciousness and say such things. But that point isn't really relevant.

BTW, when we say a zombie "believes", we're talking purely functional behaviour.

 

[loseyourname]

My quabble is simply that I interpreted your original comments to be one that denies the hard problem. In the quote above you at least admit that you are going out on a limb and making some assumptions.

Looks like you made some assumptions yourself. No big deal.

I suppose I don't respond well to being called obstinate and silly when I can point to many people who agree with my position. Frustration is just a natural response when I perceive someone is being a bit egocentric.

Since we do seem to be in agreement, I take back calling you obstinate. The position you seemed to be holding (and yes, I would have been able to tell I was wrong about had you answered my questions) was that no meaningful research could be conducted on the basis of these assumptions that I make. That position is unreasonable, and I could care less how many people might hold it.

The questions you asked were irrelevant. They still are. If I answer them, it only serves to further lead you down the wrong path by giving you the impression that they are relevant. My point should have been obvious after I posted the other thread. Instead, the posting here still continued seemingly without a clue what I was talking about and with no reference to the other information. So I can understand frustration.

They are irrelevant now; they were not before. The issue was never the points you were trying to make. The issue was me attempting to figure out exactly where you stood - you, not the hard problem itself. Now that we have that out of the way, we can move on. We could have a long time ago.

I pointed out where other posters disagreed with you to attempt to somehow get across the idea that your views were not without their problems and that one does not need to be obstinate to point them out.

Any view that claims knowledge of any external reality is subject to problems. I can explain with a fairly simple example why I think p-consciousness is clearly efficacious. This is not a foolproof argument, nor is it proof. It is only a basis for further exploration.

Consider the knee-jerk reflex. The specific nerves and parts of the brain responsible for creating it are well known. When a strike is made just below the kneecap, the leg jerks forward. There is one way (without damaging the nerves) to circumvent this reflex. It is by consciously making the effort not to jerk the leg forward. This effort results in the nervous impulse from the strike being re-routed so that it never reaches the quadriceps muscles, where it would have jerked the leg forward. This can be observed happening in the nerves and the re-route command originates in the brain. It does not result from input to the brain, and so is not the result of a reaction to stimuli. It is an action. If this does not seem to be of any importance, think a little deeper about how this differs from the operation of clearly non-conscious neural process, such as those of a computer. A computer cannot act - it can only react. Only a subjectively conscious being can focus mentally on a bodily process and thereby keep that process from occurring. I bring this up for one primary reason: this is what researchers into the neuronal basis of consciousness look for, and it is also likely to be a pretty good jumping off point from which our views truly do digress. Though I freely admit that I could easily be wrong, my guess is that this phenomenon, and related phenomena, mean nothing to you. Studying the differences between the process by which an eye auto-focuses on a particular object vs. the process by which an eye focuses on an object that is consciously looked for (in technical terms, bottom-up vs. top-down control of visual awareness) probably also means nothing to you. These are, however, what is being studied. Personally, I think it's as good a place as any to start, and more likely to produce meaningful results than sitting around and talking.

This is why I still insist your questions were not relevant. You still think I'm talking about whether other humans are conscious. As I've said before, that is merely a byproduct of the real issue, which I was using as an illustration. I couldn't care less about solipsism.

There is only one thing that could render my proposed experiment (and the questions that go with them) meaningless. That would be for other humans to not be conscious. The possible effectiveness of p-consciousness is what the experiment is designed to investigate. So while I hold that the hypothesis may very well be false, and p-consciousness may not be efficacious, that certainly would not render the experiment meaningless - in fact, that finding would be the result of the experiment. Only solipsism could provide a problem with the setup of the experiment itself. Now it is entirely possible that I'm badly overlooking something and I'm dead wrong. If you think that is the case, however, and you wish to convince me, you'll need to address the experiment itself, not give me generalized statements about the hard problem and issues with effectiveness.

I hope you see now after this response that this isn't true. I fully understand why certain scientific researchers don't care about such things. But making an assumption so that work can be carried out is very different from totally denying that an assumption was made. Originally, I thought you were doing the latter of the two. Now it seems you are not. So I' don't think we actually disagree.

All of science, as well as any other epistemology, is based on assumptions. No foundation can be proven; a given system can only be shown to be internally consistent.

 

[Fliption]

Looks like you made some assumptions yourself. No big deal.

That's the nature of communication I guess. All I can do is interpret what you say and the same for you with me. If that's called making assumptions then so be it.

The position you seemed to be holding (and yes, I would have been able to tell I was wrong about had you answered my questions) was that no meaningful research could be conducted on the basis of these assumptions that I make. That position is unreasonable, and I could care less how many people might hold it.

Correct, I absolutely DO NOT hold this position.

Consider the knee-jerk reflex. The specific nerves and parts of the brain responsible for creating it are well known. When a strike is made just below the kneecap, the leg jerks forward.

Personally, I think it's as good a place as any to start, and more likely to produce meaningful results than sitting around and talking.

I don't disagree these sorts of experiments can and should be done. Not because you're going to find what you think you're going to find, because the philosophical issues are evidence to me that it isn't there to find. But what very well may happen is that you learn something you never anticipated and perhaps this information renders the philosophical issues mute. So of course I agree that doing this research is better than doing nothing. I just originally thought that this statement:

"Do you honestly not see how being conscious of a potential mate's preferences and tastes and being conscious of your own looks and behavior would be helpful here?"

Was a bit presumptuous given the philosophical issues.

I like this atttitude better:

"So while I hold that the hypothesis may very well be false, and p-consciousness may not be efficacious, that certainly would not render the experiment meaningless - in fact, that finding would be the result of the experiment. "

 

[selfAdjoint]

BTW, when we say a zombie "believes", we're talking purely functional behaviour.

Meaning what, exactly. Does the Zombie have any inner life? He sees blue things remembers blue things, can compare what he sees with what he remembers, can imagine a blue thing he has never seen, and so on. Right? But he just doesn't experience, or miss, blueness.

 

[Philocrat]

Why Should The So-called 'Hard Problem' Hold us back Intellectually?

We are heading in the wrong direction intellectually with this Qualia issue. Let's call a truce and start thinking differently. For why may indescribability of qualia to each other in the public realm hold us back? As I have pointed out many times above, the only fundamental benchmark in the measure and understanding of qualia is if it fails us in the most important aspect of the human existence: COLLECTIVE RESPOSIBILITY. If we fail to collectively look at things, recognise what they are and action or act upon them in the 'same' or equivalent way, then this would be the the most useful way to know that qualia as part of the human conscious existence is playing dirty tricks on us...and we may very legitimately declare its presence in our being fundamentally useless.

Yes, it would be fundamentally useless as it would have nothing sinificant to contribute to collective existence.

LANGUAGE AND QUALIA. Which language are we talking about? Verbal? Written? What about BODY LANGUAGE? Tell me which scientific discipline has made any attempt to conceive it, let alone study it? Tell me! Yes, oral or spoken language cannot explain qualia from one person to the next becuase qualia is self explanatory. If you see a red car just point at it and say 'that is a red car'! If a bystander points at it and says the same thing 'that is a red car', we ought to accept that they are seeing, recognising and understanding the same thing. Qualia in this sense serves only a 'Discriminatory value' to the overall human existence. If Qualia fundamentally fails to discriminate between the different states of the physical world, then it's in deep trouble as it will fail to be a reliable part of a conscious human self.

The job of the eye is to see and discriminate between differing visual states and not to explain them. It not only must be able to discriminate between the visual states that are already known to the perceiver, but also it must discriminate between new visual states that become available as the perceiver goes about his or her daily life. All that the spoken or written language does is to label things that come through the eyes and all other visual organs - the nose, the ears, the tongue, the skin, the memory cells etc - and use them in inquisitive, acquisitive and precuationary visual activities or should I vaguely say conscious activities.

CHANGE AND QUALIA. Qualias like all other visual states obey causal and relational laws and, most importantly, they stick to rules of logic. They rely on and deteriorate with visual states or organs. Well, I don't want to go through that route of things not being there when we are not looking at them, not feeling them or simply not experiencing them. I believe that they remain very much there except that faulty bodily organs just fail to display them. Qualias change according to the corresponding changes in the physical states of the body organs that perceive them. The reliance of qualias on the proper functionaing of the visual organs that display them makes qualia an engineering problem and quite naturally prone to change. The Question now is: which type of change? FUNCTIONAL CHANGE or STRUCTURAL CHANGE? So far, we tend to habitually waste a great deal of time in concentrating entirely on the functional change of things around us and naively hope that they stay changed or they improve the physical states of things for good. But we do know that that simply isn't the case. Structural change is entirely ignored for the usual naive reason of not wishing to interfer with nature. But I am arguing that the configurational relation between quailias and the physical body organs that display them can be improved by structural re-engineering of the entire human reality or should I say the human physical state. I predict that several aspects of qualia may very well be re-engineered out of place or existence not unless they can prove their continual usefulness in the end-state of man.

If Mary came out of the black and white room and she's confronted with a new visual information...so what? What is the big deal? The Inquisitive mode of consciousness treats all knowledge of enquiry as commulaltive. In the human realm, all knowledge is classified into (1) Useful and (2)Non-useful. Mary coming out to see other colours other than black and white is just an addition to her stock of knowledge. But the most important question that should concern Mary is this. HOW USEFUL THIS NEW KNOWLEDGE IS TO HER IN THE PUBLIC REALM WHERE SHE MUST PHYSICALLY SUCCEED IN SURVIVING IS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE AT STAKE HERE. Whatever happens to this knowledge inside her is irrelevant. The only signifacnt use of this knowledge is that she must be able to discriminate between different colours in the real world that she lives in. As she goes about her daily life, she will continue to come across new visual information that is either obvious and self-explanatory or is explainable by means of our natural Langauge or is by a combination of both.

SCIENCE AND QUALIA. The attitude of science and approach of science to dealing with qualia must change. Science must treat qualia as an engineering issue that is capable of being altered when the visual organs are physically interfered with at the structural engineering or re-engineering level. The only significant scientific research that is any use to the humans is structural engineering of bodily parts and seeing precisely how they affect the visual states of all kinds. And not the analysable components of qualia. This sort of experiment would make a huge difference. Also, it is the duty of science to investigate whether the increase or decrease in the number of visual organs in the human body has any effect on the quality of visual data or visual perception. For all we know, the current physical configuration of man with the current number of visual organs may very well be inadequate for climbing to a higher or superior state of being. Science must must recsue the human race from total destruction...for the naive claim that we must leave every thing to nature is profoundly dangerous, if not wholly suicidal! For me, this amounts to what I habitually call 'DANGEROUS CONTENTMENT'.

QUESTION: Must science explain qualia first before making a genuine attempt improve the physical state of man? Science of man or science of needs: which one should science pursue?

 

[Fliption]

Meaning what, exactly. Does the Zombie have any inner life? He sees blue things remembers blue things, can compare what he sees with what he remembers, can imagine a blue thing he has never seen, and so on. Right? But he just doesn't experience, or miss, blueness.

No inner life. It means that all the brain functions associated with believing are working but nothing else. Here's the way it was put in the thread I linked.

"Belief here is used strictly in a functional sense, i.e. one's disposition to make certain verbal utterances, and does not refer to any experiential aspect of belief-- eg the subjective feelings associated with believing something.)

 

[balkan]

As it was previously stated here, the Zombie could not only state that it had p-consciousness, but believe it to be so. We are presumed able to read the mind of a Zombie for purposes of discussion, I guess. If that is so, seeing that our only evidence for p-consciousness at all is introspection, we are all in the position of such a Zombie, and thus p-consciousnesss becomes an epiphenomenon, which makes no detectable difference in our inner lives, to say nothing of our behavior.

i think an interesting point is implied here... that is, that consciousness is simply a trait of the ability to analyze "inwards" just like we analyze "outwards"...
i've read a paper about consciousness recently, where a couple of scientists claimed the awareness of action to simply be a matter of degree of intelligence and our ability to analyze ourself and our environment.
the selfawareness comes at a point when we intellectually discover, that we are thinking and feeling.

 

[selfAdjoint]

No inner life. It means that all the brain functions associated with believing are working but nothing else. Here's the way it was put in the thread I linked.

"Belief here is used strictly in a functional sense, i.e. one's disposition to make certain verbal utterances, and does not refer to any experiential aspect of belief-- eg the subjective feelings associated with believing something.)

Well in that case it seems that you are using petitio principi to define p-consciousness; that is you are assuming on the one hand that p-consciousness is the presence of qualia, and on the other hand your definition of zombies as without p-consciousness takes away ALL inner life except belief. So p-c includes the features I mentioned, which have good neurochemical substrates; sensation, memory, imagination, mental comparison.

A materialist zombie would have to have those (sensation, memory of sensation, imagination of sensation, comparison of differently generated sensations) because the brain features that produce them are being actively studied, and if the hard problem means anything, it has to confine itself to the complement of those features.

 

[Fliption]

Well in that case it seems that you are using petitio principi to define p-consciousness; that is you are assuming on the one hand that p-consciousness is the presence of qualia, and on the other hand your definition of zombies as without p-consciousness takes away ALL inner life except belief. So p-c includes the features I mentioned, which have good neurochemical substrates; sensation, memory, imagination, mental comparison.

I'm not understanding the definitional problem you're pointing out. Perhaps too much is being made of the word "belief"? The point is simply that there is no reason to believe that a zombie with identical A-consciousness to you would behave any differently from you. So if you believe you have P-consciousness, a zombie with identical A-consciousness must also behave as if it has the same belief. To suggest it really "believes" is a stumbing block because it implies an inner life, which by definition there is none. That's why I posted the clarification above that when we say belief, we are talking only about the functional aspects of it. It is probably best that the word not be used at all.

 

[vanesch]

You are smart and I think you can understand what I'm trying to say.

If I can make a resume of our two different positions:
-you say that consciousness is an explanatory concept people have invented to explain the behavior of humans, until we will find out in more detail how they really work and can describe their behavior in "simpler" terms, at which point the concept of consciousness becomes irrelevant (in the same way phlogiston is).

-I claim that consciousness is something that exists in my world (and probably in yours too) which has nothing to do with the explanation of the behavior of humans, but which, in itself, needs an explanation, and that the non-behavioral property of consciousness makes that explanation very hard in scientific terms.

After that, we got into the issue of whether we are using the word "consciousness" in the same way.

Would you agree with me then, that whatever _that_ property is, it's something that can't be communicated? And would you also agree that Chalmers and his followers think they are successful at communicating what the "hard problem" is about?

I don't know Chalmers. I will not agree with you that that property is something that cannot be communicated. I hope that it can - even easily - be communicated between two entities who both have consciousness, and hence, after some thinking, should have the same "problem", and recognize that's what is being talked about.
However, it cannot be communicated in formal terms (you agreed upon that). In order to communicate it, you can only "reach out a helping hand" and hope that it clicks on the other side.

You seem to be close to grasping that the world is full of hard problems, but none of them are about things we can talk about. I hope you give the issue some more thought; you would be glad you did.

I don't know what you are talking about. I only see one hard problem in _that_ category. And as I pointed out, you CAN talk about it. Maybe you can enlighten me.

Now keep this in mind: there is something we can't talk about, but I can't tell you what that something is, you have to figure out by yourself. Anything I can describe to you in words is not something we can't talk about. I have no way to talk about this thing, but there is a way to see it, and it's possible to guide people so they can also see it for themselves.

I can talk about it, I can try to tell you what it is, but I cannot come up with a formal definition. I can - and that's the whole problem here - also not come up with an OBJECTIVE operational description. But I can come up with a subjective description, assuming that this also fits close YOUR subjective experiences. So it is not that I cannot talk about it at all. I only need "a little help from my friends".

I didn't accuse you of anything. All I said was, if I started talking about bewustness with you without fully understanding what you mean by it, we would end up disagreeing at some point. Which is exactly the situation concerning most philosophical issues.

But you DO know what I mean, because at a certain point you said you didn't see the point in defining a new word if it was "consciousness" that I was talking about. A Freudian slip ? :-)

You are absolutely correct, but is "consciousness" one such thing or not? That is, is "consciousness" a concept that is related to "things in the world", or is it not?

We're getting close. I am conscious. So it IS a thing in the world. I *HAVE* subjective experiences. I *DO* feel pain. It is something that exists in MY world. But - I think we agreed on this - so it must be in YOUR world.

I am really impressed with that statement. Serious. So you see, we need a lot of concepts which lack formal definition in order for our communication to be meaningful, but at the same time concepts without a formal definition cannot be subject to scientific study.

Wrong. All the objects of study of all natural sciences are such. It is only in mathematics (and in linguistics and law) that concepts have a formal definition. But that is because they don't describe things in the world, but formal systems (maths and languages). Take the concept of "electron". I can simply say that it is the particle we accept as the particle of the QED dirac spinor. I can formally define what we mean with a dirac spinor in QED, but that doesn't define the "physical" electron. To do that, I'd have to give you lots of descriptions: some experimental ones, like it is the particles that come out of a hot cathode in vacuum, and they happen to be the same particles we find in the outer regions of atoms etc..., they have charge -1, they have a mass (at low energies!) of about 511KeV etc.. but I cannot DEFINE what is an electron because there will always be instances where my definition will flunk. I do exactly the same with consciousness, except for one thing: I cannot describe OBJECTIVE measurements with instruments dealing with it.
And it is thanks to this lack of formal definition that scientific progress is possible. If we had FORMALLY DEFINED an electron as Thompson could have done it, then it would not have been compatible with its quantum mechanical or relativistic description ! We still mean the same "thing in the world" as Thompson with "electron" but its theoretical description has seriously altered.

Doesn't that make you think? Doesn't it sound like science is only true to the extent that it restricts itself to formal logic?

I tried to explain you exactly the opposite !

I hope we get a chance, one day, to talk about why I think physics doesn't have as much to do with "things in the world" as we usually think. The truths of physics, from my perspective, seem to come from formal logic, not from the nature of reality. But that's a discussion way ahead.

But I think you misunderstood what physics is about in that case ! It is in setting up RELATIONSHIPS between formally defined concepts in theories (Dirac spinor) with "things out there" (electrons).

So can we take the fact that someone understands our descriptions of consciousness as proof that they are conscious?

Yes, but we're back to the same difficulty. It is not because it APPEARS as if someone understands the concept, from its behavioral point of view, that he also DOES understand it. A very smart computer program might be generating all what I'm typing here, and as such have no clue as what it is talking about.

You are correct about that, but as stated it is a problem like any other. Like any scientific problem, it will take time to be worked on, a final, absolute answer will never be found, but there's nothing preventing us from learning a lot more than we currently know.

Ah, something we can agree upon. Only, the way things present themselves, we haven't even started. As I wrote somewhere, interconnecting consciousnesses could be a first step. If it can be done.

That really depends on what you mean by behaviourism. Using a computer to send messages to an internet forum on metaphysics sounds like "behaviour" to me. Granted, mention to behaviour is absent in your description, but the description itself is manifested behaviour of a conscious entity (yourself)

No, absolutely not. Our message exchanges are (to me) absolutely no indication that either of us has consciousness. The only thing that indicates me that you have consciousness is that you are a human being.

This is what many people don't see. Consciousness is related to behaviour, but in a very abstract way. The more abstract a concept, the harder it is to think about it, and the easier it is to get confused and see problems where they don't exist.

As I pointed out, I don't think that consciousness has much to do with behavior. I even envision the possibility that consciousness IN NO WAY influences our behavior which is probably dictated by the running of a biochemical computer program. Even our thinking is not influenced by our consciousness. Our consciousness just subjectively observes what our (non-conscious) body is doing and thinking.
I acknowledge that this is an extreme viewpoint, but I consider it an interesting thought that consciousness CANNOT influence the behavior of a human being. It's just there passively observing what's being done, said and thought. And undergoes feelings.

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[vanesch]

I have a particular feature of my existence that I observe. I can then observe that I'm not sure anyone else has this same feature. I can inductively decide they probably do. But the nature of this feature forces me to decide this inductively and it is this nature that results in the inability to reductively understand it. I don't see where definitions change any of this that I've written.

EXACTLY. I think I'm on the same wavelength as Fliption (but he's putting his arguments in a much more professional way :-)

I would like to point out that the reasoning:
<<
a) with concept A we mean such and such.

b) clearly, concept A has property B.

c) now from property B, we can derive a difficult problem

so there's something wrong with the way you define concept A >>

as a wrong way of reasoning.

It is almost as if in mathematics, you write down a function,
f(x) = integral sin(t)/t dt

and then you say, yeah, well there's something wrong with your
definition of f(x) because I don't know how to work out the integral !

It is not because from some concepts follows a difficult problem that the statement of the problem is wrong (or the concepts).

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[vanesch]

because the brain features that produce them are being actively studied, and if the hard problem means anything, it has to confine itself to the complement of those features.

I think the ultimate conscious experience is the fact that pain hurts. Pain is the physiological manifestation (neurotransmitters etc...) and the behavioural consequences (trying to avoid it, and screaming if we can't avoid it) ; but the fact that it HURTS cannot be studied actually (except for ASKING "did it hurt?" and assuming the answer is honest ;-)

For instance, I am pretty convinced that trying to factorise big numbers on my PC does pain to my PC (it gets hot, it takes a long time to answer, everything seems to run slowly etc...). My PC even regularly reboots in order to avoid it (or I might have a virus). But I don't think my PC FEELS the pain. Although my program prints out that it does if the number is really big...

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[selfAdjoint]

If you stick a pin in a baby, it will respond with behavior, but it can't tell you that it hurts. Neverthelass, because the baby is human, we INFER that it hurts, and say "Nasty man! Stop hurting that baby". When your PC indicates harm with behavior by getting warm, you don't infer pain because it is a machine. Maybe you should? After all it wouldn't be much of a programming job to adapt some natural language program to produce "Ow! That hurts!" from your PC's speakers when it overheats.