Dear Philocrat,
Thank you for your most excellent response. You have an obvious advantage over me in your knowledge of and familiarity with this subject. But I view that advantage as accruing to me since it puts me in a good position to learn from you. Please be patient with me as I try to work through the ideas you have presented.
Philocrat said:
Similar analogies exist in philosophy. Depending on how far back in history you are prepared to travel, you we'll pick up along the way different versions of it.
Yes, I agree. But it seems there are some lessons we might learn from this fact. One, which I tried to illustrate in my previous posts, is that the more modern analogies are richer in possibilities for the deception and offer explanations that would be inconceivable (and seem spooky) to earlier thinkers. This would suggest that we should think in terms of the most modern analogies available and that we should be open to the possibility that reality might be incomprehensibly more complex even beyond what those modern analogies might be able to explain.
Philocrat said:
all tend to show that our external world reality could be very easily undermined in all these ways.
I am hesitant to agree with you here. It doesn't seem to me that unless "our external world reality" is clearly expressed, it can't really be undermined. And, in spite of the sophisticated and accurate theories of science, they really do not say much about reality. External reality is not clearly expressed in these theories. They only tell us how to predict certain phenomena by use of certain algorithms. Since there is no necessary real foundation for the physical theories, I don't see how it could be undermined. You can't attack or remove something that isn't there in the first place.
Philocrat said:
One of the fundamental epistemological arguments is that these deceptive or simulated states of reality are epistemologically indistinguishable from the external world reality that we are all used to.
Hold on; you're going too fast. Let me take this slowly.
First, you refer to "we" when you say "the external world reality that we are all used to." I'm sure by 'we' you mean we human beings who communicate among ourselves here on earth. That is probably consistent with the use of the term 'epistemology' which I suppose has to do with human knowledge. That's fine, because that is an appropriate and interesting arena, but it does ignore, if not preclude, the possibility of other seats of knowledge besides human beings. It also drags with it the implicit assumption that human beings (meaning their bodies including brains) are indeed a seat of knowledge. I know that these possibilities cannot even be entertained by scientists without running afoul of their established doctrines, but nonetheless, it seems to me that we should be open to considering all possibilities, especially looking back through history and seeing how often the paradigms of science have shifted, almost always toward a more complex and previously mystifying scenario.
Second, your wording suggests that the reality we are all used to is not deceptive or simulated. If reality really were deceptive and/or simulated, then there would not be any problem with the fact that it is indistinguishable from a deceptive or simulated state. So on what basis can we have any confidence that reality is not ultimately deceptive and/or simulated?
Third, considering deception and/or simulation as processes by themselves, doesn't there necessarily need to be some perceiver who is deceived or who is aware of the simulation results for there to even be such a thing as deception or simulation? And if so, who or what could that perceiver be? Of course we human beings are one obvious candidate, if indeed we have the ability to perceive. But if we are open to all possibilities, it could be that perception occurs somewhere outside the brain. This would, for example, seem to be necessary if the premise "I am everyone" is true.
So, to summarize my view of this point, I don't think there is any problem with the fact that deception and/or simulation may be going on between whatever is ontologically fundamental and whoever, or whatever actually ends up doing the perceiving. In fact, just looking at the biological system of our human bodies, we see that happening in all sensory perception, e.g. our vision system presents (what we think is) a three-dimensional world as a two-dimensional image which is then perceived as three-dimensional.
Philocrat said:
As a result we are left without a sufficient (let alone a guaranteed) knowledge of our real existence.
I agree that we are left without sufficient knowledge, but not as a result of any deception and/or simulation. I think our knowledge is lacking simply because we lack sufficient information, and that may even be temporary. (I am the ultimate optimist.)
Philocrat said:
That what we see and think to be real at first instance may not be real after all.
I think this is simply a semantic problem in that we cannot define the word 'real' without knowing what is going on. And as we have just discussed, we simply don't know what is going on.
Philocrat said:
The metaphysical problem is that concerning the configuration or structure of things in existence. From this point of view, your analogy does not quite answer the question as to why one thing is capable of being everything.
Well, to tell the truth, I have to agree with you. I recognize that there is a piece still missing in my explanation, and you may have spotted this same missing piece. If you are thinking of something different, please let me know.
In my three-part analogy I think I took care of everything required to explain the configuration and structure of everything in existence except for one thing. That one missing thing is some method of storing information which does not require the attention of the one single consciousness. The one single consciousness, as you may recall, is the posited starting point of my explanation, and in my explanation, it is the only thing that really exists. It is the "one", which you claim is inconsistent with multiple identifiable parts. Roughly, my way around this problem is that there is only one knower, but the information that is known (i.e. knowledge) is multiply separable and identifiable.
Back to the problem of storing information which needn't be attended to. (I am sitting here at my keyboard in a quandary as to whether to go into detail about my thoughts on this problem. I have decided not to. I would be happy to discuss it if you are interested, but I'll let you ask.) Suffice it to say that we humans have devised many ways of implementing algorithms using physical systems that run unattended. (Think of ignition systems on cars, or computers executing programs.) Any of these could provide analogies that might explain what might be going on in the bigger picture.
So, except for this problem, I think my three-part analogy explains why one thing is capable of being everything. The one thing is "the ability to know", or "the conscious ability to think". If, as Berkeley proposed, everything else is nothing but subsets of thoughts, or knowledge, of that one thing, then in that sense, that one thing is everything. I think it is splitting semantic hairs to debate whether a consciousness with n thoughts is one thing, n things, or n+1 things. However you count it, it is everything.
Philocrat said:
Self-categorising in a metaphysical sense is:
1) The ability to self-manifest or self-procreate without the interference of any external creative agencies.
In my scheme, the one consciousness can self-manifest simply by imagining new information. Self-procreation is a bit more difficult in my scheme. It is done by first constructing a physical world strictly by imagining and choosing a set of information, including algorithms (laws of physics) and letting it play. Then within that world, constructing (by whatever means) configurations of what we would call material vehicles or devices which could collect, store, and transform information from that physical (really virtual) environment, and present the results in some fashion for the one consciousness to perceive. From the perspective of the physical world, this device or vehicle would exhibit characteristics which would make it appear that the device itself was conscious. Again from this point of view, it would appear as if the one consciousness had self-procreated. But in reality, the self-procreation is only an illusion (as mystics have long held). N.B. this illusion occurs only to the one consciousness, since that one is the only thing that exists, and in particular, the only thing able to perceive, conceive, or be decieved.
Philocrat said:
2) The ability to self-categorise into logically and quantitatively identifiable parts (be all things while being one thing).
I dealt with this two quotes back. The idea is that the multiplicity comes only in the thoughts or bits of knowledge while the knower remains one.
Philocrat said:
3) Ability to self-actualise and self-refer with all the spatio-temporal components or dimensions fully intact.
I'm not exactly sure what you are concerned about here. But, as I said in an earlier post, the space-time of the physical (virtual) reality are completely separate and distinct from any space-time in which the one consciousness acts. This may be going into more detail than I should here, but I see ultimate reality as a series of levels, each consisting of a triad of Penrose's three worlds: the mental, the physical, and the ideal. These levels are arranged in a logical helix where the ultimate starting point, or bottom of the helix, is the purely mental world of the one consciousness. From that starting point, an ideal world of information and algorithms is constructed simply from the imagination and thoughts of that one. Some of the information and algorithms are used to construct a physical world (exactly what the substrate for that very first one is the problem I mentioned earlier). Within the physical world, vehicles of the type I described can appear to create, or at least present the illusion of, a mental world existing in that physical world. From that mental world (it is really the one vicariously operating in that "VR game"), physical structures can be configured to store information and algorithms, and also to play out the algorithms without attention. (The problem I mentioned occurs only at the very first turn of the helix. From there on, the previous physical worlds provide adequate information storage and algorithmic instantiation capabilities.)
Now, I am not sure what you mean by keeping "all the spatio-temporal components or dimensions fully intact", but I think it is clear that in my scheme, all such components could reasonably be kept intact as long as we don't mix up and confuse which components belong in which "world".
Philocrat said:
Yes, I am not denying that many thinkers, logicians and mathematicians, have got a few tricks up their sleeves to show how some or all of these are logically and quantitatively possible. But from the point of epistemology within the context of lay native speaker of our NL (Natural language), reality as we ordinarily know it begins to break down.
Yes, I agree. But I maintain that the breakdown only occurs because of inadequate analogical examples. After all, NL is nothing but analogies. Definitions of words are nothing more than analogies pointing out how the concept represented by a particular word is something like a more familiar concept. To fix the problem, or at least to push the boundaries out further, we only need a richer set of analogies.
Philocrat said:
Such notions as time, space, dimensions, communications etc., begin to take on new meanings
Exactly. That is exactly what I meant by pushing out the boundaries. And that is good. It increases our knowledge and understanding.
Philocrat said:
while logic and maths laugh endlessly in boundless continuum!
If so, I think the laughter rings hollow. I have a strong personal opinion that there is no boundless continuum in reality. And, I believe that the acceptance of a boundless continuum in mathematics and logic has led to nothing but trouble and confusion. I would be delighted to elaborate on this position if anyone is interested in discussing it.
My sincere thanks to any who have read this far. I am not sure my opinions are worth all this space I am taking up, but I am unable to express them any more concisely.
It's been fun talking with you again, Philocrat.
Paul