Chapter 2: The Argument against Physicalism

[hypnagogue]

If observables exist in a pure Life world, then qualia exist in a pure Life world, since, acc. to D4, qualia are observables.

Claiming that qualia are observables does not imply that all observables are qualia.

I don't see how he can deny that information and instruments also exist in impure worlds.

He doesn't deny that.

If qualitative contents don't exist in pure worlds, either qualitative contents are a special type of information or we are a special type of instrument or both.

You are right to point out that Rosenberg will need to explain what it is that differentiates the causal aspects of subjective experience from the causal aspects that are understood to belong to 'pure' physical systems. We won't get there for a while, though, as it will take most of the rest of the book to build up to the point where we do have such a causal theory of subjective experience (or at least the outlines of such a theory).

Perhaps I've made a mess of things, but it's because I can't see what is so special about qualitative contents. If it's that qualitative contents are a type of information that can't be derived from other types of information (and, furthermore, a particular qualitative content can't even be derived from other information of the same type), that leads me back to the processing of information which is presumably identical in both pure and impure worlds, especially in both humans and zombies.

Is it that you fail to see any relevance or force to the antiphysicalist argument in itself, or is it that you find the implications of accepting the argument to just lead to even more problems?

If it's the latter, then you're not alone. Thinking about consciousness seems to inevitably put us on that carousel. If we accept the antiphysicalist argument and accept the causal closure of physics, we seem to have no room left for p-consciousness to play any causal role, and we wind up with an unsatisfying epiphenomenalism. What makes this book original is that it proposes a new way to escape this quandary, but it will take some work to get there. You can view the rest of the book partially as an effort to answer to the concerns you voice here.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think this is the problem I've been talking about. There is nothing special about observables. However there is something special about observers. Or perhaps it would be better to say that observables are special, but it is the observer who makes them special, not some property intrinsic to the observable.

There is never any claim that there is any particular problem about observables. There is a claim that qualia in particular present problems. The only reason observables are brought into the discussion is to affirm that we do indeed have epistemic access to qualia, and therefore that we can even say something meaningful about them in the first place. Some deflationary arguments try to undermine qualia by establishing that we don't even have epistemic access to them, so Rosenberg needs to argue that we do.

And again, the special quality of phenomenal observers that you reference is so intimately bound up with the special qualities of qualia that we can't substantively differentiate the two. The problem of qualitative content already is the problem of a subjective experiencer. Affirming the 'special qualities' of qualitative content already is an affirmation of the special qualities of the subject of experience. We cannot coherently recognize or deny one without likewise recognizing or denying the other.

 

[Canute]

There is never any claim that there is any particular problem about observables. There is a claim that qualia in particular present problems. The only reason observables are brought into the discussion is to affirm that we do indeed have epistemic access to qualia, and therefore that we can even say something meaningful about them in the first place. Some deflationary arguments try to undermine qualia by establishing that we don't even have epistemic access to them, so Rosenberg needs to argue that we do.

And again, the special quality of phenomenal observers that you reference is so intimately bound up with the special qualities of qualia that we can't substantively differentiate the two. The problem of qualitative content already is the problem of a subjective experiencer. Affirming the 'special qualities' of qualitative content already is an affirmation of the special qualities of the subject of experience. We cannot coherently recognize or deny one without likewise recognizing or denying the other.

That's fine. I don't disagree (and haven't been disagreeing) with any of that.

 

[honestrosewater]

Claiming that qualia are observables does not imply that all observables are qualia.

Eh, guess I wasn't really thinking about that- just trying to introduce the subject of my post- which was about two different types of observables.

He doesn't deny that.

I meant I was saying something he would almost certainly agree with. Perhaps I should have said "could" instead of "can".

Is it that you fail to see any relevance or force to the antiphysicalist argument in itself, or is it that you find the implications of accepting the argument to just lead to even more problems?

The former. I finally deleted my last post after editing it a dozen times trying to clarify my problem. I'm starting to think I was just expecting too much, I don't know, detail or such. Focusing on the formal aspects of bare difference structures, I find your comments,

Our notion of phenomenal red and phenomenal blue is not just that they are circularly defined as different from one another. We begin with independent, self-contained notions of the two

quite interesting. If they lead me anywhere, I'll share, but feel free to move on.

 

[loseyourname]

Fair enough, but it seems to me that any construal of the qualitative content of p-consciousness that describes it as not intrinsic is just a variation of eliminative materialism. It seems that any acknowledgment of 'qualitative content' on this view is a rather hollow one that is closer to denying qualitative experience (writing it off as a misguided illusion of some sort) than it is to embracing it as an actually existent phenomenon.

You might think, but that certainly isn't what I'm proposing. I'll elaborate on this below.

If a complete physical theory doesn't give a complete description of the objective aspects of social behavior, it is because of difficulties in practice such as intractability, not because of difficulties in principle (at least, according to physicalism).

That isn't necessarily the thinking of scientists outside of physics. For instance, a complete accounting of all of the chemical reactions taking place in the head of a member of the Green party won't tell us that he opposes the WTO. The best we can do is study his brain and discover a correspondence between certain reactions and thoughts and feelings that he tells us he is having. If we had no one to tell us what he was thinking, however, we could never do this, but we could certainly still have the thoughts and feelings. Imagine that you are a neuroscientist dropped into a world full of beings that you have absolutely no capacity to communicate with in any way. You could study the reactions taking place in their brains all you want, but you will never learn the content of their thoughts or of what they communicate to each other. To go a little further, let's say their world is a pure physical world and that furthermore, they are all zombies. They can still communicate using qualitative concepts such as a hatred of their world's version of the WTO, and such communication will have qualitative content that your physical understanding of their world will never tell you anything about.

The antiphysicalist argument is that physics could not completely account for the facts about p-consciousness, even in principle. That's a much stronger claim than, and a claim of an entirely different nature from, the claim that physics can't completely describe social behavior, as you have cast it above. The latter is not a threat to physicalism, but the former is.

I'm saying that it might very well be that the former claim is not much different than the latter. It seems to me that physics by itself can never tell us anything about qualitative content, but that qualitative content can still exist in a pure physical world or even in a zombie world. As you said, zombie's can still write novels. Novels have qualitative content such as themes and character traits. This qualitative content clearly can exist in a zombie world, a world that you will agree is a pure physical world. It should be clear from this example alone that it is wrong to say that our world is not a pure physical world simply because it contains qualitative content.

Physics can tell us everything about the brains of humans, in which concepts such as grammar and narrative structure reside.

Let's say that all conscious beings in the universe died, and a piece of paper was left behind with the sentence "Bob is tall." Would not that sentence still contain a subject and predicate? By the same token, are you prepared to say that scrolls written in dead languages that no one in this world can understand have no grammatical structure or narrative content? That might be the case, but I hardly think that position or its contrary is uncontentious.

Of course zombies could write novels; that's the whole point. If zombies could not write novels, then there would indeed be something about novels that is fundamentally elusive to the physical account.

So are you saying that novels in zombie worlds have no themes or character traits or linguistic meaning? These are all qualitative attributes of novels. It seems to me that Gregg is really trying to get at something a little more fundamental than qualitative content. I think he has to, because it seems clear to me that physics can easily entail qualitative content. It just can't give any meaningful description of it.

 

[Steve Esser]

I think the anti-physcialist argument is using the term 'qualitative content' in a very specific way which doesn't exactly map to the use of the term in other contexts.

Late in Ch. 2, GR mentions a paper by Daniel Stoljar (you can find it http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~dstoljar/onlinepapers/2COP.html ) which I got around to reading last weekend. In it, Stoljar proposes a distinction between 2 types of physicalism, t-physicalism (t stands for theory) and o-physicalism (o stands for object).

He says the distinction rests on 2 theses (which each have good support): first, physical theory of the sort we have (t-physicalism) only tells us about dispositional properties of physical objects (I think this is equivalent to saying relational or extrinsic properties). Second, for there to be dispositional properties there must also be categorical properties (intrinsic properties) such that the instantiation of the latter is metaphysically sufficient for the instantiation of the former. O-physicalism acknowledges the existence of categorical or intrinsic properties.

This argument, tracing its roots to B. Russell, is closely related to GR's bare difference structure vs. qualitative content. I thought the paper was helpful in drawing out this distinction further, although GR's work ultimately goes much further.

 

[loseyourname]

I think the anti-physcialist argument is using the term 'qualitative content' in a very specific way which doesn't exactly map to the use of the term in other contexts.

Late in Ch. 2, GR mentions a paper by Daniel Stoljar (you can find it http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~dstoljar/onlinepapers/2COP.html ) which I got around to reading last weekend. In it, Stoljar proposes a distinction between 2 types of physicalism, t-physicalism (t stands for theory) and o-physicalism (o stands for object).

I believe I might have read that already. If not, I'm familiar by now with the distinction between the different kinds of physicalism. I'm perfectly sympathetic to this argument against physicalism. I do think that the physics we have describes only extrinsic relations without any attempt at substance ontology. I can see how intrinsic properties and the objects that bear them are never touched on. If "qualitative" in this case is meant by Gregg (and by hypnagogue) to be synonymous with "intrinsic," then I really have no problem with any of this chapter or the supporting arguments posed in this thread. The problem with using this argument as an argument against the physical entailment of consciousness remains, however. The qualitative content of conscious experience might not be intrinsic at all, despite the claims made in places that we know it is from experience (I certainly don't). I'll agree that his general argument against physicalism (t-physicalism anyway) is sound and I'll agree with his conclusion that not all facts are either facts of physics or entailed by physics. I just can't make the jump from there to concluding that facts about consciousness are in the set of facts not entailed by physics.

 

[honestrosewater]

Our notion of phenomenal red and phenomenal blue is not just that they are circularly defined as different from one another. We begin with independent, self-contained notions of the two: It's like something to see red, and it's like something to see blue. From these, we can observe that the difference between red and blue is not bare, but is grounded in the further fact that what it is like to see them is different. So in place of propsition 1 above, we would have something like

1'. It is like something to see phenomenal red (this[/color]).
2'. It is like something to see phenomenal blue (this[/color]).
3'. What is like to see phenomenal red is not what it is like to see phenomenal blue, therefore phenomenal red and phenomenal blue are different.

Am I completely out of it? In a pure Life world, it must be like something to detect "on" and/or it must be like something to detect "off". It has to be known that this state is "on" (or this state is "off"). It isn't enough to know "on" is not "off" and "off" is not "on". If I presented you with a Life grid of cells all in the same state and asked you if the cells would change states in the next time step, you couldn't answer unless you knew if the cells are currently "on" or "off". No? So how is detecting "on" different from seeing "red"? Why does Rosenberg not have to explain now the difference between observables that are qualia and observables that are not qualia?

Edit: Can I say that Rosenberg deals with three things: (1) formal systems, (2) interpreted formal systems, and (3) instantiated interpreted formal systems? Using the game of Life as an example, (1) would be the rules, (2) could be a grid drawn on a piece of paper representing the "cells", a cell having a penny placed inside of it representing the "on" state, an empty cell representing an "off" state, etc., and (3) would be me playing the game (moving the pennies according to the rules).
I don't see him examining a pure Life world, a pure physical world, and an impure world each as (1), (2), and (3). An examination of a pure Life and impure world would be enough. He examines a pure Life world as (1) and an impure world as (3) (when appealing to our subjective experience of qualia), but where does he examine a pure Life world as (3) or an impure world as (1)? What I have been asking for is an examination of both worlds as (2)- which he starts but doesn't complete, IMO. Until he examines the two worlds at the same level, all he's saying is that math isn't physics isn't the physical world- which isn't very impressive (Edit: with all due respect). Am I wrong? I want to see a pure Life world and an impure world examined at the same level- as formal systems, interpreted formal systems, or instantiated interpreted formal systems. Am I asking for too much?
Rosengogue: Do you have qualia (or epistemic access to qualitative contents through observation, whatever)?
Me: Yes.
Rosengogue: Well, here's a formal system, and it doesn't have qualia.
Me: So? It doesn't have me either.
Rosengogue: No, wait, come back. This system has something we can interpret as being you, as playing the role of you.
Me: And this system still doesn't have anything that plays the role of qualia?
Rosengogue: No.
Me: If I have qualia, but this system doesn't have anything that plays the role of qualia, how can it have something that plays the role of me?
Rosengogue: ??

 

[Steve Esser]

The problem with using this argument as an argument against the physical entailment of consciousness remains, however. The qualitative content of conscious experience might not be intrinsic at all, despite the claims made in places that we know it is from experience (I certainly don't). I'll agree that his general argument against physicalism (t-physicalism anyway) is sound and I'll agree with his conclusion that not all facts are either facts of physics or entailed by physics. I just can't make the jump from there to concluding that facts about consciousness are in the set of facts not entailed by physics.

OK, that's clear.

The other arguments needed are that we
1.have epistemic access to qualia thru experience.
2.qualia are not constituted by bare differences (if they are not extrinsic, they must be intrinsic (I think).

But then I definitely see how this second step argument is clouded at this stage by the still fuzzy (inter)relationship between qualia and experience which you, honestrosewater and Canute have identified as an issue. I think the problem comes in particular because this is a kind of static analysis: if qualitative content is a kind of stuff out there, why couldn't it be composed of bare differences? It is really the action of experiencing qualia which is at issue here.

I'm more easily swayed by the argument even at this stage because I guess I've always been inclined to see first-person experience (of qualia) as being essentially an access to the intrinsic nature of things, while the third-person (really inter-subjective) construction of physical theory as being necessarily about extrinsic properties.

 

[honestrosewater]

The other arguments needed are that we
1.have epistemic access to qualia thru experience.
2.qualia are not constituted by bare differences (if they are not extrinsic, they must be intrinsic (I think).

Qualia do have some extrinsic property(ies) by being observables, right? If so, they can be included in a formal system- an impure world or interpreted impure world- and that system can possibly be shown to be inconsistent or incomplete internally or relative to the real world- an instantiated interpreted impure world. If qualia can't be included in any way in a formal system, it seems to me that his argument is missing something. (Oy, I'm starting to annoy myself now )

 

[hypnagogue]

In a pure Life world, it must be like something to detect "on" and/or it must be like something to detect "off". It has to be known that this state is "on" (or this state is "off"). It isn't enough to know "on" is not "off" and "off" is not "on".

A system in a pure Life world could detect whether a certain cell was on or off at a given time step by observing the causal dynamics of the surrounding cells over time. The point is that there is nothing more to the ontology of on and off than just their differing dispositional properties over time.

Detection of 'on' in a pure Life world does not imply that it is like something (in the sense of Nagel) for the detecting system to detect 'on.' You seem to be using a much broader and more colloquial sense of the phrase that is not faithful to Nagel's usage.

Edit: Can I say that Rosenberg deals with three things: (1) formal systems, (2) interpreted formal systems, and (3) instantiated interpreted formal systems?

It would be more accurate to say that he deals with 'pure' formal systems and our universe, which he argues is not a pure formal system. (2) and (3) do not really add anything to (1); they do not tell us anything that doesn't already logically follow from (1). If something about (2) and (3) did not follow from (1), then we would have some sort of strongly emergent phenomena on our hands, and we'd have to add some extra rules to the rules already contained in (1). But that would break our stipulation that (1) is already the complete set of rules. So by definition, everything about (2) and (3) logically follows from (1) (given some set of initial conditions).

He examines a pure Life world as (1) and an impure world as (3) (when appealing to our subjective experience of qualia), but where does he examine a pure Life world as (3) or an impure world as (1)?

Examining a pure Life world as (1) is equivalent to examining it as (3), since everything about (3) logically follows from (1), by definition of what it means to be a pure Life world. On the other hand, it is up for grabs whether our world is a pure physical world; what we have to do is observe it (I suppose this meets your criterion for (3)) and see whether what we observe can follow from (1), the formal rules given by physics.

edit: Sorry, let me clarify something here. The initial conditions of any given Life world will not follow from the rules governing its evolution; to get a Life world off the ground, we need to suppose some set of initial conditions in addition to the dynamical rules. If this is what you meant by (2), then (2) does not logically follow from (1). But (3) certainly follows from a combination of the rules and a set of initial conditions. In any case, the basic point stands that nothing is really to be gained from an analysis of the evolution of a particular Life world. The argument is an argument in principle, and will apply to any instantiation of any given pure Life world.

Rosengogue: No, wait, come back. This system has something we can interpret as being you, as playing the role of you.
Me: And this system still doesn't have anything that plays the role of qualia?
Rosengogue: No.

You seem to be missing the essential point of the argument, which is that there is more to qualia than just whatever functional or dispositional roles they may play in a cognitive context. The physical causal dynamics of your zombie twin are identical to your own, so (barring interactionist dualism) if qualia play some effective causal role in you, there will be a corresponding effective causal role in the zombie. What is different is that the playing out of causal roles in you is associated with what it is like to be you (i.e. your p-consciousness), whereas for your zombie twin there is no p-consciousness associated with the causal roles; it's just the effective causal roles and nothing else.

 

[honestrosewater]

Detection of 'on' in a pure Life world does not imply that it is like something (in the sense of Nagel) for the detecting system to detect 'on.' You seem to be using a much broader and more colloquial sense of the phrase that is not faithful to Nagel's usage.

Yes, for comparison.

A system in a pure Life world could detect whether a certain cell was on or off at a given time step by observing the causal dynamics of the surrounding cells over time.

The game doesn't start until the initial conditions are specified. I wasn't sure why "The initial state of this cell is on" is not an "independent, self-contained notion" like "It is like something to see phenomenal red."

The rest of your post clears things up. Thank you very much.

 

[hypnagogue]

The qualitative content of conscious experience might not be intrinsic at all, despite the claims made in places that we know it is from experience (I certainly don't).

Rather than continue our discussion on peripheral issues about qualitative content and physics, for now I'd like to focus on this claim. I agree with Steve that that when Rosenberg talks about qualitative content, he essentially means a kind of intrinsic property. We can infer this from the form of his argument; he contends that qualia cannot be analyzed into structures of bare differences, and 'bare difference' is defined as a kind of dispositional property with no grounding intrinsic content.

Rosenberg argues that qualia have qualitative content (essentially, that they have intrinsic properties) in section 2.5, and I've presented partial summaries of the argument here and here. If you don't find this reasoning persuasive, can you indicate what premises or inferences you find contentious?

 

[hypnagogue]

The game doesn't start until the initial conditions are specified. I wasn't sure why "The initial state of this cell is on" is not an "independent, self-contained notion" like "It is like something to see phenomenal red."

I probably worded that poorly. What I meant to say was that in a pure Life world, the difference between 'on' and 'off' is a primitive, fundamental fact. They are not different in virtue of some further fact; they just are different, and there's nothing more to it than that. In the case of phenomenal red and phenomenal blue in our world, the experience of phenomenal red and the experience of phenomenal blue are the fundamental facts, and the difference between them is derivative on the fact that the qualitative experience of these colors is distinct.

 

[loseyourname]

Rather than continue our discussion on peripheral issues about qualitative content and physics, for now I'd like to focus on this claim. I agree with Steve that that when Rosenberg talks about qualitative content, he essentially means a kind of intrinsic property. We can infer this from the form of his argument; he contends that qualia cannot be analyzed into structures of bare differences, and 'bare difference' is defined as a kind of dispositional property with no grounding intrinsic content.

Rosenberg argues that qualia have qualitative content (essentially, that they have intrinsic properties) in section 2.5, and I've presented partial summaries of the argument here and here. If you don't find this reasoning persuasive, can you indicate what premises or inferences you find contentious?

Well, in the first case, the text you cited makes no argument. It's an appeal to empirical observation. He can contend that experiential content is intrinsic, but I'm just not sure why. I think it's a little difficult to make any claim about the fundamental nature of either observation itself or of the objects we observe. I just can't get my head around the problem of trying to figure out why it is that he thinks he can empirically "see" that content he experiences is intrinsic in nature.

What could a bare difference between red and blue be like? If the difference between red and blue were bare, then we could say nothing more about them than that
1. They are defined circularly in terms of their difference ('red' is not 'blue'; 'blue' is not 'red').
2. They are associated with differing dynamics (e.g. they are associated with propensities to say things like "the sky is blue"; "the fire hydrant is red"; etc.)

I can see the analogy Gregg tries to draw between a pure Life world and the world of physics, but they aren't the same. Physics does not define its properties as bare differences. Mass isn't "that which is not momentum" and so forth. Objects are defined in physics by the measurable quantities that they possesses at any given moment. It's hard to say that the difference from one physical object to another is ever "bare" in the same sense that the difference between an "on" cell and an "off" cell is in a Life world. I'm not certain that this matters, but certainly the book (at least in chapter two) doesn't make much of an effort to demonstrate that it doesn't.

If bare differences are really only defined circularly, as your above argument contends, then they really don't exist in the world of physics. The example you made with colors can be extended to quantitative properties as well. For instance:

What could a bare difference between 5 meters and 3 meters be like? If the difference between 5 meters and 3 meters were bare, then we could say nothing more about them than that
1. They are defined circularly in terms of their difference ('5 meters' is not '3 meters'; '3 meters' is not '5 meters').

If we're going to draw the same conclusion you did about color, then quantities such as 5 meters and 3 meters cannot exist in a pure Life world. Clearly they can, however, which makes the claim that content not defined in terms of bare differences cannot exist in a pure Life world dubious. Distance clearly can, as can many others things.

To be honest, it seems that what I am saying here is rather trivial. Even Gregg states that economies might conceivably exist in a Life world. I doubt that myself, but if he feels that way, I have no reason to argue as of yet. Economies clearly cannot be defined in terms of bare differences, which means that Gregg admits that properties not defined as bare differences can be entailed by a physics built up from bare difference structures. With this in mind, it seems that colors cannot be excluded from a Life world only on the basis of their not being bare difference structures.

 

[loseyourname]

OK, that's clear.

The other arguments needed are that we
1.have epistemic access to qualia thru experience.
2.qualia are not constituted by bare differences (if they are not extrinsic, they must be intrinsic (I think).

I would say we have experiential access to qualia through experience. That may sound trite, but accepting 1 depends on what you mean by "epistemic access." I will agree that we have access to the knowledge that something exists and that something else exists that experiences that something that exists. What I don't see us as having access to is the precise nature of this something that exists, qualia in this case.

Regarding 2, I'd like to comment on the equation you are making between bare differences and extrinsic properties. If bare differences are meant in the sense hypnagogue (and Rosenberg, IIRC) has been using them - x is x because it is not y, etc. - then that is certainly not what is meant by extrinsic. Extrinsic simply refers to a property of an object as it relates to other objects. The nature of these properties is not defined in terms of differences, but rather in terms of how the relationship can be expressed. It can be expressed qualitatively, but generally the physical sciences will express the relationship mathematically.

I'm more easily swayed by the argument even at this stage because I guess I've always been inclined to see first-person experience (of qualia) as being essentially an access to the intrinsic nature of things, while the third-person (really inter-subjective) construction of physical theory as being necessarily about extrinsic properties.

Well, that's just it. If you've always felt this way, then you're likely to be easily swayed by any argument that reaches the same conclusion you've already reached, especially when it appeals to your direct experience. Personally, I don't know whether or not I've ever experienced a quality that was intrinsic to the object that caused my experience. I'll agree that physical theories are descriptions of extrinsic properties, but that is simply because extrinsic properties are the only properties that the physical theorist can investigate empirically. It always seemed to me that there is no way to access intrinsic properties, because they are necessarily cut off from the causal chain that leads to experiential access. If they were properties that could be the cause of other properties, then they would be properties of objects as they relate to other objects, which seemingly makes them extrinsic. I know Gregg has worked a new theory of causation that supposedly removes this little difficulty, but I will go into those chapters with a sceptical mind.

 

[Fliption]

Well, in the first case, the text you cited makes no argument. It's an appeal to empirical observation. He can contend that experiential content is intrinsic, but I'm just not sure why. I think it's a little difficult to make any claim about the fundamental nature of either observation itself or of the objects we observe. I just can't get my head around the problem of trying to figure out why it is that he thinks he can empirically "see" that content he experiences is intrinsic in nature.

This was my exact point when I posted ealier in this thread about the argument for qualia being consider qualitative content i.e. intrinsic i.e. not entailed by bare differences...

Now it appears to me that this argument that qualia has qualitative content isn't a whole lot different from other arguments we've heard before. Unfortunately, these past arguments have always had rebuttals and I see that this one doesn't seem to be convincing to some of the participants here as well. It still seems as if we're stuck with "it is qualitative because it seems qualitative". Has any progress been made in this regard with this book or are we missing something? I personally agree with the idea. I'm just not sure the arguments in this book are any different or stronger than previous arguments. (I'm referring specifically to the point of qualia being qualitative and therefore not subject to explanation by physics)

 

[Steve Esser]

Regarding 2, I'd like to comment on the equation you are making between bare differences and extrinsic properties. If bare differences are meant in the sense hypnagogue (and Rosenberg, IIRC) has been using them - x is x because it is not y, etc. - then that is certainly not what is meant by extrinsic. Extrinsic simply refers to a property of an object as it relates to other objects. The nature of these properties is not defined in terms of differences, but rather in terms of how the relationship can be expressed. It can be expressed qualitatively, but generally the physical sciences will express the relationship mathematically.

Hi. On this point, the distinction you see between bare differences and extrinsic (or relational) properties doesn't seem like a distinction which matters. I guess I'm agreeing again with the author here (sorry - later on I'm sure I'll be more critical):
(p.26-top):
"The theoretical character of the basic properties is just the same in both cases: One stipulates at first that they are distinct and fleshes out their natures by designating laws that describe how they behave. The only real differences between Life and physics lies in such attributes as the complexity of the laws, the number and kind of dimensions the cells exist in, and perhaps non-local causation."(etc)

 

[loseyourname]

"The theoretical character of the basic properties is just the same in both cases: One stipulates at first that they are distinct and fleshes out their natures by designating laws that describe how they behave. The only real differences between Life and physics lies in such attributes as the complexity of the laws, the number and kind of dimensions the cells exist in, and perhaps non-local causation."(etc)

Well, I don't think he's taking the matter seriously enough, to be honest. I'll agree with him that a pure physical world or a pure Life world, lacking some form of grounding ontology, probably cannot exist. Just going on the assumption that it cannot, I think we can make a couple of basic inferences about the nature of this grounding ontology in a physical world and in a Life world. In a Life world, we already know exactly what it is. There is the circular definition of states as simply two states that are distinct from each other. In this case, in fact, the nature of the grounding ontological objects doesn't matter aside from the fact that there are two kinds of objects and that each object is both 1) extrinsically the same as other kinds of objects in its kind and 2) extrinsically not the same as objects not in its kind.

In a physical world, though, I don't think we can have that same kind of grounding ontology. Particle A and particle B relate to each other by means of quantities that are various in number and can themselves vary in degrees (though the degrees are quantized, they are certainly more than two). This isn't just a matter of having more complex relational laws - it is also a matter of having a more complex and rich grounding ontology.

I know that, in a sense, what I'm saying here is not important to the central point that Gregg is making, but I still think it should be pointed out simply as a matter of literary criticism, if nothing else. His basic argument really just seems to be something along the lines of:

1. All physical data is extrinsic in nature. (uncontentious from my vantage point)
2. Experiential data is intrinsic in nature. (supposedly provided by direct experience, but I will argue this one)
3. No intrinsic data can be entailed by extrinsic data. (by the definition of the terms being used, I have no qualm with this)
Therefore, experiential data cannot be entailed by physical data.

Why not just leave it at that? He may as well admit that he is making a judgement call to some degree, by saying that experiential data seems to him to be intrinsic in nature (though I still can't conceive of what the difference would be between experiencing extrinsic v. intrinisic data). It seems that, by making analogy to a Life world - a simplified world in which, again, it just seems obvious that experience could not exist - he has proven that experience cannot exist in a physical world. I've mulled this point with hypnagogue by saying it is clear there are things that can exist in a physical world but cannot exist in a Life world, so this is not a convincing argument. He's countered by saying that isn't the argument, that there is something else special about experience that makes it impossible in both a Life and a physical world. But if this is the case, why make the argument that physical facts cannot entail experience because Life facts cannot entail experience (the argument explicitly made at the outset of the chapter). Doing so only serves to confuse and lead us off on tangents such as these. Just stick with the argument I've presented above and admit that still nothing has been proven. The rest of the book can continue and that's fine. I'm guessing he might make a very compelling case for his view of causation and experience later in the book. So be it. He doesn't need to pretend that he has disqualified opposing theories before he can present his own. If his theory has additional explanatory power, then it is worth investigating on its own merit.

 

[hypnagogue]

Well, in the first case, the text you cited makes no argument. It's an appeal to empirical observation. He can contend that experiential content is intrinsic, but I'm just not sure why. I think it's a little difficult to make any claim about the fundamental nature of either observation itself or of the objects we observe. I just can't get my head around the problem of trying to figure out why it is that he thinks he can empirically "see" that content he experiences is intrinsic in nature.

The text I cited appeals to empirical observation, but this appeal is made in the service of a deductive argument. Here's the basic form:

1. If a difference is bare, then it is a difference that does not rest on any further facts. (pg. 18)
2. The difference between phenomenal red and phenomenal blue rests on the further fact that what it is like to see this[/color] is different from what it is like to see this[/color].
3. Therefore, the difference between phenomenal red and phenomenal blue is not a bare difference. They are not merely different, rather they are different in virtue of the fact that what it like to see one is not what it is like to see the other.

Rosenberg argues that a bare difference analysis of subjective experience (whether it characterizes phenomenal colors as bare differences, or as being entailed by bare differences) will leave out the phenomenal qualities. For instance, suppose we have a complete bare difference analysis of phenomenal colors (call it B) that consists of a set of statements like "p-red is different from p-blue"; "p-orange appears 'closer' to p-red than p-violet"; etc. B does not exhaustively characterize the phenomenal color space; it leaves out the phenomenal content that grounds the differences and relationships among the colors. B does not entail the facts about phenomenal content either, because (for instance) if we inverted the phenomenal color spectrum (so that p-red refers to this[/color], p-violet refers to this[/color], etc.), all the facts in B would remain true but would now be consistent with an entirely different phenomenal color space.

If we're going to draw the same conclusion you did about color, then quantities such as 5 meters and 3 meters cannot exist in a pure Life world. Clearly they can, however, which makes the claim that content not defined in terms of bare differences cannot exist in a pure Life world dubious. Distance clearly can, as can many others things.

To be honest, it seems that what I am saying here is rather trivial. Even Gregg states that economies might conceivably exist in a Life world. I doubt that myself, but if he feels that way, I have no reason to argue as of yet. Economies clearly cannot be defined in terms of bare differences, which means that Gregg admits that properties not defined as bare differences can be entailed by a physics built up from bare difference structures. With this in mind, it seems that colors cannot be excluded from a Life world only on the basis of their not being bare difference structures.

Bare differences are "ungrounded by any further facts about internal structural differences ... or internal relations of difference or contrast between unspecified intrinsic contents" (pg. 19). Economies in our world and prospective economies in a pure Life world cannot be characterized as a set of bare differences, but they do have further facts about internal structural differences that can be ultimately accounted for by bare differences. If physical spacetime can be shown to be a phenomon that arises from a more abstract set of functional relationships, then the same is true of physical distance. In a pure Life world, the difference between a string of 5 cells and a string of 3 cells could be reduced to bare difference facts about individual cells.

 

[loseyourname]

Bare differences are "ungrounded by any further facts about internal structural differences ... or internal relations of difference or contrast between unspecified intrinsic contents" (pg. 19).

I'll respond to the rest soon, but for now, just another piece of purely literary criticism. This is the third definition given of "bare differences." A good deal of the trouble that readers are having with the book thus far seems to result from concepts such as this that are never clearly specified before they are put into use. I realize that Gregg is using functional definitions - we should eventually come to know what he means by continued contextual analysis of how he uses the words. But when definitions are refined in such a way that it almost seems he is talking about one thing on one page and something else on another when he uses only one word, it's hard to follow.

 

[hypnagogue]

I'll respond to the rest soon, but for now, just another piece of purely literary criticism. This is the third definition given of "bare differences."

It's a somewhat different way of saying the same basic thing. If we accept that bare differences are fundamental, ungrounded facts, then it cannot be that a bare difference follows from further facts about internal structure, etc. But I do agree it'd be helpful if there were a single, explicitly demarcated, dictionary-like definition for this term that we could point to. (For what it's worth, there are a lot of explicit, demarcated definitions later on in the book when Rosenberg analyzes causation.)

 

[hypnagogue]

By the way, this thread is two weeks old, so although it looks like we'll continue our discussion here, it's also about time to progress further into the book. In next day or two I'll post new threads for chapters 3 and 4.

Chapter 3 is a rather long and detailed set of responses to various physicalist counterarguments. It's intended for graduate and professional level philosophers, and presupposes some familiarity with many of the arguments and terms used. Therefore, discussion of this chapter is optional, and will be conducted concurrently with discussion of chapter 4.

Chapter 4 will take us away from concerns about physicalism. Here we'll begin a portion of the book that examines some of the conceptual issues and problems that consciousness presents us with, problems that any theory of consciousness-- physicalist or not-- will have to own up to.

 

[Paul Martin]

I couldn't help jumping to conclusions

My intentions were good when I signed up as a participant in this forum. But,...since I don't have the time, and now obviously, the energy, or the intellect to keep up with the rest of you, I probably should have signed up only as a reader. But I will do my best to contribute from time to time anyway.

By way of introduction, I am reading Gregg's book but I have already violated his early admonition not to jump to conclusions and form opinions before reading the entire book. I broke that rule long before I picked up his book. From childhood, over 60 years ago, I have been intrigued by "The Hard Problem". I have been dismayed for most of that time by the more-or-less official ignoring or dismissal of the problem by Science. I have been delighted, however, in the past couple decades with the growth of consciousness studies. You people are all my heroes. I have been impatiently waiting for you to show up and begin seriously working on the problem. I will eagerly follow your developments to the best of my ability.

During that long period of frustration, I have gone ahead and formed opinions of my own about how The Hard Problem might be solved. Almost by definition, since I have adopted those opinions, they seem to me to make more sense than any alternative. (An introductory summary of them can be found at www.paulandellen.com/essays/essay140.htm ). And, naturally, these opinions present themselves for comparison whenever I consider any other ideas, including Gregg's.

In a nutshell, according to Chalmers' sieve, I am an Interactionist Dualist. It is my view that consciousness itself, or more basically "the ability to know", is uniquely ontologically fundamental. The inferences I draw from that premise are that nothing else exists in reality except for the "thoughts", i.e. apprehension of knowledge, of that consciousness. The physical world is, as Berkeley described, a vast structure of those thoughts.

I think Gregg is on the right track by pursuing causation as being fundamentally related to consciousness as follows: The Primordial Consciousness (PC for short) can cause new thoughts in at least two distinct ways: one we might call imagination, which is unconstrained. The other we might call inference, which is constrained by the choice (exercised by PC of course) to remain consistent with a set of rules (also chosen by PC). Roughly speaking, among the results of the latter is the physical universe. The results of the former include what we call Quantum Randomness, Martin Rees's "Just Six Numbers", and possibly others. Organisms which seem to be conscious are physical "vehicles" which are each "driven" by PC and which provide two-way communication between PC and neuronal activity similar to that between a remote-controlled vehicle and a human operator via radio signals. And, just as in the case of the RC vehicle, consciousness inheres only in the driver. I think this scenario answers all the Hard Problems.

In my reading, and in my conversations, I look for anything that might deflate my opinions and I solicit the same from you. My comments on "A Place for Consciousness" will usually be to try to understand some attack on my opinions, or to defend them against an attack I think I understand. I look forward to further discussion.

As for Chapter 2, I have only one comment. On page 28, Gregg quotes Lee Smolin speculating that Physics is likely to turn out to be an information process. I agree with this prediction in that I think physics will turn out to be a subset of the thoughts of PC, which can be seen as nothing but an information process. However, I think that Shannon's definition of 'information', as a difference that makes a difference, is incomplete. To be complete, we need to understand to whom or to what the difference makes a difference. I was encouraged to read where Gregg raised the same question (I'm sorry I failed to note exactly where). Gregg also begs the same question in his footnote 6 on page 28 (Forgive me for jumping ahead to Chapter 3) when he refers to "an ideal knower". In my view, the answer to these questions is, of course, PC. PC is not only the ideal knower, but PC is the only knower. And PC is the only entity to whom a difference could make a difference.

 

[Canute]

Nice post. I also had your experience of waiting around for decades waiting for science to get over Behaviourism. As far as it goes what you say makes a great deal of sense to me. One might call it the perennial view. Perhaps Rosenbergs' 'ideal knower' is the same knower that Wheeler (and Bohm?) conjectures was necessary to bring our universe of bare differences or 'dependent arisings' into existence.

 

[Paul Martin]

Thanks, Canute. I'm not sure why you called what I said, "the perennial view". Anyway, in my view, there is only one knower, so it would have to be the one Wheeler and Bohm had in mind.

Along those lines, I was impressed by one of the posters here who pointed out that the Life game is not completely described simply by the rules. There also must be some kind of substrate (a grid on paper and pennies, etc.) to support the evolving states of the game. But more importantly, in my opinion, is the necessity of some originator and possibly also the player of the game. I say "possibly" because the originator may implement some kind of autonomous machine which will allow the game to play out unattended, such as we do with our computer implementations of the game. But in any case, you need some kind of entity to originate the whole thing. I think that is also an obvious necessity for reality as a whole, and positing some kind of entity such as what I call PC does not seem unreasonable to me.

Paul

 

[Canute]

By 'perennial view' I meant that it is the recurring conclusion of researchers into consciousness (as distinct from researchers into brains) that there is only one knower, and that it is fundamental. (Erwin Scroedinger asserted this throughout the last forty years of his life).

I agree with you that the Life world metaphor has problems relating to the issues you mention. I think a few of us do. This is why I prefer the approach taken by George Spencer-Brown, who I mentioned earlier in the thread hoping someone would pick up on it. He models a universe of bare differences mathematically in the form of a calculus that does not have these problems.

His calculus is directly relevant to this discussion and I'd recommend a quick look at the principles of it it to anyone interested in this bare difference discussion. He starts at the very beginning, not with a Lifeword already created, but with an undifferentiated void. He then assumes a fundamental knower who creates (by a process akin to symmetry breaking) the universe of bare differences (the calculus) in, or out of, this void.

Thus he agrees that the phenomenal universe consists of nothing but bare differences, but grounds it ontologically without the ambiguities that arise from GR's Lifeworld approach. The ontological problem is solved by him in his calculus by saying that the undifferentiated void is the fundamental knower (or observer). Thus his void is the Tao of Taoism, the 'emptiness' of Buddhism, the 'Allah' of Sufism and so on.

He's quite a character. Excuse the name dropping but I spoke to him on the phone a while ago at some length, and the first thing he informed me was that he is a 'Buddha' meaning, among other things, that he is awake to the truth about reality.

Sorry if this is meandering off topic. Thought it wouldn't matter while we await Chapter three.

 

[Paul Martin]

Thank you once again, Canute. I was not aware, until you began pointing it out to me, (I think it was you who first told me about Schroedinger's view in another thread) that so many other people seem to agree with me. I had not heard of Spencer-Brown, or his calculus before. Where can I read more about it?

If this is off topic, then I am glad you meandered.

 

[StatusX]

Hi guys. I recently bought this book because it seemed to explore the view of consciousness that I've come to believe is the only viable option left: that the intrinsic base of reality that physics doesn't talk about is the cause of (or maybe the same as) consciousness. I hope no one minds if I join the discussion a little late.

I've been reading through this thread, and there are a couple comments I'd like to make about what's been discussed so far. First, as far as bare differences are concerned. I think the point Rosenberg was trying to make with the pure life universe is that facts about consciousness cannot be derived from just the facts about bare differences. It is an epistemological argument. It is possible, as he mentioned, that a universe consisting of pure bare differences and structure with no intrinsicness whatsoever is not logically possible, (although he mentioned this is difficult to prove), so it is possible that a pure life universe or a pure physical universe is not even a coherent idea. Now, it may be that there is some kind of experience in a life world, regardless of what its intrinsic basis is, but given only the facts about the rules and bare differences, we cannot derive any facts about experience, including whether or not it exists.

Second, I'm a little confused about the definition of intrinsic some of you are using. For example:

The qualitative content of conscious experience might not be intrinsic at all, despite the claims made in places that we know it is from experience (I certainly don't).

Also, there was mention of the qualitative properties of a novel. Could someone explain the difference between qualitative and intrinsic? Because I didn't know there was one.

 

[Canute]

Paul

If you didn't realize how many people agree with you then you're in for a nice surprise.

Here's some links.

http://www.enolagaia.com/GSB.html
http://www.lawsofform.org/
http://multiforms.netfirms.com/multiforms_1.html

StatusX - Now you mention it I agree about 'qualitative' and 'intrinsic'. I assumed we were all meaning the same by these words, but perhaps not. It'd probably be best if Hypnagogue defined them in line with GR's use. (Sorry H - hope this isn't becoming too much like hard work).

 

[loseyourname]

Also, there was mention of the qualitative properties of a novel. Could someone explain the difference between qualitative and intrinsic? Because I didn't know there was one.

In its most basic form, "qualitative" just refers to any description that doesn't use numbers. In the context of a novel, I used the example of character traits. Lady Macbeth is exceedingly conniving: that's a qualitative description of Lady Macbeth. This type of description is not identical to the word "intrinsic" as it is being used. For the purposes of this thread, "intrinsic" refers to any property of a fundamental unit of reality that cannot be reduced to a collection of other properties. In fact, as Rosenberg sets it up, consciousness cannot exist without these intrinsic properties. However, as it was conceded that zombies could still write novels with properties such as themes and character traits, "qualitative" in this thread cannot mean the same thing as "intrinsic." In fact, presumably the zombies themselves could have qualitative traits such as the propensity for being conniving.

 

[Paul Martin]

Canute

You are absolutely right. I am not only surprised but delighted.

Thanks for the links. Since we talked last, I found lawsofform.org by myself and have been digging into that. I will get right to the other two. I have also put "Laws of Form" on my list of books to buy. I haven't figured out yet whether it is even in print - but I will. Thanks again.

Paul

 

[Canute]

'Laws of Form' has been reprinted many times but is currently out of print. I managed to get a s/h copy from Amazon but it's pot luck. As I'm not a mathematician I found the more general discussion online more valuable than the book to be honest, which mostly concerns the detail of the calculus (but not entirely).

Somewhere online there are a couple of book chapters on GSB by psychologist Robin Robertson. In these he makes the link between GSB, Jung (esp. in regard to his gnostic views) and Lao-Tsu more explicit, which is useful. However I've mislaid the link. Also there might be something relevant under Varella (Franco I think) who applies GSB's calculus to biology and the structure of autopoetic systems. I've never looked into that however. Good luck. I'd very much like to know what you think when you've had a browse around.

 

[moving finger]

Maybe I'm missing the whole point here, but the OP stated :

1. The facts about a pure Life world do not entail facts about phenomenal consciousness.
2. If facts about a pure Life world do not entail facts about phenomenal consciousness, then facts about a pure physical world do not entail facts about phenomenal consciousness.
3. Therefore, facts about a pure physical world do not entail facts about phenomenal consciousness. (p. 18)

I can re-word this to "prove" that facts about a pure physical world do not entail facts about the law of universal gravitation :

1. The facts about a pure Life world do not entail facts about the law of universal gravitation.
2. If facts about a pure Life world do not entail facts about the law of universal gravitation, then facts about a pure physical world do not entail facts about the law of universal gravitation.
3. Therefore, facts about a pure physical world do not entail facts about the law of universal gravitation.

What is wrong with the logic?

 

[Tychic]

Hi moving finger,
the second premise of your argument will not work, because there is no argument for your second premise using "bare differences". Each physical theory is a mathematical theory and thus describes only bare differences. But p-consciousness is something more ore other than bare differences. See hypnagogue’s summary of Rosenberg's argument for 2.

Rosenberg goes on to argue that a pure physics world-- a world whose fundamental ontology consists only of those facts stipulated by physics-- cannot entail facts about p-consciousness, for the same general reason that facts about a pure Life world cannot entail facts about p-consciousness. He argues that the facts of a pure physical world consist entirely of bare differences; they are a stipulated set of relational, formal, schematic facts with no grounding, intrinsic basis. Thus, a pure physics world is saddled with essentially the same problem as a pure Life world: its ontology of bare differences cannot entail the observed qualitative content of p-consciousness.

 

[moving finger]

Hi moving finger,
the second premise of your argument will not work, because there is no argument for your second premise using "bare differences". Each physical theory is a mathematical theory and thus describes only bare differences. But p-consciousness is something more ore other than bare differences. See hypnagogue’s summary of Rosenberg's argument for 2.

if we take hypnagogue's summary at face value, then it would seem that Rosenberg is advancing a premise that "a pure physics world ...ontology of bare differences cannot entail the observed qualitative content of p-consciousness".

I don't see why this premise is necessarily true?

 

[moving finger]

the first thing he informed me was that he is a 'Buddha' meaning, among other things, that he is awake to the truth about reality.

sorry, but I cannot help but smile at the intellectual snobbery (intended or otherwise) inherent in such a view - it implies that those of us who are not "Buddhas" are therefore ignorant of the truth about reality?

Give me a break

 

[Moridin]

Empirical mind-brain dependence, such as argument from development, argument from brain damage and argument from split-brain patients completely shatters any objection to mind-brain physicalism.