If we accept that panexperientialism is a logically coherent worldview (see chapter 5), we are left with the question of how likely it is to be true of our world. This chapter is devoted to answering that question. Panexperientialism is roughly the view that subjective, phenomenal experience outruns cognition-- that is, that experience is not limited to cognitive systems. Before we can proceed to evaluate panexperientialism and its opposition, we need an idea of what is meant by the term "cognitive." It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what should count as cognitive and what should not; ideally, we would like the word to pick out systems that are similar to human brains in certain sophisticated regards. Rosenberg nominates Robert Kirk's "basic package" as a good example of the sense of the word "cognitive" that he adopts in this chapter. The basic package is a group of information processing capacities that includes the following: The arguments to follow are not predicated on following Kirk's sense of the word "cognition" to the letter. Rather, Kirk's basic package is to be taken as a right-spirited attempt at capturing the essence of the word in a way that corresponds to relevant high-level characteristics of human brain function, without being so general as to lose its intuitive meaning. In order to assess the likelihood that panexperientialism is true, Rosenberg does not provide direct arguments making the case for panexperientialism, but rather argues against rivaling theories that restrict experience only to cognitive systems (call these cognitive theories of experience). On any such theory, there must be some class of base properties of cognitive systems that accounts for experience. Rosenberg addresses three of the most popular proposals for such base properties-- complexity, functionality, and biology-- although the moral behind his critiques could probably be extended to any cognitive theory of experience. Recall arguments from chapters 2 and 3 that p-consciousness is not entailed by physicalism. If this is the case, then p-consciousness cannot be constructed from existing physicalist ontology, and we need some sort of new fundamental objects/processes/laws to account for it. In the absence of hard empirical data about p-consciousness beyond our own first person cases, we can evaluate any such fundamental laws by way of comparison to already established fundamental laws, such as fundamental physical laws that govern gravitation or electromagnetism. All known and widely accepted fundamental laws share striking properties of "simplicity, clarity, objectivity, and elegance" (pg 113). To the extent that one regards these features as universally descriptive of all of nature's fundamental aspects, one can judge the plausibility of new candidates for fundamental laws by evaluating them along these dimensions. The general form of the critiques Rosenberg mounts against cognitive theories of experience, then, is that it is highly unlikely that their proposed base properties for experience-- e.g. complexity or functionality-- would feature in fundamental laws of nature. In particular, he argues that the nature of the concepts they employ, the simplicity of the laws featuring these concepts, and their possible empirical consequences are varyingly so complex, ambiguous, interest relative, and ad hoc as to be unlikely candidates for fundamental natural laws. By contrast, Rosenberg regards the theory of consciousness he will develop in the second half of the book to meet the criteria of simplicity, clarity, objectivity, and elegenace, even though it has panexperientialist consequences. Rejecting this theory in favor of a cognitive theory of experience just to avoid panexperientialist consequences, then, would be in violation of accepted standards of good theory construction. As such, Rosenberg's analysis here is in keeping with the Liberal Naturalist emphasis on methodological conservatism-- we should follow established standards of good theory construction, even if it leads us to become more ontologically radical than we might have liked.