PAllen said:
How is "no time invariance" fundamentally more natural "time invariance"? Note, time is distinguishable in SR (the geometry is pseudo-Riemannian, not Riemannian). Or you can say, manifolds are preferable to fiber bundles (?).
Also, note that the value of c only chooses units not physics. Thus, there exactly two physically distinguishable choices to make (there is or is not an invariant speed), not infinite versus one. You can choose "time invariance" or "c invariance". You are not making headway convincing me that anything other than experiment chooses SR over Galilean relativity.
Yes, I agree that in order to derive the Lorentz transformation a finite constant (
c) with the dimension of a speed must somehow be injected according to which “instantaneous actions at a distance” get excluded. Obviously my previous inputs overlooked it. Thanks for this lesson.
Still I wish to challenge the rationale for invoking either a “law of physics” (such as Maxwell's equations or the “invariance of the speed of light”) or some experimental results (such as the Michelson and Morley experiment) as a valid foundation for the formal derivation of the Lorentz transformation. In my view, statements about the world, how it is, how it works, what happens there,... are just inappropriate. We should not accept any
a priori statements in this range.
SR provides a formal framework into which a model / description / simulation of the world and associated phenomena will get hosted. The purpose of that framework is to specify how our formal description of the same phenomena should be evolved when we change the perspective from which this description is proposed. The SR framework should be physically neutral, it should provide an empty structure, in the same way as in GR the actual curvature of space-time relies upon the effective presence of energy or mass.
The two postulates I have proposed for SR are not about the world, they are about us:
we sense accelerations and rotations whereas
we do not sense speed or rest. The symmetries we have discussed are not about the world itself, they deal with our
a priori concepts of space and time:
we only grasp differences in position, in orientation, in time, not their absolute values ... But the addition of
c as an external constraint, somehow linked to a
belief in the existence of a “law of nature”, in order to complement this set of postulates and symmetry rules does not fit well. It has no bearing to the meta-rules which the SR formal framework must comply with.
Actually we all know why
c is necessary, why “no signal can travel at an infinite speed”, why we must impose this constraint on our formal framework. It is not a postulate about the world and neither an external constraint derived from experiments. It reflects the
causal structure we impose to any abstract construction deserving to be labelled as a “physics theory”. We can't accept that our theories claim “explaining” phenomena through “instantaneous actions at a distance”. Causes and effects must be ordered in time otherwise they can't be distinguished from each other. As long as our physics theories abide to some concept of causality, they must fit within a formal framework imposing a maximum limit for the speed of any signal invoked in a causal explanation.
My conclusion is that
we impose the existence of
c as a consequence of our own internal mental structure, it is not imposed to us by external experiments and neither by some miraculous knowledge about the world. Comments are, of course, welcome.