bhobba said:
I have studied GR form a number of sources - my favorite being Wald - he uses Diffeomorphism Invarience, the rest General Covarience/Invarience. Wald is more mathematically sophisticated but at rock bottom is there really any difference. My suspicion is Wald does it because there is a debate about if General Covarience is correct - it should really be Genenal Invarience - the difference being, for invarience, it also applies to physical content rather than just form.
I've struggled with understanding exactly the content of general covariance, or whatever you call it, and I've come to the conclusion that there are three related but slightly different notions.
- Coordinate independence. The laws of physics have the same form in any coordinate system. This is not actually a constraint on the laws of physics, but is a constraint on how we formulate those laws. Any laws can be written in a coordinate-independent way. Some people try to salvage some physical content by revising it to say that the laws have their simplest form in coordinate-free language, but simplicity is in the eye of the beholder, so I'm not sure how useful that is.
- Background independence: The laws of physics when written in covariant have no non-dynamic scalar, vector or tensor fields. This is in some sense philosophically a generalization of Newton's third law about equal and opposite forces. If there is some field that affects the motion of particles, then those particles should affect the field, in return. In other words, the field should be dynamic. In contrast, Newtonian physics has a scalar field, universal time, that is non-dynamic, and Special Relativity has a tensor field, the metric, that is non-dynamic. Somebody argued, I think, that this principle doesn't really have any physical content, either, because you can always put some unobservable dynamics into your theory to make it satisfy this principle.
- Active diffeomorphism invariance. (I'm not sure about the distinction between "invariance" and "invarience")
Some people use "diffeomorphism invari(a/e)nce" to mean the same thing as coordinate independence. However, conceptually, there is a subtle distinction to be made (or maybe it's a false distinction) which was illustrated by Einstein's "hole argument".
Physics (or at least, most physics) takes place on some manifold, \mathcal{M}. A coordinate system is a map c from that manifold to the manifold R^n (or rather, it's a map from some open set of the first to some open set of the second). So if you have a smooth transformation on R^n:
m: R^n \rightarrow R^n,
then you can use it to transform a coordinate system on \mathcal{M}. Let c'(\mathcal{P}) = m(c(\mathcal{P})) or more compactly, c' = m \circ c where \circ is function composition. (I've seen different mathematicians use the opposite convention as to whether to write this as m \circ c or c \circ m)
Now, let me introduce something I'm going to call a "situation", which is just a collection of scalar fields, vector fields, tensor fields, etc., on the manifold. Given a situation S and a coordinate system c, we can come up with a coordinate-dependent description of that situation: \mathcal{D}(S,c).
The same situation S can be described using different coordinate systems, and the descriptions may look very different: \mathcal{D}(S,c) \neq \mathcal{D}(S,c).
But what about the opposite case? Can there be two different situations, S and S' and two different coordinate systems, c and c', such that \mathcal{D}(S,c) = \mathcal{D}(S', c'). Different situations, described by different coordinate systems, but the coordinate-dependent descriptions are the same. Is that possible?
Here's a toy example: Situation 1 has Jill holding a ball. Situation 2 has Jack holding a kitten. If we just started calling Jill "John" and started calling balls "kittens", then we would have a description of Situation 1 in our new language that sounds the same as the description of Situation 2 in our old language. But they aren't the same situation. So different situations can have the same description.
However, if a "situation" includes absolutely everything: fields, scalars, particles, metric, etc., then maybe two situations with the same descriptions are actually the same situation.
I think that that's the intuitive idea behind diffeomorphism invari(a/e)nce. If you have two points \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} on your manifold \mathcal{M}, then you could imagine two different situations: One in which there is a black hole located at point \mathcal{A}, and another where there is a black hole at point \mathcal{B}. Those are different situations, in the sense that the metric tensor is a different function on \mathcal{M} in the two cases. But they have the same description: There is a black hole at one point. Diffeomorphism invariance implies that they really aren't different situations, at all.
I think that what it really amounts to, mathematically, is that the arena for physics isn't actually manifolds, but are manifolds modulo diffeomorphisms. If you move points around on a manifold, and correspondingly adjust the metric and all other scalar, vector, and tensor fields, then you haven't done anything. Another way of putting it is that points on the manifold have no identity other than the values of the scalar, vector and tensor fields on those points. There is no difference between: "It's the same manifold, but the fields have different values" and "It's a different manifold."