Different interpretations? No, different theories

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The discussion centers on the distinction between different theories of quantum mechanics, specifically Everett's "Relative State" formulation and the Copenhagen interpretation. It argues that these are not merely interpretations but fundamentally different theories with distinct predictions, particularly regarding the quantum nature of observers and measuring devices. The impossibility of practically proving the quantum nature of an observer is noted, yet the theoretical implications of different predictions remain significant. The debate also touches on the Born rule's role in assigning probabilities within these frameworks, with concerns raised about the coherence of treating observers as both classical and quantum. Ultimately, the conversation emphasizes the need to recognize these theories as separate rather than simply interpretative.
  • #91
I don't follow your argument. Projection is a simple mathematical operation. I don't see how it has anything to do with the fact that there's no way to perform a measurement on the universe.

Also, since you agree that Gleason's theorem applies to all situations where the Born rule can be used, how can you say that Zurek's derivation is valid? These two statements look contradictory to me.
 
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  • #92
Demystifier said:
Fine. But then, as the author says in the Conclusions, we deal with
"... Many Many Worlds Interpretation (because each of the arbitrary more complicated factorizations tells a different story about Many Worlds [7])."
I have started reading the article. Maybe this will clear up when I read more of it, but it seems to me that he's saying that there's always a way to decompose the universe into non-interacting subsystems. Is this really what he means when he says that "nothing happens" in the universe? Isn't it still possible that subsystems of those subsystems are interacting with each other, and in that case, wouldn't it mean that something is happening?
 
  • #93
JK423 said:
I read the paper and it, indeed, presents a serious problem. This problem seems to be relevant to classical physics as well, not just quantum.

Consider the Earth and Sun, where the Sun stands still and the Earth goes around it in circles. The Hamiltonian of the system is
{H_1} = {H_{{r_{Earth}}}} + {H_{{r_{sun}}}} + {H_{{\mathop{\rm int}} }},
and the equations of motion show that an object (the earth) is moving in circles.
As we know, a change of coordinates to center of mass R and relative position r uncouples the system,
{H_2} = {H_R} + {H_r},
and the new equations of motion gives two static objects (or at least one of them -R- moving in constant motion).
If this system was all there is in the universe, then we would not be able to tell which description is the "real one" because they are mathematically equivalent. This holds for classical physics as well.
However, in practice when we (the observer) look at the system we see the first case -the Earth going around in circles- and not the second -two objects standing still. That's because the observer interacts specifically with the rEarth and rSun, and not with R and r. The paper suggests now, that if we put the observer in the description and consider the system "earth+sun+observer" all there is in the universe, then the Hamiltonian describing the whole system can be expressed in various different bases and there is ambiguity in which interpretation is "the real one".
Good point!

JK423 said:
Now, Schwindt -in that paper- presents this idea of postulating spacetime to solve the problem (in page 8), but he argues that it's not enough, but to be honest i cannot understand why.
I can't see where exactly (in page 8) does he argue that. Can you quote the exact statement?
 
  • #94
JK423 said:
Hmm, i don't think so.. Gleason's theorem involves projection operators that act on states.

Gleasons Theorem is prior to the definition and interpretation of states. It shows for an observable R E(R) = Tr(PR) where P is a positive operator of trace 1. P is by definition the state of the system. The only assumptions in the derivation is the eigenvalues of the Hermitian operator R are the possible outcomes of the observation and the eigenvectors are non contextual. The exact meaning of the eigenvectors as the state of the system after the observation is not required at this stage. After Gleasons Theorem is proved from the assumption of continuity in the change of system states after the observation (ie it will give the same result an infinitesimal instant later) you can show it must be in the state corresponding to the eigenvector associated with the outcome.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #95
Fredrik said:
I have started reading the article. Maybe this will clear up when I read more of it, but it seems to me that he's saying that there's always a way to decompose the universe into non-interacting subsystems. Is this really what he means when he says that "nothing happens" in the universe? Isn't it still possible that subsystems of those subsystems are interacting with each other, and in that case, wouldn't it mean that something is happening?

I had a similar disconcerting feeling about a "pure wavefunction" interpretation of quantum mechanics, that went by a slightly different route: Any wave function (in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, anyway) can be interpreted as a superposition of energy eigenstates. Within each such "branch" of the wavefunction, the universe is essentially unchanging (the time dependence e^{-i \omega t} is trivial). Now, you can argue that splitting the wave function into energy eigenstates is the "wrong" decomposition into possible worlds, but it seems to me that the notion in which it is wrong has to go beyond just unitary evolution of states in Hilbert space. So you need something besides the wave function to get any notion of dynamics at all.
 
  • #96
Demystifier said:
I can't see where exactly (in page 8) does he argue that. Can you quote the exact statement?

At page 8, last paragraph he says
In fact, there are infinitely many different spaces that can serve as a basis.
In Eq. (8) he postulates a basis {|x>}, and then in Eq. (9) he postulates another space basis{|y>} and he concludes
The relations (9) and (10) define the new space. The two spaces are totally different.
You don’t get y-space by simply moving around some points of x-space. And yet we
can write |Ψ> as a wave function in x-space or in y-space, and there is no reason why
|Ψ> should look simpler in x-space than in y-space. (This is well known for x-space
versus k-space, the Fourier transformed space. This is just a reminder that there
is an infinity of such spaces.) The Hamilton operator will look very unpleasant in
y-space. The position operator X looks nice in x-space and unpleasant in y-space.
The position operator Y looks nice in y-space and unpleasant in x-space, etc.

...

Again, H may take on its simplest form if it is written in terms
of such an integral. But again the question is why an observer, arising as some part
of the global state vector, “sees” this particular space over which the integrals run.

To be honest, i am not sure what he is trying to prove.. To my mind, postulation of a space basis plus interactions expressed in that basis plus an initial quantum state to start with, solves the factorization problem. Ofcourse these are "handwaving" arguments, i cannot be sure. What do you think?
 
  • #97
JK423 said:
At page 8, last paragraph he says

In Eq. (8) he postulates a basis {|x>}, and then in Eq. (9) he postulates another space basis{|y>} and he concludes


To be honest, i am not sure what he is trying to prove.. To my mind, postulation of a space basis plus interactions expressed in that basis plus an initial quantum state to start with, solves the factorization problem. Ofcourse these are "handwaving" arguments, i cannot be sure. What do you think?
If one takes some basis {|x>} to be a PREFERRED basis, then you are right that the problem is essentially removed. But he does not take {|x>} to be a preferred basis. In his discussion, it is merely SOME basis, not better than any other.
 
  • #98
Fredrik said:
I don't follow your argument. Projection is a simple mathematical operation. I don't see how it has anything to do with the fact that there's no way to perform a measurement on the universe.

Also, since you agree that Gleason's theorem applies to all situations where the Born rule can be used, how can you say that Zurek's derivation is valid? These two statements look contradictory to me.

I am quite confused.. You are right, Gleason's theorem applies to all those situation that Born's rule is relevant. I need to understand the differences between Gleason's and Zurek's work, so i cannot say anything else at the moment. Does Gleason's theorem assumes Born's rule for example?
 
  • #99
Demystifier said:
If one takes some basis {|x>} to be a PREFERRED basis, then you are right that the problem is essentially removed. But he does not take {|x>} to be a preferred basis. In his discussion, it is merely SOME basis, not better than any other.

What do you mean "preferred" ? That the physical interactions take their well-known form in that particular basis?
 
  • #100
JK423 said:
What do you mean "preferred" ? That the physical interactions take their well-known form in that particular basis?
No. In classical physics, it would mean that positions x correspond to positions of some physical objects. In quantum physics, it depends on the interpretation. In particular, in MWI it means that the physical object is not an abstract vector psi in the Hilbert space, but the wave function psi(x) in one particular basis x.
 
  • #101
Demystifier said:
No. In classical physics, it would mean that positions x correspond to positions of some physical objects. In quantum physics, it depends on the interpretation. In particular, in MWI it means that the physical object is not an abstract vector psi in the Hilbert space, but the wave function psi(x) in one particular basis x.

Let the physical object be an abstract vector psi in the Hilbert space. Choose a basis {|x>} via which you express your laws (interactions) in their well known form. I think this solves any ambiguities. No preferred basis in the sense that you define it.
Schmindt changes to another basis {|y>} which is not a Lorentz transform of the first {|x>}, hence he messes up the interactions. What does that prove?
Like in my example with earth+sun, when i move to center of mass R and relative position r, the transformation is not a Lorentz one, hence the R and r do not represent the position of the physical objects in space.
 
  • #102
JK423 said:
I am quite confused.. You are right, Gleason's theorem applies to all those situation that Born's rule is relevant. I need to understand the differences between Gleason's and Zurek's work, so i cannot say anything else at the moment. Does Gleason's theorem assumes Born's rule for example?
Gleason only assumes that we're dealing with a Hilbert space that's at least 3-dimensional.

From a physicist's point of view, the reason we want a theorem like Gleason's is that subspaces of the Hilbert space can be thought of as mathematical representations of yes-no experiments. For example, let a,b be real numbers such that b>a, and suppose that we design a device that measures an observable A and returns the value "yes", if the result of the A-measurement is in the interval [a,b] and "no" otherwise. The system's state vector after the measurement will be in the subspace spanned by eigenvectors of A with eigenvalues in [a,b]. There's always a subspace associated with each yes-no experiment, so we need to be able to assign them probabilities in a way that makes sense. For example, the probability associated with the trivial subspace {0} must be 0, and the probability associated with the entire Hilbert space must be 1. Further, if E and F are orthogonal subspaces, then the probability associated with the smallest subspace that contains E and F must be the sum of the probability associated with E and the probability associated with F.

These rules are similar to, but not identical to, the rules that define a probability measure. The main difference is that the domain of a probability measure, as defined in measure theory, is a σ-algebra, and the set of subspaces of a Hilbert space isn't. However, it is a lattice, and σ-algebras can be thought of as a special kind of lattice. So what we need is a generalization of the term "probability measure" to lattices.

The generalization is straightforward. It involves a version of the rules I described above. With this definition in place, we can state the problem accurately: Find all probability measures on the lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space. This is the problem Gleason solved. His answer goes like this:

For each probability measure P on the lattice L of subspaces, there's a unique state operator S such that ##P(M)=Tr(P_M S)## for all M in L, where ##P_M## is the projection operator associated with the subspace M. The map ##P\mapsto S## is a bijection from the set of probability measures onto the set of state operators.

In my opinion, it's far more natural to define a "state" as a probability measure than as a state operator, so to me, this theorem is the justification for why state operators can be thought of as states.

Now consider the special case of a pure state ##S=|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|## and let M be the eigenspace associated with some eigenvalue a of a self-adjoint operator A with non-degenerate spectrum (i.e. a 1-dimensional eigenspace for each eigenvalue). Then the formula above reduces to
$$P\left(|a\rangle \langle a|\right) =\operatorname{Tr} |\psi\rangle \langle\psi|a\rangle\langle a| =\sum_{a'} \langle a'|\psi\rangle \langle|\psi|a\rangle \langle a|a'\rangle =\left|\langle a|\psi\rangle\right|^2.$$ This right-hand side is of course the probability that the Born rule assigns to the result a when we're measuring A.

One final comment, when I say "subspace" in this post, I always mean a closed linear subspace. (A Hilbert space can have subsets that are inner product spaces but not Hilbert spaces, but we're not interested in those. By requiring that the subset isn't just a vector space, but also a closed set with respect to the norm topology, we ensure that the subset is also a Hilbert space).
 
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  • #103
JK423 said:
I am quite confused.. You are right, Gleason's theorem applies to all those situation that Born's rule is relevant. I need to understand the differences between Gleason's and Zurek's work, so i cannot say anything else at the moment. Does Gleason's theorem assumes Born's rule for example?

Gleason derives Born's rule with no assumption about it.

What it shows is given a resolution of the identity Ei, in a Hilbert space of dimension greater than 2, the only function f(Ei) 0<=f(Ei)<=1 such that f(Ei) sums to one is via the Born rule ie there exists a positive operator P of trace 1 such that f(Ei) = Tr(PEi).

You can find the details here:
http://kof.physto.se/theses/helena-master.pdf

The way probabilities enters into it is the interpretation of Ei as an observable whose outcome is one or zero so that the expected value of that observation is the probability of getting a one which is of course an f(Ei) so the theorem applies. Under this interpretation given any observable R = sum ri Ei, E(R) = sum ri Tr(PEi) = Tr(P sum ri Ei) = Tr (PR) and you have the Born rule.

If you have Balletines wonderful book on QM you see you have derived his second axiom from the first and the rest of QM follows from what he details in that book.

Note however there is no free lunch - there is an assumption being made in the proof - namely the f(Ei) does not depend on the elements of the resolution of the identity it is part of - this is called non contextuality. Mathematically it is a very clear assumption and necessary to make sense of the formalism. Physically however what it means is not quite so clear and you will find a fair amount of literature discussing it in particular the Kochen-Specker theorem - which follows fairly easily from Gleason - although the proof is usually presented in its own right.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #104
Fredrik said:
In my opinion, it's far more natural to define a "state" as a probability measure than as a state operator, so to me, this theorem is the justification for why state operators can be thought of as states.

Definitely.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #105
Fredrik, very nice analysis, thanks. Peres' book is very descriptive on this issue as well, bhobba also thank you for that diploma thesis!
I still don't understand though why all the fuss with deriving Born's rule non-circularly, and what's the point of Zurek's work.
 

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