I Does determinism exclude retrocausality?

AI Thread Summary
The discussion centers on the relationship between determinism and retrocausality, questioning whether a fully deterministic system implies that effects can only follow causes. Participants argue that in deterministic frameworks, if an event A occurs due to cause X, then if event B occurs instead, it must stem from a different cause Y, suggesting that different outcomes necessitate different preceding causes. The conversation highlights the importance of clearly defining causality, distinguishing between necessary and sufficient causes, and recognizing that in classical physics, causes are typically both necessary and sufficient. Some contributors express confusion over the implications of these definitions, particularly regarding the randomness of outcomes when multiple potential causes exist. Ultimately, the thread emphasizes the complexity of causality in deterministic systems and the need for precise terminology to avoid misunderstandings.
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Suppose the system under examination is fully deterministic. Does that imply that effects follow causes and not precede them?

For instance, if in this system Alice would respond to event X with A, but, if instead of X event Y would have happened, with B, does that mean she has no choice between A and B in that case?
 
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entropy1 said:
Suppose the system under examination is fully deterministic. Does that imply that effects follow causes and not precede them?
Bohmian mechanics is fully deterministic, and posits retrocausality, so I'd say determinism does not imply that.

For instance, if in this system Alice would respond to event X with A, but, if instead of X event Y would have happened, with B, does that mean she has no choice between A and B in that case?
This isn't an example of retro causality.
Alice wants vanilla, and she'd respond to X: vanilla ice cream being presented to her right with the action A: reaching to her right. But if instead Y happens (the vanilla is placed to her left), then she'd respond with B: reaching to her left. Straight cause and effect there, nothing retro.
Retrocausality would be her reaching for the ice cream before she knows where it is going to be placed.
 
Edit: I have changed my notation to make it consistent with @entropy1

entropy1 said:
Suppose the system under examination is fully deterministic. Does that imply that effects follow causes and not precede them?

For instance, if in this system Alice would respond to event X with A, but, if instead of X event Y would have happened, with B, does that mean she has no choice between A and B in that case?
For any discussion of causality it is absolutely essential to be clear about what definition you are using for causality. Otherwise you have people arguing who think they are arguing about substance when they are actually just arguing because they are using different definitions. Here are some suggested definitions, for clarity: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality

Necessary causes: If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the prior occurrence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.

Sufficient causes: If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.

So, given the laws of classical physics, and in particular the time reversibility, if we have an initial condition ##\cancel{A} \ Y## then we can apply the laws of physics to calculate a final condition ##B## at any later time. However, we can also start from the final condition ##B## and use the laws of physics to calculate backwards to the initial condition ##\cancel{A} \ Y##. So ##\cancel{A} \ Y## implies ##B## and ##B## implies ##\cancel{A} \ Y##.

Thus we see that ##\cancel{A} \ Y## is both a necessary and a sufficient cause of ##B##. However, by the definitions above ##B## fails to be a necessary cause of ##\cancel{A} \ Y## because ##B## did not occur prior to ##\cancel{A} \ Y##. Similarly, ##B## fails to be a sufficient cause of ##\cancel{A} \ Y## because ##\cancel{A} \ Y## did not occur subsequent to ##B##.
 
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Could one argue that in the deterministic setting, if at present B would happen instead of A, the consequence would be that consecutively something different would happen (in general/in the universe) than if A would have happened?

And if B would happen instead of A, something different preceded this event than if A would have happened?
 
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Dale said:
Thus we see that A is both a necessary and a sufficient cause of B.
entropy1 said:
And if B would happen instead of A, something different preceded this event than if A would have happened?
OK now I am completely confused. How are these statements compatible?
 
entropy1 said:
And if B would happen instead of A, something different preceded this event than if A would have happened?
I think @hutchphd is right. This is not logically possible. You can have both A and B or neither A nor B. But you cannot have A instead of B.

Edit: I am confused here. You can have both A and X or neither A nor X, but you could instead have B and Y.
 
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Not sure. A is a measurement of spin up, B is down. You can't have both or neither, so it's A instead of B, or B instead of A. This is an uncaused difference. Nothing different 'preceded event B than if A would have happened'.
OK, that's a QM interpretational assertion. There are deterministic interpretations that say B is determined and A is out, due to some preceding state, possibly a hidden one. Something like MWI says both A and B, or neither, so we're more in line with Dale's statement. WF collapse interpretations (like RQM for instance) are not necessarily deterministic, so there is B or A, even if there is no 'dice rolling' in some of them.

Am I totally inconsistent with this line of thinking?
 
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Halc said:
A is a measurement of spin up, B is down. You can't have both or neither, so it's A instead of B, or B instead of A.
Where did that come from? That isn’t what we are talking about. B is caused by A so A and B are not what you described. Not to mention that we are talking about completely deterministic systems.

Edit: I am also confused here. B is caused by Y, not A.
 
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I'm talking about followup discussion on entropy1's post 4, which is A or B, due to some prior state or not, not the scenario of one being the cause of the other.
It did get confusing when the same terms were used to describe A causing B.

But you are apparently talking about the other scenario in post 6, which is A being necessary and sufficient for B, in which case yes, both A,B or neither. I don't think that's what @entropy1 was talking about.
 
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  • #10
Halc said:
I'm talking about followup discussion on entropy1's post 4,
That was still explicitly deterministic, so I still have no idea why you brought in your example. It seems off topic for a thread about deterministic systems.
 
  • #11
Dale said:
B is caused by A
If I wrote that, that would be a mistake...
Halc said:
I don't think that's what @entropy1 was talking about.
Thanks for clearing that up. Post #4 is a somewhat separate question from post #1. In fact, I was working toward a more physical matter myself.
 
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  • #12
entropy1 said:
If I wrote that, that would be a mistake...
Ok, so in your notation what is the cause and what is the effect? Please be clear, there has been substantial confusion.
 
  • #13
Dale said:
Ok, so in your notation what is the cause and what is the effect? Please be clear, there has been substantial confusion.
In post #1 A and B are events that are caused by resp. causes X and Y. In post #4 I extended this with that A and B cause unspecified effects (consequence) and are caused by unspecified causes (precedence). I left it unspecified deliberately at this point.
 
  • #14
entropy1 said:
In post #1 A and B are events that are caused by resp. causes X and Y. In post #4 I extended this with that A and B cause unspecified effects (consequence) and are caused by unspecified causes (precedence). I left it unspecified deliberately at this point.
Ah, ok, my post above was incorrect then. I have gone back and added edits to correct my usage and make it consistent with your notation.
 
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  • #15
entropy1 said:
Could one argue that in the deterministic setting, if at present B would happen instead of A, the consequence would be that consecutively something different would happen (in general/in the universe) than if A would have happened?
Definitely. If B instead of A at present then previously Y instead of X.
 
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  • #16
entropy1 said:
And if B would happen instead of A, something different preceded this event than if A would have happened?
Dale said:
Edit: I am confused here. You can have both A and X or neither A nor X, but you could instead have B and Y.
Yes, I'm suggesting exactly that: if B would have happened at present, there would be a different preceding cause than if A would have happened (in general, but in a deterministic setting when it is either A or B, think of a quantum measurement, like Halc mentioned). But I'm not sure if this is true.
 
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  • #17
entropy1 said:
Yes, I'm suggesting exactly that: if B would have happened at present, there would be a different preceding cause than if A would have happened (in general, but in a deterministic setting). But I'm not sure if this is true.
Yes, this is true by your above notation and the above definitions. Since X and Y are necessary and sufficient causes of A and B respectively: we therefore know that B at present implies prior occurrence of Y, whereas A at present implies prior occurrence of X. This is by the definition of necessary cause.
 
  • #18
entropy1 said:
Yes, I'm suggesting exactly that: if B would have happened at present, there would be a different preceding cause than if A would have happened
Dale said:
Yes, this is true by your above notation and the above definitions. Since X and Y are necessary and sufficient causes of A and B respectively: we therefore know that B at present implies prior occurrence of Y, whereas A at present implies prior occurrence of X. This is by the definition of necessary cause.
I have to study this; this is brain exercise for me. ?:) (necessary cause vs. sufficient cause)

If X is only a sufficient cause for A, X is not mandatory to have happened. X' or X'' could be causes too. Then, X' could be a cause for both B and A. This means that if B happened the preceding cause could be X', and if A happened it could be too. So there would be a single cause, not different ones, and no need for different histories for A and B. Does that make sense?

But then, if there is some rule that A and B can't happen both, and can't happen neither, the choice between A and B would be random, right?

If X would be sufficient cause for A, and X happens, does that mean that A happens?
 
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  • #19
entropy1 said:
If X is only a sufficient cause for A, X is not mandatory to have happened. X' or X'' could be causes too. Then, X' could be a cause for both B and A. This means that if B happened the preceding cause could be X', and if A happened it could be too. So there would be a single cause, not different ones, and no need for different histories for A and B.
Does that make sense?
It does make sense for a sufficient cause. However, in classical physics all causes are necessary and sufficient causes.

entropy1 said:
If X would be sufficient cause for A, and X happens, does that mean that A happens?
Yes. If X is a sufficient cause for A and X happens then subsequently A happens.
 
  • #20
A different view on the matter is the following:

Provided the system (universe) is deterministic, if I respond differently (to some event), the event (cause) was different (because if the cause was the same, the response would be the same, right?).

For example: if I respond with A, the cause was X, but if I respond with B, there would have to have been a different cause Y.

These causes (X and Y) would have to be necessary causes.

In this example A and B are mutually exclusive (one of them happens at t0).

If X and Y would on the other hand be sufficient causes, then some different cause Z could cause A as well as B. If A and B are mutually exclusive, does that mean that the respons to Z (A or B) is random?

Is that correct?

And also, is it so that if X is necessary cause of A, that occurence of A implies occurence of X, and that if X is sufficient cause of A, that occurence of X implies occurence of A?
 
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  • #21
Determinism or non-determinism is only well defined, if we have a definition of "states".

The use of notation like "A" and "B" to denote phenomena is somewhat ambiguous. I think most contributors to this thread are using notation like "A" to denote a set of different possible phenomena.

For example, "A" could denote "It rains at my house on Monday morning". There are many different phenomena that are described by "It rains at my house on Monday morning". The can differ in details like where the rain drops land and what the closing value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average is on that day.

A different use of notation like "A" is to denote a unique event, as opposed to a set of events.

Either interpretation of notation leads to a host of problems!
 
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  • #22
entropy1 said:
If X and Y would on the other hand be sufficient causes, then some different cause Z could cause A as well as B. If A and B are mutually exclusive, does that mean that the respons to Z (A or B) is random?
This is why, in a deterministic setting, all causes must be both necessary and sufficient.
 
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  • #23
entropy1 said:
Is it true that if X is necessary cause of A, that occurence of A implies occurence of X, and that if X is sufficient cause of A, that occurence of X implies occurence of A?
And since I chose this title for the thread, does in the first case (X is necessary a condition for A, occurence of A implies occurence of X) mean that A could be a cause for X (retrocausally)?
 
  • #24
entropy1 said:
A different view on the matter is the following:

Provided the system (universe) is deterministic, if I respond differently (to some event), the event (cause) was different (because if the cause was the same, the response would be the same, right?).

If the universe is deterministic there is no "if" about how you respond. You respond deterministically. So, for your idea to be coherent, we have to imagine that your are using the term "some event" to denote a set of phenomena and that the history of universe contains several examples where phenomena of that type occurred. Likewise, what you call your "response" must also described by at least two mutually exclusive sets of phenomena ##R_1, R_2##. Otherwise the history of the universe contains no examples where you responded "differently".

However, if "some event" ##S## can be followed by two different sets of events ##R_1, R_2## then some of the events ##S,R_1,R_2## are not "states" of the universe. (In a deterministic process, a given "state" is always leads to a unique later "state". That is the definition of "state" and "deterministic".)

You are attempting to discuss cause-and-effect properties for sets of events that are not states. This might be possible, but I think it's tricky!
 
  • #25
@Stephen Tashi

If we have state of the universe X at t=0, then you say, that, under determinism, there is only a single possible state of the universe at t=1, say A, right?

So I am suggesting that if at t=1, if we don't find the state of the universe to be A, but, say, B, that X wasn't the state of the universe at t=0, but some other state Y.

Does that make sense?
 
  • #26
entropy1 said:
And since I chose this title for the thread, does in the first case (X is necessary a condition for A, occurence of A implies occurence of X) mean that A could be a cause for X (retrocausally)?
You would have to change the definition of cause if you wanted that to work, as I said in my first post when I posted the definition.
 
  • #27
Dale said:
You would have to change the definition of cause if you wanted that to work, as I said in my first post when I posted the definition.
You mean the requirement that cause precedes the effect temporally? (do you mean post #3?)

That would be a formal difference then?
 
  • #28
entropy1 said:
If we have state of the universe X at t=0, then you say, that, under determinism, there is only a single possible state of the universe at t=1, say A, right?
Yes - that's the definition of "determinism" and "states".
So I am suggesting that if at t=1, if we don't find the state of the universe to be A, but, say, B, that X wasn't the state of the universe at t=0, but some other state Y.

Does that make sense?

Yes it makes sense as deduction. How we relate a deduction to the concept of causality or retro-causality isn't clear. The deduction isn't sufficiently abbreviated by "If not A then not X". The deduction includes the time information, so it's "If not A at time t=`1 then not X at time t=0".
 
  • #29
@Stephen Tashi

Ok. So if I was to smuggle in a free-will deamon that could choose between either A or B happening at t=1, could we have retrocausality?
 
  • #30
entropy1 said:
You mean the requirement that cause precedes the effect temporally? (do you mean post #3?)

That would be a formal difference then?
Yes. With the current definition you cannot have retrocausality because of that requirement. I do not know how people who propose retrocausal theories modify the definition.

entropy1 said:
could we have retrocausality?
How is retrocausality defined? In these discussions it is absolutely essential to be clear about your definitions.
 
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  • #31
entropy1 said:
Ok. So if I was to smuggle in a free-will deamon that could choose between A and B happening, could we have retrocausality?

In mathematical logic, the statement "If P then Q" is considered True when P is False. If you introduce a demon to make Determinism False then all statements of the form "If Determinism is True then ..." are True.

Rather than introduce a demon, I think you should return to the idea of defining causality for events that are not states.
 
  • #32
Stephen Tashi said:
In mathematical logic, the statement "If P then Q" is considered True when P is False. If you introduce a demon to make Determinism False then all statements of the form "If Determinism is True then ..." are True.
My assumption is that determinism holds universally except for the free-will deamons. Then retrocausality (in the universe) could hold, right? But determinism also holds, for given a state at t=1, the state at t=0 already happened. I am simplifying enormously here, I am aware, but it is only a thought experiment.
 
  • #33
entropy1 said:
My assumption is that determinism holds universally except for the free-will deamons.

It's unclear what that means.
 
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  • #34
Stephen Tashi said:
It's unclear what that means.
You are right. For me, I think it means that if the universe is deterministic, there are still several ways in how it could be that. I mean, different histories are conceivable.

The free-will deamon picks a history by choosing a state of the present (A or B).
 
  • #35
entropy1 said:
Then retrocausality (in the universe) could hold, right?
Again, how do you define retrocausality? Until you define exactly what you mean by that word your question literally has no meaning.
 
  • #36
entropy1 said:
You are right. For me, I think it means that if the universe is deterministic, there are still several ways in how it could be that. I mean, different histories are conceivable.

The free-will deamon picks a history by choosing a state of the present (A or B).

To reach conclusions about causality, you'll have to be specific about the model of the universe that you're using. A free-will demon contradicts the definition of "state" and the definition of "deterministic" by making exceptions. With the free-will demon present, we can no longer call your model of the universe deterministic by the usual definition of deterministic.

It's one intellectual exercise to consider how causality and retro-causality are defined in the conventional model of a deterministic physical process. It's a different exercise to consider how to define a not completely deterministic model and then define causality in that context.
 
  • #37
By coincidence, there was a relevant paper published this week. I haven't read it thoroughly yet, but at first glance, it seems like it might give a sort of an answer to your question.

Reversible dynamics with closed time-likecurves and freedom of choice
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1361-6382/aba4bc

1. Introduction

The dominant paradigm in physics relies on the idea that systems evolve through time according to dynamical laws, with the state at a given time determining the entire history of the system.
General relativity challenges this view. The Einstein equations, describing the relationship between spacetime geometry and mass-energy [1], have counterintuitive solutions containing closed time-like curves (CTCs) [217]. An event on such a curve would be both in the future and in the past of itself, preventing an ordinary formulation of dynamics according to an 'initial condition' problem. The question then arises whether some more general type of dynamics is possible.

Although it is an open question whether CTCs are possible in our Universe [1822], considering dynamics beyond the ordinary temporal view is relevant to other research areas as well. In a theory that combines quantum physics with general relativity, it is expected that spacetime loses its classical properties [23, 24], possibly leading to indefinite causal structures [2527]. In a quite different direction, it has been suggested that quantum physics could be reduced to some kind of 'retrocausal' classical dynamics [2839].

The main problem arising when abandoning ordinary causality is the so called 'grand father paradox' [40]: a time traveller could kill her own grandfather and thus prevent her own birth, leading to a logical inconsistency. A popular approach holds that the grandfather paradox makes CTCs incompatible with classical physics, while appropriate modifications to quantum physics could restore consistency [4156]. A common feature of the proposals within this approach is that they postulate a radical departure from ordinary physics even in regions of space-time devoid of CTCs, or in scenarios where the time traveling system does not actually interact with anything in the past [57, 58].

A different approach is the so called 'process matrix formalism', which takes as a starting point the local validity of the ordinary laws of physics and asks what type of global processes are compatible with this assumption [5974]. This framework enforces that all operations that would normally be possible in ordinary spacetime should still be available in local regions. First considered in the quantum context, this approach has been applied to classical physics too, with the remarkable discovery of classical processes that are incompatible with any causal order between events [7577].

In reference [78], a classical, deterministic version of the formalism was proposed as a possible model for CTCs. In this model, one considers a set of regions that do not contain any, but might be traversed by, CTCs. Agents in the regions receive a classical state from the past boundary, perform an arbitrary deterministic operation on it, and then send the system through the future boundary. Dynamics outside the regions determines the state each agent will observe in the past of the respective region, as a function of the states prepared by other agents. A simple characterisation was found for all processes involving up to three regions; furthermore, it was found that, for three regions, all non causally ordered processes are essentially equivalent.

In this work, we extend the characterisation of deterministic processes to an arbitrary number of regions. We provide some simple interpretation of the characterisation: when fixing the state on the future of all but two regions, the remaining two must be causally ordered, with only one directional signalling possible. We show, by explicit examples, that there are inequivalent, non causally ordered quadripartite processes, which cannot be reduced to tripartite ones. Our results show that CTCs are not only compatible with determinism and with the local 'free choice' of operations, but also with a rich and diverse range of scenarios and dynamical processes.

Some more relevant links:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closed_timelike_curve
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-retrocausality/
 
  • #38
Does anyone here know of any model containing retrocausality, in any well-defined sense?
 
  • #39
maline said:
Does anyone here know of any model containing retrocausality, in any well-defined sense?
Several models discussed in the stanford link I gave, and the one (and several cited) in the research paper I linked, do.
 
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  • #40
Dale said:
Again, how do you define retrocausality? Until you define exactly what you mean by that word your question literally has no meaning.
Perhaps this is what is mean:
  1. If the probability P(A) of event A occurring can be experimentally increased or decreased, and that is experimentally non-zero correlated with an increase or decrease of probability P(B) of event B subsequentially occurring, I define that, then, A is a cause for B.
  2. If the reverse, that the probability P(B) of event B occurring can be experimentally increased or decreased, and that is experimentally non-zero correlated with an increase or decrease of probability P(A) of event A precedingly occurring, is true, then I define that, then, B is a retrocause for A.
  3. If there is a third event that is cause for both A and B, thereby correlating the probabilities of A and B occurring, then manipulating the probability of A correlates to the probability of B, following first (2) and then (1), and vice-versa.
 
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  • #41
In a deterministic setting then every effect is a retrocause by 2)
 
  • #42
I have an opinion about this, but I am not allowed to share it here. Thanks for letting me share a definition of retrocausality.
 
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  • #43
Perhaps this is very simplified, but: If the setting is deterministic, we could say that for example ##P \rightarrow Q##, or P implies Q, right? P in the past, Q in the future (relatively).

##P \rightarrow Q## is equivalent with ##NOT(Q) \rightarrow NOT(P)##.

So if Q can be manipulated, this could influence P in this deterministic setting, right? I consider the possibility of gradations of P and Q.

Or otherwise put: the value (gradation) of P is related to the value (gradation) of Q.

If the deterministic premisse is posed, every effect has a cause (one or more), which can be expressed as every effect is implied by a cause, right?
 
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  • #44
Yes. As discussed above, in a deterministic scenario every cause is both a necessary and a sufficient cause.
 
  • #45
Dale said:
Yes. As discussed above, in a deterministic scenario every cause is both a necessary and a sufficient cause.
Are you saying that in a deterministic scenario, both causality and retrocausality are possible (simultaneously), or are you saying that only causality is possible?
 
  • #46
entropy1 said:
Are you saying that in a deterministic scenario, both causality and retrocausality are possible (simultaneously), or are you saying that only causality is possible?
Again, that depends on your definition. According to the definition you gave above, in a deterministic setting every effect is a retrocause.

I doubt all definitions of retrocausality would do that, but I don’t know the literature on retrocausality very well.
 
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  • #47
entropy1 said:
Perhaps this is very simplified, but: If the setting is deterministic, we could say that for example ##P \rightarrow Q##, or P implies Q, right? P in the past, Q in the future (relatively).

Time is not explicitly represented in propositional logic. If you want to study a logic where time is explicitly represented, there are "temporal logics" https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-temporal/
 
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  • #48
At this point we will go ahead and close this thread. I strongly recommend studying the existing literature in this topic, perhaps including the time symmetric formulation of quantum mechanics. It is best to use definitions from the literature as they are more likely to have addressed some of the basic issues mentioned so far.

For any future threads on this topic please start with a professional scientific reference that can serve as the basis of discussion.
 
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