Does Determinism Negate Free Will?

[rygar]

i may have some facts mixed up in this story, so tell me if I'm saying anything wrong.

einstein wasn't a fan of quantum mechanics--he didn't deny it's results, but thought the method of approaching it was wrong. he thought that there was something fundamentally wrong with the fact that you can only predict statistical output and not the results of anyone trial, like relativity/classical physics can do.

he thought there was another unified theory which superceded quantum mechanics and relativity, which he spend the last years of his life looking for. he thought this theory would make the universe 100% predictable, given infinite knowledge of it's present state. if it's true that everything is so calculated and beautiful, then it must not be possible for the outcome of a situation to change based on our own cognitive powers. if it were possible, then the universe wouldn't be predictable anymore.

i understand I'm comparing two different things--the universe on an atomic level, and from a human perspective--but i feel that if it applies to the atomic level, it must also apply on all higher levels.

i don't believe in free will--only the illusion of free will. this isn't meant to be a proof of free will. but i think if you believe that einstein was right in searching for a unified theory, and that our universe is predictable, then free will can't be possible--unless you want to talking religion, which i don't.

thoughts?

 

[Enos]

I don't care too much about the uncertianty principle myself and find that it just doesn't fit the intuitive universe I have created for myself. But I'd prefer to keep the details of my universe to myself until it's seemingly perfect.

 

[Billy T]

...i don't believe in free will--only the illusion of free will. this isn't meant to be a proof of free will. but i think if you believe that einstein was right in searching for a unified theory, and that our universe is predictable, then free will can't be possible--unless you want to talking religion, which i don't.

I held your view for same reasons for many years. Finally deciding not to waste any more time trying to resolve the conflict between physics (my Ph.D. is in physics) and my strong feeling that i do actually make decisions. I added this problem to the list of things like "why there is something rather than nothing" that were impossible to answer.

I became interested in how human perceptions (a 3D precept for a 2D retinal image) works. Rapidly I concluded that the standard view of cognitive scientists is wrong and more slowly built my own view- Unexpectedly fell out of it was the possibility that physics could permit free will, but there is a price to pay for it.

See the attachment to the first post in the general philosophy thread "What price for free will" I would like to know your thoughts - does it resolve the conflict for you as it did for me. Nothing about "spirits" or "souls" etc.

 

[Alkatran]

I became interested in how human perceptions (a 3D precept for a 2D retinal image) works.

A 3d image from multiple 2D images. Computers can do it to an extent, too, so it doesn't require anything 'amazing'. All the information is there.

 

[Enos]

Can 3d be proved with a single sense? Touch needs sight to confirm that we have a grip on a three dimensional object. Sight needs feeling in order to feel that our environment isn't just two dimensional images running through our minds. Combine two pictures of the same view but two inches apart in angles and you get a three dimensional type of image. Same with sound, we need feeling to confirm that the wave patterns are what our hearing tells us our surroundings are like. Little off topic so I'll shut up now, LOL.

 

[rygar]

billy t

i agree with you, the problem is most likely unsolvable, at least by any human cognitive powers. in fact, whether i really have free will or just the illusion of free won't even affect my decisions--either way, i think I'm thinking for myself.

if you're an adament supporter of quantum theory, i could see how you could believe just the opposite of my opinion is true. it's a belief i hold, not because i think it's provable, but only because it intuitively seems more probable. even if it is not more probable, i suppose i just like the aesthetic design of einstein's vision; it's a version i would much rather prefer to the converse supported by quantum theory. fortunately, since the truth holds no bearing on my actions, i can sleep easy tonight =]

i haven't read the other thread about free will yet. I am on my way to class, i'll read it tonight and give you my thoughts.

 

[Alkatran]

Can 3d be proved with a single sense? Touch needs sight to confirm that we have a grip on a three dimensional object. Sight needs feeling in order to feel that our environment isn't just two dimensional images running through our minds. Combine two pictures of the same view but two inches apart in angles and you get a three dimensional type of image. Same with sound, we need feeling to confirm that the wave patterns are what our hearing tells us our surroundings are like. Little off topic so I'll shut up now, LOL.

You're talking about context. Well think of it this way: what use is a brain that can't give context to things? Evolution would favor brains that didn't just ignore the input coming in through senses so...

 

[selfAdjoint]

i may have some facts mixed up in this story, so tell me if I'm saying anything wrong.

einstein wasn't a fan of quantum mechanics--he didn't deny it's results, but thought the method of approaching it was wrong. he thought that there was something fundamentally wrong with the fact that you can only predict statistical output and not the results of anyone trial, like relativity/classical physics can do.

he thought there was another unified theory which superceded quantum mechanics and relativity, which he spend the last years of his life looking for. he thought this theory would make the universe 100% predictable, given infinite knowledge of it's present state. if it's true that everything is so calculated and beautiful, then it must not be possible for the outcome of a situation to change based on our own cognitive powers. if it were possible, then the universe wouldn't be predictable anymore.

i understand I'm comparing two different things--the universe on an atomic level, and from a human perspective--but i feel that if it applies to the atomic level, it must also apply on all higher levels.

i don't believe in free will--only the illusion of free will. this isn't meant to be a proof of free will. but i think if you believe that einstein was right in searching for a unified theory, and that our universe is predictable, then free will can't be possible--unless you want to talking religion, which i don't.

thoughts?

You're pretty close on Einstein's position. It wasn't actually the probability angle that bugged him so much, though he didn't like it; it was the nonreality, the notion that things have no properties until they are measured. That is the actual purpose of the EPR thought experiment that inspired John Bell; to "prove" that particles had properties all during their unobserved flight. Bell too was no fan of the observation-gives-reality version of QM; he thought that instead of "observables" we should be looking for "beables", actually existent properties.

To get back to your assumption that probabilistic QM explains free will, this is a common misunderstanding. Free will gets no help from randomizing nature or thought; a random outcome is no more accessible to be formed by our will than a deterministic one. And QM probabilism isn't about random outcomes anyway.

 

[rygar]

To get back to your assumption that probabilistic QM explains free will, this is a common misunderstanding. Free will gets no help from randomizing nature or thought; a random outcome is no more accessible to be formed by our will than a deterministic one. And QM probabilism isn't about random outcomes anyway.

i don't quite understand this part. how can you say free will gets no help from randomizing nature or thought? randomness in nature or thought provides evidence for the possibility that we can make our own decisions (because there are multiple possible outcomes). it in no one way proves it's truth, only it's possibility.

whereas if nothing in the universe was random, it would be impossible for us to change results based on our actions, since our actions are in turn results of previous actions, etc, etc. and all of these previous actions involve no probability involved--based on the current state, there is only one possible outcome.

am i missing something?

edit: okay, i think i understand what you're saying now. in quantum mechanics, even though there are many possible outcomes, there is no correlation to our will deciding these outcomes...

i guess that is true. so by either view, free will is impossible; yet by the latter view (quantum mechanics), different outcomes are possible, but by randomness on an atomic level, and not because of our own cognitive powers (which we conventionally call free will).

is that what you were talking about? either way, it cleared some things up, thanks =]

 

[Tournesol]

OTOH, why shoudln't random imupses and conscious discrimination combine ?

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_darwin.html

 

[selfAdjoint]

i don't quite understand this part. how can you say free will gets no help from randomizing nature or thought? randomness in nature or thought provides evidence for the possibility that we can make our own decisions (because there are multiple possible outcomes). it in no one way proves it's truth, only it's possibility.

The point is that for free will we require a causal universe where WE are among the causes, where our decisions can really make a difference in what happens. In determinism, we can't be causes; we are just effects. In a really random universe we have no security in any causes; where in the allegedly random realizations of eigenvalues is our will?

 

[StatusX]

What would free will even mean? As selfadjoint said, it would mean we are a cause. But what does that mean? If we are our physical bodies, then we are free to do whatever we want, it's just that what we want is determined by the laws of physics. But so what? It's still what we want. And what else could we mean by "we"? The soul?

No matter what, it comes down to either that we do things because we are following a strict guideline, whether that be rational thought, emotional thought, the laws of physics, or whatever, or we do them randomly. I don't see how free will is even a meaningful concept, beyond the kind mentioned above.

 

[Enos]

I doubt absolute free-will exist. I'm sure we are very predictable to the laws of nature but us being able to comprehend or observe the complete laws is another story.

 

[Billy T]

I have been away for a couple of days so I will combine replies in one post, giving post ref number first:

4 (ALKATRAN):"A 3D image from multiple 2D images. Computers can do it to an extent, too, so it doesn't require anything 'amazing'. All the information is there."

No, just as in a 2D photo, the information is not all there. Last time I looked at "computer vision" literature, some better programs could construct a 3D representation of a "toy world" where all the simple geometric objects were a pre known set. None can cope with a single live cat as the sole object in a white box - most can't even cope with a dead one, if it is just thrown in the box and left as it falls!
Some "conectionist networks" (also called "neural networks", but I do not like that name) can select the pre trained pattern (typically one face from many) from a patrial sample, but this is not really production of 3D from 2D.

5 (Enos): Humans, and other advanced creatures do use multiple sensory inputs to build the 3D world as you suggest, but it is interesting to know that part of the processes is "wired in" as we grow into adults. For example, if you were born blind and then are restored to sight as an adult, you will never learn to make the 2D retinal image into a 3D representation. - All you "wiring" for construction of the 3D world was from your tactile sense. The convergence angle of your eyes, focus of the lens, and several other factors the normally sighted child learns to use to do this are fixed. (In cat, this fixing takes place in less than one month and requires that the cat be active in the world. - An experiment with one cat always riding in a basket at one end of a horizontal centrally pivoted rod and another walking in harness at the other end (causing rod to turn and both to have same visual experience showed this. - Passive cat never learns to see correctly later.)

8 (selfAdjoint): "...assumption that probabilistic QM explains free will, this is a common misunderstanding. Free will gets no help from randomizing nature or thought; a random outcome is no more accessible to be formed by our will than a deterministic one."

I agree completely. That is why in post 3 I said I would: "...not to waste any more time trying to resolve the conflict between physics (my Ph.D. is in physics) and my strong feeling that i do actually make decisions. I added this problem to the list of things like 'why there is something rather than nothing' that were impossible to answer."

9 & 10: The last (inserted by edit) paragraphs of Rygar (9) answer Tournesol's (10) well IMHO.

11 (selfAdjoint): "...for free will we require a causal universe where WE are among the causes"

Perfect! His capitalization of "WE" hits the nail squarely on the head. What "we" are is the focus of my attachment to first post of thread "What Price Free Will?"
I think Free Will is possible, (not proven) but we must cease to be "physical bodies." Being a "soul" was a price too expensive for me to pay. Thus, when I stumbled on to a solution that costs less and can make non-illusionary Free Will consistent with physics, I was happy. I removed one item from the list of things impossible for humans to understand. (Again see attachment to first post of thread "What Price Free Will?")

12 &13 (StatusX & Enos) - Both should read that just referenced attachment and see if they still holds same views or ask the same questions.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I think Free Will is possible, (not proven) but we must cease to be "physical bodies." Being a "soul" was a price too expensive for me to pay. Thus, when I stumbled on to a solution that costs less and can make non-illusionary Free Will consistent with physics, I was happy. I removed one item from the list of things impossible for humans to understand. (Again see attachment to first post of thread "What Price Free Will?")

There's a philosophical halfway house between being just a result and having a soul. Your thought seems close to it. It is the existential "pour-soi"; the consciousness for-itself. I don't agree with it myself (I'm happy to be a result, if that is not an oxymoron ), but you might find it discussable.

 

[Icebreaker]

I've pretty much narrowed it down to: if you believe in free will, then you have it; if you don't believe in free will, then you don't have it. Neither should prevent you of living a full and productive life.

 

[Enos]

Like the light that travels a straight line through vacuum, we too travel the straightest (best) possible path. We consume enough matter to convert to energy to create our own curvatures in the universe or our little worlds. Just because we over power gravity doesn't mean we control the universe.

 

[rygar]

different topic related to free will but...

does anyone else think that the absence of free will de-values existence?

like, if my entire family dies tomorrow. of course it would suck on a psychological level--but that's only because our neurons are programmed that way. when you take a step back and think that there was no other possible outcome, at least an avoidable one... well, it certainly helps rectify any cognitive dissonance one might experience.

not that we should all go kill ourselves; whether we have free will or not shouldn't affect what i think my actions are going to be. but viewing the results as cause and effect gives us a lot less room to worry.

 

[StatusX]

Could someone just explain a hypothetical universe where free will exists? What would have to be different (assuming there is none here)? I just don't really understand how the concept is meaningful.

 

[rygar]

statusX:

a universe with free will would imply that the results of our actions are determined by us, the causes. furthermore, it implies that we, the causes, are not the results of other causes. or at the least, our ability to change our results does not depend on our being the result of a cause, but instead it depends on something instrinsic that we label "free will". that is, the ability to cause our own results by genuine choice. free will implies we are more than just a small part of a gigantic cause and effect chain; we have the ability to disrupt that chain, and choose its direction without any factors pre-determining the results.

 

[StatusX]

a universe with free will would imply that the results of our actions are determined by us, the causes. furthermore, it implies that we, the causes, are not the results of other causes. or at the least, our ability to change our results does not depend on our being the result of a cause, but instead it depends on something instrinsic that we label "free will". that is, the ability to cause our own results by genuine choice. free will implies we are more than just a small part of a gigantic cause and effect chain; we have the ability to disrupt that chain, and choose its direction without any factors pre-determining the results.

So for free will to exist, there needs to be some non-physical source of causation, call it a "soul", that is not itself completely driven by external causes. So why does it make the choices it makes? Obviously it is partially affected by external factors, but what makes up the difference? Either the final choice was for a reason, or it wasn't. If it was, then that reason is what caused the choice. If it wasn't, the choice was random. If you want to call this free will, fine, but it isn't much different than the way things are if you reject a non-physical soul and accept the laws of physics.

 

[rygar]

well, maybe this is just my opinion, but i wouldn't make the jump to saying free will requires a non-physical entity... there's no evidence to say that "free will" is physical nor non-physical.

why does it make the choices it makes? well, i don't believe in free will. and i can't imagine the people who do could answer this question either, because it's hard to say how something works if it might not even exist. I'm sure there are infinite possibilities.

i think arguing a non-physical soul vs the laws of physics is a completely different argument. it's quite possible that free will could exist within the laws of physics, as well as the restrictions placed upon a non-physical soul. however in both cases, you can't really justify free will by any conventional means, at least not to me... which is why i believe it doesn't exist. but by no means can i prove it doesn't.

 

[Enos]

I believe that we are non-physical beings and I still believe that free-will does not apply to us.

 

[Integral]

Beyond, QM and the uncertainty principle, since the most of the fundamental equations which govern the universe are non linear, they are chaotic in nature. Non linear dynamical systems are sensitive to initial conditions. This means that a small change in the starting conditions can mean large changes in the final state. Therefore if the universe is stricly physical we can rule out determinism.

 

[Mazuz]

Beyond, QM and the uncertainty principle, since the most of the fundamental equations which govern the universe are non linear, they are chaotic in nature. Non linear dynamical systems are sensitive to initial conditions. This means that a small change in the starting conditions can mean large changes in the final state. Therefore if the universe is stricly physical we can rule out determinism.

We don't know the fundamental equations that govern the universe, determinnism certainly seems plausible to me.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Beyond, QM and the uncertainty principle, since the most of the fundamental equations which govern the universe are non linear, they are chaotic in nature. Non linear dynamical systems are sensitive to initial conditions. This means that a small change in the starting conditions can mean large changes in the final state. Therefore if the universe is stricly physical we can rule out determinism.

Au contraire mon ami! The chaotic behavior of the solutions to these equations is deterministic! In fact the name of the behavior in technical papers is often given as "deterministic chaos". There is only one analytical path through phase space, although it approaches itself arbitrarily closely on its course. The Mandelbrot set is perfectly definite, no blur at any level, even though, like the digits of pi, we can't see all its details.

So to apply your Satz to this condition, a chaotic universe would tend toward compatibilism: it looks just like free will even if it ain't.

 

[moving finger]

The point is that for free will we require a causal universe where WE are among the causes, where our decisions can really make a difference in what happens. In determinism, we can't be causes; we are just effects.

that does not preclude us from being causes. causation is a chain... "one man's ceiling is another man's floor"... therefore it is not strictly correct to say that "we cannot be causes". The correct statement should be "we are causes, but we in turn are also caused"

MF

 

[moving finger]

I see a number of references to something called "free will" in this thread. Have the participants agreed a definition of "free will"?

If not, it's pretty pointless to debate whether it exists or not, isn't it?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

FW requires origination, ie for our actions to be more cause than effect. Determinism
implies that the to are always exactly balanced.

 

[moving finger]

FW requires origination, ie for our actions to be more cause than effect. Determinism
implies that the to are always exactly balanced.

(1) FW means nothing until we agree a definition of FW

(2) some interpretations of QM would suggest that there is no causation at a quantum level, that cause and effect are macroscopic illusions.

(3) are you suggesting that causation can be quantitatively measured? Please do elaborate...

MF

 

[Tournesol]

(1) FW means nothing until we agree a definition of FW

The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

(2) some interpretations of QM would suggest that there is no causation at a quantum level, that cause and effect are macroscopic illusions.

That would depend on your definition of "causality". People tend to
grumble that there is no causation when what they mean is that
the causation in question is not as strict as they would like.

(3) are you suggesting that causation can be quantitatively measured? Please do elaborate...

It follows through conceptually. If an event were more cause than effect,
its conscequences would be unpredictable in principle, and hence contrary to determinism.

 

[moving finger]

The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

I would suggest the word free in the definition is redundant (it is a tautology to define “free” will in terms of “free” choices), thus it becomes : The power of making choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will.

How do we define an external circumstance? As Dennett has often pointed out, one can make oneself very, very small by externalizing everything; one can also make oneself encompass potentially constraining circumstances by internalizing them.

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

If an event were more cause than effect, its conscequences would be unpredictable in principle, and hence contrary to determinism.

But (I do not agree that cause and effect can be quantified in this way, but to humour you) how would you propose to quantitatively measure the magnitudes of cause and effect, to be able to say “ahhh, this event shows more cause than effect!”?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

How do we define an external circumstance? As Dennett has often pointed out, one can make oneself very, very small by externalizing everything; one can also make oneself encompass potentially constraining circumstances by internalizing them.

Ask a determinist what they consider to be the circumstances that
constrain us down to nothing -- genetics, environment, etc.

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?

But (I do not agree that cause and effect can be quantified in this way, but to humour you) how would you propose to quantitatively measure the magnitudes of cause and effect, to be able to say “ahhh, this event shows more cause than effect!”?

You don't have to measure two things seprately to know they
are the same. If I have good reason to think Fred has never eaten
anything but hot dinners, I can conclude that the amount of
food he has eaten is equal to the amount of hot dinners he has
eaten. Nonetheless, I cannot quantify it.

Who's being pedantic now?

 

[moving finger]

Ask a determinist what they consider to be the circumstances that constrain us down to nothing -- genetics, environment, etc.

But I’m asking you, it’s your definition after all…..

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

microphysical indeterminism (if it exists) applies to computers as well as humans – would you therefore suggest that computers also have free will as you have defined it?

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?

what does evolution or revolution have to do with free will or constraints? Evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic and constrained environment lacking in any kind of free will as you have defined it.

You don't have to measure two things seprately to know they are the same.

But you do have to measure them if you want to then claim that one is greater than the other

If I have good reason to think Fred has never eaten anything but hot dinners, I can conclude that the amount of food he has eaten is equal to the amount of hot dinners he has eaten.

If (a) is the total amount of food he has eaten, then (a) depends both on (b) the average amount of food per dinner and (c) the number of dinners. If you do not know (b) then you cannot conclude (a) is equal to (c).

MF

 

[moving finger]

i don't believe in free will--only the illusion of free will. this isn't meant to be a proof of free will. but i think if you believe that einstein was right in searching for a unified theory, and that our universe is predictable, then free will can't be possible

Discussions on "free will" are notoriously difficult, usually because most participants take sides before they even agree what they are talking about (ie participants declare "I do/do not believe in free will" before there is any agreement on the definition or meaning of "free will").

Therefore, rather than debate whether "free will" (whatever the definition) really exists, I think it is much more instructive to ask :

what do people really mean when they say that they believe they act with "free will", and are they justified in having this belief?

I humbly suggest that what most people (who claim to believe in "free will") mean when they say they act with "free will" is that they believe their actions are not entirely constrained by external factors

I say "entirely" constrained because I believe most of us would agree that our actions are usually some way constrained to a greater or lesser extent by external factors (eg I cannot willingly hold my breath for more than a minute or two, no matter how much I "want" to), but belief in "free will" would imply that not all of the external constraints on our actions are necessarily absolute.

This is where it becomes useful to look closely at how we define the "person" (or better still, the agent) which we are claiming has this "free will".

Paraphrasing Dennett, one can externalise everything by making oneself really, really small. Conversely, an agent can subsume many (potentially external) constraints within itself by making itself a sufficiently finite size.

What we call our "self" is not an infinitesimal point in space. It has finite physical and logical boundaries and, most importantly, it includes within those boundaries many of the causes and effects of our decisions; in fact the personal decision-making process is based on what I like to call self-referential causal loops.

If we can identify the external "cause" of a particular decision (ie an external constraint on our free will) then we know that we are not deciding freely. But for many of our decisions we are unable to unambiguously identify the "causes", simply because those causes are internalised in a complex and self-referential way within our decision-making selves.

Thus, it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are uncaused; it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are unconstrained. It is simply the case that the decisions that we choose to call "free will" decisions are caused and constrained largely by internal self-referential causal loops, of which we have (most of the time) incomplete awareness - and this is what leads us to say that we act with "free will".

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we have, and when we understand precisely what it is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is real and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe. "Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

But I’m asking you, it’s your definition after all…..

FYI, libertariansim is the opposite of determinsim. Libertarians think we are not
totally constrained by just the same things determinists think we are totally constrained by.

microphysical indeterminism (if it exists) applies to computers as well as humans – would you therefore suggest that computers also have free will as you have defined it?

It is a necessary but insufficient condition. The other factors include
consciousness, rationallity, etc and are not ususally in dispute.

what does evolution or revolution have to do with free will or constraints? Evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic and constrained environment lacking in any kind of free will as you have defined it.

They have to do with the "high level" argument for determinism.
OC it might be the case that only microphysical determism is true,
and allows for the appearance of novelty at the social/cultural level,
as you say. And that...ta-daaaaa!... is exactly why I cited the need
for microphysical indeterminism as well.

But you do have to measure them if you want to then claim that one is greater than the other

Nope. Have you ever done any maths ? The kind involving x's and y's ?

 

[moving finger]

FYI, libertariansim is the opposite of determinsim. Libertarians think we are not totally constrained by just the same things determinists think we are totally constrained by.

We started with you defining free will in terms of no constraint from “external circumstance”. I asked you how you would define an “external circumstance”. Instead of answering you start spouting about Libertarianism and Determinism? Seems you are avoiding the question.

It is a necessary but insufficient condition. The other factors include
consciousness, rationallity, etc and are not ususally in dispute.

You did not include consciousness or rationality as prerequisite properties in your definition of free will, and they do not fall out as implied properties. Would you now like the chance to revise your definition?

what does evolution or revolution have to do with free will or constraints? Evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic and constrained environment lacking in any kind of free will as you have defined it.

They have to do with the "high level" argument for determinism.

That does not answer the question. I still maintain that evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic environment. You suggested that somehow a deterministic environment would somehow prevent evolution or revolution. I am interested to know how you think that could possibly happen (since I think it is false).

Have you ever done any maths ? The kind involving x's and y's ?

Educate me. Show me how you can demonstrate that x is greater than y (apart from just assuming it) unless you put values against x and y.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

We started with you defining free will in terms of no constraint from “external circumstance”. I asked you how you would define an “external circumstance”.

genetics, environment, etc.

You did not include consciousness or rationality as prerequisite properties in your definition of free will, and they do not fall out as implied properties. Would you now like the chance to revise your definition?

Is there any reason to believe that no-one anywhere is in possession of
them ?

That does not answer the question. I still maintain that evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic environment. You suggested that somehow a deterministic environment would somehow prevent evolution or revolution. I am interested to know how you think that could possibly happen (since I think it is false).

If being determined by the cultrue you are brought up in doesn't
cause you to behave just the same as your ancestors what does it do?

(NB the difference between low-level and high-level determinism)

Educate me. Show me how you can demonstrate that x is greater than y (apart from just assuming it) unless you put values against x and y.

let y=x/2

 

[moving finger]

We started with you defining free will in terms of no constraint from “external circumstance”. I asked you how you would define an “external circumstance”.

genetics, environment, etc.

I grant you that in the context of “free will”, environment is normally an external circumstance and we should be able to make most decisions free from environmental constraints. However I think genetics is bit more tricky (I can imagine instances where behaviour is tightly constrained by genetic factors).

You did not include consciousness or rationality as prerequisite properties in your definition of free will, and they do not fall out as implied properties. Would you now like the chance to revise your definition?

Is there any reason to believe that no-one anywhere is in possession of them ?

Are you suggesting therefore that only human beings (endowed with consciousness and rationality) can possesses this thing called “free will”?

That does not answer the question. I still maintain that evolution and revolution can take place in a completely deterministic environment. You suggested that somehow a deterministic environment would somehow prevent evolution or revolution. I am interested to know how you think that could possibly happen (since I think it is false).

If being determined by the cultrue you are brought up in doesn't cause you to behave just the same as your ancestors what does it do?

The cultural environment one is brought up in may condition one to think in certain ways, I agree, but it is no more of a constraint on free will than is the physical environment (which we saw above is an external circumstance that should not completely prohibit free will).

I see no reason why free will is a necessary pre-requisite for either evolution or revolution. Evolution in particular can be thought of as a purely deterministic process. And revolution can be simply (for example) a catastrophic change in the social order within a (hypothetical) purely deterministic society bereft of free will. But I would be happy to see examples of where you think free will is a necessary prerequisite for either evolution or revolution.

Educate me. Show me how you can demonstrate that x is greater than y (apart from just assuming it) unless you put values against x and y.

let y=x/2

which is an assumption (or definition) about the relationship between x and y, not a demonstration that x is greater than y.

This whole question arose because you asserted that “If an event were more cause than effect, its conscequences would be unpredictable in principle” which begs the question “how do you measure whether an event is more cause than effect”. As far as I am aware cause and effect are not quantitative parameters in any meaningful sense, ie it is not possible to equate or compare them and say for example “ohhh, here the cause is double the effect” – but I am open to this latter statement being proven wrong. Simply asserting “let y = x/2” does not prove it wrong.

MF

 

[moving finger]

FYI, libertariansim is the opposite of determinsim. Libertarians think we are not totally constrained by just the same things determinists think we are totally constrained by.

Libertarians (so I understand) do not accept that the whole universe behaves deterministically, for they maintain that the human mind (or the innermost regions of the brain) present an exception. According to Libertarians, a person's mind can itself cause that person to perform a particular action when that person chooses so to act, without the choice itself having any antecedent cause. The usual unbroken chain of cause and effect is thus broken, and when a person exercises his or her free will, a new chain is initiated by the act of will itself. However, the supposed mechanism for initiating a new chain of cause and effect by the mere act of free will remains a mystery.

In some ways, this seems reminiscent of Descartes' dualism (the thinking self can act independently both of causation and of the physical self).

Would you agree this is an accurate view of Libertarianism?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Are you suggesting therefore that only human beings (endowed with consciousness and rationality) can possesses this thing called “free will”?

Other being with rationaility and consciousness might have FW, but there
are not many pertinent examples.

The cultural environment one is brought up in may condition one to think in certain ways, I agree, but it is no more of a constraint on free will than is the physical environment (which we saw above is an external circumstance that should not completely prohibit free will).

whatever. The question is what the world would look like if the high-level
argument were true.

I see no reason why free will is a necessary pre-requisite for either evolution or revolution. Evolution in particular can be thought of as a purely deterministic process.

Again, you are making themistake of considering the argument against
high-level determinism as thought it were independent of the argument against.
low-level determinism.

which is an assumption (or definition) about the relationship between x and y, not a demonstration that x is greater than y.

There is such a thing as truth by stipulation. BTW, do you think I am only entitled to assert that the number of hydrogen atoms in a glass of awater is twice the number of oxygen atoms if I have counted them ?

 

[Tournesol]

Libertarians (so I understand) do not accept that the whole universe behaves deterministically, for they maintain that the human mind (or the innermost regions of the brain) present an exception. According to Libertarians, a person's mind can itself cause that person to perform a particular action when that person chooses so to act, without the choice itself having any antecedent cause. The usual unbroken chain of cause and effect is thus broken, and when a person exercises his or her free will, a new chain is initiated by the act of will itself. However, the supposed mechanism for initiating a new chain of cause and effect by the mere act of free will remains a mystery.

In some ways, this seems reminiscent of Descartes' dualism (the thinking self can act independently both of causation and of the physical self).

Would you agree this is an accurate view of Libertarianism?

MF

No, it is a straw-man. Libertarians do no believe in a rigid causal chain
to which the human brain is an exception. They think strict determinism
is false in general (which is a necessary condition for FW which only becomes
sufficient in the presence of various other factors such as rationallity and lack of external constraint).

 

[Huckleberry]

Free will? Does that mean that if I choose to be happy then I actually am? If I decide to love my girlfriend then I actually do? I feel that I have some choice in the logical processes, but I have very little choice in my own emotional processes. LOL, It is actually easier to control other peoples emotional processes than my own. It seems to me that we are both in control of our own will and subject to the will of others.

In statistics it is easy to predict what a large group of people will do under certain circumstances. It is almost impossible to predict what an individual (a stranger to you) will do under those same circumstances. A cloud of gas will expand in a completely predictable manner, but a particle of that gas could go almost anywhere. I would suggest that we do indeed have a will, but that it is not free at all. There are restraints and limitations on it beyond our control.

P.S. What would the possibility of time travel mean for free will?

What was the question?
Huck

 

[moving finger]

Are you suggesting therefore that only human beings (endowed with consciousness and rationality) can possesses this thing called “free will”?

Other being with rationaility and consciousness might have FW, but there are not many pertinent examples.

Hmmm. Why does one need to be rational to possesses free will? If I possesses free will as a rational being, and I then somehow “lose my wits” and start acting irrationally, are you suggesting that I have also lost my free will?

Does it also follow that if we can at some stage endow machines with consciousness, that they could also start acting with free will?

The cultural environment one is brought up in may condition one to think in certain ways, I agree, but it is no more of a constraint on free will than is the physical environment (which we saw above is an external circumstance that should not completely prohibit free will).

whatever. The question is what the world would look like if the high-level argument were true.

What “high level argument” is this please? Can you clarify?

I see no reason why free will is a necessary pre-requisite for either evolution or revolution. Evolution in particular can be thought of as a purely deterministic process.

Again, you are making themistake of considering the argument against high-level determinism as thought it were independent of the argument against.
low-level determinism.

Please clarify the difference between your concepts of high-level and low-level determinism, since this is not something we have defined so far (as far as I know).

which is an assumption (or definition) about the relationship between x and y, not a demonstration that x is greater than y.

There is such a thing as truth by stipulation.

With respect, this is rubbish. Truth by stipulation is only valid where there is logical preceding reasoning which supports the stipulation. You can no more claim that an unsubstantiated y=x/2 than I can claim that the morning sun will be blue. Both are unsubstantiated assertions. What you need to do to support your assertion that a system can exhibit more cause than effect is to demonstrate how cause and effect can be quantified, which you have not done.

do you think I am only entitled to assert that the number of hydrogen atoms in a glass of awater is twice the number of oxygen atoms if I have counted them ?

In this case, you KNOW from prior data that there are two hydrogen atoms per oxygen atom in water, and it is this knowledge which legitimises your “stipulation”. This is what I mean by logical preceding reasoning. Simply stipulating (without substantiation) that there are two hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom would be simply a guess, and worthless (even if true).

Libertarians do no believe in a rigid causal chain
to which the human brain is an exception. They think strict determinism
is false in general (which is a necessary condition for FW which only becomes
sufficient in the presence of various other factors such as rationallity and lack of external constraint).

You have told me what Libertarians do NOT believe, can you tell me what they DO believe? This is the more important issue.

MF

 

[TheUnknown]

Free will? Does that mean that if I choose to be happy then I actually am? If I decide to love my girlfriend then I actually do? I feel that I have some choice in the logical processes, but I have very little choice in my own emotional processes. LOL, It is actually easier to control other peoples emotional processes than my own. It seems to me that we are both in control of our own will and subject to the will of others.

In statistics it is easy to predict what a large group of people will do under certain circumstances. It is almost impossible to predict what an individual (a stranger to you) will do under those same circumstances. A cloud of gas will expand in a completely predictable manner, but a particle of that gas could go almost anywhere. I would suggest that we do indeed have a will, but that it is not free at all. There are restraints and limitations on it beyond our control.

P.S. What would the possibility of time travel mean for free will?



What was the question?
Huck

To address your question straight forwardly... i have stayed longer sicne more information is needed on the thought process of beings such as moving_finger... go to special relativity, and look up the discussion on GR and time travel... me and figner had an 8 page long discussion on time travel and free will... i basically took him to school with my 300 year advanced knowledge on the subject, and it caused him to come down with a rather pecuilar case of amnesia. I would advise all to read it who question free will. When the human mind can fathom the 4th dimension, evolution will take place.

 

[moving finger]

To address your question straight forwardly... i have stayed longer sicne more information is needed on the thought process of beings such as moving_finger... go to special relativity, and look up the discussion on GR and time travel... me and figner had an 8 page long discussion on time travel and free will... i basically took him to school with my 300 year advanced knowledge on the subject, and it caused him to come down with a rather pecuilar case of amnesia. I would advise all to read it who question free will. When the human mind can fathom the 4th dimension, evolution will take place.

 

[Tournesol]

Hmmm. Why does one need to be rational to possesses free will?

We do not ususally attribute FW to unstable nuclei. (pace John Conway)

If I possesses free will as a rational being, and I then somehow “lose my wits” and start acting irrationally, are you suggesting that I have also lost my free will?

We do not usually attribute moral responsibility to crazy people, and
FW foes with moral responsibilit as far as most peope are concerned.

Does it also follow that if we can at some stage endow machines with consciousness, that they could also start acting with free will?

Maybe.

What “high level argument” is this please? Can you clarify?

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”?

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ?

I mean (b).

What you need to do to support your assertion that a system can exhibit more cause than effect is to demonstrate how cause and effect can be quantified, which you have not done.

It's a conceptual relationship derived from determinism and predictability.

In this case, you KNOW from prior data that there are two hydrogen atoms per oxygen atom in water, and it is this knowledge which legitimises your “stipulation”. This is what I mean by logical preceding reasoning. Simply stipulating (without substantiation) that there are two hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom would be simply a guess, and worthless (even if true).

But it is "prior knowledge" that in a deterministic universe, everything is predicable. Everything else follows logicaly from that.

You have told me what Libertarians do NOT believe, can you tell me what they DO believe? This is the more important issue.

They believe that FW, as previously defined, does exist, and is incompatible
with determinism, which is therefore false.

 

[moving finger]

Does that mean that if I choose to be happy then I actually am?

Assuming that your "choice" to be happy then leads to the state that "you are happy" then - of course. Happiness is a state of mind.

What you have to understand is that "choosing" something and "deciding" something does not then automatically lead to that "thing" taking place. I can "choose" that I wish to jump over the moon, but I cannot actually accomplish that feat. I can "decide" that I want to hold my breath for 20 minutes, but the mere fact of me deciding that does not enable me to do it.

If I decide to love my girlfriend then I actually do?

As explained above, if you are capable of loving your girlfriend, and if the act of deciding to love her leads to you loving her, then you actually do.

I feel that I have some choice in the logical processes, but I have very little choice in my own emotional processes.

Perhaps you just need to "know yourself" a little better. With practice and with self-knowledge and self-understanding, you CAN control your emotions and emotional processes.

It is actually easier to control other peoples emotional processes than my own.

I humbly suggest that is simply because you need to practice.

It seems to me that we are both in control of our own will and subject to the will of others.

Please define "will"?

In statistics it is easy to predict what a large group of people will do under certain circumstances.

No. It is easy to predict what they are "likely" to do. This is not the same as what they "will" do.

It is almost impossible to predict what an individual (a stranger to you) will do under those same circumstances. A cloud of gas will expand in a completely predictable manner,

Wrong. It will expand in a statistically predictable manner, but not completely predictable.

but a particle of that gas could go almost anywhere. I would suggest that we do indeed have a will, but that it is not free at all. There are restraints and limitations on it beyond our control.

Please define what you mean by "will" in this context.

What would the possibility of time travel mean for free will?

If time travel is possible, and if there is only one universe, then the only way to ensure self-consistency (ie not being able to go back and "change" the past) is if the world is super-deterministic.
But free will CAN be compatible with determinism - it depends on how you define free will. What kind of free will are you talking about?

MF

 

[moving finger]

Why does one need to be rational to possesses free will?

We do not ususally attribute FW to unstable nuclei. (pace John Conway)

How did we get onto “unstable nuclei”? Are you suggesting that every agent must be either “rational” or an “unstable nucleus”? Surely not.

If I possesses free will as a rational being, and I then somehow “lose my wits” and start acting irrationally, are you suggesting that I have also lost my free will? .

We do not usually attribute moral responsibility to crazy people, and FW foes with moral responsibilit as far as most peope are concerned.

Crazy is not the same as acting irrationally; and I submit that free will is not the same as moral responsibility (I can have free will, and still act morally irresponsibly; I can be sane and still act irrationally).

Does it also follow that if we can at some stage endow machines with consciousness, that they could also start acting with free will? .

Maybe.

I agree!

What “high level argument” is this please? Can you clarify? .

Once this is defined, how would you then propose to show that human choices are “not entirely constrained by external circumstances”? .

a) argue for microphysical indeterminism

b) point out that the suppsoedly determining macroscopic influences
we grow up with (culture etc) have not, historically , prevented all
kinds of evolution and revoultion. If we are all determined by ourt upbringing,
back to the year dot, why aren't we still in caves ? .

I mean (b) .

As pointed out already, even if our upbringing is part of the deterministic process that defines what we are today, this does not necessarily imply that we should still be living in caves. A deterministic world can still grow, evolve, change. Evolution and revolution are entirely compatible with determinism. Therefore I have no idea what you really mean by your “high level argument”.

What you need to do to support your assertion that a system can exhibit more cause than effect is to demonstrate how cause and effect can be quantified, which you have not done.

It's a conceptual relationship derived from determinism and predictability.

Which is a purely qualitative statement, and does not imply that cause and effect can be quantified and compared such that one can say “ahhhh, here we have more cause than effect”. You have not shown that cause and effect can be quantified in this way.

In this case, you KNOW from prior data that there are two hydrogen atoms per oxygen atom in water, and it is this knowledge which legitimises your “stipulation”. This is what I mean by logical preceding reasoning. Simply stipulating (without substantiation) that there are two hydrogen atoms for every oxygen atom would be simply a guess, and worthless (even if true) .

But it is "prior knowledge" that in a deterministic universe, everything is predicable. Everything else follows logicaly from that.

Nope. A deterministic universe is NOT necessarily predictable, and (most importantly) it is IMPOSSIBLE to predict the future of even a deterministic universe from WITHIN that universe. If the universe is deterministic, the only way to predict the future is to stand “outside” of 4D spacetime (eg as God). Any being within (and interacting with) 4D spacetime cannot reliably predict the future (it comes back to those wonderful self-referential causal loops again).

You have told me what Libertarians do NOT believe, can you tell me what they DO believe? This is the more important issue.

They believe that FW, as previously defined, does exist, and is incompatible with determinism, which is therefore false.

“free will” as previously defined? Sorry, I maybe missed that. Can you repeat the definition of free will for me please?

I think you will find that such a belief (depending on how you define free will…….) necessarily means that the agent with the so-called free will must be a source of causal chains, ie is in some way acting uncaused, which is basically what I said earlier.

I wonder if you can explain how this Libertarian free will can arise any other way (apart from the so-called “straw man” explanation that you seemed to dislike)?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

How did we get onto “unstable nuclei”? Are you suggesting that every agent must be either “rational” or an “unstable nucleus”? Surely not.

It was an example of something that is unpredictable but does not have FW.

Crazy is not the same as acting irrationally; and I submit that free will is not the same as moral responsibility (I can have free will, and still act morally irresponsibly;

But if you are sane you will be held accountable for your actions.

As pointed out already, even if our upbringing is part of the deterministic process that defines what we are today, this does not necessarily imply that we should still be living in caves. A deterministic world can still grow, evolve, change. Evolution and revolution are entirely compatible with determinism. Therefore I have no idea what you really mean by your “high level argument”.

For the third time, you have made the mistake of assuming that I mean
EITHER the falsehodd of the HL argument (b) OR the falsehood of the microphysical argument (a) is adequate to allow FW. As I have already pointed
out, they both need to be false.

Which is a purely qualitative statement, and does not imply that cause and effect can be quantified and compared such that one can say “ahhhh, here we have more cause than effect”. You have not shown that cause and effect can be quantified in this way.

Your quantative/qualitative thing doesn't work.

Nope. A deterministic universe is NOT necessarily predictable, and (most importantly) it is IMPOSSIBLE to predict the future of even a deterministic universe from WITHIN that universe. If the universe is deterministic, the only way to predict the future is to stand “outside” of 4D spacetime (eg as God). Any being within (and interacting with) 4D spacetime cannot reliably predict the future (it comes back to those wonderful self-referential causal loops again).

Predictable by an ideal observer such as Laplace's Infinite Intelligence.

“free will” as previously defined? Sorry, I maybe missed that. Can you repeat the definition of free will for me please?

"The power of making free choices that are not entirely constrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."

(#31 in this thread)

I think you will find that such a belief (depending on how you define free will…….) necessarily means that the agent with the so-called free will must be a source of causal chains, ie is in some way acting uncaused, which is basically what I said earlier.

Earlier you seemed to be supporting the compatiblist idea that an agent is free
if they (proximately) cause their actions, even if those causal events are themselves entirely
caused ad-infinitum.

I wonder if you can explain how this Libertarian free will can arise any other way (apart from the so-called “straw man” explanation that you seemed to dislike)?

The straw-man explanantion has it that only humans behave indeterministically. Libertarians do not need to assume this, and QM
indicates that indterminism is in faxct widespread.