Evolutionary Game Theory question

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SUMMARY

The discussion centers on solving a problem related to Evolutionary Game Theory, specifically focusing on questions Q2.3, Q2.4a, and Q2.4b. The participant successfully derives the payoff matrix and equations for expected payoffs but encounters a contradiction when determining the interior Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). They conclude that no interior ESS exists, yet the question suggests that the only ESS is the pure strategy B, leading to confusion regarding the correctness of the problem statement.

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  • Understanding of Evolutionary Game Theory concepts
  • Familiarity with payoff matrices and expected payoff calculations
  • Knowledge of equilibrium concepts, specifically Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS)
  • Ability to manipulate and solve linear equations
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  • Study the conditions for an ESS and how they apply to different strategies
  • Examine examples of pure and mixed strategies in game theory
  • Explore the implications of subgames in determining ESS outcomes
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Homework Statement



Quite a long intro to the question so I thought it easier to include it as an image:

http://img96.imageshack.us/img96/7264/78941753.jpg
http://img686.imageshack.us/img686/7780/39557949.jpg

The Attempt at a Solution



I can do Q2.3 and get the payoff matrix given when V=4 and C=6.

For Q2.4a I get

E_{H,x}=-x_{H}+4x_{D}+x_{B}
E_{D,x}=2x_{D}+x_{B}
E_{B,x}=-0.5x_{H}+3x_{D}+2x_{B}.

For Q2.4b I normalize the payoff matrix to get

\[ \left( \begin{array}{ccc}<br /> 0 &amp; 2 &amp; -0.5 \\<br /> 1 &amp; 0 &amp; -1 \\<br /> 0.5 &amp; 1 &amp; 0 \end{array} \right)\]

Now comes the problems.

For an ESS we must have

E_{H,x}=E_{D,x}=E_{B,x} (*)

By using the normalized matrix we can rewrite these as

E_{H,x}=2x_{D}-0.5x_{B}
E_{D,x}=x_{H}-x_{B}
E_{B,x}=0.5x_{H}+x_{D}.

Let x=(h,d,b) be our interior ESS, then by (*) we have

2d - 0.5b = 0.5h + d and h - b = 0.5h + d .

The first of these can be rearranged to give h=2d-b while the second can be rearranged to give h=2d+2b. Clearly these can only both be satisfied when b=0. But this contradicts the fact that x=(h,d,b) is an interior ESS. Hence there can be no interior ESS's.

Now that seemed correct to me, but it doesn't tie-in with Q2.4c. This question claims that the only ESS is the pure strategy B. By considering the H-D subgame I get an ESS at (2/3,1/3,0).

Assuming the question is written correctly, where am I going wrong?

Thanks for any help!
 
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