Free Will vs. Fate: Examining Choice and Determinism

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok maybe "variables" isn't exactly the correct word to use then.

It is not the correct word unless you want to believe in free will. Contrary to what seems to have been agreed upon D[x=]F, in any way. To speak of "THE decision" is naive and practically "staw man" in nature. I say this because there are millions of decisions to be made in the course of this person's life, and this particular decision would not have come about exactly as it did, unless many other decisions (perhaps even all of them) were made exactly as they were.

The elimination of the term "variables" is something you do when you wish to prove a deterministic PoV. It is not a logical necessity, since, in the paradigm of "free will", there are indeed "variables". Variables, in this context, are not solvable, but remain variables until the point of decision ("decision" also being a term that only exists in a "free will" paradigm).

I say variables because at this time and point their definitions are largely unkown to us. So let's refer to them as causes. And there are billions of causal items which all contribute to the ultimate effect, the decision. Since we're speaking of determinism, these "causes" would all have to be known. Every single factor that would contribute to the decision directly or indirectly would have to be known. If this were the case, then we could determine the outcome of the decision to select chocolate.

It would help very much if you had added an "IMO", somewhere in there, since this is not in any way proven. Yes, there are many "limiting factors" ("rocks in the paths" as I referred to them on an old thread about the same topic), but these needn't cover every single aspect. IOW, I may be able to know everything that exists, and thus calculate the probability of his choosing chocolate to a perfect degree of accuracy, but I will always be left with a variable (in the "free will" paradigm) and there is thus always the chance (no matter how small) that he will take vanilla anyway.

Let's also discard the term probabilty, since that infers variation. We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision.

Not so. The fact that F has been making choices throughout his entire life is not over-lookable (if that's even a word ; I guess I mean "irrelevant"), since this situation is exactly like all of the millions of others that have been presented to F before as to whether he is predestined or free to choose. IOW, if F has been making choices throughout his life, then he is free to choose here, and there must thus be a variable (perhaps just the somewhat chaotic (though not stochastic) processes of the brain) somewhere "in the works", allowing him to choose vanilla.

We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical. Yes it is possible by introducing a "variable", but then the two become unequal, and the example looses it's point. The "probability" of alternate selection is ZERO, nado, null, nill zipp-o. Introducing a variable may change his mind, but if we solve that variable, then we can determine weather or not it will affect his choice.

But, in the "free will" paradigm, there are some variables that cannot be solved. There are some points of chaos that, though they are governed by many rules (which is why I said they are not stochastic), are not resolvable, and leave "chance" in the equation.

If someone intercepts his timeline and tells him not to pick chocolate, yes we can determine he will pick chocolate. But in the physical world there are no(proven) identical timelines to validate this. You have one set of causes, and it will one day be possible to add all those causes together to determine his "choice".

I just thought of something. I remember having started a thread about "A Universe Without Logic", or something like that... ah, here it is. Anyway, you should read the first post on there (my own), since it deals directly with this concept of "causes", which you seem to believe in without a doubt.

You see he does not actually have a "choice". All of his decisions throughout his life are unique, not variable, and can lead to only one choice or conclusion. He sees it as free will, like any other person would. However if he were able broaden his scope and examine the cascading cause and effect that brought him to this moment, and all it's intricacies, he would realize that he already knew what he wanted. He wanted chocolate because earlier was craving ice cream, because he saw someone eating chocolate ice cream. He saw that person because he decided to take a walk that day. he decide to take a walk that day because he got up early and was bored. He woke up early because his neighbor was running the lawn mower. His neihbor was doing that because he'd forgotten to do it the night before. His nieghbor forgot because when going out to do it, a friend called. His friend called because..(you get the point) And on and on and on out to the beginning. And if each chain of events could be followed back, it would lead to the moment of the decision, and we would know before he made the choice, and we would know exactly WHY he made the choice.

I understand what you're saying, but I just don't think it's good enough to prove either side, because you leave the real question as wide open as it always has been: Did F have a choice along this chain?

The point isn't that he can't make a different choice- It's that he won't. I could go walk across a freeway, but I won't. I won't because I want to live. I won't because It's a long walk to the freeway..etc, etc.

Ah-ha! And here is the flaw in a much more naked form. You are giving reasons (as you have been) for choices made. Both reason and choice belong only in the "free will" paradigm. Aside from this, you direcly say that he "could" choose one path, but wont, because of some reason. If he "could" choose one path, then he has free will, is not predestined, and has only to deal with the "limiting factors" along with the variable ones, in order to make a decision.

My point is that it all depends on how you interpret free will. In a sense it does exist- from out perspective. But we always base our decisions on experiences, and those experiences are static, and if they all could be known, then essentially what we could do is in a sense "become" that person, following all the factors that would cause his to make his choice.

So here's my question. If you make a decision without coersion, or any external influences, but the decision you will inevitably make is static and can be predetermined- is it still free will?

But this excludes the variables. Yes, it is still free will, provided the variables still exist. For example, it is impossible to determine a person's "clarity of mind" (from a purely materialistic stanpoint), and thus you might walk out into the freeway and be killed, not "because" of anything (no limiting factors), just due to an incalculable variable. If you argue that there are no "incalculable variables" then you have taken the side of predestination. However, it cannot be proven that such variables do not exist, and science (particularly physics) seems to be leaning toward the variable part (just think of Stephen Jay Gould's - purely Darwinian - view of evolution as being amoral. If it is amoral, then it is not "tending" toward anything, and is thus variable (indeterminate)).

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Mentat
It is not the correct word unless you want to believe in free will. Contrary to what seems to have been agreed upon D[x=]F, in any way. To speak of "THE decision" is naive and practically "staw man" in nature. I say this because there are millions of decisions to be made in the course of this person's life, and this particular decision would not have come about exactly as it did, unless many other decisions (perhaps even all of them) were made exactly as they were.

So noted- we must make assumptions in order to prove determinism, but since the same applies to free-will, I'm just going down this particular evil path, and casting asumptions out. Of course it's the path I was meant to take

The elimination of the term "variables" is something you do when you wish to prove a deterministic PoV. It is not a logical necessity, since, in the paradigm of "free will", there are indeed "variables". Variables, in this context, are not solvable, but remain variables until the point of decision ("decision" also being a term that only exists in a "free will" paradigm).

It would help very much if you had added an "IMO", somewhere in there, since this is not in any way proven. Yes, there are many "limiting factors" ("rocks in the paths" as I referred to them on an old thread about the same topic), but these needn't cover every single aspect. IOW, I may be able to know everything that exists, and thus calculate the probability of his choosing chocolate to a perfect degree of accuracy, but I will always be left with a variable (in the "free will" paradigm) and there is thus always the chance (no matter how small) that he will take vanilla anyway.

"the views expressed by this person are not necessarily the view of the forum, and the forum is not responsible for the views expressed in this post"- IOW, IMHO=)

That said, variables are logically solvable because we're assuming we know every element of the universe, including it's properties. So that means that even the variables are known. We know that someone will intersect the timeline to tell the person not to pick vanilla because it was anticipated. We saw that person's(time travellers) actions and realized he would time travel. We realized it would rain that day, causing the person to delay leaving the house because we observed the weather patterns, and accurately predicted the path of the storm.

Not so. The fact that F has been making choices throughout his entire life is not over-lookable (if that's even a word ; I guess I mean "irrelevant"), since this situation is exactly like all of the millions of others that have been presented to F before as to whether he is predestined or free to choose. IOW, if F has been making choices throughout his life, then he is free to choose here, and there must thus be a variable (perhaps just the somewhat chaotic (though not stochastic) processes of the brain) somewhere "in the works", allowing him to choose vanilla.

But in fact they were not "choices" he made-I may have used that word in my haste to prove the point(ya somantics are killing me here;) But PATHS is a more accurate word. At each previous juncture the same rules would apply, and he had only one true path. Think of it in terms of a maze, and there is only one route to the end. It's as if we knew the way to the end, and did not make any dead-end turns. So he went down the chosen path, because it was the only one available to him.

But, in the "free will" paradigm, there are some variables that cannot be solved. There are some points of chaos that, though they are governed by many rules (which is why I said they are not stochastic), are not resolvable, and leave "chance" in the equation.

I believe that ultimately everything is solvable, given enough understanding of it. I can't PROVE that, but it's IMO a truth. I'm of course referring to physical properties of the universe.

I understand what you're saying, but I just don't think it's good enough to prove either side, because you leave the real question as wide open as it always has been: Did F have a choice along this chain?

And my answer- No choice F did not. It was all predetermined. That was his path that led him to this point, there was no other "choice" really, it was just used as a designation-juncture would be a better word.(not going to nail me on somantics;)

Ah-ha! And here is the flaw in a much more naked form. You are giving reasons (as you have been) for choices made. Both reason and choice belong only in the "free will" paradigm. Aside from this, you direcly say that he "could" choose one path, but wont, because of some reason. If he "could" choose one path, then he has free will, is not predestined, and has only to deal with the "limiting factors" along with the variable ones, in order to make a decision.

Busted We have to discard this example- it's a bad one. It's difficult to retrain the mind to think in terms of determinism.. hehe
Instead we must say that I would not walk across the freeway because I know I would be in danger of death. Because I was not MEANT to die.(I'm simplifying here for the sake of space and to cut down on the CTS (carapal tunnel)

But this excludes the variables. Yes, it is still free will, provided the variables still exist. For example, it is impossible to determine a person's "clarity of mind" (from a purely materialistic stanpoint), and thus you might walk out into the freeway and be killed, not "because" of anything (no limiting factors), just due to an incalculable variable. If you argue that there are no "incalculable variables" then you have taken the side of predestination. However, it cannot be proven that such variables do not exist, and science (particularly physics) seems to be leaning toward the variable part (just think of Stephen Jay Gould's - purely Darwinian - view of evolution as being amoral. If it is amoral, then it is not "tending" toward anything, and is thus variable (indeterminate)).

I agree that determism must eliminate all variables, but after all, we are talking about nearly, if not absolute onmipotence here, so it becomes possible. Can it ultimately be proven? No not until we can eliminate all variables- (looks at watch) I don't see that happening this week. But what determinism also does is highlight the fallibility of science, and it's limitations. We can't yet determine "clarity of mind" yet because we lack the understanding of the human mind. Of course I would point out that "clarity" is an abstract term, and that we may one day discover that the synapses are simply firing slower than normal because of multiple factors (what we ate for breakfast, exhaustion from mid-term cramming last night, etc, etc) So you see my point, that we don't have enough evidence to prove that variables can or cannot be eliminated. We must make assumptions in both perspectives (D and F) so the whole point becomes moot without better scientific understanding.

I think I've taken this discussion as far is it can be possibly taken. we could sit and argue all day over weather variables are solvable, and get nowhere. We just must accept that we need more info.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Ever consider that "thought" is deterministic (form) and "emotions" are volitile? (essence). And thus illustrates the relationship between predeterminism and free will, as well as the functioning of the human mind?

While here if we learn to keep our emotions "in context" with our thoughts, and exhibit "self control" -- and don't do stupid things! (not always ) -- then we begin to discover we have mastery over overselves and, "our fate."

Not to be inhumane here, but I believe that even emotions are predicitable at some level. emotions are reactions, just like our physical being, and that means that something causes them. Do we understand the mechanics of them? No way, but we can establish that they are reactionary in nature.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
Not to be inhumane here, but I believe that even emotions are predicitable at some level. emotions are reactions, just like our physical being, and that means that something causes them. Do we understand the mechanics of them? No way, but we can establish that they are reactionary in nature.

But still, without emotions we wouldn't feel anything, let alone what it's like to be free. As for analytical thinking -- in and of itself -- I think it would be fair to say that it's essentially deterministic, so long as there are no feelings associated to give it "value." Here's your problem with science right there ...

Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos. Or, perchance we might discover the third option, which is the "happy medium" in the middle, where we learn to live our lives freely and responsibly.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos.

A dual pendulum system is chaotic and volatile, but still deterministic. Chaotic behavior does not imply the absense of determinism. What other reason might you have for thinking emotions are not deterministic?

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
A dual pendulum system is chaotic and volatile, but still deterministic. Chaotic behavior does not imply the absense of determinism. What other reason might you have for thinking emotions are not deterministic?

Of course I'm obviously not speaking of either extreme, but of the equilbrium which exists in the middle. Whereby once an equilibrium is achieved, from the standpoint of "the device" (mind) being fully functional (holistically), the exertion of will becomes a matter of little or "no effort."

Or at least this is how it works with me, and to be honest, I don't have any idea of what's going to happen from one moment to the next. Neither do I really care, so long as I'm enjoying myself, and that, I equate with "free will."

Ever look at yourself doing something in the moment? There are way too many things going on -- on a subconscious level that is -- to suggest that the whole thing was predetermined, especially when all you're doing is something as basic as fulfilling a need as it arises which, has little or nothing to do with choice (like going to the bathroom).

While this is why I think science has a problem grasping the idea of free will, because it refuses to look at how the mind operates, in the "holistic sense." Neither can it handle it or, won't deal with it because it tends to wreak havoc on its whole system of analytical and "sterilized" (the key word here) procedure, amounting to "control" in other words.

Which leads me to wonder, how long is it going to take for science to get its head out from being stuck up its hind end?

 

[CJames]

Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The argument that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

First you must understand that an electron, for example, is not a billiard ball. It is a statistical wave, a wavefunction, that describes the probabilities of its location, it's velocity, etc. From this an electon shell is much more complex, and the interaction between two electron shells surrounding two atoms becomes even more complex.

It is theoretically impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the motion of two atoms comming in contact. With that in mind, the complex interactions between billions of atoms in the throw of a die is a hail marry. It is impossible to predict the land of the dice. Only the probabilities of how the dice land is predictable. It can be predicted to an accuracey much higher than one in six, but it can not be 100%.

This inherent indeterminacey in nature leaves room for free will, though there is also the possibility of a "radom will" or a "probabilistic will." Of course, the differences between a free will and a random one may simply boil down to your point of view.

 

[metacristi]

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.

We talk here of a macroscopical object that is an emergent property of the quantum level,compatible with determinism,we do not need to know the position of every atom or electron inside the die.

The only question is to establish whether it is a chaotic phenomenon (still deterministic but practically unpredictable on an enough long run,depending on its interval of determinacy) or fully deterministic.

The answer is that the roll of a dice is a perfectly regular deterministic system if the air does not introduce nonlinear perturbations.Still we cannot make accurate predictions in all cases.The explanation is simple:in practice we cannot control the initial conditions with sufficient precision (we would need to control them exactly in fact) but only in a certain range.Or the dynamics of a rolling die has many cases where small differences produce very different outcomes.

We have therefore a zone of uncertainty introduced by our incapacity to control exactly the initial conditions that introduce a certain degree of 'randomness' however there are particular cases (providing an enough small range of uncertainty for the initial conditions and a simple movement of the dice) when the outcome could be accurately predicted.

 

[Royce]

From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. anyone time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for anyone time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact science as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

An oracle supposedly sees all time as one. The past, the present and future are all the same and simutanious. An oracle sees the future as already having happened. The Oracle had seen that Neo had already chosen in his future. Not that is was predetermined but that is had already happened. This had nothing to do will free will or determinism but seeing the future as it had already happened. Could Neo still choose differently? Yes, but then the Oracle would have seen that different choice. Like time travel it can only happen if it has already happened. One could easily go nuts trying to figure this out.

 

[CJames]

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.

Actually that's incorrect. Even as things get larger than h-bar, quantum indeterminancey still holds. It's true that things behave more classically, but not fully deterministic. A die made of indeterminit atoms can't be fully deterministic, no matter what. There is always a degree of uncertainty no matter how small. Chaos theory investigates the macroscopic result of that indeterminacey. If you try to balance a pen on its head, it's impossible to predict what direction it will fall. What you can do, is look for patterns in this behavior.

Incidentally, this thread is really about conciousness and if you assume that it comes from the brain, then you have to consider the fact that every synaptic gap is a quantum realm of "full" indeterminacey.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. anyone time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for anyone time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Royce, I mean this with all due respect but it appears as if you are the one without a good understanding of probability.

If we can only say that F has a 50/50 chance of choosing one or the other, this is equivalent to saying F has no preference for one or the other-- it's also equivalent to saying that F chooses absolutely randomly. If F indeed has a preference, and acts on this preference, then this preference must have some expression in the choice that F ultimately makes. Since F can only choose one or the other-- chocolate or vanilla-- at one time, this preference will not immediately make itself known after one choice. This DOES NOT imply that the preference has not been factored into that choice-- hence, it does not imply that the choice was a 50/50 proposition.

Let's say we observe F n times, for n arbitrarily large. As you acknowledge, the more observations we perform on F, the more the proportion of times F chooses chocolate in our sample of n observations converges to the proportion of times F chooses chocolate overall, in all his infinite parallel universe incarnations. So let's get extravagant and say we perform 10 billion billion observations on 10 billion billion identical parallel universe incarnations of F at their respective t0's. From this massive sample, we get that F chooses chocolate 90% of the time. Now we perform one more observation on one more identical F-- what would you put your money on, F choosing chocolate or vanilla? From your perspective, you probably wouldn't bet at all since you think that there is a 50/50 chance F will choose chocolate. But this is absurd-- since we have seen that over 10 billion billion identical trials F chooses chocolate 90% of the time, it only stands to reason to say that for our next observation there will be a 90% chance that he will choose chocolate.

Think of the same concept, but for flipping a coin. If it is a fair coin, then over many flips we will converge on the result that there is a 50/50 split between heads and tails. If it is biased, we will converge on a different result over many flips-- say, 70/30. If we flip the coin 10 million times and see it lands on heads 70% of the time do you really think there is only a 50/50 chance it will land on heads on the next flip?

In the hypothetical situation I have posed, F has a natural preference for chocolate, so it is only natural to expect this to be reflected in his choice. Well, you might ask, why should F have any preference at all? If he is truly free, would that not imply that he is free from all external influences? If you want to define free will as such, fine-- but such a radical free will clearly cannot apply to us humans in any way, since we humans ARE affected by external influences, whether we have some degree of freedom in our ensuing choices or not. To deny this is to be blind to human nature.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact science as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

Free to choose, compelled to choose-- either way, there is an impact from our environment. I was taking this environmental impact into account when I posited that F chooses chocolate 70% of the time. If you say that for every free choice there is a uniform distribution of probabilities across all possible choices, this is no different than saying that the possessor of free will must always choose uniformly at random with no influence from his environment, and therefore ultimately must choose with no justification for his choice that can have external expression.

edit: Another way to think about it... based on the logic you have posed, you may as well ignore weather reports that say there is a 70% chance of rain today-- after all, there is only a 50/50 chance of this happening; either it rains or it does not rain. The (pseudo) deterministic (and more accurate) take on weather forecasting, on the other hand, is that there is a greater or lesser chance that it rains today based on prevailing weather patterns. I don't see how determinism, for you, makes indications of causally influenced human behavior absolutely arbitrary. If anything it is the opposite.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The argument that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

We're talking here about human choice being either deterministic or free. To say we could predict a deterministic being's behavior with 100% accuracy is perhaps not strictly correct. But we can still distinguish between the determined and the free, which is all that matters. The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Under this revised way of looking at it, D may choose chocolate 99.99999999999999999999999999997 percent of the time, or some such. So it is not strictly true that D's action was absolutely fixed. But if F is still seen to choose chocolate 70% of the time, there is clearly a meaningful distinction to be made between F and D.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
We're talking here about human choice being either deterministic or free. To say we could predict a deterministic being's behavior with 100% accuracy is perhaps not strictly correct. But we can still distinguish between the determined and the free, which is all that matters. The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Under this revised way of looking at it, D may choose chocolate 99.99999999999999999999999999997 percent of the time, or some such. So it is not strictly true that D's action was absolutely fixed. But if F is still seen to choose chocolate 70% of the time, there is clearly a meaningful distinction to be made between F and D.

I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

Please indicate to me how what you have just said is not in agreement with what I said in the last post, or how exactly I'm missing your point. What you say here doesn't seem to be inconsistent with what I said.

 

[Royce]

hypnagogue, granted that this is beside the point of this thread and is really nothing more than nit picking; but, My point was that as observers with one observation or sample of one event, can only know that the odds of any one possibility occurring is the reciprocal of the number of possibilities. If there are only two choices or possibilities, and F has free will to choose either, there is nothing that we can determine as observers that indicates that F will choose one over the other at the next event.

F may choose chocolate 10 times in a row but the odds that he will choose vanilla next is still 50:50. To say that the odds that F will choose chocolate are 7:3 in one sample of one event is saying that F does not have free will and must keep track of how many times he has chosen chocolate and then choose the next time accordingly.

It is not that F ignores his propensity for chocolate or ignores any and all external and internal influences. It is as observers observing one isolated event have no way of knowing any or all of those influences and as observers can only say that he will choose one or the other.

If a coin is flipped 100 times and it comes up heads 99 time the odds of it coming up tails the 100th time is still 50:50. Casinoes make fortunes off of people who believe otherwise.

Anyway if F has free will to us as observers only it will appear random if we observe only one event. With a history or sample of many events we can say that F has a 70% preference for chocolate but still chooses vanilla 30% of the time. None of this has any bearing on the one next choise as far as we observers are concerned.

Anyway, I still believe that we have at least limited free will and that the universe is indeterminate. The uncertainty principle supports this. We are not robots of physics, chemistry nor psychology. All of these things and more may influence our choices but they don't compell our choices everytime.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

Of course not, to speak of probability as even existing is a purely "free will" assumption. Throughout the rest of your post you explain probability very well, but such a thing is but an illusion in a prestined paradigm.

For example, if fate and predestination really existed (which they don't in the "Matrix" paradigm) then Neo never had a choice. He though he did, but he was predestined to think that.

Fortunately, the "predictions" of the "oracle" were explained in "Reloaded" as (basically) resultant wisdom from having seen the (almost) exact same occurances everytime the Matrix started over again.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by CJames
I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

I don't think it really has as much to do with the mind as you indicate here, since we have to introduce an omnipotent being anyway (in order to sustain a "predestination" paradigm, that is).

You are right that Quantum Mechanics, as it is currently understood, doesn't allow for any kind of predestination (at least, not with 100% accuracy), but Quantum Mechanics (like free will itself) may be an illusion, put forth by the Omnipotent Being to trick us (not that such "tricking" would really be necessary, since He could make us believe whatever He wanted).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Royce
F may choose chocolate 10 times in a row but the odds that he will choose vanilla next is still 50:50. To say that the odds that F will choose chocolate are 7:3 in one sample of one event is saying that F does not have free will and must keep track of how many times he has chosen chocolate and then choose the next time accordingly.

No, it's saying no such thing, since each event of F choosing one or the other occurs in a parallel universe, thus the events are independent of each other. If we are correct in saying that the odds of F choosing chocolate are 70%, then in any given sample of 10 observations we may see any kind of results, ranging from all 10 being chocolate to all 10 being vanilla. But if we take a whole bunch of samples of size 10, then we will inevitably see our average result converging on a ratio of 7:3.

It is not that F ignores his propensity for chocolate or ignores any and all external and internal influences. It is as observers observing one isolated event have no way of knowing any or all of those influences and as observers can only say that he will choose one or the other.

We don't have to know the influences to know the odds. Saying that there is a 70% chance that F chooses chocolate is equivalent to saying that if you compare all the infinite parallel universe incarnations of F to each other, 70% of those will choose chocolate and 30% will choose vanilla. The more samples we take, the more our sample data converges on this 'true' ratio; that is just a mathematically proven fact of statistics. With no information about F, we can't predict anything beyond 50/50 odds. But with a sufficiently large sample, we can say beyond all reasonable doubt that the chance that F chooses chocolate is actually (say) 70%, not 50%.

If a coin is flipped 100 times and it comes up heads 99 time the odds of it coming up tails the 100th time is still 50:50. Casinoes make fortunes off of people who believe otherwise.

That's right, assuming the coin is fair-- i.e., that there really is an even odds of getting heads or tails. But in fact, the probability of getting 99 straight heads on 99 flips of a fair coin is .5^99 = 1.58 x 10^-30, in other words 1 in one hundred billion billion billion. With odds that astronomically low, doesn't it begin to make you suspicious of your initial assumption that the coin is really not biased?

Anyway if F has free will to us as observers only it will appear random if we observe only one event. With a history or sample of many events we can say that F has a 70% preference for chocolate but still chooses vanilla 30% of the time. None of this has any bearing on the one next choise as far as we observers are concerned.

But it does-- if our sample is large enough, it very strongly indicates that there is really a 70% chance F will choose chocolate on the next observation, not a 50% chance. The strength of the indication is proportionate to the size of the sample, so we can make our conviction as to the true chances arbitrarily strong with arbitrarily many samples.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
But still, without emotions we wouldn't feel anything, let alone what it's like to be free. As for analytical thinking -- in and of itself -- I think it would be fair to say that it's essentially deterministic, so long as there are no feelings associated to give it "value." Here's your problem with science right there ...

Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos. Or, perchance we might discover the third option, which is the "happy medium" in the middle, where we learn to live our lives freely and responsibly.

And I think compatiblism is that middle road.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by CJames
Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The argument that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

First you must understand that an electron, for example, is not a billiard ball. It is a statistical wave, a wavefunction, that describes the probabilities of its location, it's velocity, etc. From this an electon shell is much more complex, and the interaction between two electron shells surrounding two atoms becomes even more complex.

It is theoretically impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the motion of two atoms comming in contact. With that in mind, the complex interactions between billions of atoms in the throw of a die is a hail marry. It is impossible to predict the land of the dice. Only the probabilities of how the dice land is predictable. It can be predicted to an accuracey much higher than one in six, but it can not be 100%.

This inherent indeterminacey in nature leaves room for free will, though there is also the possibility of a "radom will" or a "probabilistic will." Of course, the differences between a free will and a random one may simply boil down to your point of view.

Ok then let me ask you this. Let's for arugments sake- challenge indeterminency. Most things are ordered at a higher level, and can be predicted. We can predict with chromosome makeup that if billy's mom and dad both have blue eyes, and all their ancestors had blue eyes, then billy will have blue eyes. Indeterminecy to me seems like more of a "we don't know so we're making it random" theory. It's true you would need massive amounts of computing power to calculate the interaction of billions of atoms. It could be likened to plotting the rotational pathways of a thousand solar system's planets simultaneously. I don't call that random. I call that beyond our current ability to do. There are patterns in everything. If we could determine the pathway of one single electron, just one, then we can follow them all. It's all a mattere of having the capability to do it.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. anyone time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for anyone time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact science as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

An oracle supposedly sees all time as one. The past, the present and future are all the same and simutanious. An oracle sees the future as already having happened. The Oracle had seen that Neo had already chosen in his future. Not that is was predetermined but that is had already happened. This had nothing to do will free will or determinism but seeing the future as it had already happened. Could Neo still choose differently? Yes, but then the Oracle would have seen that different choice. Like time travel it can only happen if it has already happened. One could easily go nuts trying to figure this out.

But what you're not understanding is that determinism isn't dealing with probability. Determinism is absolute certainty. There is no element of randomness at all, because there is only one choice. From the perspective of the chooser, he does have a choice. But we as deterministic observers see that he will choose chocolate based on everything pertaining to this choice directly or indirectly. His selection becomes as obvious as 1+1=2 because there is only one answer.

As for neo, the answer is no he couldn't choose differently. Unless something changed the course of events. He will inevitably make the same choice, because he was meant to make that choice- this is his path. It's like when he first met the oracle and broke the vase. Remember she said "what's really going to bake your noodle, is would you have still broken it if I hadn't told you about it" The answer is yes because he was meant to break the vase.

It is complexed but if you follow the logic of determinency, it can be proven if you take some liberties with computations.

 

[Zantra]

People we're basically sitting here- one trying to prove that nothing is 100 percent, the other trying to prove that everything is 100 percent. It's likened to proving infinity. I can't prove that t he universe never ends, because if it never ends, than I'll never reach the end to tell you. Based on our current knowledge, this is the same thing. You can't PROVE that probablility can't be ascertained to 100 percent anymore than I can prove it can't. At best all we can say is "AS FAR AS WE KNOW". Everything else is just assumption.

 

[KitNyx]

One thing about this thread that I do not agree with: We are taking for granted that predestination is not the person in questions choice. For the sake of arguement, let's say "God" is the "being" creating these destinies. Who is to say that "He" (God), does not know what decision you will make? This makes things more difficult because now we have predestined freewill. As long as "God" knows the outcome of every interaction in a persons life then it could be said that our persons life is predetermined, yet because our person does not see the future, he/she has the illusion of freewill. This has actually already been discussed, but in this case I do not see where or why there would be ANY variation between two parallel universe, one with predestination, one with freewill.

Or, to mix this up further, what if "God" knew the outcome of EVERY possible choice you could make? This would be a true blending of freewill AND predestination. This theory works very well with the popular multiverse theories.

I mention these theories, but in my opinion all of them refute the existence of "God". The idea of strict freewill denies the existence of an omnisceint being. The idea of predestination refutes the division between Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell. The multiverse idea leads to the most interesting problems. It leads us to the belief in each person having an infinite number of souls, each needing to be individually judged. In my opinion, this again refutes the existence of Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell.

Honestly, I do not see how any of these theories can sustain the belief of a "being" that creates our destinies. Hence, the only theory that stands is absolute freewill without "God".

- KitNyx

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by KitNyx
Or, to mix this up further, what if "God" knew the outcome of EVERY possible choice you could make? This would be a true blending of freewill AND predestination. This theory works very well with the popular multiverse theories.

With God being omniscient, then that means He knows everything, whether He set the universe up as a matter of free will or not. And, the only reason He can forsee the future is because He "knows" us that well. Thus it seems conspicuous that he set us up to experience free will. Or else why bother to create us, if only to see His own reflection? It would have been much easier to create a mirror.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Please indicate to me how what you have just said is not in agreement with what I said in the last post, or how exactly I'm missing your point. What you say here doesn't seem to be inconsistent with what I said.

LOL. You're right, it's not inconsistent with what you said. It's just that I think you missed the point, and that is that a deterministic universe is incompatable with quantum mechanics.

Peace.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by KitNyx
One thing about this thread that I do not agree with: We are taking for granted that predestination is not the person in questions choice. For the sake of arguement, let's say "God" is the "being" creating these destinies. Who is to say that "He" (God), does not know what decision you will make? This makes things more difficult because now we have predestined freewill. As long as "God" knows the outcome of every interaction in a persons life then it could be said that our persons life is predetermined, yet because our person does not see the future, he/she has the illusion of freewill. This has actually already been discussed, but in this case I do not see where or why there would be ANY variation between two parallel universe, one with predestination, one with freewill.

Or, to mix this up further, what if "God" knew the outcome of EVERY possible choice you could make? This would be a true blending of freewill AND predestination. This theory works very well with the popular multiverse theories.

I mention these theories, but in my opinion all of them refute the existence of "God". The idea of strict freewill denies the existence of an omnisceint being. The idea of predestination refutes the division between Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell. The multiverse idea leads to the most interesting problems. It leads us to the belief in each person having an infinite number of souls, each needing to be individually judged. In my opinion, this again refutes the existence of Good and Evil, divine judgement, and heaven and hell.

Honestly, I do not see how any of these theories can sustain the belief of a "being" that creates our destinies. Hence, the only theory that stands is absolute freewill without "God".

- KitNyx

If you're talking about free will with prior knowledge, then it's by defenition a paradox. It may be the illusion of free will, from the perspective of the person living it, but in actuality it's predtermism, because the outcome is known. Percieved free will, is not absolute free will. Which is where the theory of compatible determinism comes into play.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
LOL. You're right, it's not inconsistent with what you said. It's just that I think you missed the point, and that is that a deterministic universe is incompatable with quantum mechanics.

Peace.

Yeah, and I addressed exactly this point in my post. So let's quit the condescending laughter and read more carefully.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok then let me ask you this. Let's for arugments sake- challenge indeterminency. Most things are ordered at a higher level, and can be predicted. We can predict with chromosome makeup that if billy's mom and dad both have blue eyes, and all their ancestors had blue eyes, then billy will have blue eyes. Indeterminecy to me seems like more of a "we don't know so we're making it random" theory. It's true you would need massive amounts of computing power to calculate the interaction of billions of atoms. It could be likened to plotting the rotational pathways of a thousand solar system's planets simultaneously. I don't call that random. I call that beyond our current ability to do. There are patterns in everything. If we could determine the pathway of one single electron, just one, then we can follow them all. It's all a mattere of having the capability to do it.

It's not totally random. As I explained in a later post, chaos theory looks for those patterns. If you were to take it beyond chaos theory's capabilities and could instead model the entire system atom by atom, you could theoretically calculate the exact probability that the child's eyes would be blue. This value will be extremely close to 100%, but it won't be 100%. To use a real-life example, mutations in genetic code are relatively common. Enough so for even viruses to evolve.

EDIT: The last part about determining the pathway of a single electron is your misconception. That is an impossibility. To know an electron's position you must observe it with, say, a photon. But by detecting its existence with this photon you are altering its velocity dramatically. In this way, only varying degrees of velocity and position can be determined with certain accuracys.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by Mentat
I don't think it really has as much to do with the mind as you indicate here, since we have to introduce an omnipotent being anyway (in order to sustain a "predestination" paradigm, that is).

You are right that Quantum Mechanics, as it is currently understood, doesn't allow for any kind of predestination (at least, not with 100% accuracy), but Quantum Mechanics (like free will itself) may be an illusion, put forth by the Omnipotent Being to trick us (not that such "tricking" would really be necessary, since He could make us believe whatever He wanted).

I don't think predestination is exactly the same as determinism, however. The idea behind determinism is that each subatomic particle obeys a clockwork set of rules, meaning that every point in the future would be determined exactly by the laws of physics. But now that the laws of physics are not so clockwork, this is no longer the case.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Yeah, and I addressed exactly this point in my post. So let's quit the condescending laughter and read more carefully.

The unfortunate thing about a forum is that you can't read other expressions. I put the LOL in there with the hopes of lightning the mood, but it kinda comes off condescending. In any case, you may be right that I didn't read carefully enough.

This is why I thought you missed my point:

The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Maybe by physical theories you meant classical theories? This is crucial because quantum mechanics is a physical theory.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
The unfortunate thing about a forum is that you can't read other expressions. I put the LOL in there with the hopes of lightning the mood, but it kinda comes off condescending. In any case, you may be right that I didn't read carefully enough.

This is why I thought you missed my point:

The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Maybe by physical theories you meant classical theories? This is crucial because quantum mechanics is a physical theory.

Sorry if I misinterpretted your message, CJames. We cool baby, we cool.

I also probably obscured the issue with my language. I meant 'the determined' in the above to be an analog to a rigidly deterministic character in a quantum-indeterminate world. Hence, I spoke of D as perhaps having something like 99.99997% odds of choosing chocolate instead of 100%, with the small uncertainty due to quirky quantum effects.

I recognize that theoretically speaking, it's impossible to predict anything with 100% accuracy. But the indeterminacy of quantum effects drops drastically as scale increases, and I don't see how quantum effects could have anything more than a very negligible impact on human choice. For instance, a computer processes information on a scale much smaller than the human brain, and in fact even owes its very functionality to some of the principles of quantum mechanics. But having said this, the behavior of computers is extremely regular and predictable (insert Windows joke here ); if quantum effects don't make our computers act strangely indeterminate, I don't see how they could have a meaningful 'indetermining' effect on the much coarser scale of neurons in the human brain.

So we take it for granted that nothing is 100% predictable-- it follows that any choice a person has made could have been made differently, and thus the person by definition has free will. Or do they? Are we satisfied to equate free will with the infinitesimal chance that some weird quantum effect might influence one of our choices one day and nudge us in the other direction? I think this doesn't really capture the spirit of what is meant by free will.

I also threw out the notion that one with free will could be defined as one whose behavior cannot be predicted by physical theories to account for this 'spirit' of the term 'free will.' Thus, while D's behavior is not really fixed since there is an infinitesimal chance he might choose vanilla, he is still basically 'determinate' insofar as there's an almost 100% chance he chooses chocolate, and this result at least should be in complete agreement with existing physical theories. I don't know if it's really physical-theoretically tenable to say that F has a 70% chance of choosing chocolate, but this view seems to better characterize the notion that F has some meaningful room for freedom in his choice.

 

[CJames]

if quantum effects don't make our computers act strangely indeterminate, I don't see how they could have a meaningful 'indetermining' effect on the much coarser scale of neurons in the human brain.

Neurons are much larger than transistors, but the two are very different systems. A transistor is designed rigidly to be either "on" or "off." A neuron is designed more to send a "random" signal, reinforced by past signals and their effect. This random element is impossible in a deterministic universe. There have actually been software symulations that treat neurons as though they were subatomic particles, and the results are highly encouraging, revealing neural nets that can learn and make decisions. Synaptic gaps require chemical effects as well as electric ones. Molecules are quite QM based.

So we take it for granted that nothing is 100% predictable-- it follows that any choice a person has made could have been made differently, and thus the person by definition has free will. Or do they? Are we satisfied to equate free will with the infinitesimal chance that some weird quantum effect might influence one of our choices one day and nudge us in the other direction? I think this doesn't really capture the spirit of what is meant by free will.

Again, I did only say that QM leaves room for free will, it doesn't imply it. However, it would be more correct to say that quantum mechanics on a large scale (more correctly chaos theory) is influencing every choice we make. Why does a mind made of interactions between various wavefunctions not capture the spirit of free will?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
Neurons are much larger than transistors, but the two are very different systems. A transistor is designed rigidly to be either "on" or "off." A neuron is designed more to send a "random" signal, reinforced by past signals and their effect. This random element is impossible in a deterministic universe. There have actually been software symulations that treat neurons as though they were subatomic particles, and the results are highly encouraging, revealing neural nets that can learn and make decisions. Synaptic gaps require chemical effects as well as electric ones. Molecules are quite QM based.

Neurons are more complex in their functionality than transistors, this is true. But the basic premise is the same-- neurons are either 'on' or 'off' depending on their electrostatic potential with respect to the surrounding environment. This having been said, neurons are not 'off' all the time-- they do exhibit a sort of 'random' or rest activation level even when they are not strongly stimulated, but I don't see any theoretical reason why this could not be explained in terms of continuous fluctuations in the neurons' potentials in addition to weak ambient signals bouncing around in the brain. Additionally, this effect is not as important as it might seem since the strength of a neural signal is determined by how rapidly a neuron fires. So though neurons have a 'resting' rate of activation, it is essentially the equivalent of a non-signal, or at least a very weak one, compared to the higher rates of firing which are actively reinforced by direct stimulation.

It is also true that a neuron's behavior is dependent on the transmission of molecular neurotransmitters, which themselves reside within the domain of quantum effects. However, it takes not one but a whole bunch of neurotransmitters to activate a neuron sufficiently to get it firing. I would think that this dependence on large quantities of neurotransmitters would in effect average out the influence of quirky quantum behavior of individual molecules on the firing of the neuron, thus making the quantum effects again relatively unimportant.

Again, I did only say that QM leaves room for free will, it doesn't imply it. However, it would be more correct to say that quantum mechanics on a large scale (more correctly chaos theory) is influencing every choice we make. Why does a mind made of interactions between various wavefunctions not capture the spirit of free will?

In one sense it does, if the indeterminacy/randomness that these wavefunction interactions introduce is really significant. If this uncertainty makes a certain choice 99.9999999% certain (in the parallel universe sense of probability), then for all practical purposes we can speak of this system as if it is deterministic. If it allows for significant 'breathing room' in the decision making process-- even, say, a 90/10 or 95/5 split in a binary decision-- then we can't equate such a system with determinism and must allow that it is meaningful to say, yes, the decision could have been made differently.

In another sense, wavefunction interactions don't capture the spirit of free will, which was one of the main points I've been trying to make. In addition to my definition of free will at the outset of this thread, there is the notion that the posited freedom of choice is under the discretion and control of the individual. But if we explain the room for freedom in terms of wavefunction interactions, it implies that choices can be made freely only by virtue of randomness, which by definition cannot be controlled.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by CJames
I don't think predestination is exactly the same as determinism, however. The idea behind determinism is that each subatomic particle obeys a clockwork set of rules, meaning that every point in the future would be determined exactly by the laws of physics. But now that the laws of physics are not so clockwork, this is no longer the case.

You are right, of course, but that doesn't preclude the possibility (in principle) that all of the observations of indeterminacy have been predestined to occur as they did.

 

[CJames]

I'd like to say now that you are a very intelligent person, hypnogogue.

Originally posted by hypnagogue
This having been said, neurons are not 'off' all the time-- they do exhibit a sort of 'random' or rest activation level even when they are not strongly stimulated, but I don't see any theoretical reason why this could not be explained in terms of continuous fluctuations in the neurons' potentials in addition to weak ambient signals bouncing around in the brain. Additionally, this effect is not as important as it might seem since the strength of a neural signal is determined by how rapidly a neuron fires. So though neurons have a 'resting' rate of activation, it is essentially the equivalent of a non-signal, or at least a very weak one, compared to the higher rates of firing which are actively reinforced by direct stimulation.

But you must consider that the "direct stimulation" came from somewhere. A great example from chaos theory is that when a butterfly flaps its wings, a few months later this can mean the difference between rain and sunshine hundreds of miles away. (The butterly effect.) In the same way, of the random weak signals sent by various neurons in the brain, some of these signals will by chance come together and grow larger and larger until they become a main or "on" signal. In the same way that chaos theory show us it is impossible to predict the whether months in advance, it is just as impossible to predict a choice very far in advance, until the probability increases (as one signal or the other becomes stronger) to near 100%, at which point I would argue the decision has essentially been made already. Keep in mind that the decision to have icecream in the first place way likely a random response to a general lowering of dopamine levels in the brain, a choice made from many alternatives.

It is also true that a neuron's behavior is dependent on the transmission of molecular neurotransmitters, which themselves reside within the domain of quantum effects. However, it takes not one but a whole bunch of neurotransmitters to activate a neuron sufficiently to get it firing. I would think that this dependence on large quantities of neurotransmitters would in effect average out the influence of quirky quantum behavior of individual molecules on the firing of the neuron, thus making the quantum effects again relatively unimportant.

Depending what you consider important. The position and velocity of a single molecule could ultimately determine whether a singnal is on or off, via the butterfly effect. Since the position and velocity of a single molecule is quantum mechanical in nature, it's very important to the overall effect.

In one sense it does, if the indeterminacy/randomness that these wavefunction interactions introduce is really significant. If this uncertainty makes a certain choice 99.9999999% certain (in the parallel universe sense of probability), then for all practical purposes we can speak of this system as if it is deterministic. If it allows for significant 'breathing room' in the decision making process-- even, say, a 90/10 or 95/5 split in a binary decision-- then we can't equate such a system with determinism and must allow that it is meaningful to say, yes, the decision could have been made differently.

It depends when you take the measurement what the probability is. I can't say for sure when it becomes more certain, but by the time it gets up to 99.99999% the decision has pretty much been made.

In another sense, wavefunction interactions don't capture the spirit of free will, which was one of the main points I've been trying to make. In addition to my definition of free will at the outset of this thread, there is the notion that the posited freedom of choice is under the discretion and control of the individual. But if we explain the room for freedom in terms of wavefunction interactions, it implies that choices can be made freely only by virtue of randomness, which by definition cannot be controlled.

Remember what the individual is though. The individual's mind is supposed to be the overall effect of all the behavior going on in the brain. The choice may be made by virtue of randomness, but this randomness is part of the individual, and thus the choice was made by the individual.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
I'd like to say now that you are a very intelligent person, hypnogogue.

Thanks CJames, I'd have to say the same about you since you definitely make me question my ideas.

But you must consider that the "direct stimulation" came from somewhere. A great example from chaos theory is that when a butterfly flaps its wings, a few months later this can mean the difference between rain and sunshine hundreds of miles away. (The butterly effect.) In the same way, of the random weak signals sent by various neurons in the brain, some of these signals will by chance come together and grow larger and larger until they become a main or "on" signal. In the same way that chaos theory show us it is impossible to predict the whether months in advance, it is just as impossible to predict a choice very far in advance, until the probability increases (as one signal or the other becomes stronger) to near 100%, at which point I would argue the decision has essentially been made already. Keep in mind that the decision to have icecream in the first place way likely a random response to a general lowering of dopamine levels in the brain, a choice made from many alternatives.

I admit I haven't read up extensively on chaos theory, but it seems to me that the butterfly effect, although intractable to predict, still ultimately functions as a deterministic process. Likewise, weak ambient signals in the brain may snowball into something meaningful on a large scale, but it seems that this is still ultimately a deterministic process. To call something truly random (indeterminate), do we not have to make recourse to quantum indeterminacy?

I would say that the principle cause of 'direct stimulation' of neurons comes from input from the sensory organs, which sets everything else off in a cascade of mental events. While weak signals can in principle snowball to something much greater, this process itself must take place against the greater backdrop of ongoing activity in the brain. This greater activity can be seen both as a necessary condition to allow the snowballing effect to take hold, and as an inertial condition resisting chaotic fluctuations. What I'm getting at is that it's not clear to what extent and how often such chaotic fluctuations make a big difference in brain activity.

Depending what you consider important. The position and velocity of a single molecule could ultimately determine whether a singnal is on or off, via the butterfly effect. Since the position and velocity of a single molecule is quantum mechanical in nature, it's very important to the overall effect.

This is true, but if these molecules are really acting randomly, then the random tendency to promote the chaotic snowballing effect could equally be counterbalanced by the random tendency to not promote such fluctuations. So again, I agree that in principle such an effect could take place, but it's not clear in a practical context how much it influences our day to day activity.

Remember what the individual is though. The individual's mind is supposed to be the overall effect of all the behavior going on in the brain. The choice may be made by virtue of randomness, but this randomness is part of the individual, and thus the choice was made by the individual.

I absolutely agree with this sentiment-- it's why I believe that even in a deterministic framework the individual's choice is his own. If free will is to be explained by random fluctuations in the position and velocity of neurotransmitters, then we can say that the freedom of choice is part of the individual's unique makeup. However, we can't say that the individual is controlling his freedom. Rather, we'd have to say that the individual has freedom of choice only by virtue of randomness-- he may be 'jolted' into a new perspective thanks to quantum uncertainty, but he can't consciously bring this 'jolting' into effect through willpower or directed thought. His freedom comes only by his tendency to be affected by his own randomness.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Thanks CJames, I'd have to say the same about you since you definitely make me question my ideas.

I admit I haven't read up extensively on chaos theory, but it seems to me that the butterfly effect, although intractable to predict, still ultimately functions as a deterministic process. Likewise, weak ambient signals in the brain may snowball into something meaningful on a large scale, but it seems that this is still ultimately a deterministic process. To call something truly random (indeterminate), do we not have to make recourse to quantum indeterminacy?

That's why I keep going back and forth between chaos theory and quantum mechanics. Chaos theory isn't actually a part of quantum mechanics, but it's the macroscopic result of quantum mechanics.

Allow me to present an example. Imagine trying to balance a perfect diamond on its tip. Further imagine that this diamond is in a vacuum, and that it is being placed on a crystaline plain by a robotic arm oriented as perfectly possible as we can make it. When this diamond is released, it will fall a different direction every time. Why? The diamond is a crystal latice, its tip is just a few atoms, if that, across. Quantum uncertainty dictates that these few atoms are really statistical waves, and the diamond leans slightly due to this. Eventually the whole diamond falls over.

The primary variable in this expiriment is the atoms at the tip of the diamond, though some other factors ultimately contribute as well. This is an easily seen example of how quantum randomness ultimately effects the macroscopic world seen as chaos theory.

In the butterfly effect, one flap of the wing generates a small air movement. But even if the air around the butterfly is perfectly still, and the wing is perfectly shaped, this puff of air will alter in shape very shortly after the flap. A puff of air can't be treated like a simple point, it has to be treated as a dynamic system of millions of interacting particles, as even fluid dynamics breaks down beyond a certain point. The domination of this air puff gets less and less visible until it has blended in with all other fluctuations in the air. But the slight deveations it made throughout the system are expressed along with other things as a huge difference in the whether much later. There's nothing deterministic about it. The same butterfly can flap it's wings in an infinite number of universes, as the only change in the entire universe, and the wheather will still be different in each universe months later.

I would say that the principle cause of 'direct stimulation' of neurons comes from input from the sensory organs, which sets everything else off in a cascade of mental events. While weak signals can in principle snowball to something much greater, this process itself must take place against the greater backdrop of ongoing activity in the brain. This greater activity can be seen both as a necessary condition to allow the snowballing effect to take hold, and as an inertial condition resisting chaotic fluctuations. What I'm getting at is that it's not clear to what extent and how often such chaotic fluctuations make a big difference in brain activity.

If I'm not hungry, nobody's mentioned ice cream, and I'm pretty happy, what could drive me to suddenly decide I want some icecream? Randomness.

This is true, but if these molecules are really acting randomly, then the random tendency to promote the chaotic snowballing effect could equally be counterbalanced by the random tendency to not promote such fluctuations. So again, I agree that in principle such an effect could take place, but it's not clear in a practical context how much it influences our day to day activity.

Except that it isn't as shown by chaos theory. Randomness on a small scale doesn't blend away to uniformity, it is exagerated immensely. This is why so many things tend to come in waves, why a lot of things happen simultaneously, for no apparent reason at all.

I absolutely agree with this sentiment-- it's why I believe that even in a deterministic framework the individual's choice is his own. If free will is to be explained by random fluctuations in the position and velocity of neurotransmitters, then we can say that the freedom of choice is part of the individual's unique makeup. However, we can't say that the individual is controlling his freedom. Rather, we'd have to say that the individual has freedom of choice only by virtue of randomness-- he may be 'jolted' into a new perspective thanks to quantum uncertainty, but he can't consciously bring this 'jolting' into effect through willpower or directed thought. His freedom comes only by his tendency to be affected by his own randomness.

Willpower and directed thought are the emmergent properties of this jolting effect, so in that sense you're right. But you can't separate willpower from this randomness. The end result is still an individual that does what it wants when it wants, or chooses not to.

 

[metacristi]

CJames

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.


Actually that's incorrect. Even as things get larger than h-bar, quantum indeterminancey still holds. It's true that things behave more classically, but not fully deterministic. A die made of indeterminit atoms can't be fully deterministic, no matter what. There is always a degree of uncertainty no matter how small. Chaos theory investigates the macroscopic result of that indeterminacey. If you try to balance a pen on its head, it's impossible to predict what direction it will fall. What you can do, is look for patterns in this behavior.

Incidentally, this thread is really about conciousness and if you assume that it comes from the brain, then you have to consider the fact that every synaptic gap is a quantum realm of "full" indeterminacey.

James,we talk here of the usual definition of 'determinism' (correlated with 'randomness') in accordance with the requirements of science and the scientific method.All subsistems (for we cannot 'run' the Universe itself from the same initial conditions) which when ran from the same (indistinguishable experimentally) initial conditions present the same behaviour at least for a limited (experimentally accesible) period of time (in the case of chaotic systems the interval of accurate predictions is given by the Liapunov exponents) are deterministic.Otherwise they are random.

Basically we cannot prove that the universe itself is deterministic or random in the absolute sense (not to mention that there is no way to disprove the existence of a deity who chooses how the 'dice' are thrown at quantum level-though,maybe,there is no mathematical formula to model them exactly).The Copenhagen Interpretation is not enough,there are alternative interpretations fully compatible with the standard mathematical formalism of QM and determinism,at least at quantum level (de Broglie-Bohm's interpretation of QM).

There is no proof that chaotic systems are so because of quantum events (though I cannot deny such a possibility).All we know is that the macroscopic level is an emergent property of matter where deterministic laws (as I defined them above) reign.To make the constatation that a specific subsystem is deterministic (chaotic or deterministic clasically) we do not need to have the exact position of all its atoms.

It's enough to make the constatation that initial conditions, indistinguishable experimentally,lead to the same behaviour in time,at least for a limited period of time (the case of chaotic systems).For that there is no need to have a good model of the subsystem,all we need is to be able to 'run' it again experimentally.

In this context the flipping of a coin or the 'dice' problem are fully deterministic processes,they are not even chaotic,as I've argued previously.The 'randomness' is introduced by our inability to control the initial parameters inside a small enough range (anyway macroscopic way above quantum level).As I've argued there are some cases when we can actually predict the outcome of a dice roll,providing a small enough range of errors in the knowledge of the initial conditions (besides some initial parameters are fully macroscopical).

Are all macroscopic phenomena determnistic (fully deterministic or chaotic)?.The reality is that we do not know.There are many macroscopic processes we deem now as being stochastic but this entirely due to the fact that we are not able to predict their behaviour.Especially due to their complexity.For example the 'background noise' is a stochastic process however no one can claim that it is intrinsically so.Indeed it can be a chaotic process or even a fully deterministic one but tremendously complex so that basically we have no chance to establish that,at least now.

The problem of consciousness is directly related with the above considerations.The actual emergentist-computational theory claim that consciousness is entirely a macroscopic phenomenon being also a very complex emergent property of matter.Though I am a supporter of Penrose-Hameroff's 'quantum consciousness' approach,the reality is that now we have no experimental 'confirmation' that consciousness does have a connection with the quantum level.

It' not clear now whether this (macroscopical) emergentist approach support the reductionism of consciousness at the laws of physics or chemistry.It postulates however that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon,dependent also of previous states of the brain,that can be modeled:it is dependent of some initial conditions of the brain's 'neural network' which,very possible,might not be reduced entirely at the laws of physics and chemistry (but this does not make it less deterministic).That is,though not directly,it questions the existence of the 'libertarian' free will.From what I've read some say that consciousness is a chaotic phenomenon,being also very complex,so that we will have big problems in establishing its true nature.

The libertarian free will needs the existence of an 'element' that it is neither fully random nor deterministic.Or in nature we know (apparently at least) only random and deterministic processes (chaotic determinism included).There is nothing left to choose...Still our ignorance of today does not mean it cannot exist,my suggestion is to remain open to such a possibility...the actual emergentist approach might prove unable (though possible will never be disproved experimentally) to explain all features of consciousness as we know it...

 

[Zantra]

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