How do atoms build thoughts and emotions?

[martinbn]

Physicist Carlo Rovelli recently proclaimed that consciousness is just another physical thing, ...

(https://iai.tv/articles/consciousness-is-not-an-object-we-can-observe-auid-3608)

Where did Rovelli say that?

 

[Herman Trivilino]

All due respect to a professor of philosophy, but professors of medicine and professors of psychology routinely observe consciousness.

It seems Frank did state that we don't observe consciousness. But then he made a statement about the way in which we observe it, which seems a contradiction.

Consciousness does not observe itself in the way we observe objects; rather, it dissolves the distinction between observer and observed altogether.

The next time you are observing your own consciousness look for the one who's doing the observing. Sam Harris has written and spoken about this extensively.

Whatever is doing that observing is the same as what is being observed.

That seems unique.

Another unique thing is that you can't observe someone else's consciousness.

 

[gentzen]

Consciousness is not an object we can observe

Materialism misses the self-awareness built into consciousness

Physicist Carlo Rovelli recently proclaimed that consciousness is just another physical thing, while materialist philosophers argue that consciousness is simply one brain state observing another.

Well, consciousness is not an object, not a thing, and not one brain state.

But whether physicists really claim that remains unclear to me. That is why I had that disagreement with Motore:

But I object when you use words or concepts so carelessly as to blur that difference.

I don't see how I'm blurring the difference, I'm just using standard definitions. A single frozen state isn't a process, but the continuous evolution of those states is.

My problem with the last statement is that the continuous evolution of a state is something that can be observed, at least in principle. Just like an object, a thing, or a brain state.

But consciousness cannot be observed in a similar way. The consequences of a process can be observed, what went in and what came out. Similar for consciousness. Maybe you can also subdivide a process into smaller steps, with intermediate results that can also be observed in principle. But concluding from this that every process can be subdivided into infinitesimally small steps (all with intermediate results that can be observed in principle), and that every process is in fact such a collection of infinitesimal steps? I don't think that is justified.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Where did Rovelli say that?

Probably, this website may be of help:

https://www.noemamag.com/there-is-no-hard-problem-of-consciousness/

 

[Dale]

Another unique thing is that you can't observe someone else's consciousness.

Again, medical and psychological researchers observe other people's consciousness on a very regular basis. And they publish their findings in the professional scientific literature.

 

[PeroK]

What would a human without consciousness be like? I would say that a large part of our intellectual, analytical and emotional identity would have to disappear.

From that point of view consciousness is being objectively observed all the time.

I would disagree with the philosophers who see consciousness as a mystical added extra. It's a integral part of how we function as human beings. It's easy to observe objectively. Understanding how precisely it emerges from organic chemistry is another question.

 

[Herman Trivilino]

Again, medical and psychological researchers observe other people's consciousness on a very regular basis. And they publish their findings in the professional scientific literature.

True. I was wrong about that.

Nevertheless, Frank seems to be saying that consciousness both cannot and can be observed.

I can hear Richard Feynman's mocking pronunciation in his Brooklyn accent: "philozzzophy".

 

[GRQFT]

Some of the comments in this thread seem to suggest a lack of awareness and knowledge of the field of Cognitive Neuroscience (CN), so I thought I'd provide a brief summary of a typical CN experiment.

What I'll describe is akin to how a TV repairman will inject a waveform (say a 1V peak-to-peak 1kHz sinewave) into the audio section of a broken TV to figure-out why it no longer produces sound. Of course, the repairman has an electrical schematic to assist him in his effort whereas the cognitive neuroscientist wants to obtain one.

So, let's say that the experimenter wants to assess a particular theoretical model of auditory processing whereby speech sounds undergo a transformation from the exogenous (physics-based) world to an endogenous (cognitive-based) representation. Specifically the model describes how the neural representation of speech sounds undergo several levels of abstraction including extraction of simple spectrotemporal 'edges', to larger 'contours', and then ultimately to invariant object-level representations of words.

With this as the goal we'd start by designing stimuli that will elicit a particular response at say the contour level of auditory processing. This might, for example, take the form of sounds with the same spectrotemporal properties as human speech but sans the semantic content (i.e., the sounds will not be perceived as words).

These stimuli will then be presented to the subject via a specific experimental design such as a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) discrimination task so that the results can be analyzed using signal detection theory (e.g., enabling the creation of a receiver operating characteristic curve).

While the subject is listening to the stimuli and her behavioral responses are being recorded, her physiological responses will be recorded as well. There are many different functional neuroimaging methods available including fMRI, FNIRS, SPECT, PET, EEG, MEG, etc.

Once the neuroimaging data are collected they will be analyzed using a signal processing algorithm appropriate for that imaging modality. So, let's say that we acquired the brain signals via MEG (magnetoencephalography). In that case we might use a joint time-frequency representation like event-related spectral perturbation (ERSP) to see how the power in each of the oscillatory frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta, gamma) changes relative to the pre-stimulus baseline (the changes in each band are often different, each reflecting a particular mode of processing).

With the behavioral and physiological data in hand we can then see how well they accord with the theoretical model we sought to evaluate. For example, we might look to see where in the ascending/afferent auditory pathway the stimuli generated the greatest activation. A good theoretical model will be explicit about the neuronal mechanisms occurring at each level of auditory processing and the computations they perform in these local circuits. The collective action of these circuits is what gives rise to large-scale brain activity, and that's what's recorded by the functional neuroimaging method.

When done properly, an experiment as described above will provide insight into how physics-based stimuli are transformed to mental representations. If we then use our knowledge of neuroscience (vs cognitive neuroscience) as to how neurons function, and how they're built-up from atoms and molecules, we can begin to provide a rough sketch that addresses the OP's question.

 

[gentzen]

Well, consciousness is not an object, not a thing, and not one brain state.

But whether physicists really claim that remains unclear to me.

Probably, this website may be of help:

https://www.noemamag.com/there-is-no-hard-problem-of-consciousness/

At least Carlo Rovelli on that website does not claim consciousness to be an "object", "thing", or "brain state":

“Red,” as a qualia, is the name of the process we generally undergo when we see or remember or think about the color red.

“Consciousness” and “experience” are names we use to denote events that happen inside us, that make us.

We have souls. We have an inner self. We can treat ourselves as transcendental subjects in the Kantian sense. We have emotions and spiritual life; we experience qualia. These entities are not obtained by addition to a physical state, but by subtraction from a complete physical account. Mental processes are physical processes described in a way that captures only their salient characteristics.

In fact, most often he uses the word "process". Even so he uses "events" only once, the way he uses it shows that it is an acceptable description for him. He also uses "physical state" only once, and here the context hints that he is describing the image of Chalmers and his followers, which he rejects.

 

[Demystifier]

All due respect to a professor of philosophy, but professors of medicine and professors of psychology routinely observe consciousness. And they have published many of their observations in the professional scientific literature.

Technically, they observe a correlate of consciousness, not consciousness itself.

 

[Dale]

Technically, they observe a correlate of consciousness, not consciousness itself.

Yes. That is true of every measurement of any measurand.

 

[javisot]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_neuroscience

Of that entire list, there is one problem that, from my point of view, is the most important, since its solution could alter the solutions to the other problems: "Do quantum mechanical phenomena, such as entanglement and superposition, play an important part in the brain's function and can it explain critical aspects of consciousness?"

Everyone knows that Penrose and Hameroff's proposal is incorrect, but the question remains.

 

[Dale]

Do quantum mechanical phenomena, such as entanglement and superposition, play an important part in the brain's function and can it explain critical aspects of consciousness?

To my knowledge there is neither any theoretical nor any empirical reason to believe that this question is likely to be answered “yes”.

 

[Demystifier]

Yes. That is true of every measurement of any measurand.

Yes, but there is a difference. When you measure a correlate of a physical quantity, you establish a correlation of one quantity with another quantity. But when you measure a correlate of consciousness, you establish a correlation of a quantity with a quality. For instance, even though the measurement of the mass of the Higgs particle is very indirect, at least the mass of the Higgs is a quantity. By contrast, consciousness is not even a quantity.

 

[javisot]

To my knowledge there is neither any theoretical nor any empirical reason to believe that this question is likely to be answered “yes”.

I find it hard to believe that my brain is the only place in the universe where quantum effects do not exist.

For someone who believes that human beings, with their thoughts and emotions, are built from atoms, it shouldn't seem strange. It would be natural to doubt this if, like Demystifier, you hold the view that physics cannot explain everything and that consciousness is precisely one of the things it fails to explain.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

What would a human without consciousness be like?

If I would believe in physicalism - the view that everything is physical -, a human without consciousness would probably be like a sort of p-zombie?

 

[Motore]

I find it hard to believe that my brain is the only place in the universe where quantum effects do not exist.

For someone who believes that human beings, with their thoughts and emotions, are built from atoms, it shouldn't seem strange. It would be natural to doubt this if, like Demystifier, you hold the view that physics cannot explain everything and that consciousness is precisely one of the things it fails to explain.

They exist, they are just not needed to explain consciousness. In my opinion classical physics and biology is enough to explain the physical processes in the brain that give raise to emergent phenomenon we call consciousness. We don't have the full explanation yet simply because of the sheer complexity of those processes, which we currently cannot track.

 

[martinbn]

Probably, this website may be of help:

https://www.noemamag.com/there-is-no-hard-problem-of-consciousness/

I found it too, and it is a nice read, but I probably misunderstood the quote. He wrote that Rovelli proclaimed that consciousness is a physical thing. At the end he rejects the possibility that consciousness is a physical object, and I thought that those too mean the same. But Rovelli doesn't claim anything like that at all.

 

[PeroK]

If I would believe in physicalism - the view that everything is physical -, a human without consciousness would probably be like a sort of p-zombie?

Perhaps all I'm saying is that consciousness results from organic chemistry and we need nothing more.

They wouldn't be a zombie, but a lower mammal. Perhaps like a deer, that lives largely by instinct and herd mentality. I suspect that a deer has little or no consciousness.

Both deer and humans share an organic basis. The difference, IMO, is only the sophistication of our brain. In your case, you have to add something extra to distinguish how a deer lives from how a human lives. I personally can't see any reason to suppose that we are more than organic chemistry at work.

 

[javisot]

They exist, they are just not needed to explain consciousness.

You say that as if consciousness had been explained.

 

[Dale]

Yes, but there is a difference. When you measure a correlate of a physical quantity, you establish a correlation of one quantity with another quantity. But when you measure a correlate of consciousness, you establish a correlation of a quantity with a quality. For instance, even though the measurement of the mass of the Higgs particle is very indirect, at least the mass of the Higgs is a quantity. By contrast, consciousness is not even a quantity.

Yes. I agree with this as a statement about most current theories and measurements of thought. But not as a statement about thoughts themselves.

For example, I love my wife and I love my job. And the love I feel for my wife is greater than the love I feel for my job. So it seems possible that love could be quantified.

But our theories of thought are mostly not quantitative yet. And our measurements remain quite poor. So this is where the scientific work needs to be focused if we are to answer the OP’s question.

 

[Dale]

I find it hard to believe that my brain is the only place in the universe where quantum effects do not exist.

For someone who believes that human beings, with their thoughts and emotions, are built from atoms, it shouldn't seem strange. It would be natural to doubt this if, like Demystifier, you hold the view that physics cannot explain everything and that consciousness is precisely one of the things it fails to explain.

Nothing in this response is remotely related to my actual arguments or statements.

Would you prefer to try to address my actual statements on this topic, or would you prefer for me to address your strawman mischaracterization? I am willing to do either, but I do feel that the former would be more productive.

 

[Paul Colby]

Another fun question to ask is: what about free will?

This is an excellent question which is why I have the best free will money can buy.

 

[Roberto Pavani]

Short answer:
My working hypothesis is that consciousness is what happens when an information-processing system starts modelling itself and mistakes the model for an independent entity.

Long answer:

I think the first question we should clarify is whether time is fundamental or emergent.

If time is emergent, then it seems natural to regard consciousness as emergent as well. Thinking, memory, introspection, and even the notion of a persistent self all appear to require a temporal structure. Without some notion of before and after, change, comparison, and accumulation of information, it is difficult to see how consciousness, in the form we experience it, could even be formulated.

If time is not emergent and is instead a fundamental aspect of reality, the question remains open. Even then, however, it still has to be demonstrated that consciousness is something more than the result of an enormously complex network of physical, biological, and informational processes. Simply asserting that consciousness is "special" does not establish that it lies outside the scope of emergence.

As an aside, I found the recent Hugging Face incident interesting in this context. Systems built entirely from computational processes are beginning to exhibit behaviors that, at least superficially, resemble some of the features traditionally associated with consciousness: self-reference, internal representations, planning, contextual reasoning, and descriptions of their own state. This certainly does not prove that such systems are conscious. However, it makes it harder to argue that those characteristics are uniquely biological.

For that reason, I think the central question is not "How do atoms create consciousness?" but rather "What properties would make a system conscious, and why should those properties be impossible to obtain from a sufficiently complex organization of matter and information?"

A final thought.

Whether time is fundamental or emergent, and whether consciousness is fundamental or emergent, ultimately seems to matter only if the alternatives lead to different observable consequences.

If there is no possible experiment that could distinguish the two views, then the disagreement may be more about ontology than physics. In that case, why should we favor one interpretation over the other?

 

[A.T.]

For example, I love my wife and I love my job. And the love I feel for my wife is greater than the love I feel for my job.

That is your subjective comparison of your own subjective expierences.

So it seems possible that love could be quantified.

I don't see how your example suggest that you can quantify it in an objective manner, that would allow comparing your experience to someone else's.

For example:

I say: "Blue is nicer than red"
You say: "Red is nicer than blue"

We can confirm this survey using some brain scans that measure "happiness levels", while the colors are shown to us. So the objective measurement says we disagree on which color is more pleasant.

But what if red looks to me like blue looks to you, and vice versa. Then we actually agree on which color experience is nicer. And yet the objective measurement cannot capture that agreement.

 

[Motore]

You say that as if consciousness had been explained.

Did I say that? In the very next sentence I explicitly said "in my opinion," which I would presume people can read to mean it's just my opinion that we don't need quantum mechanics to explain it.

But what if red looks to me like blue looks to you, and vice versa. Then we actually agree on which color experience is nicer. And yet the objective measurement cannot capture that agreement.

How do you know it cannot? If our internal experiences are entirely tied to our physical brain states and processes, then an objective measurement of those states could theoretically capture that red looks to you the way blue looks to someone else.
You are just assuming from the start that the subjective experience is completely detached from the objective measurement, which is the exact thing we are debating.
A definition of "subjective experience" could be helpful here.

 

[A.T.]

A definition of "subjective experience" could be helpful here.

Unless you are born blind, you should know what red looks to you. This is your "subjective experience" of the color red.

... an objective measurement of those states could theoretically capture that red looks to you the way blue looks to someone else.

How would you validate that measurement?

 

[Dale]

That is your subjective comparison of your own subjective expierences.

While that is true, the discussion with @Demystifier was not about subjective vs objective. That discussion was about quantitative vs. qualitative. The fact that love can be ordered indicates that it may be possible to quantify it.

I don't see how your example suggest that you can quantify it in an objective manner, that would allow comparing your experience to someone else's.

That is an open question. It may not be possible to compare experiences in an objective manner between different persons. We don't know for sure at this time.

However, there isn't anything in the scientific method that intrinsically precludes subjective measurements nor producing theories that predict the results of subjective measurements. It may be that no quantitative theory of thought would be able to say if you love your wife more than I love mine. But even if such a theory turns out to be impossible, there still may be theories that can predict within each individual if they love their work more than their wife or vice versa.

But what if red looks to me like blue looks to you, and vice versa. Then we actually agree on which color experience is nicer. And yet the objective measurement cannot capture that agreement.

But you are assuming both that a theory of thought will have between-subject comparisons of experience and also that it needs to be able to objectively measure them. Even if such a theory has between-subject comparisons of experience, it does not follow that they must be objectively measured. There are lots of physics theories that include things in the theory that cannot be measured objectively. Why should a theory of thought be required to objectively measure everything in the theory when theories of physics don't?

What is required is that a theory must predict the measurements. If you have a theory of subjective measurements that says that you will have a measurable preference for blue and I will have a measurable preference for red, and if we measure our preferences and the result is as predicted, then the theory is validated. That is the scientific method. It doesn't matter if the theory has an unmeasurable comparison between the two of us that says my experience of blue is the same as your experience of red. As long as the predicted measurement agrees with the actual measurement the theory is valid.

 

[PeroK]

Unless you are born blind, you should know what red looks to you. This is your "subjective experience" of the color red.


How would you validate that measurement?

I don't see that having the same conception of the colour red has anything much to do with consciousness.

The difference between humans and lower animals isn't the ability to recognise colours.

Consciousness is about the ability to recognise, think and reason about oneself. What we are doing on this thread requires consciousness. It would be impossible to debate without it.

And we have the objective measure that I believe organic chemistry is sufficient to explain myself; whereas, others perceive a mystical or religious quality in themselves, which I lack.

That's not very deeply scientific. But, unless some of us are lying, that's a clear, objective difference between the way we perceive ourselves.

You can, by the way, dismantle all of science with a sufficiently solipsistic philosophy. No science can prove itself in the face of a sufficiently sceptical philosophy.