I'm starting this thread to continue a tangential discussion of interpretations, specifically Bohmian vs Copenhagen from https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=324790". As a class of phenomena "Yes" of course. As an object "No", nor do I believe in the existence of "The Universe" as a real object now. Your question shows a misunderstanding of CI or more generally of its positivism. It is as much an error to deny the existence of the moon (as an object) when it is not observed as to assert the existence of the moon (as an object) when is not observed. But there is "moon as object" and "moon as process". And the physical process we have repeatedly observed as the moon along with the observed cause and effect of physics which dictates how observations are implemented show that "the moon has not suddenly ceased to exist" by virtue of our continued existence. We can infer from experiment that a sudden failure of the moon to continue its journey about the earth would cause such upheavals, said upheavals which we continually fail to see, that we effectively are continually observing the moons existence. When collections of phenomena behave so ponderously as to be effectively in continual interaction with their environment and thus are continuously under observation of their gross properties we can then treat such as objects and utilize the reality model of classical mechanics to describe those objects at the resolution which is significantly meaningful to them. "Reality" is a model of phenomena as behaving objects with properties whose values (objective state) are always well defined. Below the level of this model is the phenomena themselves which "happen". In describing those phenomena at the classical level a "reality model" is appropriate but it is still a model. At the quantum level the use of a reality model breaks down and we should stick to the more operational description of the phenomena themselves. But don't confuse the positivism used in CI with nihilism. CI does not make assertions about the nature of reality or its absence. CI is not a philosophical theory at all. Tt rather is --as stated-- an interpretation giving the meaning of the terms and constructs in QM. It is not (as with MW or BPW) a general philosophical statement about the universe. The principle point is that in CI the wave-function we right down is "the wave function we write down" and should not be asserted to be a physical object. You are free to go beyond CIQM and assert in addition to the computational wave function a physical one. But understand that you are then going beyond QM into a realm of metaphysics. Similarly if you postulate a reality of many-worlds. If you wish to talk of such within the realm of science then you should seek empirically testable hypotheses such as means to directly observe pilot waves or communicate between parallel worlds. An unfortunate product of the historic development of QM and grappling with its interpretation is the use of terms with implicit meaning such as "state vector" or "wave function". It would be helpful if we distinguished the mathematical wave-function interpreted as CI interprets it as our representation of knowledge about a physical system from the physical wave-function asserted by other "interpretations". Those other interpretations do not deny that one in addition to thinking about physical wave-functions out there also work with the body of knowledge about the physical system which we encapsulate in a mathematical wave-function. They thus do not really deny the CI interpretation of the (mathematical) wave-function but rather overlay additional meaning. And I think we can agree that those other interpretations can accept collapsing these mathematical wave-functions as a method of calculation, just as one would collapse a classical probability distribution to a new conditional distribution (Bayesian inference) when new information is asserted. They are free to assert anything they like about their physical wave-functions. I would similarly parse through the remaining points of CI and assert that really the other "interpreters" are not denying the assertions of CI but rather overlaying (for their own reasons) additional "baggage" which for the most part does not add to the predictions of QM. Finally I would assert that these other "interpretations" should instead be referred to as "models" unless and until they either contradict or append on to the predictions of QM. CI is the "shut up and calculate" interpretation. No! the theory of general relativity --properly parsed-- tells us the behavior of physical objects (now that we're on the classical level I'll use a "reality" model and speak of classical test bodies or EM waves as objects). It may be described in terms of geometry but that is a choice of model. The equivalence principle goes both ways. We can interpret the regional gravity as a dynamic force in a regionally flat geometry or as an absence of dynamic forces in a regionally curved geometry or any of a continuum of possible mixtures. This is a "choice of gauge" roughly analogous to choosing the potential of a charged particle to be zero at infinity. The physical quantity is not the value of the potentials but differences in potential between distinct space-time events. Indeed you may reformulate GR in terms of a anisotropic variable speed of light field expressible via an refractive tensor. It is just a relabeling of the same mathematical entities used in calculating the behavior of physical objects. Ultimately geometry is a mathematical construct not an observed phenomenon. But two physicists understanding all of this can still discuss "how matter bends space-time" because the geometry model is the most efficient at encoding the physics. They use the terms always in a tentative non-literal meaning. They are using the language of the model since the model encapsulates the predictions of the theory (but not necessarily uniquely). At the same time physicists must be careful using "language of the model" short hand because one may (and I have seen this happen many times) get caught up in arguments about differences in model components which do not upon careful investigation yield differences in observations.