Is Consciousness Just the Result of Electrical Activity in Our Brains?

[RingoKid]

If consciousness exists as it must for us to rationalise the universe we live in then where does it exist. Solely in the brain or outside of it ?

I say outside in line with dualist schools of thought. That would make the best candidates for this dimension of consciousness we have so far being wrapped up in every point of 4d spacetime and we by the nature of our vibrational makeup tap into it.

Does a string have to vibrate in all dimensions to have an effect on 4d spacetime ?

No, if it vibrates in any less than our 3, forget time for a minute cos we only want a snapshot, then it probably only registers as an effect like gravity or light/heat.

so why not apply the effect of strings vibrating in an extra dimension of conciousness but not fully in our 4d universe and open up the possibility on a true theory of EVERYTHING ?

I mean neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex; sounds like vibrational string activity when applied to a living entity.

Haven't you ever known something without knowing why or made an intuitive leap without knowing how ? Where does such "knowledge" originate ?..collective memory ?

To me it seem the simplest explanation and in line with current physical speculation especially if we have these extra dimensions anyway. Subjective experience can be accounted for by virtue of no 2 entities being exactly a like due to time and spatial variations at the time of conception.

If consciousness is a "state of awareness" and that state exists physically but not in our 4d universe then it exists elsewhere and can be blanketed to include consciousness/awareness in all multiverse scenarios.

Do to consciousness what big bang does to matter and rewind it back to it's genesis and what do you get, where do you end up and what do you think ?

We experience the universe

If this view is right, then in some ways a theory of consciousness will have more in common with a theory in physics than a theory in biology. Biological theories involve no principles that are fundamental in this way, so biological theory has a certain complexity and messiness to it; but theories in physics, insofar as they deal with fundamental principles, aspire to simplicity and elegance. The fundamental laws of nature are part of the basic furniture of the world, and physical theories are telling us that this basic furniture is remarkably simple. If a theory of consciousness also involves fundamental principles, then we should expect the same. The principles of simplicity, elegance, and even beauty that drive physicists' search for a fundamental theory will also apply to a theory of consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

Yes, I should have assumed that. Since you've been here you have been a most charitable sort.

P.S.
Is it just me or have the Smileys been rearranged?

 

[StatusX]

one indication that it may be beyond science is that it is impossible to test, something fundamental to the scientific method. i can make a simple program that simply prints the words "I am conscious." then I could make an advanced AI program that is capable of carrying on a conversation about art or love or something, and then when i ask it if its conscious, it says "I am conscious." is the second program any more conscious than the first?

there is nothing i can say or do that would convince you i am conscious, and yet it is completely obvious to me. if you could scan my brain as i was being asked the question, it is conceivable you would be able to tell that i would say yes, seemingly independent of whether it was actually true. that is to say, there is a place in our brain that we go to for the answer to that question, just like there's a place where we get our height or age if someone asks. so what's different between me and the programs? is consciousness an illusion? if this is the answer science will give us in the end, can we conclude that science was not adequate for that question, or do we accept it?

edit: i took my theory about memory out, i realized it doesn't really address experience.

 

[Canute]

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

 

[hypnagogue]

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.

Rosenberg observes that many of the conceptual problems involved with phenomenal conscious revolve around questions of causation (eg interactionism which denies causal closure of the physical, vis a vis epiphenomnalism which denies P-consciousness any causal powers at all, etc.). In order to place consciousness into the natural order in a non-ad hoc way, he re-examines our theories of causality, finds them lacking, and constructs a new one. His new account of causation introduces receptivity, which is roughly a system's capacity to be affected, and characterizes effective causation as an operator of constraint on a given domain of possible states. He develops the theory formally by creating a directed graph notation.

He goes on to argue that physical theory ultimately describes a schema composed of bare differences, and finds such a schema ontologically lacking. In other words, he characterizes physics as an entirely extrinsic theory, and finds extrinsic phenomena to be incoherent in the absence of some kind of bottom-line intrinsic phenomena that can instantiate and realize such extrinsic/schematic relationships. He proposes phenomenal and experiential properties to be the perfect sort of intrinsic candidate to do the job. So he winds up with a panexperientialist theory where physical phenomena are just the set of functional relationships that phenomenal properties engage in.

In elaborating this idea within his detailed theory of causation, he

* assigns P-consciousness causal relevance without slipping into interactionism or epiphenomenalism,
* manages to neatly solve a number of paradoxes surrounding consciousness such as the boundary problem,
* comes to a sort of functionalist view on consciousness that avoids the usual observor-relative and ontological problems associated with it,
* avoids falling into the usual pitfalls associated with panexperientialism/panpsychism,
* and more.

You might also find the following brief summary helpful: http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~anand/html/Rosenberg.html

 

[StatusX]

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldn't we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

 

[hypnagogue]

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldn't we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

A very pertinent question. You are essentially invoking the hypothetical philosophical entities called zombies, which are much discussed by both physicalists (eg Dennett) and anti-physicalists (eg Chalmers). My position on this question is that, yes, we would still have the same discussions, because our discussions are driven by physical causal mechanisms. Of course, our discussions would not be meaningful, because we would not really be referring to phenomenal consciousness, since by definition in this thought experiment we would not have it.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

Depending on your metaphysical outlook, there are subtler points to be raised. For example, in Rosenberg's framework (which I favor) one could say both that this place in the brain is all there is to consciousness and that it is in direct contact with the metaphysical phenomena responsible for consciousness. But we need to make some qualifications. 'This place in the brain' is all there is to consciousness, but a purely physical account of this place in the brain is not all there is to the brain (on Rosenberg's view), so physicalism fails here. And the purely physical structure of the brain is in contact with phenomenal consciousness not in the sense that it is affected by it, but rather in the sense that the physical structure literally is just the effective causal content of the phenomenal consciousness. So these two are directly related in a way that is somewhat analogous to the way that the abstract structure of a building is directly related to the material that instantiates that structure.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

 

[hypnagogue]

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.

That's not what the terms mean, or at least, I've never seen them used this way in philosophy. Nor have I meant them in this way when I've used the terms.

Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness? If you suppose that these new particles have some sort of ad hoc property that magically produces consciousness, you might as well transfer that ad hoc property to the accepted particles.

 

[gerben]

Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?

I do not think this is a question that needs to be answered for a scientific understanding. We also do not know the answer to such questions about theories that are supposed to be very successful like:
why do masses attract other masses?

(the following does not matter at all for the philosophical question, but to be more conform with modern physics I should have said something like this: Why do masses curve space-time and why do masses follow geodesics in curved space-time?)

If someone could introduce some particles plus some rules of how these particles behave and then have a system that resembles consciousness that theory would be very welcome

 

[StatusX]

If there was some parellel universe where these zombies lived, they might be able to answer any problem of science, but no matter how hard they try, they'll never understand consciousness. Why? Because it isn't really there for them. It's a "defect" of their brain that they think its there, and no matter how hard you try to convince them otherwise, they'll just say "But I'm looking right now, I see that red apple. Why can't science tell me why red looks the way it does?" It's a really tough problem, because there is really nothing different between us and these zombies, except we presume that we really are consciouss and they aren't.

I think the premise is flawed, and that if there were beings with the exact same physical brain structure as us, we couldn't be different. One possibility is that we are both conscious, and any system whose components interact the way our neurons do, whether its made of protein, silicon, wood, or whatever, would also be conscious. If you were to slowly take pieces of our brain away, somehow still keeping us alive, it seems that our consciousness would in some sense fade away gradually. If a retarted human had the same basic brain structure as a chimpanzee, how could one be conscious and not the other? So basically what I'm saying is, all animals with brains would be conscious, to some degree. Maybe other systems would be too. I read that article by Chalmers, and his idea that a thermostat could have some extremely simple form of consciousness is appealing physically, because it doesn't resort to the religious idea that life is anything other than a collection of atoms obeying physical laws (his idea simply altering these laws slightly), but its hard to swallow.

The other possibility is that there is no consciousness. This is hard to accept, obviously, since in a way, our own consciousness is the only thing we truly do know (although, remember: "knowing" is a physical process of our brain). And yet, the zombies argument show that any system like us would behave the same way, independent of whether it was conscious. We could, like the zombies, spend hundreds of years searching futilely for something that isn't there. In other words, consciousness isn't something fundamental to the universe or outside physics, it is simply a biological property that we have a hard time dealing with because we can't get "outside the system."

It's also interesting to note that, presumably, everything about the world can be explained purely by the physical methods we have now (or will soon possess, once a unified theory is formed), except consciousness. We can, in principle, start from the laws of quantum mechanics and work all the way to explain why we have philosophical debates about the nature of consciousness. But consciousness itself would remain unexplained. On the other hand, maybe a unified theory will not fall into place until we accept consciousness as something fundamental and work towards incorporating it into a true theory of everything.

Damn, how many times did I say conscious? Is there another word I could use?

 

[RingoKid]

If someone could introduce some particles plus some rules of how these particles behave and then have a system that resembles consciousness that theory would be very welcome

I think we should call them "imagyons" and they need a place to exist for a start like a different dimension, the system is us and the universe in general, the particles behave according to observation of the human race across a broad spectrum taking into account cultural, geograhical and spatio temporal differences.

I and others here really should put in the legwork to develop the idea and help the rest of the planet get up to speed so we can move onwards and upwards.

It would be simple, elegant and beautiful. Noble values to aspire to

peace

 

[Canute]

StatusX

... since in a way, our own consciousness is the only thing we truly do know (although, remember: "knowing" is a physical process of our brain). And yet, the zombies argument show that any system like us would behave the same way, independent of whether it was conscious.

I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

 

[StatusX]

I agree that our own consciousness is all we can know for certain. But on what evidence do you say that knowing is a physical process of our brains? By assuming that this true you are in effect assuming that consciousness is caused by brains, which is exactly what we are not yet able to prove.

Everything about the brain that can affect the physical world can be explained by physical laws. This is just an assumption, but I think its probably true, because anything that affects the physical world can be experimentally tested. This includes our ability to know, remember, speak, see, etc. When I talk about consciousness, I mean the subjective experience of what its like to be you, to see red, to feel happiness. This is something fundamentally different than anything science has explained in the past, becuase it is not a functional relation between things, but an absolute. For example, quantum mechanics explains how one measurement relates to another one, but it doesn't explain what an electron is. Consciousness needs to be explained as what it is, not what it does.

Just to be clear, when I say knowing is a physical function of the brain that can be explained by physical laws, I don't mean the subjective experience of what its like to know something. I mean that, in principle, if you could scan someones brain with sufficient accuracy and you had a sufficient understanding of neurobiology (both of which are probably at least a hundred years away), then you could derive everything that this person knows. This includes his opinion that he is a conscious being. However, these facts alone do not describe what its like to have this knowledge

Also the zombie argument shows us nothing at all about the nature of consciousness. It would show us a lot about it if we ever came across a real zombie, but as yet they are hypothetical creatures, so we cannot deduce anything about consciousness from their hypothetical existence, any more than we can from their hypothetical non-existence.

The fact is, zombies are something we can conceive of, so there is at least the possibility that they could exist. This is very important if you think about what a zombie would be like. They could discover every physical law succesfully, just like us. They would try to explain consciousness, just like us. But no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't, because its not really there. There is nothing you could say to convince them they aren't really conscious. They could describe what it's like to be conscious just as well as you could. Basically what I'm saying is, there is at least the possibility that we are zombies, and that there is no such thing as consciousness.

Another possible take you can have on the zombies is that they couldn't really exist, even hypothetically. In this view, anything that has the physical properties of our brain must also have consciousness. Now these are both materialist views, so if you disagree with materialism, then you will have a different opinion. But it is entirely possible, and very common, for a non-materialist to still think that every functional property of the brain can be explained by physical laws, so that isn't where the argument breaks down.

 

[anuj]

To understand consciousness, we first need to understand how do we ourself work. Human brain is that biological body part which drives our life with the feedback received from other sensor organs such as nose, tongue, eye, ear and sensation received from skin. The body as a whole trains itself with experience from the surroundings/ environment.

Our life starts as soon as we are born. I presume we are born with zero thoughts in our mind (empty memory cells). Is it posible to figure out what a newly born baby would be thinking after his birth. Because this is the least disturbed state of human mind and more closer to an attempt to understand what is consciousness.

 

[hitssquad]

Our life starts as soon as we are born.

Apparently not.

 

[anuj]

Apparently not.

If the life (the thought activity of our brain) does not start with its birth, we need to know at what stage it starts. I mean the evolution of our thought process starting from zero thought in the begining.

 

[Canute]

Everything about the brain that can affect the physical world can be explained by physical laws. This is just an assumption,...

I don't see that as an assumption. By definition the operation of the physical brain can be explained by physical laws.

but I think its probably true, because anything that affects the physical world can be experimentally tested. This includes our ability to know, remember, speak, see, etc.

Now that's what I call an assumption.

Consciousness needs to be explained as what it is, not what it does.

I agree completely. However it's a tricky one. According to most scientists it doesn't do anything at all, so studying what it does is not possible. Unfortunately scientifically-speaking it's existence has not yet been verified, so studying what it is is also a problem.

Just to be clear, when I say knowing is a physical function of the brain that can be explained by physical laws, I don't mean the subjective experience of what its like to know something.

Is it possible for ones brain to know something that one is not subjectively aware of knowing, and for which there is nothing that it is like to know it? That seems unlikely to me.

I mean that, in principle, if you could scan someones brain with sufficient accuracy and you had a sufficient understanding of neurobiology (both of which are probably at least a hundred years away), then you could derive everything that this person knows. This includes his opinion that he is a conscious being. However, these facts alone do not describe what its like to have this knowledge.

Facts? If you could prove anything you've said in this para. your name would go down in neuroscience's hall of fame.

The fact is, zombies are something we can conceive of, so there is at least the possibility that they could exist.

This is a sort of ontological argument for zombies. Unfortunately it doesn't work for zombies any better than it does for God. Personally I can't conceive of a zombie, as defined by philosophers, without abandoning my reason, something I'm not prepared to do. They are a useful concept in some thought experiments, but a zombie would never report that there is 'something that it is like' to feel pain, while human beings do so all the time. I'd say this shows that an unconscious entity would not and could not behave like a human being.

This is very important if you think about what a zombie would be like. They could discover every physical law succesfully, just like us. They would try to explain consciousness, just like us.

Why would they try to explain something that for them does not exist?

But no matter how hard they tried, they couldn't, because its not really there. There is nothing you could say to convince them they aren't really conscious.

If one is not conscious one cannot be convinced of anything at all, let alone that one is not conscious. To be convinced one has to be conscious. Try convincing your PC that it isn't conscious. You have to be very careful with zombie arguments, it's very easy to be led astray.

They could describe what it's like to be conscious just as well as you could.

Doesn't it seem rather unlikely that an entity that is not conscious could describe what it like to be conscious as well as an entity that is conscious?

Basically what I'm saying is, there is at least the possibility that we are zombies, and that there is no such thing as consciousness.

Are you sure about this? Why does being awake feel different to being asleep?

Another possible take you can have on the zombies is that they couldn't really exist, even hypothetically. In this view, anything that has the physical properties of our brain must also have consciousness.

I'm afraid your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise here. It is quite possible for someone to believe that a zombie is an incoherent concept while not believing that consciousness is simply a property of brains.

 

[StatusX]

I don't see that as an assumption. By definition the operation of the physical brain can be explained by physical laws.
...
Now that's what I call an assumption.

Those are all processes that can affect the physical world. You have to understand the difference between the subjective experience of a function and the function itself. The easiest way to understand this is by asking, what do you know about another person that you haven't inferred about them under the assumption they are just like you? You know they know things, since you can ask a question and get an intelligent reply. You know they can see, because you can throw a punch at them and theyll try to duck. You know they can speak, because you hear them. For this information to get from them to you, it had to affect the physical world, and so all these functions are physical. However, you don't know they have an experience of these things. That you infer because you assume all humans are like you.

Your whole argument seems to rest on this, so let me just make it clear. Someone asks you: "Are you conscious right now?" This rattles your eardrum, and makes neurons begin firing. This starts a chain reaction that goes into your cerebrum where, due to its physical structure, a new signal is sent to your vocal cords to make the sound "yes." At every point in this process, the operation is physical, and there is no reason to doubt that every step will one day be explained by conventional science, just like digestion or circulation is now.(I know these aren't completely understood, but hopefully you get my point) Your conscious experience during this time is a sort of side effect, and would not affect the results of an experiment.

It basically comes down to this: Do you think an artificial intelligence program could, in principle, behave exactly like a human? Maybe our technology will never get there, but is it physically possible? If you don't, then you think there is something about the brain that is nonphysical besides consciousness, and you'll have to explain what it is. If you do, then you can understand why this could be a realizable example of a zombie.

Is it possible for ones brain to know something that one is not subjectively aware of knowing, and for which there is nothing that it is like to know it? That seems unlikely to me.
...
Facts? If you could prove anything you've said in this para. your name would go down in neuroscience's hall of fame.
...
This is a sort of ontological argument for zombies. Unfortunately it doesn't work for zombies any better than it does for God. Personally I can't conceive of a zombie, as defined by philosophers, without abandoning my reason, something I'm not prepared to do. They are a useful concept in some thought experiments, but a zombie would never report that there is 'something that it is like' to feel pain, while human beings do so all the time. I'd say this shows that an unconscious entity would not and could not behave like a human being.
...
Why would they try to explain something that for them does not exist?
...
If one is not conscious one cannot be convinced of anything at all, let alone that one is not conscious. To be convinced one has to be conscious. Try convincing your PC that it isn't conscious. You have to be very careful with zombie arguments, it's very easy to be led astray.
...
Doesn't it seem rather unlikely that an entity that is not conscious could describe what it like to be conscious as well as an entity that is conscious?
...
Are you sure about this? Why does being awake feel different to being asleep?

Everything this zombie says is, as I described before, a consequence of his total physical brain structure. If a being had the exact same brain structure, it would respond to the same stimuli the same way. This includes any questions about consciousness. When we argue about consciousness, it is our physical brains that read the arguments, access memories and logically analyze ideas for counterarguments, and control our fingers to type a response. During all of this, yes, we are aware. But a thrid party could not know this, and it is not logically necessary that we be conscious during any of it. I don't mean we could do it in our sleep, because our physical brain state would be radically different. I mean even a zombie could do it.

In particular, your argument that a non-conscious being couldn't be convinced of anything is very weak. Yea, your computer couldn't be convinced of anything anymore than a hamster or a piece of toast could. They don't have the physical cognitive structure. It has nothing to do with consciousness. You could imagine a very intelligent but non-conscious AI program which is programmed to think it is conscious. It could be convinced of plenty of things, but you would have a hard time convincing it that it isn't conscious.

Just as another example: a zombie would know the difference between wake and sleep because his brain would be in a different state, and his behavior would be different. When he woke up, he would also have written in his memory that he was recently sleeping, and could tell us that. Consciousness is not necessary, and would not change anything we could observe about him.

I'm afraid your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise here. It is quite possible for someone to believe that a zombie is an incoherent concept while not believing that consciousness is simply a property of brains.

I mentioned that. These are the two possible materialist viewpoints. Materialism is the view that the physical properties of something completely describe it. That is, two systems that are physically identical can't be different in any possible way.

 

[Canute]

Those are all processes that can affect the physical world. You have to understand the difference between the subjective experience of a function and the function itself.

You stated that to know, to remember, to speak and to see are physical processes. No doubt there are physical processes usually involved in these things, but on what grounds do you say that only physical processes are involved? Do you have some data that nobody else has?

The easiest way to understand this is by asking, what do you know about another person that you haven't inferred about them under the assumption they are just like you? You know they know things, since you can ask a question and get an intelligent reply. You know they can see, because you can throw a punch at them and theyll try to duck. You know they can speak, because you hear them. For this information to get from them to you, it had to affect the physical world, and so all these functions are physical.

You are assuming that consciousness is non-causal. You may be right, but you'll have trouble proving it. Nobody else can.

However, you don't know they have an experience of these things. That you infer because you assume all humans are like you.

Quite agree. I find Occam's razor applicable in this situation. It would be a needless complication to assume that they are not conscious. However, you're right, this does not prove that they are.

Your whole argument seems to rest on this, so let me just make it clear. Someone asks you: "Are you conscious right now?" This rattles your eardrum, and makes neurons begin firing. This starts a chain reaction that goes into your cerebrum where, due to its physical structure, a new signal is sent to your vocal cords to make the sound "yes." At every point in this process, the operation is physical, and there is no reason to doubt that every step will one day be explained by conventional science, just like digestion or circulation is now.(I know these aren't completely understood, but hopefully you get my point) Your conscious experience during this time is a sort of side effect, and would not affect the results of an experiment.

Of course you're entitled to your opinion, but this is all conjecture. As yet there is no evidence that it is the case, and much evidence that it is not. For instance, how many people who are unconscious answer 'yes' when you ask them if they are conscious?

It basically comes down to this: Do you think an artificial intelligence program could, in principle, behave exactly like a human? Maybe our technology will never get there, but is it physically possible? If you don't, then you think there is something about the brain that is nonphysical besides consciousness, and you'll have to explain what it is. If you do, then you can understand why this could be a realizable example of a zombie.

I don't understand your argument here. Why do I have to explain something that is non-physical besides consciousness? Also the question is whether an AI program can be conscious, not whether it can behave like a human being. Consciousness is not behaviour.

Everything this zombie says is, as I described before, a consequence of his total physical brain structure. If a being had the exact same brain structure, it would respond to the same stimuli the same way. This includes any questions about consciousness. When we argue about consciousness, it is our physical brains that read the arguments, access memories and logically analyze ideas for counterarguments, and control our fingers to type a response. During all of this, yes, we are aware. But a thrid party could not know this, and it is not logically necessary that we be conscious during any of it. I don't mean we could do it in our sleep, because our physical brain state would be radically different. I mean even a zombie could do it.

Again, you are entitled to your opinion. But if you want to influence anybody else's you're going to have to find some evidence. Personally I believe that it is unreasonable to say that one can argue about consciousness without being conscious.

In particular, your argument that a non-conscious being couldn't be convinced of anything is very weak. Yea, your computer couldn't be convinced of anything anymore than a hamster or a piece of toast could. They don't have the physical cognitive structure. It has nothing to do with consciousness. You could imagine a very intelligent but non-conscious AI program which is programmed to think it is conscious. It could be convinced of plenty of things, but you would have a hard time convincing it that it isn't conscious.

Again, more opinion. You need to explain why my argument is very weak. What if I took your 'intelligent' (whatever we mean by that) but non-conscious AI program and instead of programming it to be convinced that it is conscious I programmed it to be convinced that it is not conscious? According to you it would go on behaving in precisely the same way. This seems a muddle of ideas to me.

Just as another example: a zombie would know the difference between wake and sleep because his brain would be in a different state, and his behavior would be different.

But how would this zombie know that its brain is in a different state? Surely it would just be in a different state. In order to know that it's brain is in a different state it's brain would have to be in yet another different state (the one correlating to 'knowing' that it's state is different). Where does this regression end?

Human beings do not rely on the observation of their own brain-states in order to know how they feel. If a zombie can only tell that it's awake only by observing its own brain-states then it does not have human-like consciousness.

Another problem is that of how a zombie brain can observes itself? Does one part encode for another in some sort of self-referential loop? Which bit of brain correlates to being awake, which to 'knowing' that it is awake, and which to knowing it knows that it's awake? Without consciousness there is no way to break out of this loop.

 

[StatusX]

You stated that to know, to remember, to speak and to see are physical processes. No doubt there are physical processes usually involved in these things, but on what grounds do you say that only physical processes are involved? Do you have some data that nobody else has?

All I'm saying is that the physical results of these processes can be entirely explained in physical terms, using traditional scientific methods. These physical results include discussions about consciousness, which was my main point. If it helps you to visualize what I mean, picture a typed essay about consciousness. Some interaction of an obscenely large number of atoms and forces conspired to transform carbon into lifeforms, which evolved into people, which created the computer, and hit the keys, coordinated by electrical signals in the brain, and printed out this paper, which is now just an ordered collection of atoms. I'm arguing that every single step along the way is explainable using the laws of relativity and quantum mechanics. This is debatable, which brings me to...

You are assuming that consciousness is non-causal. You may be right, but you'll have trouble proving it. Nobody else can.

True, and this may be the main place our opinions diverge. I'll explain why I feel this way in a minute.

Of course you're entitled to your opinion, but this is all conjecture. As yet there is no evidence that it is the case, and much evidence that it is not. For instance, how many people who are unconscious answer 'yes' when you ask them if they are conscious?

This is obviously a hypothetical question, and there is no way to know what a person without consciousness would say to such a question, just like there's no way to prove that someone who says yes is in fact conscious. However, from a materialist viewpoint, which is where I'm coming from, there cannot be a difference between two people who have the same physical constituents.

I don't understand your argument here. Why do I have to explain something that is non-physical besides consciousness? Also the question is whether an AI program can be conscious, not whether it can behave like a human being. Consciousness is not behaviour.

I'm arguing in terms of behavior. A zombie or a computer with AI would behave the same as us, ie, they would try to understand consciousness. However, they could not succeed. And all I mean by consciousness is experience. I am saying that you can explain every aspect of human behavior(which is a result of the physical brain) with physical laws, but the subjective notion of experience (eg, what its like to see the color red) may require something more. If you are arguing that a computer couldn't replicate our behavior, then you are saying there is something in our behavior that can't be explained by physical laws. This could only be true if either consciousness (ie, experience) is causal or if there is some property of the brain besides consciousnes that can't be explained in physical terms.

Now, if you are saying consciousness is causal, ie, it has a direct influence on our behavior, then you are saying that our physical actions are caused by more than just the physical electrical signals in our brain. There is no evidence for this, and I simply don't think its true. While this is only my opinion, it is also widely held even by the philosophers who are not materialists.

Again, more opinion. You need to explain why my argument is very weak. What if I took your 'intelligent' (whatever we mean by that) but non-conscious AI program and instead of programming it to be convinced that it is conscious I programmed it to be convinced that it is not conscious? According to you it would go on behaving in precisely the same way. This seems a muddle of ideas to me.

Obviously if you programmed it to think it wasn't conscious, it would be physically different than it was before. It could also not possibly mimic human behavior with this extra constraint, and thus could not qualify as a zombie.

But how would this zombie know that its brain is in a different state? Surely it would just be in a different state. In order to know that it's brain is in a different state it's brain would have to be in yet another different state (the one correlating to 'knowing' that it's state is different). Where does this regression end?

Human beings do not rely on the observation of their own brain-states in order to know how they feel. If a zombie can only tell that it's awake only by observing its own brain-states then it does not have human-like consciousness.

Another problem is that of how a zombie brain can observes itself? Does one part encode for another in some sort of self-referential loop? Which bit of brain correlates to being awake, which to 'knowing' that it is awake, and which to knowing it knows that it's awake? Without consciousness there is no way to break out of this loop.

It wouldn't subjectively know anything. It could, however, report information about itself, since that simply requires an electrical signal to travel from one part of the brain to another, namely, from memory to the speech center. We have an experience of this process when it happens in our brain, but we don't logically need to.

EDIT:
I realize I am not being very clear about where I stand, so just for the record, I feel that systems are completely described by their physical states. It is possible that these physical states give rise to consciousness in some situations, and if so, there should be some kind of fundamental law describing such a relationship. Another possibility is that consciousness is an illusion, which I logically accept as a possibility, but hate intensely.

If the first case is true, then whether consciousness is causal or not is debatable. In the context of the zombies argument I had to assume it wasn't for coherence, because by the premise, zombies are beings that influence the physical world exactly as we do. If consciousness is causal, zombies are not logically possible, and I think this may be your position. Looking back, I see that our disagreements were because you were just assuming this to be true from the start, and trying to consider the zombies from this perspective, which is impossible. You might want to at least consider the other views and see where you think yours succeeds where they fail. Your position is actually appealing in that consciousness may be the mechanism that causes wave collapse in QM, and thus does play a significant causal role. However, when I argued against a causal role for consciousness, I meant that in principle, consciousness does little to influence our macroscopic behavior. Have you ever tried describing the color red in words? I think a hypothetical zombie would do just as well, even if his affect on the world was slightly different than ours at a microscopic level.

 

[olde drunk]

When i access a data memory file on my computer i see the code, etc.

Has anyone even suggested that we have a physical cell (or whatever) that we encode to have a memory? is this cell hung on a synapse?

take a brain slice and put it into the most powerful e-microscope, show me a memory cell or the residue of an abstract thought, please.

love&peace,
olde drunk

 

[RingoKid]

information carrying strings according to a vibrational pattern across a dimension of consciousness that gets translated by our brain to resemble memory, knowledge and subjective truth to the individual.

consciousness is a place, we tap into it and project it's "image" onto our universe in 4d spacetime.

could it be so simple ?

 

[gerben]

information carrying strings according to a vibrational pattern across a dimension of consciousness that gets translated by our brain to resemble memory, knowledge and subjective truth to the individual.

consciousness is a place, we tap into it and project it's "image" onto our universe in 4d spacetime.

could it be so simple ?

You propose that consciousness is something completely separate from the physical world, that comes into contact with the physical world via brains.

ok

and then?

 

[RingoKid]

yup...

...in as much as branes and hidden dimensions wrapped up in each point particle sized co ordinate in 4d spacetime are completely separated from the physical world.

It's not so much that this dimension comes into contact via brains as i believe it permeates every fibre of our being accounting for genetic memory. The contact is always present but we decode the contact using our brains.

and then?

...we try to make sense of the data according to the accumulation of knowledge from the collective human experience across a broad spectrum of subjects from metaphysics to religion to quantum mechanics and cosmology, irrespective of culture, geographical and temporal traditions.

the collective consciousness now has a place to exist

We unify the human experience into a consensus reality with or without God. It doesn't matter cos it's all about us and how we percieve ourselves and the universe we inhabit.

i just found this on the net and haven't even read it yet but it appears i am not alone. I may the first to associate hidden dimensions of string theory to repositories of consciousness and by association memory, knowledge and truth...

Time will tell.

 

[RingoKid]

oops forgot to post the link...

http://www.meta-religion.com/Physics/Consciousness/physics_of_collective_consciousness.htm

 

[gerben]

RingoKid, what I was doing was summarizing your post in language that I could understand, leaving out anything that I (and I assume most of the other readers) did not understand.

So now for your new post:
You propose that this totally separate realm (called consciousness) contacts everything in the physical world.

That is it for this time I did not understand the rest.

I do not understand why you say our brain "decodes" something from a separate realm (called consciousness). I think it simply "decodes" (interprets) sensory input coming from the physical world, and we are somehow conscious of this interpretation.

 

[abbott]

Observation is the core necessity of an existence that operates as a balance of opposites. Our powers of observation will always end in unpercieveability (time or space "before" the big bang, the meaning of time or space in the face of the infinity we observe them approach).

We (classical philosophy "who am I?" and "what is everything?") must be the knowable universes understanding of itself, after all what is anything we have observed other than a reflection of the energies we've used to detect it. And what is a living thing? A converter of energies, we sustain ourselves by in-taking things and changing them into other things (sounds like a process of observation to me).

 

[Canute]

All I'm saying is that the physical results of these processes can be entirely explained in physical terms, using traditional scientific methods. These physical results include discussions about consciousness, which was my main point.

I can't see why you would believe that discussions about consciousness can happen in the absence of consciousness, unless it is to protect an underlying physicalist theory. Human beings don't normally talk about things whose existence they have no evidence for, why would zombies do it? Can you imagine finding a distant planet where nothing is conscious, but whose inhabitants spend their time discussing consciousness? I don't buy it.

If it helps you to visualize what I mean, picture a typed essay about consciousness. Some interaction of an obscenely large number of atoms and forces conspired to transform carbon into lifeforms, which evolved into people, which created the computer, and hit the keys, coordinated by electrical signals in the brain, and printed out this paper, which is now just an ordered collection of atoms. I'm arguing that every single step along the way is explainable using the laws of relativity and quantum mechanics. This is debatable, which brings me to...

Yes, it is debatable.

This is obviously a hypothetical question, and there is no way to know what a person without consciousness would say to such a question, just like there's no way to prove that someone who says yes is in fact conscious.

We know that people who are unconscious (asleep, knocked out etc.) do not say yes to the question of whether they are conscious. If you asked a zombie they'd say no, since they are zombies. They would therefore not behave like human beings. If they answer yes, as we would, then either they are not zombies or they are lying.

However, from a materialist viewpoint, which is where I'm coming from, there cannot be a difference between two people who have the same physical constituents.

I realize that, but it is a conjecture.

I'm arguing in terms of behavior. A zombie or a computer with AI would behave the same as us, ie, they would try to understand consciousness. However, they could not succeed.

Hang on, if zombies are intelligent and consciousness is scientifically explicable then why can't zombies succeed in explaining consciousness? I would have thought they were the ideal entities to do it. If they can't succeed in doing this it can only be that they are not conscious, in which case human beings are not zombies.

And all I mean by consciousness is experience. I am saying that you can explain every aspect of human behavior(which is a result of the physical brain) with physical laws, but the subjective notion of experience (eg, what its like to see the color red) may require something more.

That seems self-contradictory. It is saying that when you stop at a red traffic light seeing the red light cannot be explained by physical laws, but the fact that you stopped can be. However the reason you stopped was because you saw a red light, an experience which cannot be explained by physical laws. I can't see how you reconcile these two views. Why did you stop?

If you are arguing that a computer couldn't replicate our behavior, then you are saying there is something in our behavior that can't be explained by physical laws.

It's not quite so straighforward. There's an issue here about whether physical laws are sufficient or necessary to detirmine behaviour. That is, we can say that human consciousness is not capable of breaking any physical laws, but still argue that human behaviour cannot be explained only by reference to those laws.

Now, if you are saying consciousness is causal, ie, it has a direct influence on our behavior, then you are saying that our physical actions are caused by more than just the physical electrical signals in our brain. There is no evidence for this, and I simply don't think its true.

Ok. But there is no scientific evidence that it is not true and I take the other view. I base this on non-scientific evidence, my own experience of consciousness.

Obviously if you programmed it to think it wasn't conscious, it would be physically different than it was before. It could also not possibly mimic human behavior with this extra constraint, and thus could not qualify as a zombie.

So for a zombie to behave like a human it must think that it is conscious? But if it can think it is conscious then it is conscious, at least according to Descartes.

It wouldn't subjectively know anything. It could, however, report information about itself, since that simply requires an electrical signal to travel from one part of the brain to another, namely, from memory to the speech center. We have an experience of this process when it happens in our brain, but we don't logically need to.

What would a zombie answer if you asked it how it is feeling today?

EDIT: I realize I am not being very clear about where I stand, so just for the record, I feel that systems are completely described by their physical states. It is possible that these physical states give rise to consciousness in some situations, and if so, there should be some kind of fundamental law describing such a relationship. Another possibility is that consciousness is an illusion, which I logically accept as a possibility, but hate intensely.

Ok, I see where you're coming from. But don't forget that there are other possibilities.

. Have you ever tried describing the color red in words? I think a hypothetical zombie would do just as well, even if his affect on the world was slightly different than ours at a microscopic level.

All experiences are incommensurable, incommunicable etc., so we cannot describe red in words. If a zombie could explain the colour red (by which I take it you mean 'the experience of seeing the colour red') then it would be nothing like a human being. In any case I suspect that a zombie would not be able to explain what the colour red is like, since a zombie would not be able to experience seeing red. There would be nothing that it is like to see it. A zombie would merely register some particular frequency of light waves that correspond to what those quirky humans call 'red'.

 

[Canute]

Hypnagogue

Thanks for your note and link on Rosenberg. I don't see what he is getting at so will do some further exploring.

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.

Yes, point taken. I was wondering whether the book was worth reading.

 

[RingoKid]

Gerben

String theory would have all matter, charges and field/wave effects as being vibrations of bands of energy vibrating across up to 10 dimensions and encompassed in a larger 11th dimension of which we can only detect 4, the 4 being our 3d universe and time.

The shape of the string, it's rate of vibration and the number of dimensions it vibrates in determine it's elemental or field properties. The accumulation of which in 4d format forms atoms, molecules, objects and entitites.

So for a collection of strings such as a sentient life form to have consciousness then it must at some stage of it's vibrational traverse through a dimension or combination thereof acquire a consciousness ie an awareness of it's own existence.

This would allow for say a rock to not be aware of it's existence due to it's lack of vibration in a dimension of consciousness.

The alternative is to assign intrinsic properties of consciousness to all strings.

The separateness of the hidden dimensions is not really separate because they exist at every 4d co ordinate in physically detectable spacetime.

So what we see as reality is merely our 4d sensory perception of it. Our awareness of the underlying reality is what we are all searching for albeit in a multitude of disciplines. Our brain decodes what our senses tell it in the physical world but it also allows us to project our consciousness to the non physical world implied by black holes, multiverses and hidden dimensions.

 

[Fliption]

That seems self-contradictory. It is saying that when you stop at a red traffic light seeing the red light cannot be explained by physical laws, but the fact that you stopped can be. However the reason you stopped was because you saw a red light, an experience which cannot be explained by physical laws. I can't see how you reconcile these two views. Why did you stop?

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

 

[Rader]

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

So you do not think life is that aspect of human behavior?

Did you ever see a human not acting like, it was alive and have consciousness? Or better yet ask yourself the question.

Are you looking for a discussion or do you really believe that?

 

[gerben]

Ringokid

I agree that string theory assumes that there are many dimension. I also agree that we experience only 3 spatial dimensions and 1 temporal dimension. What I do not see is, why it would be useful, or how it would further understanding, to associate consciousness with another dimension. Of course you can do so, but it does not make anything clear. In string theory the multiple dimensions are used to explain how the "4d spacetime world" that we experience behaves (this also includes rocks). If you only say that consciousness is another dimension then that statement in itself is empty.

 

[Canute]

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

Ah yes, you're quite right. On reflection my responses to StatusX were muddled on this issue.

I forgot that it is argued that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. I forgot because I don't believe it. What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

 

[selfAdjoint]

What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

This is an interesting position. You seem to believe that consciousness IS required for explaining human behavior, that many things humans do cannot be explained without assuming that they feel what it is like to be in some state or other. On the other hand you also believe that this proposition can never be proved. As it was said, "You believe because you see. Blessed are they who believe what they don't see."

 

[Fliption]

Ah yes, you're quite right. On reflection my responses to StatusX were muddled on this issue.

I forgot that it is argued that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. I forgot because I don't believe it. What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

We are in complete agreement. I've had long discussions with Hypnagogue on this one. I too find it hard to believe that a zombie would ever believe it is conscious. The trick though, is to understand that the belief that one is conscious can be completely explained with an analysis of A-consciousness. And there is no necessary reason why a zombie could not find itself in such an A-conscious state. In fact, if a zombie has A-consciousness identical to you, then it must have a belief it has P-consciousness,as you do. So the behaviour of believing that I am conscious does not require P-consciousness to be explained.

The point of the exercise is one of epistomology about P-consciousness. It doesn't really mean that a zombie would actually believe in the hard problem. I don't believe that it would.

 

[Fliption]

This is an interesting position. You seem to believe that consciousness IS required for explaining human behavior, that many things humans do cannot be explained without assuming that they feel what it is like to be in some state or other. On the other hand you also believe that this proposition can never be proved. As it was said, "You believe because you see. Blessed are they who believe what they don't see."

It's an interesting dilemma. It doesn't seem likely that a zombie would ever believe in a hard problem. It seems as if you really have to have P-consciousness to see the hard problem. But the belief in a hard problem itself can be completely explained with A-consciousness and doesn't require P-consciousness. To me, this just makes the hard problem a personal private hell for each of us who really do have P-consciousness

 

[StatusX]

We are in complete agreement. I've had long discussions with Hypnagogue on this one. I too find it hard to believe that a zombie would ever believe it is conscious. The trick though, is to understand that the belief that one is conscious can be completely explained with an analysis of A-consciousness. And there is no necessary reason why a zombie could not find itself in such an A-conscious state. In fact, if a zombie has A-consciousness identical to you, then it must have a belief it has P-consciousness,as you do. So the behaviour of believing that I am conscious does not require P-consciousness to be explained.

This is exactly what I was trying trying to explain before, and I completely agree with everything said here.

The point of the exercise is one of epistomology about P-consciousness. It doesn't really mean that a zombie would actually believe in the hard problem. I don't believe that it would.

Now here you lose me. I thought you said all behavior could be explained? What makes this behavior special? My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is interesting, because it suggests a pleasing symmetry between the mental world and the physical world. If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.

 

[Fliption]

My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie.

I'd make one change to this statement above. Instead of saying "would also be exhibited by a zombie", I'm saying "could also be exhibited by a zombie. There is a difference. The new sentence isn't making a statement one way or the other about what a zombie would believe or how it would behave. It simply says that no behavior is "out of scope" for a zombie. This includes believing in the hard problem.

In the zombie illustration, many times it is claimed that the zombie "would" believe it is conscious. This is simply because one of the assumptions of the illustration is that the zombie has identical A-consciousness as someone who has P-consciousness. That assumption is made for the sake of illustrating the problems of consciousness. Not because a zombie really would have identical A-consciousness.

I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is true and is the essence of the hard problem. How can P-consciousness exists and not be explained by the physical facts?

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Rothie M:
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

Hypnagogue:

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?

Rothie M:

What is experiential consciousness?
Someone's definition of what they think consciousness is.
This definition could be wrong.
I think the root cause of our inability to understand consciousness
is that people think it is something unphysical.Why should this be so?
A colour exists at a certain place for a certain time with a certain intensity and hue.What is so unphysical about this?
Our brains certainly categorize consciousness differently from other phenomena.But that is probably because our brains have evolved to enable us to survive and they categorize to aid survival - not to give deep philosophical insight.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

If I see an area of colour, the area is continuous with no gaps in it.This can't be explained by saying that the area is made of lots of waves or particles.But space is continuous and so we would suspect an area of colour to be an area of space or some continuous property associated with that continuous area of space.Dark energy
is considered to be a property of space, so perhaps there is an association between consciousness and dark energy.We would suspect that we can have conscious experiences anywhere in the universe and we would also suspect that space exists everywhere in the universe,whereas waves and particles might not.I mention all this because it is my belief that space-time exists in space and time.In other words space-time is particulate in nature and this is why gravitational force carriers (which can be particles) can alter space-time.
One kind of particle influences another.
According to quantum mechanics the vacuum should have a colossal energy density of 10^120 Joules per cubic metre.This figure is at odds with experiment.However if the vacuum energy does not have a gravitational field
perhaps we could say that space is made from it - we would not expect space to have a gravitational field either.So, in this scenario,particles of which space-time is constituted, exist in a medium of vacuum particles called
space.And it is the vacuum particles which have a continuous distribution which allows the areas of colours, we consciously experience, to be continuous.

 

[StatusX]

Yes, photons are discrete, but there are so many of them per cell that we couldn't possibly make out individual ones, and so light appears continuous.

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually traveling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

What I meant was that the area of colour is not made from photons.
It has to be made from something else that is continuous.

 

[douglas]

Possible Explanation

There is apparently an underground paper that explains consciousness but I haven't read it. Someone told me that there are plans to publish it next year. Has anyone heard of this paper? All I know is that the author's initials are MD and only a few people have a copy.

Please email me if you know anything about this paper.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually traveling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

 

[StatusX]

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

Yes, I just read over your other posts in this thread and I can see you understand the arguments. Sorry, I should have done that first.

Regarding your point about if "experience could arise without any real objects," it certainly can. Consciousness can experience itself, as any reasonably accomplished meditator can attest to.

 

[Canute]

... My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.

This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

The question of whether our consciousness in its entirety comes into existence when we are born as mortal beings remains moot. As yet there is no scientific evidence that points either way. Those who research consciousness as opposed to brain generally assert that there's a lot more to consciousness than meets the eye.