Is Consciousness Just the Result of Electrical Activity in Our Brains?

[Rothiemurchus]

There is no reason to believe that consciousness is non-physical.
It is undoubtedly closely linked to the physical behaviour and nature of the brain.
But whether or not we can explain how is another matter.

main argument is that we must all have a unique collection of particles in part of our brain that defines us - otherwise their is no good reason why I should not be looking out of your body now and experiencing your feelings!
This also would put an end to the idea of a copy of me living now, in the past or future somwhere or somehow - I am not having two sets of conscious experience at the same time and nor are you.Also,what defines the distances and angles at which I see everything - a location somewhere inside my head.
This is why,without realising why, we say "point of view."
I would say that this "point of view" is a unique collection of particles which,
could be called the soul.It is the positon in space relative to which all
the colours,sounds ,smells and so on that I experience, exist.
And there must be a lot of ways of combining these particles if all living things with nervous systems on our planet (and perhaps elsewhere) are to
each have a unique soul.

 

[DM]

I noticed certain people use the word soul.

Do you believe in God?

Or is it just a theory?

 

[PIT2]

There is no reason to believe that consciousness is non-physical.

I disagree with that, because there are plenty of things that give a clue that consciousness might be non-physical, such as telepathy, Near Death Experiences and other such things. They may not prove it, but they do give some strong clues.

main argument is that we must all have a unique collection of particles in part of our brain that defines us - otherwise their is no good reason why I should not be looking out of your body now and experiencing your feelings!

You might actually be experiencing my life as me. You and me could be the same consciousness that experiences reality from multiple perspectives! Its possible and you wouldn't realize it if it was the case.

 

[graffix]

>>>You might actually be experiencing my life as me. You and me could be the same consciousness that experiences reality from multiple perspectives! Its possible and you wouldn't realize it if it was the case.

If it is the same consciousness that is experiencing reality from multiple perspectives then it in essence stretches the definition of consciousness; however I agree strongly to your statement!. If we stick to the defintion of consciousness as a "sense of one's personal or collective identity" and if my consciousness and Your consciousness are the same, it would have to be at different times, because we know for sure it's not happening at the same time (I can't see through your eyes). I can't prove that anyone is at this time (time that I am in now) is experiencing the same type of consciousness that I am experiencing, and most likely in my version of reality no one else is, (people are hollow robots!). I subscribe to the idea of "my version of reality" and that my reality is actually the collapsing of wave functions that I perceive as "time". I think that our consciousnesses (realities) are actually stacked on top of one another, each independent yet connected, and they interact with all of them. This (sort of) can be supported by quantum mechanic's principles of non-locality. If you believe in reincarnation then you won't mind the suggestion that death probably only means a move to another consciousness, yet at the same time it's all the same "big" consciousness to begin with. There probably are infinite versions of your self that actually exist as well, but you are you now, your consciousness. So reality, really, is an infinite web of events (possibilities) ever molded/changed by decisions made by the collection of consciousnesses. This is basically the theory of the Many Worlds Interpretation (if I interpreted correctly). Reality may not even be real as we think it is. It could just be a collection of ideas (in a computer?) that can't be disputed, since everything contained in it follows the laws of physics (a video game!). What I mean by "not disputed" is that no one can say "that reality is not possible" since our realities are infront of us, it has to be possible!

 

[DM]

What I mean by "not disputed" is that no one can say "that reality is not possible" since our realities are infront of us, it has to be possible!

Couldn't agree more.

The obsurdity of linking consciousness with unrealism is chaotic.

Pain is by far the strongest proof that we will ever possesses to approve realism and existence of consciousness.

In any doubts of consciousness being real, plunge yourselves into a ball of fire and feel the excruciating pain all over your bodies.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

The fact that we try to avoid pain is an evolutionary response:avoid pain and usually you avoid serious injury and survive.Pain like any other conscious experience is "real"
in the sense that it has a certain magnitude for a certain time - just like ,for example, the mass of an energetic particle.Pain could just be a propery of matter,like mass, that exists with a certain magnitude for a certain time at a certain place.
I would guess that conscious experiences like pain colours sounds and so on are properties
stitched into the fabric of space whereas things we don't experience consciously like atoms have properties such as charge that can move through space.Dark energy fron the realm of cosmology is a property of space
and so could be associated with consciousness.Because there are many
more dimensions in string theory than just 3 space and 1 time dimension,
I wouldn't be surprised if these extra dimensions are connected to conscious experience which would require at least 5 dimensions - one for each sense.
So I would expect string theory to be the ultimate theory of the cosmos.

 

[RingoKid]

I have reckoned for a while now that

consciousness is a place/dimension we as living entities have the ability to tap into and project onto a fabric of spacetime that then sustains the universe. A collective illusion based on percievable sensory input.

Due to us all being in different times, places, dates of inception and genetic makeup, we experience differently but it all makes up the collective human experience which we feedback into the consciousness domain possibly when we sleep or dream.

It makes it easier for me to think of my dead loved ones still having a consciousness that exists someplace else that i can interact with when my time in this universe is done.

 

[RingoKid]

when you see a light in the distance is it the light hitting your retina or are you projecting a wave of thought towards the light ?

you are conscious of the light but is it consciousness on an absolute reality level of perhaps strings changing to accommodate the movement of the universe and your projection of consciousness on to it or is it just the light traveling as a wave/particle towards you on a superficial reality level that limits our perceptions to the sensory ?

If light and consciousness propagate exclusive of our 4d universe as strings/extra dimensions and we are locked in the system forever the goldfish in our mirrored bowl then how would you know what is "really" moving and what is "really" real if we can only "see" within a limited spectrum and to certain extent ?

 

[babsyco]

Why are you looking to physics to explain consciousness? We don't try to explain why two books tell different stories in terms of the phsyical makeup of particles and their relationships, and why? because the particle makeup is irrelevant to the information they carry. Magic particles is no explanation for consciousness, and as Hypnagogue said, is completely unsupported by scientific data. Linking the extra dimensions of string theory to consciousness? WHY?

Consciousness I think, will be eventually explained by the physiology of the brain, nothing supernatural or phenomenal as far as physics principles go. Why look outside what we know about physics already. We don't explain thoughts or base desires or any 'unconscious' brain activity in terms particle physics, so why do it with consciousness? Of course you COULD say that if it were based on the physiology of the brain then that would mean that it is possible for two identical consciousnesses to exist. To that I say, for anything of substance to be exactly the same as something else, they not only have to share all properties and aspects, but must inhabit the same place at the same time, meaning that a single consciousness cannot inhabit two bodies. Aside from this, the likeliness that two consciousnesses (is that right?) WOULD be the same is ridiculously small, considering that they would have to have the same physical composition down to a tee, and also have to have shared the exact same past in order to have been exposed to the exact same sensory input.

And come on, that's not what was originally meant by the term 'point of view', it wasn't a reference to a certain point in our brain that contains a unique particle bar code for us. It was simply a reference to viewing anything from a particular vantage point that effected what we saw. How can a discussion on consciousness have so little scientific evidence? I think there is more reason to talk about consciousness in terms of information processing-the principle our brains and minds operate on, NOT particle physics. As I said, we don't analyse novels in terms of the particle composition, and why? because those particles are irrelevant to the information carried by the arrangement of letters into words, sentences, etc.

I think there is no reason to think that consciousness is outside the realm of what we know about physics, and all you have to do is look at the rate of advancement of new information processors and how fast what they can accomplish advances, all without any new physics discoveries.

 

[Fliption]

I think there is no reason to think that consciousness is outside the realm of what we know about physics, and all you have to do is look at the rate of advancement of new information processors and how fast what they can accomplish advances, all without any new physics discoveries.

There is quite a bit of philosophical credibility to the idea that physics, as it exists today, CANNOT explain consciousness. The problems of consciousness run much deeper than just "we haven't had time to figure it out yet but soon we'll link it all to effects of the brain."

 

[selfAdjoint]

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

Yes the research goes on, but the research hasn't yet found the secret of consciousness. One needn't be a "philosopher" to observe exceptional events and refrain from assuming a priori what the explanation is.

 

[babsyco]

I know that there are quite a few philosophers who tend to suspect that consciousness will turn out to beyond what we already know of the universe or some other phenomenal cause, but I have to say I'm afraid I (in my infinite and always consistent knowledge-[joke]) disagree with them. I cannot say it WON'T be the case, but I CAN say I have seen absolutely no reason to think it will so far, and doing things like linking it to extra dimensions in string theory doesn't exactly do wonders for the arguments credibility to me, either. What on Earth is the basis for links like that? If you have any sites or books that you think pose the phenomenal argument well, I seriously would love to read them, as I must admit I have been a bit bias to the other side in what I read about consciousness, and could do with a better idea of the phenomenal argument, but I just (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

Thanks, Babsyco.

 

[anuj]

Anyone trying to understand consciousness may have to read a little about the Hindu philosophy. I myself do not understand the meaning of consciousness fully but I do not reject it too just because it is difficult to explain it scientifically. To make our society more progressive, peaceful and prosperous we need both science as well as religion. Science for the materialistic development and religion for the control of our own mind, which if left uncontrolled can turn the benefits of science into great disasters.

This is where I think we need to sit quitely and explore the world within ourself, reason out who are we, me, myself etc. In short explaining consciousness. Recently I came across an article in an Indian newspaper which I found quite interesting. I think, the contributors to this thread may like to read.

Check this site: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/902912.cms

 

[babsyco]

I think you need to look at some of the atrocities that religion has caused before you say that we need it to in some way keep our minds or scientific discovery in check. Beliefs work both ways: cause good and bad.

Thanks, Babsyco.

 

[olde drunk]

Yeah, if you talk to the philosophers they tend to agree with that. Meanwhile the research goes on, as if the philosophers had never spoken. It's like a wife trying to get her husband to care about flowered valances over the windows.

do we have valances over the windows? oh, i hung them? lol

 

[hypnagogue]

doing things like linking [consciousness] to extra dimensions in string theory doesn't exactly do wonders for the arguments credibility to me, either.

I absolutely agree with you on this point. Don't take such wild speculations as representative of the general argument that physicalism can't account for consciousness.

If you have any sites or books that you think pose the phenomenal argument well, I seriously would love to read them, as I must admit I have been a bit bias to the other side in what I read about consciousness, and could do with a better idea of the phenomenal argument, but I just (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

David Chalmers has a number of good papers online about the argument. Check out http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html for starters. Chalmers also has a couple of books on consciousness (The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory and Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem) if you are interested in a more in-depth discussion.

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.

 

[Les Sleeth]

A Fallacy in the Physicalist Theory of Consciousness

I know that there are quite a few philosophers who tend to suspect that consciousness will turn out to beyond what we already know of the universe or some other phenomenal cause, but I have to say I'm afraid I . . . disagree with them. . . . (in the past) have been put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.

A favorite argument is David Chalmers’ zombie analogy and qualia model, which has been discussed at length here in the past. I see Hypnagogue beat me to it, but I’ll give you a site anyway where you can find links to articles both for and against Chalmers’ argument:
http://dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/Philosophers/C/Chalmers,_David/

Speaking for myself, I am unenthusiastic about physicalist theories of consciousness for other reasons. Leaving my personal experiences out it (which I admit is the main reason for my skepticism), and instead just relying on what is observable by everyone, then I believe at least one physicalist conclusion drawn from observations is what's called in philosophy the fallacy of composition. I’d think this fallacy in physicalist theory would fit your complaint of being “put off by what I've seen as unsupported theories.”

An example one of my philosophy dictionaries gives of the fallacy of composition would be to conclude that because all members of a baseball team are married, the baseball team as a whole therefore must have a wife. I’ve used an artist’s painting in the past to describe the fallacy. It goes something like this:

Say a research probe arrives here from another planet and finds Leonardo da Vinci’s painting of Mona Lisa. The probe takes samples of the paint and analyzes its chemistry; it takes samples of the canvas and records its composition; the probe analyzes the wavelengths of light reflected by the paint; it weighs the painting; it describes how all these factors are interconnected. Finally when every possible measurable factor is listed, it sends a report back to its home planet.

Question: do the planet’s inhabitants fully understand that painting? Has the painting been completely described by its list of components, its chemistry, its physics, and the interrelationships involved in all that? Is it logical to conclude that the whole is solely defined by the parts? This is what physicalist theory is. No more and no less. It is a description of the parts, their relationships, and their functions. That’s why physicalists now say they’ve explained life (ha!), and why they say they will eventually explain consciousness.

But just like that type of description of Leonardo da Vinci’s painting didn’t account for the creative organization present there, so too does physicalist descriptions of consciousness fail to account for why consciousness behaves in creatively organizing ways that are not observed in any non-living physical situation.

Buckminster Fuller once wrote, “Life is antientropic. It is spontaneously inquisitive. It sorts out and endeavors to understand.” Why isn’t consciousness entropic if it is matter-created? Why should survival be so important to matter-created consciousness? Shouldn’t it instead be just like its parent and behave disintegratively? Yet when a consciousness is like that, we consider it unhealthy or even psychopathic.

So I say physicalist theory is just as “unsupported” as supernatural creationist theories or wild mixes of quantum, string, etc. theories to form exotic metaphysics. I believe an unbiased mind must admit we don’t understand what causes the organizational drive and quality found in life and consciousness, and so would be open to the possibility there’s other unrecognized force(s) present in our universe causing that organization and consciousness's desire to manifest it.

 

[hypnagogue]

I'd just like to point out quickly that Les's arguments here aren't representative of kinds of arguments against physicalism given by Chalmers or Rosenberg. That is to say, one can reject Les's above arguments above but still accept the ones put forth by Chalmers/Rosenberg, because they are based on different principles.

I myself do not find anything troublesome for physicalism when it comes to accounting for life, or paintings, or the way a mind functions; I believe that a proper physicalist perspective can answer all of these questions satisfactorily, at least in principle. Nonetheless, I do not believe that any physicalist perspective can even begin to account for experiential consciousness, even in principle.

My objective here isn't to argue against Les, but just to establish the scope and flavor of the problem. The core dilemma (as propounded by Chalmers/Rosenberg) revolves around how we can account for experiential consciousness, and consideration of this dilemma does not entail that life, mind (in the purely physical/functional sense), etc. should also be problematic phenomena for physicalism (although one may find these phenomena problematic for physicalism on different grounds).

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'd just like to point out quickly that Les's arguments here aren't representative of kinds of arguments against physicalism given by Chalmers or Rosenberg. That is to say, one can reject Les's above arguments above but still accept the ones put forth by Chalmers/Rosenberg, because they are based on different principles.

Quite true. I was actually trying to contrast the two approaches.

I myself do not find anything troublesome for physicalism when it comes to accounting for life, or paintings, or the way a mind functions; I believe that a proper physicalist perspective can answer all of these questions satisfactorily, at least in principle.

Well, here we strongly disagree then. I would like to see how you explain the organizational quality found in life and consciousness with physical principles. I've challenged many people here to do it, and no one has yet. If Chalmers were participating here, I'd question him too for conceding to a physicalist theory of life.

Nonetheless, I do not believe that any physicalist perspective can even begin to account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. . . . My objective here isn't to argue against Les, but just to establish the scope and flavor of the problem. The core dilemma (as propounded by Chalmers/Rosenberg) revolves around how we can account for experiential consciousness, and consideration of this dilemma does not entail that life, mind (in the purely physical/functional sense), etc. should also be problematic phenomena for physicalism (although one may find these phenomena problematic for physicalism on different grounds).

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

 

[RingoKid]

If consciousness exists as it must for us to rationalise the universe we live in then where does it exist. Solely in the brain or outside of it ?

I say outside in line with dualist schools of thought. That would make the best candidates for this dimension of consciousness we have so far being wrapped up in every point of 4d spacetime and we by the nature of our vibrational makeup tap into it.

Does a string have to vibrate in all dimensions to have an effect on 4d spacetime ?

No, if it vibrates in any less than our 3, forget time for a minute cos we only want a snapshot, then it probably only registers as an effect like gravity or light/heat.

so why not apply the effect of strings vibrating in an extra dimension of conciousness but not fully in our 4d universe and open up the possibility on a true theory of EVERYTHING ?

I mean neural oscillations in the cerebral cortex; sounds like vibrational string activity when applied to a living entity.

Haven't you ever known something without knowing why or made an intuitive leap without knowing how ? Where does such "knowledge" originate ?..collective memory ?

To me it seem the simplest explanation and in line with current physical speculation especially if we have these extra dimensions anyway. Subjective experience can be accounted for by virtue of no 2 entities being exactly a like due to time and spatial variations at the time of conception.

If consciousness is a "state of awareness" and that state exists physically but not in our 4d universe then it exists elsewhere and can be blanketed to include consciousness/awareness in all multiverse scenarios.

Do to consciousness what big bang does to matter and rewind it back to it's genesis and what do you get, where do you end up and what do you think ?

We experience the universe

If this view is right, then in some ways a theory of consciousness will have more in common with a theory in physics than a theory in biology. Biological theories involve no principles that are fundamental in this way, so biological theory has a certain complexity and messiness to it; but theories in physics, insofar as they deal with fundamental principles, aspire to simplicity and elegance. The fundamental laws of nature are part of the basic furniture of the world, and physical theories are telling us that this basic furniture is remarkably simple. If a theory of consciousness also involves fundamental principles, then we should expect the same. The principles of simplicity, elegance, and even beauty that drive physicists' search for a fundamental theory will also apply to a theory of consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

I hope it isn't necessary to accept Chalmers and/or Rosenberg as undisputable authorities on how to argue against physicalistic assertions before one can post opinions on consciousness. While I do appreciate and respect your admiration of them, they don't impress me similarly. I'm afraid I perceive them as not empircial enough, and consequently too rationalistic for my tastes. I hope we can agree that each person is free to make his case relying on whatever best suits his predilections.

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Of course, of course. I didn't mean to imply that one couldn't make any other arguments on the matter, and I wasn't interested in critiquing your position here either (otherwise I would have gone into more detail). I apologize if it came off that way. I just wanted to emphasize that the arguments you presented in your post are different from those of Chalmers, in order to make the point that even if one does not accept your arguments, one still may accept theirs, and vice versa.

Yes, I should have assumed that. Since you've been here you have been a most charitable sort.

P.S.
Is it just me or have the Smileys been rearranged?

 

[StatusX]

one indication that it may be beyond science is that it is impossible to test, something fundamental to the scientific method. i can make a simple program that simply prints the words "I am conscious." then I could make an advanced AI program that is capable of carrying on a conversation about art or love or something, and then when i ask it if its conscious, it says "I am conscious." is the second program any more conscious than the first?

there is nothing i can say or do that would convince you i am conscious, and yet it is completely obvious to me. if you could scan my brain as i was being asked the question, it is conceivable you would be able to tell that i would say yes, seemingly independent of whether it was actually true. that is to say, there is a place in our brain that we go to for the answer to that question, just like there's a place where we get our height or age if someone asks. so what's different between me and the programs? is consciousness an illusion? if this is the answer science will give us in the end, can we conclude that science was not adequate for that question, or do we accept it?

edit: i took my theory about memory out, i realized it doesn't really address experience.

 

[Canute]

Even if you don't find Chalmers convincing, I would highly recommend Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Rosenberg motivates the argument against physicalism differently from Chalmers, and proceeds to develop a metaphysical framework in which experiential consciousness finds a natural place in the order of things. His framework might be regarded as metaphysically extravagant by some, but the manner in which it dissolves many of the seemingly intractable paradoxes surrounding consciousness into a very natural and pleasing picture of nature makes me believe that he's at least on the right track.

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

 

[hypnagogue]

I don't know Rosenberg's ideas. Are you able to give a v. quick summary of them?

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.

Rosenberg observes that many of the conceptual problems involved with phenomenal conscious revolve around questions of causation (eg interactionism which denies causal closure of the physical, vis a vis epiphenomnalism which denies P-consciousness any causal powers at all, etc.). In order to place consciousness into the natural order in a non-ad hoc way, he re-examines our theories of causality, finds them lacking, and constructs a new one. His new account of causation introduces receptivity, which is roughly a system's capacity to be affected, and characterizes effective causation as an operator of constraint on a given domain of possible states. He develops the theory formally by creating a directed graph notation.

He goes on to argue that physical theory ultimately describes a schema composed of bare differences, and finds such a schema ontologically lacking. In other words, he characterizes physics as an entirely extrinsic theory, and finds extrinsic phenomena to be incoherent in the absence of some kind of bottom-line intrinsic phenomena that can instantiate and realize such extrinsic/schematic relationships. He proposes phenomenal and experiential properties to be the perfect sort of intrinsic candidate to do the job. So he winds up with a panexperientialist theory where physical phenomena are just the set of functional relationships that phenomenal properties engage in.

In elaborating this idea within his detailed theory of causation, he

* assigns P-consciousness causal relevance without slipping into interactionism or epiphenomenalism,
* manages to neatly solve a number of paradoxes surrounding consciousness such as the boundary problem,
* comes to a sort of functionalist view on consciousness that avoids the usual observor-relative and ontological problems associated with it,
* avoids falling into the usual pitfalls associated with panexperientialism/panpsychism,
* and more.

You might also find the following brief summary helpful: http://www.cise.ufl.edu/~anand/html/Rosenberg.html

 

[StatusX]

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldn't we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

 

[hypnagogue]

i have a question for those who think consciousness is beyond the physical: if the physical structure of our brains were exactly the same, but we weren't conscious, wouldn't we still have these discussions? the arguments we are making about experience, how its definition is so elusive, how were sure we have it but can't prove it; all these arguments are coming from our physical brains, and are completely independent of our conscious experience.

A very pertinent question. You are essentially invoking the hypothetical philosophical entities called zombies, which are much discussed by both physicalists (eg Dennett) and anti-physicalists (eg Chalmers). My position on this question is that, yes, we would still have the same discussions, because our discussions are driven by physical causal mechanisms. Of course, our discussions would not be meaningful, because we would not really be referring to phenomenal consciousness, since by definition in this thought experiment we would not have it.

there is a place in our brain that is accessed when we are asked if we are conscious. now, either that place is all there is to consciousness, or it is in direct contact with whatever supernatural phenomenon is the real cause.

Depending on your metaphysical outlook, there are subtler points to be raised. For example, in Rosenberg's framework (which I favor) one could say both that this place in the brain is all there is to consciousness and that it is in direct contact with the metaphysical phenomena responsible for consciousness. But we need to make some qualifications. 'This place in the brain' is all there is to consciousness, but a purely physical account of this place in the brain is not all there is to the brain (on Rosenberg's view), so physicalism fails here. And the purely physical structure of the brain is in contact with phenomenal consciousness not in the sense that it is affected by it, but rather in the sense that the physical structure literally is just the effective causal content of the phenomenal consciousness. So these two are directly related in a way that is somewhat analogous to the way that the abstract structure of a building is directly related to the material that instantiates that structure.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

 

[hypnagogue]

Intrinsic = existing in space AND time
Extrinsic = existing outside of space AND time i.e in space-time.

That's not what the terms mean, or at least, I've never seen them used this way in philosophy. Nor have I meant them in this way when I've used the terms.

Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness? If you suppose that these new particles have some sort of ad hoc property that magically produces consciousness, you might as well transfer that ad hoc property to the accepted particles.