Is Consciousness Just the Result of Electrical Activity in Our Brains?

[Canute]

Those are all processes that can affect the physical world. You have to understand the difference between the subjective experience of a function and the function itself.

You stated that to know, to remember, to speak and to see are physical processes. No doubt there are physical processes usually involved in these things, but on what grounds do you say that only physical processes are involved? Do you have some data that nobody else has?

The easiest way to understand this is by asking, what do you know about another person that you haven't inferred about them under the assumption they are just like you? You know they know things, since you can ask a question and get an intelligent reply. You know they can see, because you can throw a punch at them and theyll try to duck. You know they can speak, because you hear them. For this information to get from them to you, it had to affect the physical world, and so all these functions are physical.

You are assuming that consciousness is non-causal. You may be right, but you'll have trouble proving it. Nobody else can.

However, you don't know they have an experience of these things. That you infer because you assume all humans are like you.

Quite agree. I find Occam's razor applicable in this situation. It would be a needless complication to assume that they are not conscious. However, you're right, this does not prove that they are.

Your whole argument seems to rest on this, so let me just make it clear. Someone asks you: "Are you conscious right now?" This rattles your eardrum, and makes neurons begin firing. This starts a chain reaction that goes into your cerebrum where, due to its physical structure, a new signal is sent to your vocal cords to make the sound "yes." At every point in this process, the operation is physical, and there is no reason to doubt that every step will one day be explained by conventional science, just like digestion or circulation is now.(I know these aren't completely understood, but hopefully you get my point) Your conscious experience during this time is a sort of side effect, and would not affect the results of an experiment.

Of course you're entitled to your opinion, but this is all conjecture. As yet there is no evidence that it is the case, and much evidence that it is not. For instance, how many people who are unconscious answer 'yes' when you ask them if they are conscious?

It basically comes down to this: Do you think an artificial intelligence program could, in principle, behave exactly like a human? Maybe our technology will never get there, but is it physically possible? If you don't, then you think there is something about the brain that is nonphysical besides consciousness, and you'll have to explain what it is. If you do, then you can understand why this could be a realizable example of a zombie.

I don't understand your argument here. Why do I have to explain something that is non-physical besides consciousness? Also the question is whether an AI program can be conscious, not whether it can behave like a human being. Consciousness is not behaviour.

Everything this zombie says is, as I described before, a consequence of his total physical brain structure. If a being had the exact same brain structure, it would respond to the same stimuli the same way. This includes any questions about consciousness. When we argue about consciousness, it is our physical brains that read the arguments, access memories and logically analyze ideas for counterarguments, and control our fingers to type a response. During all of this, yes, we are aware. But a thrid party could not know this, and it is not logically necessary that we be conscious during any of it. I don't mean we could do it in our sleep, because our physical brain state would be radically different. I mean even a zombie could do it.

Again, you are entitled to your opinion. But if you want to influence anybody else's you're going to have to find some evidence. Personally I believe that it is unreasonable to say that one can argue about consciousness without being conscious.

In particular, your argument that a non-conscious being couldn't be convinced of anything is very weak. Yea, your computer couldn't be convinced of anything anymore than a hamster or a piece of toast could. They don't have the physical cognitive structure. It has nothing to do with consciousness. You could imagine a very intelligent but non-conscious AI program which is programmed to think it is conscious. It could be convinced of plenty of things, but you would have a hard time convincing it that it isn't conscious.

Again, more opinion. You need to explain why my argument is very weak. What if I took your 'intelligent' (whatever we mean by that) but non-conscious AI program and instead of programming it to be convinced that it is conscious I programmed it to be convinced that it is not conscious? According to you it would go on behaving in precisely the same way. This seems a muddle of ideas to me.

Just as another example: a zombie would know the difference between wake and sleep because his brain would be in a different state, and his behavior would be different.

But how would this zombie know that its brain is in a different state? Surely it would just be in a different state. In order to know that it's brain is in a different state it's brain would have to be in yet another different state (the one correlating to 'knowing' that it's state is different). Where does this regression end?

Human beings do not rely on the observation of their own brain-states in order to know how they feel. If a zombie can only tell that it's awake only by observing its own brain-states then it does not have human-like consciousness.

Another problem is that of how a zombie brain can observes itself? Does one part encode for another in some sort of self-referential loop? Which bit of brain correlates to being awake, which to 'knowing' that it is awake, and which to knowing it knows that it's awake? Without consciousness there is no way to break out of this loop.

 

[StatusX]

You stated that to know, to remember, to speak and to see are physical processes. No doubt there are physical processes usually involved in these things, but on what grounds do you say that only physical processes are involved? Do you have some data that nobody else has?

All I'm saying is that the physical results of these processes can be entirely explained in physical terms, using traditional scientific methods. These physical results include discussions about consciousness, which was my main point. If it helps you to visualize what I mean, picture a typed essay about consciousness. Some interaction of an obscenely large number of atoms and forces conspired to transform carbon into lifeforms, which evolved into people, which created the computer, and hit the keys, coordinated by electrical signals in the brain, and printed out this paper, which is now just an ordered collection of atoms. I'm arguing that every single step along the way is explainable using the laws of relativity and quantum mechanics. This is debatable, which brings me to...

You are assuming that consciousness is non-causal. You may be right, but you'll have trouble proving it. Nobody else can.

True, and this may be the main place our opinions diverge. I'll explain why I feel this way in a minute.

Of course you're entitled to your opinion, but this is all conjecture. As yet there is no evidence that it is the case, and much evidence that it is not. For instance, how many people who are unconscious answer 'yes' when you ask them if they are conscious?

This is obviously a hypothetical question, and there is no way to know what a person without consciousness would say to such a question, just like there's no way to prove that someone who says yes is in fact conscious. However, from a materialist viewpoint, which is where I'm coming from, there cannot be a difference between two people who have the same physical constituents.

I don't understand your argument here. Why do I have to explain something that is non-physical besides consciousness? Also the question is whether an AI program can be conscious, not whether it can behave like a human being. Consciousness is not behaviour.

I'm arguing in terms of behavior. A zombie or a computer with AI would behave the same as us, ie, they would try to understand consciousness. However, they could not succeed. And all I mean by consciousness is experience. I am saying that you can explain every aspect of human behavior(which is a result of the physical brain) with physical laws, but the subjective notion of experience (eg, what its like to see the color red) may require something more. If you are arguing that a computer couldn't replicate our behavior, then you are saying there is something in our behavior that can't be explained by physical laws. This could only be true if either consciousness (ie, experience) is causal or if there is some property of the brain besides consciousnes that can't be explained in physical terms.

Now, if you are saying consciousness is causal, ie, it has a direct influence on our behavior, then you are saying that our physical actions are caused by more than just the physical electrical signals in our brain. There is no evidence for this, and I simply don't think its true. While this is only my opinion, it is also widely held even by the philosophers who are not materialists.

Again, more opinion. You need to explain why my argument is very weak. What if I took your 'intelligent' (whatever we mean by that) but non-conscious AI program and instead of programming it to be convinced that it is conscious I programmed it to be convinced that it is not conscious? According to you it would go on behaving in precisely the same way. This seems a muddle of ideas to me.

Obviously if you programmed it to think it wasn't conscious, it would be physically different than it was before. It could also not possibly mimic human behavior with this extra constraint, and thus could not qualify as a zombie.

But how would this zombie know that its brain is in a different state? Surely it would just be in a different state. In order to know that it's brain is in a different state it's brain would have to be in yet another different state (the one correlating to 'knowing' that it's state is different). Where does this regression end?

Human beings do not rely on the observation of their own brain-states in order to know how they feel. If a zombie can only tell that it's awake only by observing its own brain-states then it does not have human-like consciousness.

Another problem is that of how a zombie brain can observes itself? Does one part encode for another in some sort of self-referential loop? Which bit of brain correlates to being awake, which to 'knowing' that it is awake, and which to knowing it knows that it's awake? Without consciousness there is no way to break out of this loop.

It wouldn't subjectively know anything. It could, however, report information about itself, since that simply requires an electrical signal to travel from one part of the brain to another, namely, from memory to the speech center. We have an experience of this process when it happens in our brain, but we don't logically need to.

EDIT:
I realize I am not being very clear about where I stand, so just for the record, I feel that systems are completely described by their physical states. It is possible that these physical states give rise to consciousness in some situations, and if so, there should be some kind of fundamental law describing such a relationship. Another possibility is that consciousness is an illusion, which I logically accept as a possibility, but hate intensely.

If the first case is true, then whether consciousness is causal or not is debatable. In the context of the zombies argument I had to assume it wasn't for coherence, because by the premise, zombies are beings that influence the physical world exactly as we do. If consciousness is causal, zombies are not logically possible, and I think this may be your position. Looking back, I see that our disagreements were because you were just assuming this to be true from the start, and trying to consider the zombies from this perspective, which is impossible. You might want to at least consider the other views and see where you think yours succeeds where they fail. Your position is actually appealing in that consciousness may be the mechanism that causes wave collapse in QM, and thus does play a significant causal role. However, when I argued against a causal role for consciousness, I meant that in principle, consciousness does little to influence our macroscopic behavior. Have you ever tried describing the color red in words? I think a hypothetical zombie would do just as well, even if his affect on the world was slightly different than ours at a microscopic level.

 

[olde drunk]

When i access a data memory file on my computer i see the code, etc.

Has anyone even suggested that we have a physical cell (or whatever) that we encode to have a memory? is this cell hung on a synapse?

take a brain slice and put it into the most powerful e-microscope, show me a memory cell or the residue of an abstract thought, please.

love&peace,
olde drunk

 

[RingoKid]

information carrying strings according to a vibrational pattern across a dimension of consciousness that gets translated by our brain to resemble memory, knowledge and subjective truth to the individual.

consciousness is a place, we tap into it and project it's "image" onto our universe in 4d spacetime.

could it be so simple ?

 

[gerben]

information carrying strings according to a vibrational pattern across a dimension of consciousness that gets translated by our brain to resemble memory, knowledge and subjective truth to the individual.

consciousness is a place, we tap into it and project it's "image" onto our universe in 4d spacetime.

could it be so simple ?

You propose that consciousness is something completely separate from the physical world, that comes into contact with the physical world via brains.

ok

and then?

 

[RingoKid]

yup...

...in as much as branes and hidden dimensions wrapped up in each point particle sized co ordinate in 4d spacetime are completely separated from the physical world.

It's not so much that this dimension comes into contact via brains as i believe it permeates every fibre of our being accounting for genetic memory. The contact is always present but we decode the contact using our brains.

and then?

...we try to make sense of the data according to the accumulation of knowledge from the collective human experience across a broad spectrum of subjects from metaphysics to religion to quantum mechanics and cosmology, irrespective of culture, geographical and temporal traditions.

the collective consciousness now has a place to exist

We unify the human experience into a consensus reality with or without God. It doesn't matter cos it's all about us and how we percieve ourselves and the universe we inhabit.

i just found this on the net and haven't even read it yet but it appears i am not alone. I may the first to associate hidden dimensions of string theory to repositories of consciousness and by association memory, knowledge and truth...

Time will tell.

 

[RingoKid]

oops forgot to post the link...

http://www.meta-religion.com/Physics/Consciousness/physics_of_collective_consciousness.htm

 

[gerben]

RingoKid, what I was doing was summarizing your post in language that I could understand, leaving out anything that I (and I assume most of the other readers) did not understand.

So now for your new post:
You propose that this totally separate realm (called consciousness) contacts everything in the physical world.

That is it for this time I did not understand the rest.

I do not understand why you say our brain "decodes" something from a separate realm (called consciousness). I think it simply "decodes" (interprets) sensory input coming from the physical world, and we are somehow conscious of this interpretation.

 

[abbott]

Observation is the core necessity of an existence that operates as a balance of opposites. Our powers of observation will always end in unpercieveability (time or space "before" the big bang, the meaning of time or space in the face of the infinity we observe them approach).

We (classical philosophy "who am I?" and "what is everything?") must be the knowable universes understanding of itself, after all what is anything we have observed other than a reflection of the energies we've used to detect it. And what is a living thing? A converter of energies, we sustain ourselves by in-taking things and changing them into other things (sounds like a process of observation to me).

 

[Canute]

All I'm saying is that the physical results of these processes can be entirely explained in physical terms, using traditional scientific methods. These physical results include discussions about consciousness, which was my main point.

I can't see why you would believe that discussions about consciousness can happen in the absence of consciousness, unless it is to protect an underlying physicalist theory. Human beings don't normally talk about things whose existence they have no evidence for, why would zombies do it? Can you imagine finding a distant planet where nothing is conscious, but whose inhabitants spend their time discussing consciousness? I don't buy it.

If it helps you to visualize what I mean, picture a typed essay about consciousness. Some interaction of an obscenely large number of atoms and forces conspired to transform carbon into lifeforms, which evolved into people, which created the computer, and hit the keys, coordinated by electrical signals in the brain, and printed out this paper, which is now just an ordered collection of atoms. I'm arguing that every single step along the way is explainable using the laws of relativity and quantum mechanics. This is debatable, which brings me to...

Yes, it is debatable.

This is obviously a hypothetical question, and there is no way to know what a person without consciousness would say to such a question, just like there's no way to prove that someone who says yes is in fact conscious.

We know that people who are unconscious (asleep, knocked out etc.) do not say yes to the question of whether they are conscious. If you asked a zombie they'd say no, since they are zombies. They would therefore not behave like human beings. If they answer yes, as we would, then either they are not zombies or they are lying.

However, from a materialist viewpoint, which is where I'm coming from, there cannot be a difference between two people who have the same physical constituents.

I realize that, but it is a conjecture.

I'm arguing in terms of behavior. A zombie or a computer with AI would behave the same as us, ie, they would try to understand consciousness. However, they could not succeed.

Hang on, if zombies are intelligent and consciousness is scientifically explicable then why can't zombies succeed in explaining consciousness? I would have thought they were the ideal entities to do it. If they can't succeed in doing this it can only be that they are not conscious, in which case human beings are not zombies.

And all I mean by consciousness is experience. I am saying that you can explain every aspect of human behavior(which is a result of the physical brain) with physical laws, but the subjective notion of experience (eg, what its like to see the color red) may require something more.

That seems self-contradictory. It is saying that when you stop at a red traffic light seeing the red light cannot be explained by physical laws, but the fact that you stopped can be. However the reason you stopped was because you saw a red light, an experience which cannot be explained by physical laws. I can't see how you reconcile these two views. Why did you stop?

If you are arguing that a computer couldn't replicate our behavior, then you are saying there is something in our behavior that can't be explained by physical laws.

It's not quite so straighforward. There's an issue here about whether physical laws are sufficient or necessary to detirmine behaviour. That is, we can say that human consciousness is not capable of breaking any physical laws, but still argue that human behaviour cannot be explained only by reference to those laws.

Now, if you are saying consciousness is causal, ie, it has a direct influence on our behavior, then you are saying that our physical actions are caused by more than just the physical electrical signals in our brain. There is no evidence for this, and I simply don't think its true.

Ok. But there is no scientific evidence that it is not true and I take the other view. I base this on non-scientific evidence, my own experience of consciousness.

Obviously if you programmed it to think it wasn't conscious, it would be physically different than it was before. It could also not possibly mimic human behavior with this extra constraint, and thus could not qualify as a zombie.

So for a zombie to behave like a human it must think that it is conscious? But if it can think it is conscious then it is conscious, at least according to Descartes.

It wouldn't subjectively know anything. It could, however, report information about itself, since that simply requires an electrical signal to travel from one part of the brain to another, namely, from memory to the speech center. We have an experience of this process when it happens in our brain, but we don't logically need to.

What would a zombie answer if you asked it how it is feeling today?

EDIT: I realize I am not being very clear about where I stand, so just for the record, I feel that systems are completely described by their physical states. It is possible that these physical states give rise to consciousness in some situations, and if so, there should be some kind of fundamental law describing such a relationship. Another possibility is that consciousness is an illusion, which I logically accept as a possibility, but hate intensely.

Ok, I see where you're coming from. But don't forget that there are other possibilities.

. Have you ever tried describing the color red in words? I think a hypothetical zombie would do just as well, even if his affect on the world was slightly different than ours at a microscopic level.

All experiences are incommensurable, incommunicable etc., so we cannot describe red in words. If a zombie could explain the colour red (by which I take it you mean 'the experience of seeing the colour red') then it would be nothing like a human being. In any case I suspect that a zombie would not be able to explain what the colour red is like, since a zombie would not be able to experience seeing red. There would be nothing that it is like to see it. A zombie would merely register some particular frequency of light waves that correspond to what those quirky humans call 'red'.

 

[Canute]

Hypnagogue

Thanks for your note and link on Rosenberg. I don't see what he is getting at so will do some further exploring.

It's difficult to give a quick summary (even when explaining it in depth, I've found that sometimes the best recourse is to just direct the reader to the book), but I'll try.

Yes, point taken. I was wondering whether the book was worth reading.

 

[RingoKid]

Gerben

String theory would have all matter, charges and field/wave effects as being vibrations of bands of energy vibrating across up to 10 dimensions and encompassed in a larger 11th dimension of which we can only detect 4, the 4 being our 3d universe and time.

The shape of the string, it's rate of vibration and the number of dimensions it vibrates in determine it's elemental or field properties. The accumulation of which in 4d format forms atoms, molecules, objects and entitites.

So for a collection of strings such as a sentient life form to have consciousness then it must at some stage of it's vibrational traverse through a dimension or combination thereof acquire a consciousness ie an awareness of it's own existence.

This would allow for say a rock to not be aware of it's existence due to it's lack of vibration in a dimension of consciousness.

The alternative is to assign intrinsic properties of consciousness to all strings.

The separateness of the hidden dimensions is not really separate because they exist at every 4d co ordinate in physically detectable spacetime.

So what we see as reality is merely our 4d sensory perception of it. Our awareness of the underlying reality is what we are all searching for albeit in a multitude of disciplines. Our brain decodes what our senses tell it in the physical world but it also allows us to project our consciousness to the non physical world implied by black holes, multiverses and hidden dimensions.

 

[Fliption]

That seems self-contradictory. It is saying that when you stop at a red traffic light seeing the red light cannot be explained by physical laws, but the fact that you stopped can be. However the reason you stopped was because you saw a red light, an experience which cannot be explained by physical laws. I can't see how you reconcile these two views. Why did you stop?

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

 

[Rader]

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

So you do not think life is that aspect of human behavior?

Did you ever see a human not acting like, it was alive and have consciousness? Or better yet ask yourself the question.

Are you looking for a discussion or do you really believe that?

 

[gerben]

Ringokid

I agree that string theory assumes that there are many dimension. I also agree that we experience only 3 spatial dimensions and 1 temporal dimension. What I do not see is, why it would be useful, or how it would further understanding, to associate consciousness with another dimension. Of course you can do so, but it does not make anything clear. In string theory the multiple dimensions are used to explain how the "4d spacetime world" that we experience behaves (this also includes rocks). If you only say that consciousness is another dimension then that statement in itself is empty.

 

[Canute]

Actually, the way I understand the zombie illustration, it is true that all behaviour can be completely explained with physical laws. This fact is why we have the hard problem to begin with. If there were some aspect of human behaviour that was necessarily caused by consciousness then we could easily conclude that P-Consciousness is equivalent to the differences in A-Consciousness between a conscious human and a zombie. This would eliminate the hard problem. The fact that physical laws can explain all behaviour yet still not say anything about subjective experience is what the hard problem is all about.

Ah yes, you're quite right. On reflection my responses to StatusX were muddled on this issue.

I forgot that it is argued that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. I forgot because I don't believe it. What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

 

[selfAdjoint]

What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

This is an interesting position. You seem to believe that consciousness IS required for explaining human behavior, that many things humans do cannot be explained without assuming that they feel what it is like to be in some state or other. On the other hand you also believe that this proposition can never be proved. As it was said, "You believe because you see. Blessed are they who believe what they don't see."

 

[Fliption]

Ah yes, you're quite right. On reflection my responses to StatusX were muddled on this issue.

I forgot that it is argued that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. I forgot because I don't believe it. What seems to be true is that it is not possible to show that consciousness is required in order to explain human behaviour. However, this is not quite the same claim as the one that states that human behaviour can be explained without reference to consciousness. The first I believe to be true, the second false. (I suspect the second claim is untestable anyway.)

We are in complete agreement. I've had long discussions with Hypnagogue on this one. I too find it hard to believe that a zombie would ever believe it is conscious. The trick though, is to understand that the belief that one is conscious can be completely explained with an analysis of A-consciousness. And there is no necessary reason why a zombie could not find itself in such an A-conscious state. In fact, if a zombie has A-consciousness identical to you, then it must have a belief it has P-consciousness,as you do. So the behaviour of believing that I am conscious does not require P-consciousness to be explained.

The point of the exercise is one of epistomology about P-consciousness. It doesn't really mean that a zombie would actually believe in the hard problem. I don't believe that it would.

 

[Fliption]

This is an interesting position. You seem to believe that consciousness IS required for explaining human behavior, that many things humans do cannot be explained without assuming that they feel what it is like to be in some state or other. On the other hand you also believe that this proposition can never be proved. As it was said, "You believe because you see. Blessed are they who believe what they don't see."

It's an interesting dilemma. It doesn't seem likely that a zombie would ever believe in a hard problem. It seems as if you really have to have P-consciousness to see the hard problem. But the belief in a hard problem itself can be completely explained with A-consciousness and doesn't require P-consciousness. To me, this just makes the hard problem a personal private hell for each of us who really do have P-consciousness

 

[StatusX]

We are in complete agreement. I've had long discussions with Hypnagogue on this one. I too find it hard to believe that a zombie would ever believe it is conscious. The trick though, is to understand that the belief that one is conscious can be completely explained with an analysis of A-consciousness. And there is no necessary reason why a zombie could not find itself in such an A-conscious state. In fact, if a zombie has A-consciousness identical to you, then it must have a belief it has P-consciousness,as you do. So the behaviour of believing that I am conscious does not require P-consciousness to be explained.

This is exactly what I was trying trying to explain before, and I completely agree with everything said here.

The point of the exercise is one of epistomology about P-consciousness. It doesn't really mean that a zombie would actually believe in the hard problem. I don't believe that it would.

Now here you lose me. I thought you said all behavior could be explained? What makes this behavior special? My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is interesting, because it suggests a pleasing symmetry between the mental world and the physical world. If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.

 

[Fliption]

My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie.

I'd make one change to this statement above. Instead of saying "would also be exhibited by a zombie", I'm saying "could also be exhibited by a zombie. There is a difference. The new sentence isn't making a statement one way or the other about what a zombie would believe or how it would behave. It simply says that no behavior is "out of scope" for a zombie. This includes believing in the hard problem.

In the zombie illustration, many times it is claimed that the zombie "would" believe it is conscious. This is simply because one of the assumptions of the illustration is that the zombie has identical A-consciousness as someone who has P-consciousness. That assumption is made for the sake of illustrating the problems of consciousness. Not because a zombie really would have identical A-consciousness.

I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is true and is the essence of the hard problem. How can P-consciousness exists and not be explained by the physical facts?

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Rothie M:
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

Hypnagogue:

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?

Rothie M:

What is experiential consciousness?
Someone's definition of what they think consciousness is.
This definition could be wrong.
I think the root cause of our inability to understand consciousness
is that people think it is something unphysical.Why should this be so?
A colour exists at a certain place for a certain time with a certain intensity and hue.What is so unphysical about this?
Our brains certainly categorize consciousness differently from other phenomena.But that is probably because our brains have evolved to enable us to survive and they categorize to aid survival - not to give deep philosophical insight.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

If I see an area of colour, the area is continuous with no gaps in it.This can't be explained by saying that the area is made of lots of waves or particles.But space is continuous and so we would suspect an area of colour to be an area of space or some continuous property associated with that continuous area of space.Dark energy
is considered to be a property of space, so perhaps there is an association between consciousness and dark energy.We would suspect that we can have conscious experiences anywhere in the universe and we would also suspect that space exists everywhere in the universe,whereas waves and particles might not.I mention all this because it is my belief that space-time exists in space and time.In other words space-time is particulate in nature and this is why gravitational force carriers (which can be particles) can alter space-time.
One kind of particle influences another.
According to quantum mechanics the vacuum should have a colossal energy density of 10^120 Joules per cubic metre.This figure is at odds with experiment.However if the vacuum energy does not have a gravitational field
perhaps we could say that space is made from it - we would not expect space to have a gravitational field either.So, in this scenario,particles of which space-time is constituted, exist in a medium of vacuum particles called
space.And it is the vacuum particles which have a continuous distribution which allows the areas of colours, we consciously experience, to be continuous.

 

[StatusX]

Yes, photons are discrete, but there are so many of them per cell that we couldn't possibly make out individual ones, and so light appears continuous.

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually traveling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

What I meant was that the area of colour is not made from photons.
It has to be made from something else that is continuous.

 

[douglas]

Possible Explanation

There is apparently an underground paper that explains consciousness but I haven't read it. Someone told me that there are plans to publish it next year. Has anyone heard of this paper? All I know is that the author's initials are MD and only a few people have a copy.

Please email me if you know anything about this paper.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually traveling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

 

[StatusX]

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

Yes, I just read over your other posts in this thread and I can see you understand the arguments. Sorry, I should have done that first.

Regarding your point about if "experience could arise without any real objects," it certainly can. Consciousness can experience itself, as any reasonably accomplished meditator can attest to.

 

[Canute]

... My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.

This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

The question of whether our consciousness in its entirety comes into existence when we are born as mortal beings remains moot. As yet there is no scientific evidence that points either way. Those who research consciousness as opposed to brain generally assert that there's a lot more to consciousness than meets the eye.

 

[StatusX]

Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

I'll explain why I believe consciousness isn't causal without referring to any hypothetical beings.

When you read my post, light is stimulating your eye, which sends signals to your brain. Your brain turns this visual data into words, and then into abstract ideas (ie, signals representing abstract ideas). These signals cause other signals to start up, which represent your own personal ideas. You might look at an apple lying on your desk and this causes new signals which represent the color red. These new signals interact with the ones already floating around in your head to bring you to the conclusion that red is real, and my arguments are nonsense.(ie, daft) Now, I'm saying that each of these steps is a physical process, and can be explained by the laws of QM and, if they apply, relativity. We aren't yet close to such an explanation, and in fact they might not actually be signals, but instead something more abstract, like "brain states." But they are physically explainable. On the other hand, you seem to be saying that at some point in this process, a mystical, non-physical force (ie, causal consciousness) creeps in and affects the physical outcome. The brain is a physical object, no inherently different than a computer. What brings you to the conclusion that there is such a mystical force?

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain. If the electrical state of our brain could be altered by physical means, it is not at all unreasonable to claim that our conscious experience would change as well. Who's to say we couldn't electrically stimulate ourselves into any conscious state we wanted? I could electrically induce you into a state where you had my opinions about consciousness, or maybe those of someone who doesn't believe in it at all. Our beliefs about consciousness are completely physically rooted. (note: maybe I would have to change the physical structure in addition to the electrical configuration to achieve certain conscious states, but this does not affect my argument.)

This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration." If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

 

[Canute]

I'll explain why I believe consciousness isn't causal without referring to any hypothetical beings.

When you read my post, light is stimulating your eye, which sends signals to your brain. Your brain turns this visual data into words, and then into abstract ideas (ie, signals representing abstract ideas).

Hmm. How does one turn an electro-chemical signal into an idea in the absence of consciousness? What is an 'abstract idea'? Is there any other sort? Or are you suggesting that ideas are physical? Does the idea of an elephant take up more brain space than the idea of a mouse?

These signals cause other signals to start up, which represent your own personal ideas.

This is a sleight of hand. An electro-chemical signal is a physical thing, an idea is not, (even if you believe that ideas have neural correlates). If these signals 'represent' ideas then who or what is decoding the representation and turning them into ideas? That is, how does your e-c signal become a non-physical idea?

You might look at an apple lying on your desk and this causes new signals which represent the color red.

What do you mean 'represent' the colour red? I thought you were arguing that the signals were the colour red.

These new signals interact with the ones already floating around in your head to bring you to the conclusion that red is real, and my arguments are nonsense.(ie, daft)

Are you saying that 'red' is not real? Why are you trying to explain our experience of it then?

Now, I'm saying that each of these steps is a physical process, and can be explained by the laws of QM and, if they apply, relativity.

OK. But I'll bet you can't find any evidence to prove it.

We aren't yet close to such an explanation,

I wonder why not.

and in fact they might not actually be signals, but instead something more abstract, like "brain states."

I'd say a brain state was not abstract. This is the problem, it is not possible to argue from brain states to states of consciousness. This is why so many arguments against the notion that the neural correlates of consciousness are consciousness have been published. I like neurophysiologist Karl Pribram's remark that looking for consciousness in the brain is like digging to the centre of the Earth to find gravity.

But they are physically explainable. On the other hand, you seem to be saying that at some point in this process, a mystical, non-physical force (ie, causal consciousness) creeps in and affects the physical outcome.

Hold on, I didn't suggest that there was anything mystical about consciousness, and both of us are arguing that it is non-physical, me on the basis that is does exist, you on the basis that it doesn't.

The whole basis of your argument is that something that is non-phsyical cannot exist, and that therefore consciousness is physical insofar as it exists and non-physical insofar as it doesn't. This forces you into the incoherent view that ideas are physical, despite the fact that they have no physical extension.

The brain is a physical object, no inherently different than a computer. What brings you to the conclusion that there is such a mystical force?

'Mystical' is your word, not mine. What forces me to conclude that consciousness (or, more properly, conscious experiences) is not physical is that the brain can be observed in the third-person and consciousness cannot be.

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain. If the electrical state of our brain could be altered by physical means, it is not at all unreasonable to claim that our conscious experience would change as well.

There is no doubt that as human beings our states of consciousness are affected by the states of our brains. However the states of the tides are affected by the state of the moon. It does not follow that water is made out of moons.

Who's to say we couldn't electrically stimulate ourselves into any conscious state we wanted?

Whose to say there isn't a teapot in orbit around Mars?

I could electrically induce you into a state where you had my opinions about consciousness, or maybe those of someone who doesn't believe in it at all. Our beliefs about consciousness are completely physically rooted. (note: maybe I would have to change the physical structure in addition to the electrical configuration to achieve certain conscious states, but this does not affect my argument.)

Yes, but this is just a restatement of your opinion. I'm arguing that there is no evidence for your opinion. Can you think of any? There's none yet in the literature.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration."

In a way I agree. It depends how you use the term 'prove'. If I say 'it appears to me that it's raining' I can know that this is true. I can 'prove' its truth to myself by a simple act of introspection, (and the statement remains true whether or not it is raining). But I cannot demonstrate a proof of it. Perhaps you wouldn't consider my introspective evidence a 'proof', but this doesn't really matter. What is known directly is certain but not provable by demonstration, (e.g. 'I think therefore I am'), whereas what can be proved by demonstration can always be falsified (Goedel et al) and is therefore never certain. This is one of the odd consequences of the nature of consciousness and of formal reasoning.

If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

I cannot demonstrate that I am conscious. However it doesn't follow that I cannot be sure whether I am or not. Are you suggesting that we could be not-conscious yet think we are, or be conscious yet think we are not? If so then we better just agree to disagree.

 

[Fliption]

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain.

I agree with you that no argument can be made to say that consciousness is causal. But you seem to go to far with your arguments. If we say that we have no evidence that A causes or has an effect on B, we cannot then conclude that therefore B must cause(or is a byproduct of A). This idea is simply a belief and actually contradicts the whole premise you originally agreed with.

I still wonder if you understood me earlier when I said that a large part of the issue with consciousness is one of epistomology. The whole reason for the zombie illustration is to say that consciousness is beyond the study of a materialist paradigm. It does not claim anything about the causality of consciousness. It merely claims we cannot "know" these things using a materialist toolkit. So this includes making conclusions about it being the byproduct of anything.

You agree with the illustration when it claims that consciousness cannot be shown to be causal but then disagree with the illustration when you make the claim that therefore consciousness is the byproduct of physical processes. This is exactly what the illustration is telling you is NOT the case. You cannot make a statement about causality one way or the other because you cannot make a connection using a materialist paradigm. How can you agree that there is no causal connection and that no explanation can be had under materialism and then claim that it is simply a byproduct of physical processes? This seems inconsistent to me.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration." If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

I agree with Canute here, although this could largely be semantic. To me all knowledge is personal and I think that's how Canute is using the term "knowledge" as well. The only thing I am certain of is that "something exists". I know this because I of aware of existence and something has to exists for this awareness to exists.

When Canute used "prove by demonstration", I interpret it to mean proving to others. Since I do not "know" that the external world really exists and this includes all those people that I might use to "prove by demonstration" to, "prove by demonstration" doesn't prove anything.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Fliption:
I agree with you that no argument can be made to say that consciousness is causal.

Rothie M:
It has to be causal.Because consciousness is associated with the passage of time and
time passes when physical entities change from one spatial configuration to another.
Energy of some kind causes the configurations to change.

 

[Burnsys]

i guess if we want to fin what counsiosnes really is, we have to research on dopamine and endorfines... why dopamine in our brains make as feel good? while other neurotransmisors make as feel bad??

it may sound stupid, but i think it's a good question, if it doesn't have an answer yet..