Is Consciousness Just the Result of Electrical Activity in Our Brains?

[Fliption]

My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie.

I'd make one change to this statement above. Instead of saying "would also be exhibited by a zombie", I'm saying "could also be exhibited by a zombie. There is a difference. The new sentence isn't making a statement one way or the other about what a zombie would believe or how it would behave. It simply says that no behavior is "out of scope" for a zombie. This includes believing in the hard problem.

In the zombie illustration, many times it is claimed that the zombie "would" believe it is conscious. This is simply because one of the assumptions of the illustration is that the zombie has identical A-consciousness as someone who has P-consciousness. That assumption is made for the sake of illustrating the problems of consciousness. Not because a zombie really would have identical A-consciousness.

I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

This is true and is the essence of the hard problem. How can P-consciousness exists and not be explained by the physical facts?

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Rothie M:
Consciousness is different to what is regarded as physical reality i.e space-time.
It could just be that there are some particles that don't obey relativity theory
and that this is the only difference between consciousness and the absence of consciousness (tachyons - particles with negative squared mass - are hypothesised to travel faster than light).

Hypnagogue:

We've been over this already. The reason physicalism is typically rejected, as in considerations from the 'hard problem' of consciousness, is the argument that no physical mechanism can account for experiential consciousness, even in principle. That critique covers your stipulative law breaking particles as well. Introducing a new set of particles does nothing to advance us on the core of the problem: Why are these particles and their interactions accompanied by experiential consciousness?

Rothie M:

What is experiential consciousness?
Someone's definition of what they think consciousness is.
This definition could be wrong.
I think the root cause of our inability to understand consciousness
is that people think it is something unphysical.Why should this be so?
A colour exists at a certain place for a certain time with a certain intensity and hue.What is so unphysical about this?
Our brains certainly categorize consciousness differently from other phenomena.But that is probably because our brains have evolved to enable us to survive and they categorize to aid survival - not to give deep philosophical insight.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

If I see an area of colour, the area is continuous with no gaps in it.This can't be explained by saying that the area is made of lots of waves or particles.But space is continuous and so we would suspect an area of colour to be an area of space or some continuous property associated with that continuous area of space.Dark energy
is considered to be a property of space, so perhaps there is an association between consciousness and dark energy.We would suspect that we can have conscious experiences anywhere in the universe and we would also suspect that space exists everywhere in the universe,whereas waves and particles might not.I mention all this because it is my belief that space-time exists in space and time.In other words space-time is particulate in nature and this is why gravitational force carriers (which can be particles) can alter space-time.
One kind of particle influences another.
According to quantum mechanics the vacuum should have a colossal energy density of 10^120 Joules per cubic metre.This figure is at odds with experiment.However if the vacuum energy does not have a gravitational field
perhaps we could say that space is made from it - we would not expect space to have a gravitational field either.So, in this scenario,particles of which space-time is constituted, exist in a medium of vacuum particles called
space.And it is the vacuum particles which have a continuous distribution which allows the areas of colours, we consciously experience, to be continuous.

 

[StatusX]

Yes, photons are discrete, but there are so many of them per cell that we couldn't possibly make out individual ones, and so light appears continuous.

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually traveling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

What I meant was that the area of colour is not made from photons.
It has to be made from something else that is continuous.

 

[douglas]

Possible Explanation

There is apparently an underground paper that explains consciousness but I haven't read it. Someone told me that there are plans to publish it next year. Has anyone heard of this paper? All I know is that the author's initials are MD and only a few people have a copy.

Please email me if you know anything about this paper.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If our brain was electrically stimulated in the right way, I believe we could have all the experiences we have in everyday life: color, sound, heat, pleasure. I don't see any reason to doubt this. So there is nothing actually traveling between us and the object we are looking at that causes the subjective experience of color. All that happens is photons hit our eye and cause a chemical reaction which causes electrical impulses in our brain. These impulses gives rise to conscious experience. I think the brain is the only place we should look to if we want to find the cause of consciousness.

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

 

[StatusX]

Your explanation doesn't explain subjective experience. Your explanation only explains how the brain receives information through the senses, and how it might register. That same explanation can be used to decribe how a video camera records a signal on a tape. The signal is detected, the signal and tape together create a recording; but neither the camera or the tape has a clue any of that has gone on.

Consciousness is not just the mechanics receiving information. What is creating the personal awareness of that information?

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I was responding to Rothiemurchus' post where he said that our conscious experience of color is caused by"color particles" that travel from the object to our eyes. I was just explaining why I thought that experience could arise without any real objects, and thus without any color particles, so there is no reason for them to exist. I was in no way trying to explain consciousness.

Yes, I just read over your other posts in this thread and I can see you understand the arguments. Sorry, I should have done that first.

Regarding your point about if "experience could arise without any real objects," it certainly can. Consciousness can experience itself, as any reasonably accomplished meditator can attest to.

 

[Canute]

... My original point from 20 posts ago, if anyone still cares, was that all behavior, including any philosophical inquiries into the nature of conscious, would also be exhibited by a zombie. I have no evidence that the great philosophers of the mind aren't zombies. The point is that nothing about the physical world requires phenomenal consciousness.

Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

If you choose to accept the physical world as the ultimate truth, there is no way you can prove the existence of the mental world (as I just argued). On the other hand, if you accept the mind as the ultimate truth, there is no way to prove the physical world (eg, Descartes' doubt arguments). I can take this even farther. Our mental world simply popped into existence when we were born, much like the physical world. Both have only existed for a finite time. Both expand, in a sense, over time. I'm sure there are more.

This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

The question of whether our consciousness in its entirety comes into existence when we are born as mortal beings remains moot. As yet there is no scientific evidence that points either way. Those who research consciousness as opposed to brain generally assert that there's a lot more to consciousness than meets the eye.

 

[StatusX]

Your claim goes beyond what is known. It might be true but, as I said earlier, I don't believe it. In fact I find the idea daft. Many people claim that we can explain human behaviour and the existence of the physical world without reference to consciousness. However this is a conjecture. As things stand we are unable to explain the existence of human consciousness or the physical world. It is therefore possible that the reason we cannot explain thses things is that we think we can explain them without reference to consciousness.

I'll explain why I believe consciousness isn't causal without referring to any hypothetical beings.

When you read my post, light is stimulating your eye, which sends signals to your brain. Your brain turns this visual data into words, and then into abstract ideas (ie, signals representing abstract ideas). These signals cause other signals to start up, which represent your own personal ideas. You might look at an apple lying on your desk and this causes new signals which represent the color red. These new signals interact with the ones already floating around in your head to bring you to the conclusion that red is real, and my arguments are nonsense.(ie, daft) Now, I'm saying that each of these steps is a physical process, and can be explained by the laws of QM and, if they apply, relativity. We aren't yet close to such an explanation, and in fact they might not actually be signals, but instead something more abstract, like "brain states." But they are physically explainable. On the other hand, you seem to be saying that at some point in this process, a mystical, non-physical force (ie, causal consciousness) creeps in and affects the physical outcome. The brain is a physical object, no inherently different than a computer. What brings you to the conclusion that there is such a mystical force?

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain. If the electrical state of our brain could be altered by physical means, it is not at all unreasonable to claim that our conscious experience would change as well. Who's to say we couldn't electrically stimulate ourselves into any conscious state we wanted? I could electrically induce you into a state where you had my opinions about consciousness, or maybe those of someone who doesn't believe in it at all. Our beliefs about consciousness are completely physically rooted. (note: maybe I would have to change the physical structure in addition to the electrical configuration to achieve certain conscious states, but this does not affect my argument.)

This isn't quite accurate. It is very easy to prove the existence of the mental world, it is just not possible to prove it by demonstration. In contrast it is impossible to prove the existence of the physical world by any means or under any circumstances.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration." If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

 

[Canute]

I'll explain why I believe consciousness isn't causal without referring to any hypothetical beings.

When you read my post, light is stimulating your eye, which sends signals to your brain. Your brain turns this visual data into words, and then into abstract ideas (ie, signals representing abstract ideas).

Hmm. How does one turn an electro-chemical signal into an idea in the absence of consciousness? What is an 'abstract idea'? Is there any other sort? Or are you suggesting that ideas are physical? Does the idea of an elephant take up more brain space than the idea of a mouse?

These signals cause other signals to start up, which represent your own personal ideas.

This is a sleight of hand. An electro-chemical signal is a physical thing, an idea is not, (even if you believe that ideas have neural correlates). If these signals 'represent' ideas then who or what is decoding the representation and turning them into ideas? That is, how does your e-c signal become a non-physical idea?

You might look at an apple lying on your desk and this causes new signals which represent the color red.

What do you mean 'represent' the colour red? I thought you were arguing that the signals were the colour red.

These new signals interact with the ones already floating around in your head to bring you to the conclusion that red is real, and my arguments are nonsense.(ie, daft)

Are you saying that 'red' is not real? Why are you trying to explain our experience of it then?

Now, I'm saying that each of these steps is a physical process, and can be explained by the laws of QM and, if they apply, relativity.

OK. But I'll bet you can't find any evidence to prove it.

We aren't yet close to such an explanation,

I wonder why not.

and in fact they might not actually be signals, but instead something more abstract, like "brain states."

I'd say a brain state was not abstract. This is the problem, it is not possible to argue from brain states to states of consciousness. This is why so many arguments against the notion that the neural correlates of consciousness are consciousness have been published. I like neurophysiologist Karl Pribram's remark that looking for consciousness in the brain is like digging to the centre of the Earth to find gravity.

But they are physically explainable. On the other hand, you seem to be saying that at some point in this process, a mystical, non-physical force (ie, causal consciousness) creeps in and affects the physical outcome.

Hold on, I didn't suggest that there was anything mystical about consciousness, and both of us are arguing that it is non-physical, me on the basis that is does exist, you on the basis that it doesn't.

The whole basis of your argument is that something that is non-phsyical cannot exist, and that therefore consciousness is physical insofar as it exists and non-physical insofar as it doesn't. This forces you into the incoherent view that ideas are physical, despite the fact that they have no physical extension.

The brain is a physical object, no inherently different than a computer. What brings you to the conclusion that there is such a mystical force?

'Mystical' is your word, not mine. What forces me to conclude that consciousness (or, more properly, conscious experiences) is not physical is that the brain can be observed in the third-person and consciousness cannot be.

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain. If the electrical state of our brain could be altered by physical means, it is not at all unreasonable to claim that our conscious experience would change as well.

There is no doubt that as human beings our states of consciousness are affected by the states of our brains. However the states of the tides are affected by the state of the moon. It does not follow that water is made out of moons.

Who's to say we couldn't electrically stimulate ourselves into any conscious state we wanted?

Whose to say there isn't a teapot in orbit around Mars?

I could electrically induce you into a state where you had my opinions about consciousness, or maybe those of someone who doesn't believe in it at all. Our beliefs about consciousness are completely physically rooted. (note: maybe I would have to change the physical structure in addition to the electrical configuration to achieve certain conscious states, but this does not affect my argument.)

Yes, but this is just a restatement of your opinion. I'm arguing that there is no evidence for your opinion. Can you think of any? There's none yet in the literature.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration."

In a way I agree. It depends how you use the term 'prove'. If I say 'it appears to me that it's raining' I can know that this is true. I can 'prove' its truth to myself by a simple act of introspection, (and the statement remains true whether or not it is raining). But I cannot demonstrate a proof of it. Perhaps you wouldn't consider my introspective evidence a 'proof', but this doesn't really matter. What is known directly is certain but not provable by demonstration, (e.g. 'I think therefore I am'), whereas what can be proved by demonstration can always be falsified (Goedel et al) and is therefore never certain. This is one of the odd consequences of the nature of consciousness and of formal reasoning.

If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

I cannot demonstrate that I am conscious. However it doesn't follow that I cannot be sure whether I am or not. Are you suggesting that we could be not-conscious yet think we are, or be conscious yet think we are not? If so then we better just agree to disagree.

 

[Fliption]

I'm not saying there is no consciousness. It is perfectly possible that consciousness is real, but it is only a byproduct of the physical laws governing our brain.

I agree with you that no argument can be made to say that consciousness is causal. But you seem to go to far with your arguments. If we say that we have no evidence that A causes or has an effect on B, we cannot then conclude that therefore B must cause(or is a byproduct of A). This idea is simply a belief and actually contradicts the whole premise you originally agreed with.

I still wonder if you understood me earlier when I said that a large part of the issue with consciousness is one of epistomology. The whole reason for the zombie illustration is to say that consciousness is beyond the study of a materialist paradigm. It does not claim anything about the causality of consciousness. It merely claims we cannot "know" these things using a materialist toolkit. So this includes making conclusions about it being the byproduct of anything.

You agree with the illustration when it claims that consciousness cannot be shown to be causal but then disagree with the illustration when you make the claim that therefore consciousness is the byproduct of physical processes. This is exactly what the illustration is telling you is NOT the case. You cannot make a statement about causality one way or the other because you cannot make a connection using a materialist paradigm. How can you agree that there is no causal connection and that no explanation can be had under materialism and then claim that it is simply a byproduct of physical processes? This seems inconsistent to me.

I don't see a difference between "prove" and "prove by demonstration." If you disagree with my physicalist viewpoint, then of course you'll say consciousness can be proven, and that its all that can be proven. But my entire point is that we would believe it was there whether or not it really was. So it is impossible to prove it beyond any doubt, unless you disprove my viewpoint.

I agree with Canute here, although this could largely be semantic. To me all knowledge is personal and I think that's how Canute is using the term "knowledge" as well. The only thing I am certain of is that "something exists". I know this because I of aware of existence and something has to exists for this awareness to exists.

When Canute used "prove by demonstration", I interpret it to mean proving to others. Since I do not "know" that the external world really exists and this includes all those people that I might use to "prove by demonstration" to, "prove by demonstration" doesn't prove anything.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Fliption:
I agree with you that no argument can be made to say that consciousness is causal.

Rothie M:
It has to be causal.Because consciousness is associated with the passage of time and
time passes when physical entities change from one spatial configuration to another.
Energy of some kind causes the configurations to change.

 

[Burnsys]

i guess if we want to fin what counsiosnes really is, we have to research on dopamine and endorfines... why dopamine in our brains make as feel good? while other neurotransmisors make as feel bad??

it may sound stupid, but i think it's a good question, if it doesn't have an answer yet..

 

[Les Sleeth]

It has to be causal.Because consciousness is associated with the passage of time and time passes when physical entities change from one spatial configuration to another. Energy of some kind causes the configurations to change.

It may be causal, but the point was that no argument or set of facts can show it is caused. So far, the subjective element of consciousness is unexplainable by any known principles associated with biology or physics.

 

[Rothiemurchus]

Les Sleeth:
no argument or set of facts can show it is caused

Rothie M:
I disagree.
If, one day, particles are detected at a region in space where ,for example ,an area of colour exists,and these particles are detected for the same length of time as a conscious observer says he can see the area of colour,that would be convincing evidence.

 

[StatusX]

I'll keep this short. Imagine a computer so powerful, it could simulate the physical human brain in every aspect. Every neuron would be modeled to incredible precision. All the sources of input would have to be supplied to it (eg, the data from a video camera could be translated into the appropriate data an eye would send it). The output would be translated into some form we could understand. For example, the data it sends to the virtual "vocal cords" could be tanslated into text. Is this possible?

If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas. There would be no way to "see" these ideas, they wouldn't take up space, but they would be inherent in the pattern of 1s and 0s in the computer memory. As I have already emphasized, it would tell us it was conscious. Just like a virtual pendulum "swings" back and forth, a virtual brain acts the same as a real brain, and a real brain "tells" the world it is conscious.

If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why? Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument. If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true. And Fliption, to me, the zombies exist in an alternate universe where the rules are different. They just illustrate logical possibilities.

 

[selfAdjoint]

A great post.

The only reply the others could make is pretty weak:

We can't build that computer right now.
We might never be able to build it.
Until you can show us the computer being conscious (and we will be the judges of whether it is conscious or not), we can continue to believe in our fairyland.

 

[Les Sleeth]

A great post.

The only reply the others could make is pretty weak:

We can't build that computer right now.
We might never be able to build it.
Until you can show us the computer being conscious (and we will be the judges of whether it is conscious or not), we can continue to believe in our fairyland.

I'd respectfully submit that those aren't the only replies others can make, and neither are all of those replies "weak."

I think it is ironic you seem to downplay an argument you yourself are likely to make. You say, "Until you can show us the computer being conscious (and we will be the judges of whether it is conscious or not), we can continue to believe in our fairyland." Well, do you not use that exact same argument against God? You say, "Show me that God! Until you do (and we will be the judge if it is really God or not) we will continue to believe in our physicalist fairyland."

It isn't the God-believers who are bound by the standard of producing evidence for proof; the standard for God-believers is faith. Empiricists are the ones who insist a hypothesis is to be confirmed by experience, which means by your own rules you are held to different standards. Isn't it reasonable to expect empirical physicalists to produce that computer consciousness they say is possible? And until you do, isn't your theory just another unsubstantiated physicalist "fairyland."

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'll keep this short. Imagine a computer so powerful, it could simulate the physical human brain in every aspect. Every neuron would be modeled to incredible precision. All the sources of input would have to be supplied to it (eg, the data from a video camera could be translated into the appropriate data an eye would send it). The output would be translated into some form we could understand. For example, the data it sends to the virtual "vocal cords" could be tanslated into text. Is this possible?

Maybe. Since it hasn't been done, no one knows. You might say it is possible, I will disagree. The only possible solution is for those who assert it is possible to actually do it.

If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas. There would be no way to "see" these ideas, they wouldn't take up space, but they would be inherent in the pattern of 1s and 0s in the computer memory. As I have already emphasized, it would tell us it was conscious. Just like a virtual pendulum "swings" back and forth, a virtual brain acts the same as a real brain, and a real brain "tells" the world it is conscious.

You are modelling a zombie, which everyone agrees is possible.

[If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas] If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why? Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument. If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true. And Fliption, to me, the zombies exist in an alternate universe where the rules are different. They just illustrate logical possibilities.

Where in your explanation is the "you" that is making decisions, changing your mind, willing your body to go here or there? You can easily account for all computing functions of the brain, and all behavior, but you cannot account for self awareness, subjectivity, qualia experience, or whatever you want to call it. Your focus seems to be the quantum steps, the discrete, the parts . . . what you don't see is the continuous, the undivided, the whole . . .

If someone sees either ONLY the discrete, or ONLY the continuous, then in this reality where we exist at least they are going to miss something.

 

[harvey1]

If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why? Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument. If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true. And Fliption, to me, the zombies exist in an alternate universe where the rules are different. They just illustrate logical possibilities.

Well, the problem here is that you are reasoning based on "what we know not". Every so often someone comes along with a 'scientific theory' that they say predicts all the equations of physics, and therefore is the 'right' theory (and they are usually not the humble types in their proclamation). Of course, ask them to produce equations that are not known which we can experiment, they are usually mum. What they have done is predict the past successes of science, and even though it is an admirable task if done correctly, such kind of 'theories' do not tell us that a revolutionary theory has been discovered. Rather, all we can do is look at them and say "does it make butter too?".

Well, I think this is a very similar situation to your thought experiment. What are we supposed to do with such computational results other than scratch our heads and pick up our discussion right before we were interrupted? The fact of the matter is, a theory might be right, but if it does not show us how it is right or if it is right in experiments that we can perform, such a theory is generally not useful to science.

In the case of a super computer having all these abilities, all we can ask at the end of the day is whether it is simply under the spell of Searle's Chinese room thought experiment. You might recall in that thought experiment that a person who does not know a lick of Chinese is put inside a room (we don't know that he doesn't know Chinese). While in the room, someone comes along and slips through the door a question written in Chinese characters. A few minutes later out spews the answer in English. Now, to most of us, we would assume that the person in the room is fluent in Chinese. But, we would be wrong. If we could look inside we would see that the person has a pretty substantial filing system that they can match the Chinese characters, stroke by stroke, until find a file that contains the answer in English for that question written in Chinese. The 'translator' has no understanding of Chinese, but everyone on the outside is confident that the guy is fluent in Chinese.

What this thought experiment shows is not that AI is impossible, rather it shows that to know that AI is possible we must have a much better philosophical understanding of language, theory of learning, theory of meaning, and a theory of truth (among a few others). We need to demonstrate how a proposition can be encoded into symbols and then decoded such that no information is lost (or very little information). We can translate the contents of a sentence into 1' & 0's, but we cannot translate the meaning. Without demonstrating how it is possible, we might just as well be talking Chinese to the guy in a Chinese room.

 

[BoulderHead]

It isn't the God-believers who are bound by the standard of producing evidence for proof; the standard for God-believers is faith.

Faith does not constitute a proof and is not related to evidence. Those relying on it may share a commonality, but by definition faith is not related to possession of evidence for some fact.

Empiricists are the ones who insist a hypothesis is to be confirmed by experience, which means by your own rules you are held to different standards. Isn't it reasonable to expect empirical physicalists to produce that computer consciousness they say is possible?

Not really, so long as it is being held as a possibility.

And until you do, isn't your theory just another unsubstantiated physicalist "fairyland."

If someone is holding it on faith to be a proof for something not yet know to be factual then, yes.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Faith does not constitute a proof and is not related to evidence. Those relying on it may share a commonality, but by definition faith is not related to possession of evidence for some fact.

Right, that's exactly what I was trying to say, and did say when I said, "It isn't the God-believers who are bound by the standard of producing evidence for proof; the standard for God-believers is faith." Faith, at least as described by Paul and applied to God, is something one has without proof. It is an inner feeling, not an external process as proof is. So I still think that, in terms of credibility, the empirical physicalist has an entirely different standard to meet than people of faith.

Not really, so long as it is being held as a possibility.

True. However, the attitude of the physicalist who believes in and/or entertains speculative ideas like computer consciousness, life self-organizing from chemistry, time travel, universes bubbling up from nothingness, and so on seems to be harboring a double standard when he recommends situating in Fairyland those of us who suspect some sort of consciousness might have been involved in creation. Personally, I think certain aspects of creation can be explained much easier and make more sense if consciousness was involved in their creation.

Must it be that anyone who claims to "feel" something more than the universe's mechanics is deluded? Maybe its the mechanics who are suffering from a deadened feeling nature, and who then are projecting that problem onto everybody who can still feel.

 

[selfAdjoint]

True. However, the attitude of the physicalist who believes in and/or entertains speculative ideas like computer consciousness, life self-organizing from chemistry, time travel, universes bubbling up from nothingness, and so on

To equate computer consciousness and the chemical origin of life, for which there is weak but valid evidence, with time travel which has no evidence, is a misconstruction which prevents collegial discussion. I might as well characterize your thought as coming from the Land of Oz (and I don't mean Australia!).

 

[Les Sleeth]

To equate computer consciousness and the chemical origin of life, for which there is weak but valid evidence, with time travel which has no evidence, is a misconstruction which prevents collegial discussion. I might as well characterize your thought as coming from the Land of Oz (and I don't mean Australia!).

Fair enough. I withdraw time travel from the list. I might add that the Wizard of Oz was my favorite childhood book, so watch it there.

 

[StatusX]

I don't think the burden of proof is on me. I am saying that any finite physical system can, in theory, be simulated. There is no evidence to doubt this, and none of you seem to disagree with it for most systems. So the burden is on you to explain what is different about the particular arrangement of atoms in our brain that makes simulation impossible, even in theory? No one has addressed this.

It would be like me claiming that every physical object has a mass. I can't prove this, but you would be the one who would have to make a compelling argument if you thought it wasn't true.

 

[Canute]

(from Fliption) You agree with the illustration when it claims that consciousness cannot be shown to be causal but then disagree with the illustration when you make the claim that therefore consciousness is the byproduct of physical processes. This is exactly what the illustration is telling you is NOT the case. You cannot make a statement about causality one way or the other because you cannot make a connection using a materialist paradigm. How can you agree that there is no causal connection and that no explanation can be had under materialism and then claim that it is simply a byproduct of physical processes? This seems inconsistent to me.

That seemed worth reposting. It's easy to make that mistake whichever side one is on.

I'll keep this short. Imagine a computer so powerful, it could simulate the physical human brain in every aspect. Every neuron would be modeled to incredible precision.

But I can't imagine it, so the rest of your thought experiment means nothing to me. Roger Penrose would almost certainly be in the same position. Your computer would have to model the brain all the way down to the quantum level, where, quite possibly, as far as we know, consciousness and brain are related via quantum coherence in microtubles, a process that begins at the level of the absolutely fundamental substrate of matter, in micro-units of mass and energy. If the relationship between brain and mind is rooted at such a fundamental level then how can it modeled by a computer. It seems an unscientific idea.

All the sources of input would have to be supplied to it (eg, the data from a video camera could be translated into the appropriate data an eye would send it). The output would be translated into some form we could understand.

Pardon me? Who is this 'we' that you mention here? I thought your computer was supposed to understand its own data.

For example, the data it sends to the virtual "vocal cords" could be tanslated into text. Is this possible?

It seems quite possible. After we have have taken the output from a video camera, translated it into the sort of data a human eye, which is part of the brain by the way, would send to the brain, and then we had translated it back into a something we could understand, like the output of a video camera, it shouldn't be too hard to translate the data we've encoded to send to its vocal chords back into text that we can understand.

If so, this computer would be capable of having ideas.

Perhaps you need to think about this some more. If if it was this easy to solve the 'problem of consciousness' then the early Greeks would have done it. You can't say 'heap together some bunch of components that may or may not be equivalent to a human brain, assume that it exists, and this shows that physicalism is true'. It just isn't that easy. If it was that easy then every sane person would be a physicalist.

There would be no way to "see" these ideas, they wouldn't take up space, but they would be inherent in the pattern of 1s and 0s in the computer memory.

There is no evidence that ideas can exist in a pattern of 1s and 0s. Until you can show that they can this is science fiction.

As I have already emphasized, it would tell us it was conscious. Just like a virtual pendulum "swings" back and forth, a virtual brain acts the same as a real brain, and a real brain "tells" the world it is conscious.

It is true that as conscious beings we tell each other that we are conscious. It's also true that if a hypothetical virtual brain is defined as behaving precisely like a real one then it must, just like a real one, report that it is conscious when it is. Nothing follows from this. It's an ontological argument for the existence of the hypothetical.

If not, why not? What is so special about the particular arrangement of matter in our brain that prohibits simulation? We could simulate a pendulum, a solar system, gas in a container, but not this? Why?

That's what I'd much rather discuss, rather than arguing with you about zombies and the like. It's a question that cannot be answered using our usual methods of reasoning. If you look at it closely it's a metaphysical question. As such it must be distinguished from scientific questions and thought about in a different way.

It is impossible to show that consciousness is epiphenominal on the physical, and this means that it might not be. It does not mean that is not, but equivalently it does not mean that it is. This is Fliption's point. For this reason I do not argue that I can show you are wrong, I argue that you can't show that you are right. But I can't show that I'm right either.

To me the real question to ask is this; why it is that neither of us (and nobody else) can prove our case about the relationship between consciousness and brain? And also perhaps, and as many philsophers have suggestedis the case, does our inability to do this have something to do with the particular way we reason.

Canute, you continue to use common sense as an argument.

Sorry about that.

If you disagree, use logical reasoning to explain why, or illustrate an example that shows why my arguments are absurd without assuming your preconceived notions are true.

That's not quite a fair challenge. How can I reason logically if I'm not allowed to use my common sense?

I think we should stop arguing and simply accept the obvious, that the truth about consciousness cannot be known by reason alone, as so many people have asserted over the millenia, and accept that it cannot even be shown to exist by formally logical means, let alone to be this or that.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I don't think the burden of proof is on me. I am saying that any finite physical system can, in theory, be simulated. There is no evidence to doubt this, and none of you seem to disagree with it for most systems. So the burden is on you to explain what is different about the particular arrangement of atoms in our brain that makes simulation impossible, even in theory? No one has addressed this.

It would be like me claiming that every physical object has a mass. I can't prove this, but you would be the one who would have to make a compelling argument if you thought it wasn't true.

I do not think anyone is saying the "arrangement of atoms in our brain that makes simulation . . . " can't be achieved. The bigger issue is whether that arrangement is responsible for self-awareness. The idea is that one can account for all human behaviors and brain functions with brain physiology, but the brain physiology we know would only produce a zombie (something that can mimic all human behaviors, but doesn't have a personal experience of what it's doing).

So at least the self-aware part of consciousness might be the result of something other than physiology. For example, possibly there is a general pool of consciousness that's evolved with the universe which is manifested in the CSN. Such a panpsychic theory suggests the brain shapes, organizes and individualtes a "point" of that general consciousness, and the self-aware part is an essential part of the panpsychic realm.

 

[StatusX]

The only compelling argument that such a simulation would be impossible that I've seen so far was Canute's claim that the operation of the brain is significantly affected by quantum processes that can't be simulated, and I'll try to argue it here.

No one is saying QM can't be modeled, and in fact many simple QM systems have been computer simulated. The confusion arises because people hear that there is "uncertainty" in QM, and assume this means there are no rules. There are strict rules. The problem is that when a wave function collapses, it does so randomly, and we only know the probability it will collapse into certain states. We can't create a virtual system that would act exactly the same as a given real one for the same reason that two real, identical QM systems will not act exactly the same: there is inherent randomness. But we can create a virtual system that would behave in a way that an identical real one could. We would just have to have some kind of random number generator for the wave function collapse.

One way around this is to say that these random collapses aren't truly random, but are affected by our consciousness. This is a very interesting idea, and I definitely accept it as a possibility. Another is to say the variables in question(eg, the position, velocity, mass, etc. of every particle being modeled) are continuous, and therefore any rounding we would do so that a computer could work with the numbers would be the source of error. I'm not sure about this, but I remember reading that a given volume of space contains a finite amount of information, something like 1 bit per square Planck unit of its bounding surface, and this would refute such a claim. For now, I'm just going to have to claim that we can get so close to the real values that any deviation from reality would not cause a significant difference in observed behavior. But I can't prove this.

However, this whole idea is in opposition to the view that neurons are the basic components of the brain. A crude explanation of this model is that a neuron acts by outputting a signal if it inputs are above a certain threshold, and the interaction of many, many such neurons can give rise to complicated behavior. In computer science, neural nets attempt to replicate this function, and have acheived such impressive results as handwriting and facial recognition. I can't claim that the human brain could be modeled exactly by an extremely sophisticated neural net, but many researchers believe it could be. Well just have to wait and see.

And by the way, I am not claiming this simulation would be consicous. It might be, and it might not be. But whichever it is, how could it be different than whichever we are? Getting back to the zombie argument, a society of these simulations would attempt to explain consciousness. They wouldn't know they were just simulations, and we don't know that we aren't.