Is Consciousness Present at All Levels of Matter?

[russ_watters]

Actually, studies of patients who have had the corpus callosum, along with other intermediaries between the RH and LH, removed suggest that the idea of a single, indivisble self might actually be mistaken. I know it sounds wildly counterintuitive, but functions normally associated with conscious awareness, such as object recognition and selection, can be carried out by half the body and half the brain without the other half being aware of it.

Who considers object recognition and selection conscious behavior? Its well-known that humans are capable of performing complex tasks and processing complex information entirely without conscious thought (ever had highway hypnosis?). That's an interesting experiment that I hadn't heard of, but what it implies to me is that the human brain works very much like a parallel-processing computer: different parts can process different pieces of information independently, and without the need for user input (conscious thought).

Part of the reason for this, I think, is that conscious thought is far too slow slow to be useful for most activities humans do. Imagine if typing required conscious thought - you'd only be able to type 20 words a minute, thinking about how to spell every word and then where the key for each letter was (basically, that's hunt-and-peck typing).

 

[Fliption]

Then zombies have it too, and it is not the consciousness all the consciousness-is-extra believers tout.

Zombies by definition don't have what I'm referring to. I agree that consciousness can be defined broadly enough to have some of the functional aspects that loseyourname has mentioned. But when we are talking about what we cannot know with regard to consciousness, we cannot know that the non-functional part of consciousness (A-consciousness) exists in an arm or even a rock. Does an arm have the functional stuff? Of course not, that's a no-brainer. Literally!

 

[Canute]

Zombies by definition don't have what I'm referring to. I agree that consciousness can be defined broadly enough to have some of the functional aspects that loseyourname has mentioned. But when we are talking about what we cannot know with regard to consciousness, we cannot know that the non-functional part of consciousness (A-consciousness) exists in an arm or even a rock. Does an arm have the functional stuff? Of course not, that's a no-brainer. Literally!

You say that we cannot know that the non-functional part of consciousness exists in an arm or a rock. You then add that we know that it doesn't. Isn't this a contradiction?

By saying that consciousness has a non-functional part you are implying that it has a functional part. How do you know this? It seems to be just as much a scientifically heretical claim as saying that a rock is conscious.

 

[Fliption]

You say that we cannot know that the non-functional part of consciousness exists in an arm or a rock. You then add that we know that it doesn't. Isn't this a contradiction?

Hmm, exactly where am I saying that we know arms don't have the non-functional aspect of consciousness? My last sentence is claiming that we know an arm doesn't have the functional properties that a brain does and therefore doesn't have the functional aspects of consciousness.

By saying that consciousness has a non-functional part you are implying that it has a functional part. How do you know this? It seems to be just as much a scientifically heretical claim as saying that a rock is conscious.

I know this because that is the way it is defined for the purposes of philosophical discussion. "Consciousness" is just a word. The meaning of this word has come to encompass both the functional and seemingly non-functional aspects. This is why Chalmers makes a distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consicousness. Arm's may have P-Consciousness but I doubt seriously they have A-Consciousness.

 

[Canute]

Hmm, exactly where am I saying that we know arms don't have the non-functional aspect of consciousness? My last sentence is claiming that we know an arm doesn't have the functional properties that a brain does and therefore doesn't have the functional aspects of consciousness.

On re-reading I see that you're right. My apologies. I misread your sentence because I can't see how anyone can arrive at the view that part of consciousness is causal and part of it isn't. Most philosophers conclude that C is one thing, hence the binding problem, and I have no idea of the grounds on which people divide it into functional/non-functional parts, or P-consciousness and A-consciousness, so I don't adopt this system of classification and see A & P consciousness as the same thing.

I know this because that is the way it is defined for the purposes of philosophical discussion. "Consciousness" is just a word. The meaning of this word has come to encompass both the functional and seemingly non-functional aspects. This is why Chalmers makes a distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consicousness. Arm's may have P-Consciousness but I doubt seriously they have A-Consciousness.

Let's face it, neither of us have any idea whether there are two part to consciousness called A & P, nor any idea whether arms and rocks (or rather the constituents of same) have either kind.

My point about causality was just that to say that some part of consciousness is causal is to completely contradict current theoretical physics. To a physicist the idea of causal consciousness is folk-psychological nonsense. (Or at least during the week it is).

The assumption that C is causal cannot serve as a foundation for a scientific theory of C, for there is no scientific evidence that human behaviour is affected by the fact that we are conscious, and according to physics it is not. So it seems to me that we cannot infer consciousness from behaviour, and cannot divide it into causal and non-causal parts, without being unscientific. Not unless, that is, consciousness is made out of matter or, equivalently, matter is made out of consciousness.

 

[loseyourname]

Who considers object recognition and selection conscious behavior? Its well-known that humans are capable of performing complex tasks and processing complex information entirely without conscious thought (ever had highway hypnosis?). That's an interesting experiment that I hadn't heard of, but what it implies to me is that the human brain works very much like a parallel-processing computer: different parts can process different pieces of information independently, and without the need for user input (conscious thought).

Actually, it's very well known that the human brain is a parallel-processor. The really interesting implication of these experiments is that just about every function of the brain seemingly can be carried out without conscious input. The question I would ask is why you consider, in this case, the tasks carried out by the left-hemisphere to be conscious, but the tasks carried out by the right hemisphere to be non-conscious. Words can also be spat out unconsciously, including correct answers to questions. In addition, objects can be seen and recognized by touch consciously. So who are we to say simply that because the left-hemisphere is not conscious of the visual input, that the right hemisphere is not conscious? You may be able to say that action undertaken by the left hand was taken unconsciously, but there is no valid logical leap from that premise to the conclusion that the right hemisphere never consciously received any input. In fact, it should be clear from personal experience that we are conscious of input to both hemifields of vision. Given these considerations, what reason is there to believe that consciousness resides entirely in only one hemisphere?

Edit: Let me see if I can phrase this a little more explicitly: It is clear from these studies that neither hemisphere is conscious either of the input or activity of the other. How then can we call one hemisphere conscious and not the other? How do we know that they are not both conscious?