Is Language Useless in Philosophical Discussions?

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
Let me just say again that your enjoyment of such experiences depends on language, because as I see it, language shapes the very way that we understand such experiences. Langauge is the fundamental aspect of our consciousness. Let’s say that when you looked out on the beautiful hills surrounding your house, you couldn’t make out any distinct shapes, just a blur of color. You wouldn’t be able to classify (linguistically) anything that you saw, so you wouldn’t be able to make any kind of aesthetic judgments. I hope this makes sense, I’m tired.

If you cannot stop your mentality -- internal dialogue, problem solving, imagination, etc. -- to the point that it dominates every waking moment (and jumps in while you are sleeping too), then I can understand why you believe what you do. In such a case you would be describing what concepts and language mean to you.

However, we are talking here not about what only you know, but what is true about consciousness in general, so you cannot accurately generalize from what only you know and/or those others who also cannot assuage the dominance of their mentality. If there are people who can actually be conscious of reality without concepts and language, then that has to be explained by your model, and it isn't.

Once I saw a film of a woman having a baby underwater. They also did it by candle light so when the baby came out bright lights wouldn't hurt his eyes. The mother was a very relaxed sort, and so this birth was very easy for everyone. I was impressed to see that once the baby was out of the womb, but still underwater and connected umbilically, it broke into the biggest smile you can imagine. Was that a conscious smile? By your theory, it was not because the baby couldn't explain to anyone how or why he smiled. But I say the baby didn't need language or concepts to be conscious that he felt good and found things pleasing.

When I am out walking here, enjoying a misty sunset evening, I can tell you for fact that language and concepts make no difference to what I am doing. I am not looking at a sun, trees, red-shouldered hawks overhead, rolling hills, perfect rows of grapevines . . .

I am experiencing. What? I don't care what. I just am interested in experiencing a yellow warm orb, greenness, pink and purple fluffy things in the sky, symmetry (of the rows), moist air . . .

See, at that time it is an experience to be felt, not to be defined. It is a unified experience, not one broken up by thought processes. You could take me to a new universe, where nothing was as it is here, and I wouid still be able to enjoy it experientially without knowing a thing about how it worked or what to call it (as long as I felt safe of course). On the other hand, if I wanted to talk about it or if I wanted to figure out what made this new universe function the way it does, then I would need language and concepts.

So, to reinterate my point, I am suggesting that you and others who claim concepts and language are the basis of consciousness may believe so because you aren't paying much attention to the potential for pure experience that consciousness is capable of. If so, then when it's time for us to enter into a discussion about the nature of consciousness, you might be generalizing from too narrow a sampling (your limited experiences), which your model reflects.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Fliption
But why create such a problem when you don't have to?

Actually, we don't have to create any problems. Even the chicken-and-egg problem is not a real problem, at least not as far as chicken and eggs are concerned. The issue here is understanding. Does it do any good to say "experience is a given" and leave it at that? That explains nothing.

Perhaps I've missed the argument for why this must be the case? Is there some sort of evidence or argument(other than it just is) that I've missed?

Unfortunately this is not a clear-cut issue, otherwise there wouldn't be so much debate. The best I can offer by way of argument is this:

1: uwouaslkwnxhelalwiefshefowehlwoui
2: kjeisbnxgwyuerbnsepouwhsncjeugsb

A: "pain in the toe"
B: "clear blue summer sky"

At some basic level, 1 an 2 are what people are calling "experiences". So are A and B. You think it's obvious how one becomes the other, but that is only because you don't think something as clear as a blue summer sky could be experienced as anything other than the way you experience it.

Definition comes from experience

So how does "pain in the toe" comes from "uwouaslkwnxhelalwiefshefowehlwoui"? How does something defined come from something undefined?

Where else could it possibly come from?

Mysterious? Eternal? Self-created? Through an evolutive process?

I bet 'evolutive' has more power of explanation than the other three, but power of explanation has little to do with truth.

With your theory, there is no answer to this question unless we invoke god or something like that. I say it's experience.

Exactly how does "experience" differ from "God"? Both are undefined concepts.

And I didn't say the question can only be answered by invoking God.

Put your hand in a fire and tell me you couldn't establish a distinction between that feeling and typing on your keyboard.

If I have no concept of "hand" and "fire", putting my hand in a fire will cause me to feel something I don't understand. Which, I suspect, is what babies feel when they put their hands in the fire: they feel something they don't like and don't understand.

I also suspect that when you feel something you don't like and don't understand, it's because you're not experiencing it other than as a vague, undefined sensation you have no power to control. "I don't know why but I don't like this place"; "I don't know why but that person makes me feel uncomfortable". You get the idea.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
Actually, we don't have to create any problems. Even the chicken-and-egg problem is not a real problem, at least not as far as chicken and eggs are concerned. The issue here is understanding. Does it do any good to say "experience is a given" and leave it at that? That explains nothing.

Yes but so what? We are talking about how existence is, not whether or not the way it is explains things for us. The speed of light is constant in a vacuum, it is a given. Gravity shows up where there is mass or acceleration, it is a given. Photons radiate quantumly, it is a given.

Just because we can't explain why something is so is not a reason to discount that it may be as it seems.

Originally posted by confutatis
So how does "pain in the toe" comes from "uwouaslkwnxhelalwiefshefowehlwoui"? How does something defined come from something undefined?

I think the above statement shows you are confused. You seem unable to separate two very distinct potentials of consciousness: the ability to experience, and the ability to think.

Somehow I think you must already know what you are saying doesn't make sense. If you look at what defines empiricism, for instance, it is two very distinct processes: experience and logical thinking. It is not just thinking and language. Those days when human investigation into existence was only thinking and language represent the dark days of rationalism. It was the addition of experience to reason that birthed the scientific method.

Once you acknowledge thinking and experience both are elements of consciousness, then you can ask if their proportions can be altered. If you are now thinking 99% of the time and experiencing 1%, can you alter it to 95%/5%? How about 80/20? What about 60/40? What about 20/80? Oh my God, what would happen if someone could actually do (however temporarily) 0/100?

I don't know if you are athletic, but to be successful there one must learn to lean more toward experiential. Yes, sound principles of the sport must be learned, but once learned, the best athletic moments occur when you get ultra-experiential. It is as though all the tactics and skills you have learned just get done without thinking, almost like through some kind of elevated "seeing." The best musicians can tell you it is the same for them as they "feel" their way while playing music. Another simple example is learning to ride a bike . . . try to do it primarily by thinking and you'll never learn.

Originally posted by confutatis
If I have no concept of "hand" and "fire", putting my hand in a fire will cause me to feel something I don't understand. Which, I suspect, is what babies feel when they put their hands in the fire: they feel something they don't like and don't understand.

I also suspect that when you feel something you don't like and don't understand, it's because you're not experiencing it other than as a vague, undefined sensation you have no power to control. "I don't know why but I don't like this place"; "I don't know why but that person makes me feel uncomfortable". You get the idea.

It doesn't seem like you appreciate babies much. I am not saying they don't learn to distinguish by defining, and that language doesn't play an important role in that.

But a most (THE most to me) delightful thing about a baby is that he/she doesn't have a bunch of stuff his his/her head. They are very natural, and I say that's because they are so experiential. The more concepts clutter up their heads, the more they lose that beautiful naturalness.

You know, there are a lot of people who work hard at returning to that experiential place. Hmmmm, could it be what Jesus was recommending when he said "you must become as children again"?

Anyway, I disagree with trying to model human consciousness like a computer. No matter how much AI enthusiasts are convinced they will achieve consciousness, I don't believe they will because they will never get a computer to experience (if experience is defined as the ability to sense/feel events, know one has sensed/felt an event, and retain knowledge of that sensed/felt event). I see the attempt by some thinkers (not necessarily you) to eliminate the primacy of experience in consciouness as a step toward being able to call a non-experiencing computer conscious.

 

[Fliption]

After reading this response I'm not sure what we exactly disagree on.

Originally posted by confutatis
Actually, we don't have to create any problems. Even the chicken-and-egg problem is not a real problem, at least not as far as chicken and eggs are concerned. The issue here is understanding. Does it do any good to say "experience is a given" and leave it at that? That explains nothing.

Exactly what is it you are trying to explain? Experience is not necessarily just a "given". It should be studied just like everything else. This study could conclude it is a given but it isn't my starting assumption. But asserting that it doesn't exists without language not only does not explain anything, it also opens up numerous other questions. And for no apparent reason as it seem to add nothing.

Unfortunately this is not a clear-cut issue, otherwise there wouldn't be so much debate.

To be honest, I haven't seen any reason why it shouldn't be a clear cut issue.

The best I can offer by way of argument is this:

1: uwouaslkwnxhelalwiefshefowehlwoui
2: kjeisbnxgwyuerbnsepouwhsncjeugsb

A: "pain in the toe"
B: "clear blue summer sky"

At some basic level, 1 an 2 are what people are calling "experiences". So are A and B. You think it's obvious how one becomes the other, but that is only because you don't think something as clear as a blue summer sky could be experienced as anything other than the way you experience it.

How else could a blue sky be experienced? Are you suggesting that a fire is anything other than hot?(I keep bringing up the fire example to draw away from all the "vision" analogies.)

So how does "pain in the toe" comes from "uwouaslkwnxhelalwiefshefowehlwoui"? How does something defined come from something undefined?

I don't know what you mean by "pain in the toes" nor do I know what you mean by "undefined". My only claim is that there is an input, called experience. I thought you were claiming there isn't any such input without concepts, but now it seems you are arguring that there is at least something experienced called "uwouaslkwnxhela..." Whether I have "defined" this thing as a pain in the toe or not doesn't seem relevant to the fact that the experience DOES exists.

Mysterious? Eternal? Self-created? Through an evolutive process?

Mysterious? What does that mean. Does that explain anything? Eternal? What does that mean? None of these mean anything to me. They certainly aren't any more valid than just asserting experience as a given. At least I know what that means.

Exactly how does "experience" differ from "God"? Both are undefined concepts.

Are you serious? If there is anything that I am certain of, it is my own experience. I know nothing of god. The fact that I can't define experience in such a way for you to objectively prove that I have it doesn't impact my knowledge of it at all.

And I didn't say the question can only be answered by invoking God.

Yes I know you didn't. But there was no answer before your last post and mysterious, eternal, and self creating are no better. They could be if I understood what they mean but currently I don't.

If I have no concept of "hand" and "fire", putting my hand in a fire will cause me to feel something I don't understand. Which, I suspect, is what babies feel when they put their hands in the fire: they feel something they don't like and don't understand.

Now we completely agree. Here you are claiming that there is an experience. I was under the impression that you didn't believe experiences existed without concepts. I don't have a problem at all with what you have written above.

I also suspect that when you feel something you don't like and don't understand, it's because you're not experiencing it other than as a vague, undefined sensation you have no power to control. "I don't know why but I don't like this place"; "I don't know why but that person makes me feel uncomfortable". You get the idea.

Again, I agree with this. But I could care less whether something is "vague and undefined". That doesn't mean it doesn't exists. It looks as if you concede this.

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by confutatis
Now that I understood you better, this is the only point I still have a problem with. If you do not consider what differences may exist in internal conscious perception, you will never understand why agreement can never be reached. You seem to think that issue is irrelevant, I think it's more fundamental than anything else. It's the issue, period.

All wars are fought because of differences in people's internal conscious perception. If Bush could understand Osama, and vice-versa; if Sharon could understand Arafat, and vice-versa; if Dennett could understand Chalmers, and vice-versa... then the only problems left in the world would be the ones only God (or nobody) can solve.

(I added this as an afterthought: if we accept that differences in internal conscious perception may exist, then it's perfectly possible to talk about it, as we're doing now! It's a problem just like any other; difficult perhaps but not "hard" in the way Chalmers puts it. If the "hard" problem were really that hard, not even Chalmers would be able to talk about it)

I'm sorry. The confusion here is my fault. When I say that such differences hardly seem to matter, the differences I'm referring to deal with concrete concepts (like color). Two people may possibly experience different internal conscious perceptions when looking at a particular color (Person #1 really does see blue, whereas Person #2 sees green but simply calls it blue because that's what he has been told to call it). I don't think I worded that very well but everyone knows the philosophical problem I'm talking about. I wouldn't say, however, that differences in internal conscious perceptions are unimportant if we're talking about more abstract concepts, such as beliefs, as you mentioned. The difference here, as I see it, is that conflicting conscious perceptions of concrete concepts can be buried by language (so that even the person holding these conflicting conscious perceptions does not know it). I don't see how this is possible when dealing with abstract concepts or even with complex concrete concepts (that is, a concept consisting of many different concrete concepts, such as shape or color). I've been using the word concept a lot. I hope I haven't confused you even more.

 

[hypnagogue]

http://journalofvision.org/3/9/712/ demonstrates that infants only 16 weeks old can discriminate between colors, long before linguistic capabilities begin to develop in the average child. Are these infants conscious? Well, we can't be sure. But what seems apparent is that however we go about dividing up and categorizing the world, it can occur without language (unless you believe that the mothers' baby talk was necessary for their ability to discriminate colors).

If newborn turtles have the wherewithal to discriminate ocean from non-ocean, I don't think it's unreasonable to suppose that human infants have a natural ability to discriminate red from blue, regardless of a linguistic understanding of those concepts. How does descrimination arise if the initial state is one marked by a complete lack of discrimination? A good question, perhaps impossible to answer. Perhaps the assumption that experience begins as a completely incomprehensible jumble is simply false.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
We are talking about how existence is, not whether or not the way it is explains things for us.

A few days ago I was having a conversation with Marcus on the "Science and Mathematics" forum. I said, and he enthusiastically agreed with me, that the best way to understand metaphysics is to listen to great music. I'm not coming from where you think I'm coming.

You seem unable to separate two very distinct potentials of consciousness: the ability to experience, and the ability to think.

I can see it from another perspective: I have the ability to think about sensations, and I have the ability to think about language.

I can see it from yet another perspective: I have the ability to experience sensations, and I have the ability to experience language.

Which perspective is right, yours, my first, my second, or some other? It doesn't matter. Think of a building - the view from inside is completely different from the view from the outside, yet it's the same building. If the exterior walls are painted gray, and the interior walls are painted green, is the building gray or green? Can you really understand why some people think it's gray and others think it's green?

It's the same with the human mind. There are two currents, the "mentalists" and the "materialists" - the "insiders" and the "outsiders". Both think the other is wrong; both are right from their own perspective, and wrong for not acknowledging that the other perspective is just as valid. I lean more to the mentalist/insider side, but I'm trying to get a glimpse of the outside.

Somehow I think you must already know what you are saying doesn't make sense.

It's really hard to explain to people inside that the building looks gray from the outside. They expect it to look just as green.

The best musicians can tell you it is the same for them as they "feel" their way while playing music.

I am an amateur pianist, and I can tell you this: no matter how much "feeling" you put into the music, eventually it's all a matter of pressing the right keys with the right pressure for the right amount of time. There's absolutely nothing more to it. A piano can't understand feelings, a human can't understand what makes Vladimir Horowitz such a great pianist. While it's true that you will never play the piano well if you think in terms of mechanics, it's also true that you will never be able to play the piano at all if you ignore mechanics. It's not wise to ignore one perspective just because you don't like it.

But a most (THE most to me) delightful thing about a baby is that he/she doesn't have a bunch of stuff his his/her head. They are very natural, and I say that's because they are so experiential. The more concepts clutter up their heads, the more they lose that beautiful naturalness.

Do you have kids? I do. I have a beautiful girl and a beautiful boy. I like to watch the smile on their faces when I tell them they are angels from heaven. They smile, I suspect, for two reasos: because they know I truly believe that, and because they know it's true. But even angels from heaven can be studied, analyzed, discussed. It doesn't detract from their beauty and it doesn't take away the mystery of their existence. It's a mistake to think otherwise. Reason does not have the power to diminish the grandeur of the world; at worst it can hide some of it, at best it makes it even grander.

Anyway, I disagree with trying to model human consciousness like a computer. No matter how much AI enthusiasts are convinced they will achieve consciousness, I don't believe they will because they will never get a computer to experience

Why do you disagree with me then? If the perspective I'm offering is correct, then it implies one thing: computers will never be conscious because we will never know how to emulate consciousness. We may have some theories about it, but our theories will imply that consciousness must necessarily arises from an unconscious process - meaning must necessarily come from meaninglessness. Since we, the creators of computers, are already conscious, we're no longer capable of doing it. It's too late.

Notice that we have already built conscious computers: our brains! But it was a one-shot thing, no second chance at it, Dennett et al notwithstanding.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Fliption
Canute,

Experience is more than just seeing. This scenario could not happen because if one has no concepts then they cannot experience stubbing their toes either. There is no concept of toe or pain. So if you follow this view to it's logical conclusion, then nothing would ever happen. No one would be alive today. Nothing can be experienced with concepts and concepts cannot be developed without experience. Again I ask, which came first the chicken or the egg? [/B]

I think you misinterpreted. I agree that experience is a different matter entirely. That was pretty much much what I was saying, that the experience of seeing preceeds the conceptualisation of the images.

Therefore if (as was being argued) we cannot see at all until we have learned to conceptualise properly then one can feel the pain of stubbing one's toe while being unable to see what you stubbed it on. This assumes that pain is a direct experience and not a conception (or only a conception at a much deeper level), and on that we maybe disagree.

BTW

Are you serious? If there is anything that I am certain of, it is my own experience. I know nothing of god.

Some would find that self-contradictory.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by confutatis

The thing that must be understood is that at some point, either in our personal history, or the history of our species, or the history of organisms, everything we know and experience today consisted of nothing more than a collection of completely undefined "stuff". The challenge then is (was), how do you define anything at all if you can only define things in terms of other things? It's not valid to appeal to anything outside the collection of undefined data, to define things in terms of something which has been mysteriously predefined by some unknowable entity.

The above is, in essence and as far as I can tell, the best statement of the problem of consciousness. [/B]

It would be a bit Buddhist for a scientific statement of the problem, but as a deep one I reckon it's pretty good.

Defining must always begin with an undefined term, as for any dictionary or mathematical system. Perhaps consciousness (experience, Being) is it, after all it appears to be indefinable. Also it would naturally be the first thing to be defined, the first thing of which we are aware.

Equivalently 'defining' begins with knowledge and knowledge begins with experience and experience begins with an awareness of 'self'. Once we've defined 'self' we can define 'not-self' and all the rest follows.

As time goes by we start defining and categorising in more and more detail, and forget that our undefined term is actually outside of all those our systems of definitions, undefined in all of them, and wonder why we cannot define it.

Sorry, that's a muddle. If it makes no sense ignore it.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
A few days ago I was having a conversation with Marcus on the "Science and Mathematics" forum. I said, and he enthusiastically agreed with me, that the best way to understand metaphysics is to listen to great music. I'm not coming from where you think I'm coming.

I will admit that I have trouble understanding you. No one with whom I've interacted here at PF has so successfully kept me in the dark (or, have I been so confused about ). I remember wondering when I first saw the handle you chose if it was a play on the name Confucious, or on the word confusion.

From my perspective, you are not consistant, but I am open to being convinced I simply don't understand the way you are putting things.

Originally posted by confutatis
I can see it from another perspective: I have the ability to think about sensations, and I have the ability to think about language.
I can see it from yet another perspective: I have the ability to experience sensations, and I have the ability to experience language. Which perspective is right, yours, my first, my second, or some other? It doesn't matter.

But then, you go and say something like the above. What do you mean "which perspective is right"? I have never suggested either were wrong. What I have said is, experience is one thing, thinking is another. They are not in conflict. The question we are debating is, which is more basic, fundamental, necessary to the existence of consciousness: experience or thinking?

I think some of us are saying in this debate that you can have consciousness without thinking, but you cannot have consciousness without experience. Another little test: when we think, that necessarily is an experience, but when we experience, it isn't necessarily thinking.

Originally posted by confutatis
Think of a building - the view from inside is completely different from the view from the outside, yet it's the same building. If the exterior walls are painted gray, and the interior walls are painted green, is the building gray or green? Can you really understand why some people think it's gray and others think it's green?

No, I can't understand it at all in an intellegent person. A proper answer is that it is green inside and gray outside. What is difficult about looking (i.e. experiencing) both inside AND outside?

Originally posted by confutatis
It's the same with the human mind. There are two currents, the "mentalists" and the "materialists" - the "insiders" and the "outsiders". Both think the other is wrong; both are right from their own perspective, and wrong for not acknowledging that the other perspective is just as valid. I lean more to the mentalist/insider side, but I'm trying to get a glimpse of the outside.

That maybe true in general, but we shouldn't we expect more from a philosopher? Here aren't we trying to represent objective reality, and not the egocentric view?

But your representation of the two sides as mentalists and materialistst doesn't represent the "side" I am on. To me, everyone who is trying to figure out existence relying primarily on the mind is a mentalist; and then there are materialistic-oriented mentalists, and idealistically-oriented mentalists. My "side" is the experientialist. I believe one can never know or understand the whole of reality very well until one gives top priority to personally experiencing that which one thinks might be true.

Originally posted by confutatis
I am an amateur pianist, and I can tell you this: no matter how much "feeling" you put into the music, eventually it's all a matter of pressing the right keys with the right pressure for the right amount of time. There's absolutely nothing more to it.

If you play the piano that way, remind me never to show up for one of your recitals. [zz)]

Originally posted by confutatis
While it's true that you will never play the piano well if you think in terms of mechanics, it's also true that you will never be able to play the piano at all if you ignore mechanics. It's not wise to ignore one perspective just because you don't like it.

Yes, but who is making it a competition that is either-or? The technical aspect MUST BE LEARNED. No dispute! The competition is which gets priority in a performance, feeling or technical performance. Which does the average listener prefer, and which is the most enjoyable to perform for the musician?

Originally posted by confutatis
Do you have kids? I do. I have a beautiful girl and a beautiful boy. I like to watch the smile on their faces when I tell them they are angels from heaven. They smile, I suspect, for two reasos: because they know I truly believe that, and because they know it's true. But even angels from heaven can be studied, analyzed, discussed. It doesn't detract from their beauty and it doesn't take away the mystery of their existence. It's a mistake to think otherwise. Reason does not have the power to diminish the grandeur of the world; at worst it can hide some of it, at best it makes it even grander.

Here is that competition again. I am not trying to put down reason. I am asking which is more basic to the existence of consciousness, experience or reason.

Originally posted by confutatis
Why do you disagree with me then? If the perspective I'm offering is correct, then it implies one thing: computers will never be conscious because we will never know how to emulate consciousness.

I think I disagree with you because you are not clear about what your position is. But I admit it might be me having a bad understanding day. I cannot see how what you have said implies "computers will never be conscious because we will never know how to emulate consciousness."

Originally posted by confutatis
We may have some theories about it, but our theories will imply that consciousness must necessarily arises from an unconscious process - meaning must necessarily come from meaninglessness. Since we, the creators of computers, are already conscious, we're no longer capable of doing it. It's too late. . . . Notice that we have already built conscious computers: our brains! But it was a one-shot thing, no second chance at it, Dennett et al notwithstanding.

Bad understanding day or not, here I am pretty sure your reasoning doesn't follow. If consciousness does come from an unconscious process, it doesn't mean consciousness cannot now figure out what those unconscious processes were and replicate them (after all, consciousness is now smarter than the dumb unconscious processes we are speculating created it).

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
http://journalofvision.org/3/9/712/ demonstrates that infants only 16 weeks old can discriminate between colors, long before linguistic capabilities begin to develop in the average child. Are these infants conscious? Well, we can't be sure. But what seems apparent is that however we go about dividing up and categorizing the world, it can occur without language (unless you believe that the mothers' baby talk was necessary for their ability to discriminate colors).

If newborn turtles have the wherewithal to discriminate ocean from non-ocean, I don't think it's unreasonable to suppose that human infants have a natural ability to discriminate red from blue, regardless of a linguistic understanding of those concepts. How does descrimination arise if the initial state is one marked by a complete lack of discrimination? A good question, perhaps impossible to answer. Perhaps the assumption that experience begins as a completely incomprehensible jumble is simply false.

But what if we assume that there are certain built-in features of language that allow for a kind of rough discrimination? Hmm, where'd I put my copy of Chomsky's, On Language?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by zk4586
But what if we assume that there are certain built-in features of language that allow for a kind of rough discrimination? Hmm, where'd I put my copy of Chomsky's, On Language?

Now you're talking about features of language and not language itself. I think Fliption was correct to say that you are thinking more in terms of the more basic functions of categorization and the like. If you are talking only of language, then your argument should not be able to generalize to animals that do not have advanced, abstract language. But it appears that they do.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Canute
I think you misinterpreted. I agree that experience is a different matter entirely. That was pretty much much what I was saying, that the experience of seeing preceeds the conceptualisation of the images.

Therefore if (as was being argued) we cannot see at all until we have learned to conceptualise properly then one can feel the pain of stubbing one's toe while being unable to see what you stubbed it on. This assumes that pain is a direct experience and not a conception (or only a conception at a much deeper level), and on that we maybe disagree.

Actually, I knew what your opinion was I think. The first sentence was really the only one directed at you. I agree with where you were going. I just thought that the contant use of vision by confutatis and others as an example had trapped us into thinking that their claim of "concepts coming before experience" only applied to vision. When they actually mean ALL experience(including stubbing ones toe) does not exists until it is conceptualized. This view of theirs appears much more absurd to me when you leave the realm of vision and and start thinking about other experiences. I can only guess this is why my example of fire has not been directly responded to.

Some would find that self-contradictory.

Lol. Yep. I knew that when I wrote it. But I decided to stick with what is generally meant by the term god.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I remember wondering when I first saw the handle you chose if it was a play on the name Confucious, or on the word confusion.

Sorry about the confusion. I should limit the size of my posts, but conciseness is not one of my virtues.

By the way, 'confutatis' is meant to tell an important fact about me: I'm nuts about a particular kind of music.

I think some of us are saying in this debate that you can have consciousness without thinking, but you cannot have consciousness without experience. Another little test: when we think, that necessarily is an experience, but when we experience, it isn't necessarily thinking.

All of that really depends on how you define "think" and "experience". But the central problem is that ultimately everything is defined in terms of everything else. There's no starting point.

The competition is which gets priority in a performance, feeling or technical performance. Which does the average listener prefer, and which is the most enjoyable to perform for the musician?

Ha! That's easy. A pianist who has technique but 0% feeling is not worth hearing. But a pianist who has feeling but 0% technique cannot be heard at all! He can only play in his head.

It's not a matter of competition, it's a matter of acknowledging that you can't give primacy to one over the other.

[/b]Here is that competition again. I am not trying to put down reason. I am asking which is more basic to the existence of consciousness, experience or reason.[/b]

I say neither and both. That probably confuses you, but I'm also confused by your assertion that you don't want a competition, you only want to know who comes first.

I admit it might be me having a bad understanding day.

It's more like both of us are having a bad understading life...

Bad understanding day or not, here I am pretty sure your reasoning doesn't follow. If consciousness does come from an unconscious process, it doesn't mean consciousness cannot now figure out what those unconscious processes were and replicate them (after all, consciousness is now smarter than the dumb unconscious processes we are speculating created it).

I rushed through my argument and I don't have time to elaborate for now. Sorry. But I'd like to point out that your "dumb unconscious processes" are not dumb at all. For one thing, they can play the piano far better than your "smart conscious processes". You look at a face and you instantly recognize it without even having to think about it. Try to do that consciously and tell me what "dumb" really means.

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by Canute
Hang on, where did 'truth' come from? You say here that first we experience, then we categorise, then we explain. It seems to follow that that experience is not semantics.

Some people (notably Wittgenstein) think language is crucual to consciousness but all we can say is that language is important to everyday human consciousness. There is no evidence that language is necessary for consciousness and, if it is, no explanation for how we became able to use language before we had an experience.

You mentioned truth being the opposite of what confutatis said. So, yeah, I got confused. Semantics is developed from experience after the 'experience' happened, that's what I said.

You are right. I went off on a tangent there. Just a mishap, that's all. Thanks for the reply.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by zk4586
But what if we assume that there are certain built-in features of language that allow for a kind of rough discrimination? Hmm, where'd I put my copy of Chomsky's, On Language?

Actually, I don't see how language would be possible so soon and so readily unless there were built-in features. But there are a lot of things the body seem's designed to do, and which are undeveloped in the infant. We are not debating the predispositions of our physiology, but rather what is most basic about consciousness.

 

[zk4586]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Now you're talking about features of language and not language itself. I think Fliption was correct to say that you are thinking more in terms of the more basic functions of categorization and the like. If you are talking only of language, then your argument should not be able to generalize to animals that do not have advanced, abstract language. But it appears that they do.

You said, "How does descrimination arise if the initial state is one marked by a complete lack of discrimination?" I simply suggested that built-in features of language could allow for rapid development of language, and thus we could do away with the idea that one begins in a state "marked by a complete lack of discrimination." I don't see how this really changes anything I've been saying.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
But the central problem is that ultimately everything is defined in terms of everything else. There's no starting point.

This an area of thought that is quite undecided. I am someone who can't agree with your overall statement.

What I could agree with is there is a whole class of things which are defined in terms of their relation to other things. That class gives us relative understanding, and in that class is included many things which are important to us, such as rational thought and language.

However, to say "there's no starting point" is only to say that you either haven't found one, can't imagine one, or see no need for one in order to understand the nature of reality. Personally, I cannot figure out how the relative aspects of existence ultimately make sense unless there is a starting point.

Actually, I think the two sides of the debate in this thread really boils down to the relativists and the "foundationalists." Dennett claims his model of consciousness gets around the problem of infinite regress that always plagues any relativist position attempting to circumvent an absolute principle (of course, the irony is that in the process any relativist position must eventually become the absolute!). The much simpler solution is to accept there is an absolute foundation at the base of all existence.

 

[Canute]

by LWSleeth - But your representation of the two sides as mentalists and materialistst doesn't represent the "side" I am on. To me, everyone who is trying to figure out existence relying primarily on the mind is a mentalist; and then there are materialistic-oriented mentalists, and idealistically-oriented mentalists. My "side" is the experientialist. I believe one can never know or understand the whole of reality very well until one gives top priority to personally experiencing that which one thinks might be true.

This raises one of the main points of misunderstanding. Many people treat 'consciousness' (experience) as synonymous with 'mind' (computation/thinking). This happens all the time in the literature. I sometimes wonder if we're all conscious in the same way given the arguments on this point. Perhaps one has to live in country with some space to expand into, some sense of nature and natural complexity, and star-lit nights to walk into appreciate the difference, as you suggested.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by zk4586
You said, "How does descrimination arise if the initial state is one marked by a complete lack of discrimination?" I simply suggested that built-in features of language could allow for rapid development of language, and thus we could do away with the idea that one begins in a state "marked by a complete lack of discrimination." I don't see how this really changes anything I've been saying.

Why does it have to be linguistic in nature? I bet the same kind of color discrimination that can be done by a 16 week old infant could also be done by, say, a 16 week old cat. Langauge is a type of conceptual tool for categorization, but it's not the only one.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
This an area of thought that is quite undecided. I am someone who can't agree with your overall statement.

What I could agree with is there is a whole class of things which are defined in terms of their relation to other things. That class gives us relative understanding, and in that class is included many things which are important to us, such as rational thought and language.

However, to say "there's no starting point" is only to say that you either haven't found one, can't imagine one, or see no need for one in order to understand the nature of reality. Personally, I cannot figure out how the relative aspects of existence ultimately make sense unless there is a starting point.

Actually, I think the two sides of the debate in this thread really boils down to the relativists and the "foundationalists." Dennett claims his model of consciousness gets around the problem of infinite regress that always plagues any relativist position attempting to circumvent an absolute principle (of course, the irony is that in the process any relativist position must eventually become the absolute!). The much simpler solution is to accept there is an absolute foundation at the base of all existence.

Great post. This is where the link is between epistemology and ontology. A priori the 'absolute' in ontological terms (what lies outside of Plato's cave) cannot be a relative phenomenon and cannot have a scientific existence (so we are chained to our benches). This seems to be generally accepted by philosphers.

But in an epistemological sense the 'absolute' is the starting point for discrimination (categorisation, defining, conceiving etc). This starting point, if all knowledge derives from experience, can only be an 'absolute' experience.

Hence in Advaita, Taoism etc. epistemology and ontology are the same thing in the end. All IMHO of course, but we seem to agree on this.

 

[Canute]

"By the way, 'confutatis' is meant to tell an important fact about me: I'm nuts about a particular kind of music."

Ok I'll have a stab. You like Bach and especially the 48 P's and F's. On the mechanics of playing the piano Rubenstein (I think) said - it's not the notes that are difficult to play, it's the silences between them.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
This an area of thought that is quite undecided. I am someone who can't agree with your overall statement.

That is only because you don't understand what I said. It's not easy to explain this, but it's quite clear once you understand it.

to say "there's no starting point" is only to say that you either haven't found one, can't imagine one, or see no need for one in order to understand the nature of reality.

It's neither. The issue is that knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist.

Personally, I cannot figure out how the relative aspects of existence ultimately make sense unless there is a starting point.

Well, there was a time people could not understand why the world was not falling if it had no foundation. That left them confused, because they couldn't possibly imagine a foundation, other than an infinite chain of turtles. It was only when astronomy revealed that the world can't possibly fall, because there's nothing for it to fall into, that people understood how their intuition betrayed them.

Knowledge is no different. It has no foundation, no starting point, because such a foundation can't possibly exist. There's nothing outside what you know that can convince you that what you know to be true is actually false. (and notice that you can only be proven wrong on something because you accept that something else is true; there's no way to prove that everything you know to be true is false - some of it perhaps, but not everything)

The much simpler solution is to accept there is an absolute foundation at the base of all existence.

The "absolute foundation at the base of all existence" can't possibly exist. If it did, then it would need a foundation for itself. Turtles all the way...

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Canute
Ok I'll have a stab. You like Bach and especially the 48 P's and F's.

That too.

On the mechanics of playing the piano Rubenstein (I think) said - it's not the notes that are difficult to play, it's the silences between them.

Great quote. As for my experience, I found that playing what's written in the score is trivial, so trivial even a computer can do it. The real challenge is to play what is not written - that takes genius.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by confutatis
Great quote. As for my experience, I found that playing what's written in the score is trivial, so trivial even a computer can do it. The real challenge is to play what is not written - that takes genius.

This is somewhat of a tangent, but computer programs have been written to play musical scores taking things such as natural biological timing fluctuations and such into account, and the result is judged by experimentally blind human judges to sound decidedly emotive and 'human.' There's more to it than just the biological timing fluctuations but that's what I can remember off the top of my head.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by Canute
This raises one of the main points of misunderstanding. Many people treat 'consciousness' (experience) as synonymous with 'mind' (computation/thinking). This happens all the time in the literature. I sometimes wonder if we're all conscious in the same way given the arguments on this point. Perhaps one has to live in country with some space to expand into, some sense of nature and natural complexity, and star-lit nights to walk into appreciate the difference, as you suggested.

I am convinced we are not all conscious in the same way. Your comment about notes and the "silences" between notes is exactly the difference I see between the two main ways people are conscious. In this world, of course one needs to pay attention to thinking ("notes") as well as what might lie hidden in the silence. One extreme gives the computer mind, the other extreme leaves behind the spaced out mind. My goal is to develop both the ability to be silent inside, and develop my ability to reason.


I wanted to add that I've been working on a thread for the last few days to examine this contrast in types of consciousness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
That is only because you don't understand what I said. It's not easy to explain this, but it's quite clear once you understand it. . . . The issue is that knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist.

Just saying so doesn't make it so. I'll assume your next sentences are your arguments, so let's see if you have justified your statement "knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist."

Originally posted by confutatis There's nothing outside what you know that can convince you that what you know to be true is actually false. (and notice that you can only be proven wrong on something because you accept that something else is true; there's no way to prove that everything you know to be true is false - some of it perhaps, but not everything)

I understand there are things which are better (or even only) understood by studying their relationships to other things. There is no argument about that. But you are describing the workings of what you believe from within the context of what you believe. It is not a proof to say there is nothing but relativeness because relative things always work in a relative way.

Originally posted by confutatis . . . there was a time people could not understand why the world was not falling if it had no foundation. That left them confused, because they couldn't possibly imagine a foundation, other than an infinite chain of turtles. . . .Knowledge is no different. It has no foundation, no starting point, because . . . the "absolute foundation at the base of all existence" can't possibly exist. If it did, then it would need a foundation for itself. Turtles all the way...

When you say there is no starting point, and then talk about "Turtles all the way," actually you are describing exactly what must happen if things are only relative. Nothing you say solves the problem of endless regress.

An absolute foundation, on the other hand, is the most basic principle/cause/existence possible. It needs nothing to hold it up, it is the basis of everything. If such a "ground state" exists, all beginings and regress start and end there respectively.


So, you have not yet made your case that all is relative because "knowledge, as a whole, does not have a starting point, a foundation, because such a foundation can't possibly exist." Instead you've given reason to suspect all is not relative.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by LW Sleeth
I understand there are things which are better (or even only) understood by studying their relationships to other things.

No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things. That's what "understanding" means. You can't understand a thing if it relates to nothing else. That's why nobody understands "reality", "consciousness", "space", "time", "beauty", and so many other mysteries.

But once again you are describing the workings of what you believe from within the context of what you believe.

I'm describing things as I see them.

It is not a proof to say there is nothing but relativeness because relative things always work in a relative way.

What do you mean by proof? Philosophy is thousands of years old and, if you exclude mathematicians, no one was ever able to come with a philosophical proof of anything. You know why? Because language is to philosophers what wood is to a carpenter. Just like a carpenter's imagination must be restrained by the limitations of wood, a philosopher can only do what his language allows him to do. And "proof" is definitely not allowed.

When you say there is no starting point, and then talk about "Turtles all the way," actually you are describing exactly what must happen if things are only relative.

Nope.

Nothing you say solves the problem of endless regress.

Think of a dictionary. Anything you can possibly talk about is described there. How does the dictionary define words if not by describing one word in terms of others? Are you saying that can't be done? Nonsense!

Now does a dictionary really describe anything? Of course not. A dictionary only describes a language. But you are mistaken if you think any description of anything is fundamentally different from a dictionary. It isn't. It's exactly the same thing. All these posts, all those philosophy books, they are mere attempts at definitions of the way we talk. Watch it closely and you will see.

An absolute foundation, on the other hand, is the most basic principle/cause/existence possible.

Right there! You just described "an absolute foundation" in terms of something else! Your absolute foundation is anything but absolute!

It needs nothing to hold it up, it is the basis of everything. If such a "ground state" exists, all beginings and regress start and end there respectively.

So that's the (relative) definition of your absolute foundation? Thanks for making my point for me

 

[Les Sleeth]

Originally posted by confutatis
No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things.

Are you going to be another one of those here who argues one's case by restating over and over again what one believes?

Originally posted by confutatis
I'm describing things as I see them.

Hmmmm, looks like it . . .

Originally posted by confutatis
That's what "understanding" means. You can't understand a thing if it relates to nothing else. That's why nobody understands "reality", "consciousness", "space", "time", "beauty", and so many other mysteries.

. . . .and again.

Originally posted by confutatis
What do you mean by proof? Philosophy is thousands of years old and, if you exclude mathematicians, no one was ever able to come with a philosophical proof of anything. You know why? Because language is to philosophers what wood is to a carpenter. Just like a carpenter's imagination must be restrained by the limitations of wood, a philosopher can only do what his language allows him to do. And "proof" is definitely not allowed.

Relax, I didn't mean a formal proof, I meant with evidence and reason to build a case that so thoroughly accounts for how reality works I must, if I am being reasonable, accede to your model. So far all you are doing is repeating what you believe, you are not addressing the exceptions and counterpoints I bring up other than to say "No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things," as you are about to do again . . .

Originally posted by confutatis Think of a dictionary. Anything you can possibly talk about is described there. How does the dictionary define words if not by describing one word in terms of others?

[zz)]

Originally posted by confutatis Are you saying that can't be done? Nonsense!

The classic strawman . . . I have never once said any of the things are arguing against.

Originally posted by confutatis Now does a dictionary really describe anything? Of course not. A dictionary only describes a language. But you are mistaken if you think any description of anything is fundamentally different from a dictionary. It isn't. It's exactly the same thing. All these posts, all those philosophy books, they are mere attempts at definitions of the way we talk. Watch it closely and you will see.

Who's arguing? You are doing exactly what I said you were doing in my last post.

You are also doing what your above argument was supposed to refute about what I said, which was, ". . . you are describing the workings of what you believe from within the context of what you believe. It is not a proof [substitute: sound argument] to say there is nothing but relativeness because relative things always work in a relative way."

Originally posted by confutatis
Right there! You just described "an absolute foundation" in terms of something else! Your absolute foundation is anything but absolute! . . . So that's the (relative) definition of your absolute foundation? Thanks for making my point for me

We are using language to represent what we are talking about. Langauge and thought are exactly what you represent them to be: tools for communicating about what is relative. I have NEVER disputed that. If they are as such, and if there is something absolute, then tools which only operate in relative terms can never adequately express this absolute.

All that is understood by half-way informed philosophers when it comes this area of metaphysics. So being sarcastic about that rather elementary point doesn't tell us anything.

As an "experientialist" the only thing I consider a "proof" is that which has been experienced somewhere, at sometime, by someone (excluding tautalogies and such, of course). I have been telling you that your model of consciousness doesn't account for experiences I have had, and I believe others have had. I freely admit language cannot express that experience, but guess what, language can never be equivalent to any experience other than the experience of participating in language.

If you are hungry, will your hunger get satisfied by talking about eating, or do you need to experience eating? Obviously the language "food" is not the experience food. Period. You know that, I know that.

If that is the case, then the experience of the absolute (if possible) would also not be the language of the absolute. We know if it exits we can't get at it through the language of philosophy. What we are trying to do therefore is infer from the way reality "works" if an absolute is a logical hypothesis, or maybe even a necessary hypothesis.

That is why when you argue for the absoluteness of relativity , I bring up logical problems I have with it, such as infinite regress. Your answer is to come back and tell me about all the relative stuff in the universe, which I already know and don't dispute. It seems more appropriate to first address people's counterarguments so that your answers reflect you have taken into account the points that have been made.

 

[hypnagogue]

LW, how exactly are you using the term 'experience'? From what I gather you have been using it primarily to mean conscious, subjective experience, but you've also used it a couple of times (or so it seems) to refer to objective actions/activities. For instance, you say the way to satisfy hunger is to experience eating. But if I were to have the conscious experience of eating induced in me by a mad scientist, I imagine it would not have a completely overriding effect on my hunger, which is ultimately satisfied by the ingestion of sugars and such by my objective body. (If you have ever been hooked up to one of those nutrtition transport systems in a hospital-- whatever they're called-- you'll find that you don't get terribly hungry despite not eating for long periods.)

 

[Les Sleeth]

LW, how exactly are you using the term 'experience'? From what I gather you have been using it primarily to mean conscious, subjective experience, but you've also used it a couple of times (or so it seems) to refer to objective actions/activities. For instance, you say the way to satisfy hunger is to experience eating. But if I were to have the conscious experience of eating induced in me by a mad scientist, I imagine it would not have a completely overriding effect on my hunger, which is ultimately satisfied by the ingestion of sugars and such by my objective body. (If you have ever been hooked up to one of those nutrtition transport systems in a hospital-- whatever they're called-- you'll find that you don't get terribly hungry despite not eating for long periods.)

I have been using the term "experience" to refer to that aspect of consciousness that is aware of what it senses. I use the word "senses" in the broadest possible way so that it includes the physical senses, intuition, or any other way we detect information. In other words, we sense/feel and we know we sense/feel; both aspects together is what I consider experience.

The hunger analogy probably wasn't the best, but it is one I like because we all know what it is like to be hungry. My point was that there is a big difference between thinking or talking about eating, and actually eating. For the general meaning of experience I do not distinguish between information that comes from the outside, or that which comes from within. So it wouldn't matter to the basic nature of experience if the information I become aware of is regarding my objective actions/activities. And if you were to have the conscious experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, that would be the experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, and not the experience of eating. You might not be able to properly interpret the situation until you were starving to death, but that doesn't change the nature of experience, which is really my overall point. Experience is one thing, thinking and language are another.

 

[Canute]

No, things can only be understood by studying their relationships to other things. That's what "understanding" means. You can't understand a thing if it relates to nothing else. That's why nobody understands "reality", "consciousness", "space", "time", "beauty", and so many other mysteries. SNIP

What do you mean by proof? Philosophy is thousands of years old and, if you exclude mathematicians, no one was ever able to come with a philosophical proof of anything. You know why? Because language is to philosophers what wood is to a carpenter. Just like a carpenter's imagination must be restrained by the limitations of wood, a philosopher can only do what his language allows him to do. And "proof" is definitely not allowed.

All this seems pretty much true, but only in a way.

You are right that science and 'analytical' philososophy is restricted to the study of relative phenomena, and that neither is capable of absolute proofs. However experience is not reasoning. Reasoning has limits (Plato's cave again) but experience transcends those limits. We know this from mathematics among other things.

Experience must preceed perceptual or conceptual knowledge. Therefore experience (or not all experience) is not this kind of knowledge. This is why direct knowledge (apperception) can, in theory at least, bring certain knowledge but reasoning, as you say, cannot.

You can't say that nobody understands ultimate reality and so on, because there are many people who claim they do. They may be wrong but you'd have to show this.

Think of a dictionary. Anything you can possibly talk about is described there. How does the dictionary define words if not by describing one word in terms of others? Are you saying that can't be done? Nonsense!

Words in dictionaries are relative phenomena as you say. However dictionaries exist so clearly not all the words in a dictionary are relative, otherwise they could not exist. There is at least one undefined term in every dictionary and in every mathematical theory and in any 'theory of everything'.

The universe consists entirely of relative phenomona. There is therefore soemthing that is not relative that underlies these phenomena, and on which all these relative phenomena are epiphenomenal. This must be something absolute.

Now does a dictionary really describe anything? Of course not. A dictionary only describes a language. But you are mistaken if you think any description of anything is fundamentally different from a dictionary. It isn't. It's exactly the same thing. All these posts, all those philosophy books, they are mere attempts at definitions of the way we talk. Watch it closely and you will see.

Half right again I'd say. Sleeth was not talking about 'describing'. He was talking about experiencing. Experiencing, at the limit, does not require words, categories, conceptions, perceptions, sensory data, or relative phenomena of any kind. For the reasons you give this must be the case since realtive phenomena cannot exist unless something that is not relative underlies them.

Right there! You just described "an absolute foundation" in terms of something else! Your absolute foundation is anything but absolute!

It is not possible to describe something that is absolute except in relative terms. This is why in non-dual cosmologies it is asserted that nothing true can be said about the absolute. To describe it is to 'relativise' it. Hence it is not correct to say that the absolute exists or not-exists, they are incorrect terms. However luckily to have an experience it is not necessary to describe it so absolute knowledge is theoretically possible.

It is the experience that Sleeth is talking about, and the words are necessary. "The Tao must be talked" in Chuang Tsu's words. However the experience is not the words.

BTW this is worth reading in this context
from ( http://www.dieoff.org/page126.htm)

Your point about philosophy is a good one. Analytical philosophy hasn't made any progress in two thousand years. The reason is that this tradition of philosophy does not acknowledge the limits to reasoning, even though we know what they are. Martin Heidegger is brilliant on this issue. Here's an extract from 'What is Metaphysics', his inaugural lecture at U of Frieberg. The whole text is worth reading. The guy is my all time hero-genius.


"Metaphysics, however, speaks continually and in the most various ways of Being. Metaphysics gives, and seems to confirm, the appearance that it asks and answers the question concerning Being. In fact, metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it never asks this question. Metaphysics does not ask this question because it thinks of Being only by representing beings as beings. It means all beings as a whole, although it speaks of Being. It refers to Being and means beings as beings. From its beginning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion of beings and Being. This confusion, to be sure, must be considered an event and not a mere mistake. It cannot by any means be charged to a mere negligence of thought or a carelessness of expression. Owing to this persistent confusion, the claim that metaphysics poses the question of Being lands us in utter error."

 

[zk4586]

...if I were to have the conscious experience of eating induced in me by a mad scientist, I imagine it would not have a completely overriding effect on my hunger, which is ultimately satisfied by the ingestion of sugars and such by my objective body.

Geez, you have a real hypothetical-scenario-involving-a-mad-scientist fetish, don't you?

 

[hypnagogue]

Geez, you have a real hypothetical-scenario-involving-a-mad-scientist fetish, don't you?

No more than you have a fetish for language. I just think the mad scientist thing is a useful device to demonstrate a realistically plausible scenario where experience is shown to be dissociated from the objective referrents to which it usually is taken to refer. This is an important distinction to make.

 

[hypnagogue]

And if you were to have the conscious experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, that would be the experience of eating induced by a mad scientist, and not the experience of eating. You might not be able to properly interpret the situation until you were starving to death, but that doesn't change the nature of experience, which is really my overall point.

I agree with your second statement here, which is why I think you shouldn't make the distinction that you make in the first. From the 1st person perspective, for at least some nonnegligible duration of time, the experience of eating is identical whether it arises from actually eating, or from being fooled into thinking that you are eating by proper stimulation of your brain. The upshot of this is that there is no direct tie from subjective experience to objective referrents. Your distinction between the two arises from a 3rd person perspective, but is not apparent from the 1st person. So, in fact, I would say that it is more proper to say that experientially the two are identical. If we do not say this then we introduce an objective term into our notion of experience and so we are no longer referring exclusively to subjective experience, or 'awareness of sensation' as you put it.

This is a side-issue to your main point, but I think it is important to talk about it so we remain as precise as possible on what we mean by 'experience.'

Experience is one thing, thinking and language are another.

Absolutely agree.

 

[confutatis]

All this seems pretty much true, but only in a way.

Yes, but in a very interesting way.

Reasoning has limits (Plato's cave again) but experience transcends those limits. We know this from mathematics among other things.

It works both ways. Reason can transcend experience, experience can transcend reasoning, and the interplay between the two is what allows us to acquire knowledge. As a result of that, the way you reason shapes the way you experience, and vice-versa. Then, talking about "reason" is equivalent to talking about "experience". They are two sides of the same coin.

You can't say that nobody understands ultimate reality and so on, because there are many people who claim they do. They may be wrong but you'd have to show this.

I mean "understand" in a rational way, in the sense of being able to describe it to others.

Sleeth was not talking about 'describing'. He was talking about experiencing.

To talk about experience is to describe experience. You can't talk about anything without describing that thing.

Experiencing, at the limit, does not require words, categories, conceptions, perceptions, sensory data, or relative phenomena of any kind.

Sure, but that kind of experience can't be understood or talked about, except in extremely elusive terms.

It is not possible to describe something that is absolute except in relative terms. This is why in non-dual cosmologies it is asserted that nothing true can be said about the absolute.

Why is it that you can't see that the statement "nothing true can be said about the absolute" is nonsense? For one thing, it can't possibly be true as it is a statement about the absolute.

To describe it is to 'relativise' it. Hence it is not correct to say that the absolute exists or not-exists, they are incorrect terms.

Exactly! We can't think of reality as being a "thing", and we can't think of consciousness as being a "process". Thinking about things that way lead to all sorts of nonsense.

Analytical philosophy hasn't made any progress in two thousand years.

Actually they did, they achieved quite a progress, only not in the area where they expected it. The greatest contribution of philosophy to mankind is an elaborate vocabulary. This discussion about 'consciousness' would not be possible if philosophers had not invented the concept. The mistake is to think that any philosophical discussion about 'consciousness' consists of anything other than an attempt to define what the word 'consciousness' means. That's what I think some people don't get, but it's not their fault, it's not easy to see through the deceptive aspects of language.

That applies to all my posts, by the way. I'm not trying to prove or demonstrate anything about consciousness, philosophy is not capable of that. All I'm saying is that the concept 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness', except perhaps in a tautological way.

 

[Canute]

It works both ways. Reason can transcend experience, experience can transcend reasoning, and the interplay between the two is what allows us to acquire knowledge. As a result of that, the way you reason shapes the way you experience, and vice-versa. Then, talking about "reason" is equivalent to talking about "experience". They are two sides of the same coin.

This is not the case. Try reading Russell or Popper for instance.

I mean "understand" in a rational way, in the sense of being able to describe it to others.

Understanding has got nothing to with describing to others. Experiences are indescribable in principle. In philophy this is known as 'incommensurability.

To talk about experience is to describe experience. You can't talk about anything without describing that thing.

Ok

Sure, but that kind of experience can't be understood or talked about, except in extremely elusive terms.

No kind of experience can be talked about except in 'elusive terms'.

Why is it that you can't see that the statement "nothing true can be said about the absolute" is nonsense? For one thing, it can't possibly be true as it is a statement about the absolute.

That isn't quite right. The statement is saying that 'the absolute' (let's say 'essence or 'ultimate reality') has no attributes. Therefore any statement like 'it exists' is untrue, but not entirely untrue.

Depending on how much philosophy you know you may find this a strange claim. However it can be shown logically.

Exactly! We can't think of reality as being a "thing", and we can't think of consciousness as being a "process". Thinking about things that way lead to all sorts of nonsense.

Hmm. Don't know what you mean there.

Actually they did, they achieved quite a progress, only not in the area where they expected it. The greatest contribution of philosophy to mankind is an elaborate vocabulary. This discussion about 'consciousness' would not be possible if philosophers had not invented the concept. The mistake is to think that any philosophical discussion about 'consciousness' consists of anything other than an attempt to define what the word 'consciousness' means. That's what I think some people don't get, but it's not their fault, it's not easy to see through the deceptive aspects of language.

Sorry, I didn't mean to suggest that philosophy was a waste of time. I meant that the questions which were unanswerable to Plato are still unanswerable today. That is why one philosopher (can't remember but could check) remarked that Western philosophy 'consists of a series of footnotes to Plato'. In this context it's intersting that you cite 'an elaborate vocabulary' as a success.

That applies to all my posts, by the way. I'm not trying to prove or demonstrate anything about consciousness, philosophy is not capable of that. All I'm saying is that the concept 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness', except perhaps in a tautological way.

The only agreed defintion of consciousness is 'what it is like'. Whether that invokes the concept of consciousness depends on whether you think the words are the thing, or the thing is something that the words point at.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It works both ways. Reason can transcend experience, experience can transcend reasoning, and the interplay between the two is what allows us to acquire knowledge. As a result of that, the way you reason shapes the way you experience, and vice-versa. Then, talking about "reason" is equivalent to talking about "experience". They are two sides of the same coin.

Sometimes it seems like you believe arbitrariness is a compelling line of reasoning. Why don't you feel the need to justify statements you offer that are in dispute among us? Just saying things are true without logical and/or evidential support gives me no way to either accept your point, or understand how you came to your conclusion.

For example, you say "the interplay between the two [reason and experience] is what allows us to acquire knowledge." If that is so, then how do you explain rats that can learn how to negotiate a maze or feed themselves from a mechanical feeding device? Did they require reason to know, or was experience enough to give them knowledge?

When you debate, mostly what I see you do is state your point of view; you don't adequately respond to others' legitimate counterpoints, and you don't seem particularly bothered by exceptions to your statements. Are you trading ideas with an openness to learn, or are you lecturing?

That applies to all my posts, by the way. I'm not trying to prove or demonstrate anything about consciousness, philosophy is not capable of that. All I'm saying is that the concept 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness', except perhaps in a tautological way.

First you say you aren't trying to prove anything about consciousness, and then you say " 'experience' does not need to be invoked in order to provide a clear definition of the concept 'consciousness'." You might not have noticed but you are participating in a discussion about the nature of consciousness. Some of us disagreed with a basic assumption of Rorty (and Dennett) that language and thought are the defining aspects of consciousness. We are not talking about "defining" consciousness as a dictionary would! But in any case, I'd love to see how you get rid of experience in your definition. Are you going to show us that, are or you going to just keep making arbitrary statements.

Exactly! We can't think of reality as being a "thing", and we can't think of consciousness as being a "process". Thinking about things that way lead to all sorts of nonsense. . . .

. . . The mistake is to think that any philosophical discussion about 'consciousness' consists of anything other than an attempt to define what the word 'consciousness' means. That's what I think some people don't get, but it's not their fault, it's not easy to see through the deceptive aspects of language.

I say, you are the one who doesn't get it. You don't even know what discusssion you are in. Here's how I see what you are saying in relation to what the rest of us are talking about.

I say the word "green" represents a certain wavelength of light. You say, green is only a word. I say, I know green is a word, but what does that have to do with whether or not there is a certain EM wavelength? You say, even EM and wavelengths are just words. I say, yes but so what, who said they weren't words? Well, you say, even a word is just a word. I say, the discussion is not about words, we are trying to talk about what a certain words represent in objective reality. You say, there is nothing but words, and, and all else is nonesense! Okay, I say, if that is so, then make your case. You say, I just state the obvious facts, it's up to you to figure out what I'm talking about, although its not your fault you don't understand me 'cause what I'm talking about is over most people's heads.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I agree with your second statement here, which is why I think you shouldn't make the distinction that you make in the first. From the 1st person perspective, for at least some nonnegligible duration of time, the experience of eating is identical whether it arises from actually eating, or from being fooled into thinking that you are eating by proper stimulation of your brain. The upshot of this is that there is no direct tie from subjective experience to objective referrents. Your distinction between the two arises from a 3rd person perspective, but is not apparent from the 1st person. So, in fact, I would say that it is more proper to say that experientially the two are identical. If we do not say this then we introduce an objective term into our notion of experience and so we are no longer referring exclusively to subjective experience, or 'awareness of sensation' as you put it.

This is a side-issue to your main point, but I think it is important to talk about it so we remain as precise as possible on what we mean by 'experience.'

Yep, you caught me there. As I generalized about experience, I knew something was inaccurate about lumping internal and external experience together. Let me see if I can say it better.

That experience which comes from within my consciousness has only me as its source. If there is anything truly unique about consciousness, then I don't see how anything "outer" can indentically simulate an experience of that uniqueness. But that which comes from without is usually information reaching me from my senses and brain. There's no reason I can think of that outer information, registering mostly as vibratory analogs of physical events in my consciousness, couldn't (in theory) be simulated perfectly. So I agree, with the right tools a mad scientist could give me the "experience" of eating. However, I do not think he could give me an experience of the most basic nature of consciousness since (I believe) that can only come from within consciousness itself.

 

[confutatis]

I meant that the questions which were unanswerable to Plato are still unanswerable today.

We don't have more answers than Plato, but we do have a lot more questions. That was my point. Philosophy gives us something to talk about. Without philosophy we could not have cocktail parties. Or this forum, for that matter.

The only agreed defintion of consciousness is 'what it is like'. Whether that invokes the concept of consciousness depends on whether you think the words are the thing, or the thing is something that the words point at.

That can't possibly be an agreed definition of consciousness because I don't agree with it :)

I was actually wondering about that this morning. According to that line of thinking, there must be something that "it is like" to be a woman which only women know, right? After all, you have to be a woman to know what it is like to be a woman. Even though I kind of grasp the idea behind the argument, I think putting things that way is silly. The idea may be valid, but the expression of it is pure nonsense. Let's see if I can explain it.

What is a woman? A woman is certainly not defined by "what it feels like to be a woman"; if things were that way no one could know that something as "being a woman" existed, for no one can know what a person feels inside. So a woman must be defined in a different way. Let's say we define a woman by her appearance. So as far as everyone is concerned, if it looks like a woman then it is a woman. That sounds like a more sensible definition. But what about the "what it feels..." stuff? Can someone have the appearance of a woman and "feel like" a man? And here's where the nonsense becomes clear, at least for me.

If "looking like a woman" and "feeling like a woman" are exactly the same thing, then no one who "looks like a woman" could possibly "feel like" anything except a woman. Any difference between "how it looks like" and "how it feels like" would be simply a matter of perspective, different language to describe the same phenomenon. But people are saying this is wrong, there is a difference, so let's examine it.

Someone named 'JS' claims to "feel like" a woman. Even though JS looks like a man, behaves exactly as a man, is sexually attracted to women, and exhibits any known characteristic of a man, JS insists the "feeling inside" is that of a woman. What do we make of JS? We are tempted to call him a fool, right? But the problem is, how can we be sure that JS doesn't really feel like a woman? After all, only JS knows about his/her subjective feelings, so we have to give JS the benefit of the doubt, right? Wrong! Just as we don't know "what it feels like to be JS", likewise JS doesn't know "what it feels like to be a woman". His claim is bogus, he's a man, period.

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

 

[Fliption]

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

It appears to me that you are trapped in a box and can't get out. You're turning everything into a semantic game. Who cares what it feels like to be a "woman"? That's just an arbitrary distinction with a word assigned to it. It doesn't have anything to do with consciousness. Consciousness is "what it's like to be". Not be "something", necessarily. Just "to be".

 

[confutatis]

It appears to me that you are trapped in a box and can't get out. You're turning everything into a semantic game.

My goodness, that's the point! We are all trapped in a box called "the subjective world" and everything anyone says IS a semantic game. The only alternative to communication is reading people's minds. I cannot do that.

Consciousness is "what it's like to be". Not be "something", necessarily. Just "to be".

So, are you?

 

[Canute]

We don't have more answers than Plato, but we do have a lot more questions. That was my point. Philosophy gives us something to talk about. Without philosophy we could not have cocktail parties. Or this forum, for that matter.

Very true. However think we should take this as a sign that our phiolosophising has gone wrong somewhere.

That can't possibly be an agreed definition of consciousness because I don't agree with it :)

No you're right. Not everyone agrees. However this is the common definition within consciousness studies, after a well known papar by Thomas Nagel which asked what it would be like to be a bat. It isn't a scientific definition of course, but it's the only one on which there is any concensus.

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

No offense (really) these are difficult issues. However this is nonsense. If we do not feel anything we are not conscious. How you can say that subjective experience has nothing to do with consciousness defeats me completely. There is no answer to it.

Also every shred of evidence suggests that what it is like to be a woman is unlike what it is like to be a man, thank goodness. Imagine feeling like you can't park.

 

[hypnagogue]

I was actually wondering about that this morning. According to that line of thinking, there must be something that "it is like" to be a woman which only women know, right? After all, you have to be a woman to know what it is like to be a woman.

'What it is like to be' refers to one's direct subjective experience. It does not follow from this that any linguistic dividing line we can come up with entails a totally unique and unknowable set of subjective experiences. For instance, the totality of what it is like to be me is certainly distinct from the totality of what it is like to be you. However, this does not imply that there is no overlap. If we were to look upon the same sunset from the same vantage point, our subjective experiences would still not be identical, but to a large extent they would contain the same phenomenological content-- assuming that your 'red' is the same as my 'red,' and so on.

There is certainly something it is like to be a normally functioning human woman, but it is a further, non-trivial question whether or not it is possible in principle for a man to have a good grasp of this 'what it is like-ness.' The question to ask is, to what extent do the typical subjective experiences of a man overlap with that of a woman? Although differences undoubtedly exist, there is also undoubtedly a great deal of overlap. For a man to have no comprehension of what it is like to be a woman, there would have to be some sort of subjective experience that woman encounter for which a man has no adequate analog in his own repertoire of subjective experience. This may or may not be the case, but we certainly can't assume as you have that it must be the case.

For instance, a man does not undergo menstruation, but a typical man probably experiences cramps at some point in his life, and probably experiences some form of mood swing as well. While still not identical in every detail to the woman's experience, the man can probably imagine a reasonable facsimile of a menstruating woman's experience by way of comparison to his own past experiences. (This claim would be bolstered considerably if the typical woman claims that subjective feeling of menstrual cramps is not qualitatively different in a fundamental way from the feeling of 'normal' cramps, and so on.) Contrast this with a blind man, who will never even be able to construct a reasonable facsimile of what it is like to experience visual consciousness, since he has no adequate experiential analogs through which to attain an understanding.

Can someone have the appearance of a woman and "feel like" a man? And here's where the nonsense becomes clear, at least for me.

We can guess at the answer using a linguistic interchange between men and women on their subjective experiences, but we cannot be sure. So in some respect it may be a nonsensical question to ask, but the nonsense belongs to the way the question has been framed, not to the underlying concept of 'what it is like.'

If "looking like a woman" and "feeling like a woman" are exactly the same thing, then no one who "looks like a woman" could possibly "feel like" anything except a woman.

I honestly don't know what justification you have for tying together appearances and subjective experience in this way. You'd be better served to talk about neurobiology. If there were some neural correlates of consciousness that were scientifically shown to correspond to 'feeling like a woman,' and if your JS character was then shown to possesses these neural correlates, then we would have a high degree of confidence that his claim is justified.

Of course, the problem here is that 'feeling like a woman,' if there truly is such a thing, would probably be exceedingly subtle, vague, and complex. It is not nearly so easy to pick out such a thing as it is to pick out, say, visually 'feeling' redness.

His claim is bogus, he's a man, period.

There seems to be some confusion here. JS is obviously a man, since manhood is defined physiologically. That does not preclude him from feeling like a woman, just like an adult is not precluded from the possibility of feeling like a child under the proper circumstances.

The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

Subjective experience has everything to do with it. You are speaking of a mechanism by which one concludes that other people possesses the same type of subjective experiences that one encounters directly. One does not need this process to know one's own subjective experience-- obviously not, since the only way one can observe the appearance and behavior of others in the first place is through the medium of their own subjective experience.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If you understood that, you should be able to see what's wrong with the "what it feels like" argument. The reason we know we are conscious is not because we "feel" anything, it's simply because we notice that our appearnce and behaviour is very similar to other people who claim to be conscious, just like women know they are women because they notice their similarity to other people known as "women". Subjective experience has nothing to do with it.

I am becoming infatuated with your vision for humanity. Music without feeling, relationships without feeling, life without feeling . . . very efficient. I just hope that what creates everything from dull pianists to mass murderers isn't the lack of feeling.

 

[confutatis]

I am becoming infatuated with your vision for humanity. Music without feeling, relationships without feeling, life without feeling . . . very efficient. I just hope that what creates everything from dull pianists to mass murderers isn't the lack of feeling.

My piano playing is rather dull, and I killed four people yesterday. Are you happy to hear that?

Now if you'd excuse me, I have to think about a reply to hypnagogue's thoughtful post.

 

[confutatis]

For a man to have no comprehension of what it is like to be a woman, there would have to be some sort of subjective experience that woman encounter for which a man has no adequate analog in his own repertoire of subjective experience. This may or may not be the case, but we certainly can't assume as you have that it must be the case.

That is way beside my point. All I said was that we can assume for sure that if there is something about yourself which you think only you have, then you have no word for it. As a consequence, everything you talk about, absolutely everything, must consist of concepts that are shared. Applied to my example, all that is possible for women to talk about themselves are those things that are common to all people who are defined as women.

You seem to be getting the wrong impression that language controls what you are. I never said that. All I said was that language controls what you think you are. You must agree with me that there's far more to you than what you think you are.

For instance, a man does not undergo menstruation, but a typical man probably experiences cramps at some point in his life, and probably experiences some form of mood swing as well. While still not identical in every detail to the woman's experience, the man can probably imagine a reasonable facsimile of a menstruating woman's experience by way of comparison to his own past experiences.

Men have noses and women also have noses. Whatever it is that men share with women, I can assure you it is not part of what makes women "women", if you think of "women" as oppose to "men".

Contrast this with a blind man, who will never even be able to construct a reasonable facsimile of what it is like to experience visual consciousness, since he has no adequate experiential analogs through which to attain an understanding.

Listen to yourself! Are you able to construct a reasonable facsimile of what it is like to experience visual consciousness? Are you saying a blind man cannot know he is blind? It seems so, as one needs to understand what vision is before one knows one doesn't have it.

I honestly don't know what justification you have for tying together appearances and subjective experience in this way.

I'm not "tying together appearances and subjective experience". Read my post. I said "subjective experience has nothing to do with it".

You'd be better served to talk about neurobiology. If there were some neural correlates of consciousness that were scientifically shown to correspond to 'feeling like a woman,' and if your JS character was then shown to possesses these neural correlates, then we would have a high degree of confidence that his claim is justified.

If I could get you to understand the point I'm trying to make, you would see that this idea of "neural correlates" those materialists love to talk about is nonsense. But we have to save that discussion for a later time.

There seems to be some confusion here. JS is obviously a man, since manhood is defined physiologically. That does not preclude him from feeling like a woman

No, it does not. That's not what I said. What I said is that if JS does feel like a woman, he has absolutely no way to know it.

just like an adult is not precluded from the possibility of feeling like a child under the proper circumstances.

That's not a correct analogy. Adults know how it feels to be a child. It's perfectly correct for an adult to say "I'm feeling like a child today". I certainly feel like a child when I'm completely free of worries and just enjoying myself. But the reverse is not true; no child can claim to feel like an adult because a child doesn't know how an adult feels. As a child I often felt adult-like feelings, but I never thought of them as "adult-like feelings" until I grew up and learned what an "adult-like feeling" is.

Do you understand what I'm trying to say?

Subjective experience has everything to do with it. You are speaking of a mechanism by which one concludes that other people possesses the same type of subjective experiences that one encounters directly. One does not need this process to know one's own subjective experience

That's not what I said. What I said is that you need this "process" in order to describe you own subjective experience in linguistic terms, to others and even to yourself.

For instane, I have never felt "enlightened". Maybe I did a few moments in my life, I have recollections of experiences which I could not understand at the time they happened. So those experiences happened, I'm not questioning that. But I don't think I can call those experiences "enlightenment", because I don't know what "enlightenment" means.

Now you tell me: how do I know if I ever experienced "enlightenment"? Is it enough for me to look at people who did? Certainly not, as according to them you can't tell the difference from the outside. Is it enough for me to listen to people explaining what "enlightenment" is? Again not, for they all tell me that "enlightenment" can't be explained. Now that leads me to conclude, from my perspective, that "enlightenment" can't be experienced, and that people who claim to have experienced it don't know what they are talking about.

Please don't get me wrong about that. The fact that you don't know what you are talking about doesn't diminish it. I certainly feel profound love for many things, but I don't know what "love" is. I know what loving behaviour is, but "love" completely eludes me. When I use the word "love", it's always in a poetical way. I'm quite OK with the fact that I don't know what "love" is, for the thing I feel when I use the word is far more important, far more meaningful than any word can possibly convey.

 

[Fliption]

Please don't get me wrong about that. The fact that you don't know what you are talking about doesn't diminish it. I certainly feel profound love for many things, but I don't know what "love" is. I know what loving behaviour is, but "love" completely eludes me. When I use the word "love", it's always in a poetical way. I'm quite OK with the fact that I don't know what "love" is, for the thing I feel when I use the word is far more important, far more meaningful than any word can possibly convey.

Confutatis, not only do I understand what you're saying here, I can agree with it too. But what you're describing is no different than the situation with color that everyone here has already acknowledged. None of us know whether our experience of "blueness" is really the same. But you have to be careful when you make statements like "You have no idea what blue is." As you did with enlightenment. You can experience anything. You just can't know whether what you're experiencing would be considered the same thing by another. This doesn't mean that the subjective experience cannot exists.

And while I understand your point in the last post, it is not at all what was being said earlier. Earlier, the view was that experience cannot exists without some conceptual understanding. This is what I've disagreed with from the start. I'm still not sure how to relate this latest view with those "the physical world is just a blur until you learn some words" posts.

 

[zk4586]

The real issue that divides us is this: Is subjective experience important?

Some of us say yes, some of us say no.

We should just agree to disagree.

 

[Fliption]

The real issue that divides us is this: Is subjective experience important?

Some of us say yes, some of us say no.

We should just agree to disagree.

Important for what?