Is Math an Inherent Part of Nature or a Human Invention?

[octelcogopod]

This ontological confusion is then compounded by the usual epistemological one - mistaking the map for the terrain. The desire is to deal with the substance~form dichotomy (materiality and its boundary states) by assigning reality and unreality to an epistemological division. So the world (being out there) is real, the maths (being in our heads) is unreal. Yet clearly this does not work because the maths is still really out there in some sense - as the boundaries, the limits, the constraints. The maths is more than just a potential fiction, a social construction due to restricted cognitive technologies.

The way I sort out this nest of confusion is first to accept the epistemological division (I think the "modelling relations" crowd in theoretical biology - Rosen, Pattee, Salthe - do the best job here). So nature, reality, is a constructed view. Both our notions about its materials and its laws, its substance and its form, are "in our heads" and justified by a modelling relation (so it is a process with its own purpose, its own needs, not some dispassionate god's eye view).

So reality, as far as we can know it, is our invention. That applies to our mathematical ideas about it, but also our "physical impressions" too. It is all a map.

However on the whole, it is a very good map - as it has developed within the self-refining tradition of metaphysical abduction, scientific induction and logico-mathematical deduction (Peirce's pragmatic triad!).

And then the ontological bit of the story. We can see that limits only actually exist in the sense that they are the boundaries to what exists. They are how far a process of development can go in some direction before asymptotically tending to a limit. So in fact they are the ontically unreal. The boundary remains always infinitesimally just beyond where reality can reach (so as to be able to be seen to enclose it fully).

Yet boundaries also have a real causality. At least if you are a process thinker, a systems science, you believe that there is such a thing as downward causation and even final cause. So forms can act as constraints that actually shape materiality. Maths exists "out there" as something real in the sense that there are forms (of the kind maths can describe) which have a causal role in the realm of the real.

I guess we have to ask the question then whether the set of forms that humans can imagine is a superset or a subset of those that reality can express. Sometimes it seems our inventions are more fertile - we can elaborate to create more imagined things than can actually exist. Other times, that maths is in fact quite impoverished. It is a pretty crude map of the terrain. More subtle things are going on than we have captured so far.

I really enjoyed this post. The first thing that comes to mind (especially regarding the superset/subset question) is that it would seem logical that by abstracting reality into shapes these abstractions in the mind would in fact be a superset. If they would be a subset it implies to me that there is some aspect which will never be reachable and imaginable since they would either have to be equal to, or "above" reality to encompass reality, right?
It could be the barrier is simply the fact that the abstracted models are not actually physical(in the normal physical definition), but in that sense the models and map could be identical to reality? In my mind it becomes a bit confusing after awhile I must admit.

 

[apeiron]

I really enjoyed this post. The first thing that comes to mind (especially regarding the superset/subset question) is that it would seem logical that by abstracting reality into shapes these abstractions in the mind would in fact be a superset. If they would be a subset it implies to me that there is some aspect which will never be reachable and imaginable since they would either have to be equal to, or "above" reality to encompass reality, right?

Yes, we need to "rise above" - make generalisations, find universals, abstract, relax constraints - to model. Maps should contain the least information needed to do the job. And a triangle can be seen as a map of triangular relationships in general. There is something definite by which to measure reality's approach to a maximally reduced ideal form.

But then where does this ideal exist? The traditional debate says either the ideal is just a construction of the human mind (so is just a choice and not real in any useful sense of the word) or else it is transcendent - outside our reality and also inhabiting its own Platonic realm (with its own laws of operation and existence).

Whereas I see a story inbetween these extremes of convenient fiction and transcendental entity. A triangle would stand as a limit state on reality. It is more than an idea (because physically, assuming a euclidean spacetime, it is not as if we could have imagined something different being true as the limit description). But it is less than transcendent as it is only the limit of reality (of the universe as it actually is). It emerges as part of this physical existence and so exists (in the non-existent way that boundary exist!) only because there was a reality that could have this kind of limit.

We can then of course generalise our early ideas about triangles and Euclidean space that seem to be an accurate description of actual reality-limits. We can relax some of the constraints which were taken as axiomatic and discover curved geometries, for example. And then reality can turn out to be that way too.

We can keep on generalising, throwing away constraint after constraint and seeing what is left. Perhaps we are following the same path as reality takes, perhaps not. It is not necessary that this is the right path, on the other hand, it probably is. Depends on how good we are at identifying the constraints and choosing what to throw out.

 

[Ken G]

I think the subset/superset dichotomy is an interesting one to consider. Like most dichotomies, we should anticipate two aspects from the start:
1) The dichotomy identifies separate directions, more so than separate possibilities. We should not expect an either/or kind of answer.
2) The truth emerges as a kind of combination of, or an interaction between, the extremes, not only because the truth borrows a little from both, but also because there is a kind of essential tension there.
In the triangle analogy, this might play out as saying that on one hand, a perfect triangle is a subset of geometric forms, and the triangles we "find" in reality are less perfect, so the perfect example seems like a subset. But then we also recognize its perfection stems not from being a particular example, but rather from being a limiting example. So in that sense, they are a superset-- something outside of reality that reality never reaches. So there is a kind of "Platonic" element to a triangle in the way it forms a kind of boundary to the actual. Shall the closure of the actuality count as part of the reality? That's a similar question as to whether the imaginations of the mind count as a subset or superset of what is real.

On a related matter, I'm reminded of what I tell my daughter when she asks me if unicorns are real. She loves unicorns, so if I told her "no, you love a fiction", I would not be serving her. So instead I say "the way you feel about unicorns is certainly real, although there is in actuality no such animal as a unicorn." That she can imagine unicorns, and generate a strong feeling about them, is a part of the reality of her relationship with unicorns, so she has in a sense stretched reality to include something it might not otherwise have included. Perhaps it is the same with triangles, and mathematics is yet another of reality's many creation processes.

Of course, then people always ask, "does that mean Newton's laws didn't work before Newton?" My answer to that is "obviously yes-- before Newton there were no laws to test whether or not they worked. However, we can take data from before Newton, and, after Newton, test that Newton's laws work on that data." So Newton's laws only work after Newton, but they work on data from before Newton. After Newton, the reality expanded to include Newton's laws, and whatever extent those laws work, and that extent applies as well to data from before Newton as after.

 

[disregardthat]

I would have said calculus is in fact a particularly murky example of how mathematics develops . People were groping around for a long time for the foundational justification of the early guesses that appeared to work.

My opinion is on the contrary, the extensions made were excellent example of mathematical progress. Creating new mathematics is essentially what we do, but with set theory we have captured two things: 1) a formalization of the type of extensions we are inclined to do, and 2) an axiomatic setting in which mathematics can be used. Both of these are useful, but not essential for mathematics.

But what you see as "extensions", I see as generalisations or relaxations. So the relaxing of some constraining assumption - like the the impossibility of infinitesimal quantities or the taking of limits - is what opens up the new terrain.

Extension and generalizations may often the same thing, and some times they may not. A trivial example may be defining 0^0 = 1 in some particular setting. A little less trivial example (which may be thought of a generalization with some good will I guess) is giving sense to 0.3333... Originally when dealing with integers and then fractions, 0.3333... didn't have any meaning, and it wasn't deduced that 0.333... = 1/3. It was rather decided that when a sequence of digits reappear in the division process, we connect the sign "..." to the end of a recurring sequence of digits to represent the fraction in question. Later it was taken as an infinite sum. We extended our mathematical notation, which is equivalent to extending mathematics (yes!).

OK, this is arguable because it is said it is no longer required of mathematical axioms. But clearly it was originally a requirement. And even today there has to be some motivation to propose an axiom and some conviction that it is not self-contradicting.

It doesn't make sense to convinced of a axiom, it doesn't even make sense to be "convinced" of any particular part of mathematics. For mathematical statements, it is like building a toy model by the step-by-step guide and say about the final product "this is correct." More appropriately we will say "this was done correctly", and that is an entirely different thing. What does it mean to be convinced of "502+32 = 534"? We really aren't convinced of this statement (our terms treat it as such (a statement) which makes it sound like we are, but that I covered when I talked about mathematical truth being more of a label). Rather, we are convinced that we calculated correctly, which again is an entirely different thing.

In the same sense, being convinced of an axiom does not make sense. We didn't calculate anything, but we gave rule. For axioms, it is like being convinced of the rules of chess. We never say "the rules of chess are correct", but we may say "these are the rules of chess", which "translates" to "these axioms are correct". And we may say "this move is correct", corresponding to a theorem, meaning it was in accordance with the rules (the axioms).

I am aware of the historical context of this, but their conviction was not of the mathematical statements/axioms themselves, but rather of what they modeled. They were convinced that geometric calculations captured measured lengths, or that adding two integers would give the total number of stones split in two piles etc...

Both historically and currently, the view that euclidean geometry is "true" per se is nonsense. There are no physical lines or points to speak of, and there are no platonic lines or points to speak of. And by the same token general relativity is neither "true". (And that general relativity refutes euclidean geometry is meaningless in any interpretation i can think of)

And in modelling relations theory, this act of interpretation is held not be logical but in fact the informal part of the business. The meaning of the mathematical statement would seem "logical" - or rather obvious to the person with the right training. But it is not actually logical in the sense of being also a formalisable operation. Reducible to syntax and so absent of semantics.

I have a slightly broader understanding of the term "formal". It is the language we use into argue mathematically that is formal. In this sense semantics is also formal, and not opposed to, say, formal operations.

I think it is a trap to think of logic as "formalized rules of inference". Logic is part of the structure of language, which is critically important, and not rules in essence. Yes, logic may well be formalized, but how then are we arguing for more general logical statements following logical axioms? We are using the logical axioms much like we are using mathematical axioms, and that is just what is going on: we are doing mathematics. We are using logic to argue about logical rules. Logic, in a sense, "hovers" above all the formalizations regardless of whether it itself is what has been formalized. In this sense I am still convinced that the transition from mathematical calculations to a statement in a given physical model is logical in nature.

 

[qsa]

in the beginning there was no PI then the integers said let there be PI and every other matter(pun intended). so the universe was created with six constants h,c,e,alpha,Me,Mp. apeiron check your PM maybe you will see the light (also pun intended). and spread the gospel.

 

[apeiron]

Extension and generalizations may often the same thing, and some times they may not.

Does "extension" have some technical meaning here? I'm sure you don't intend the set theoretic usage.

To make it clear, I would be talking about the dichotomy of induction and deduction - which are definitely different, if complementary, operations. So you induce to generalise, deduce to recover particulars.

A trivial example may be defining 0^0 = 1 in some particular setting. A little less trivial example (which may be thought of a generalization with some good will I guess) is giving sense to 0.3333... Originally when dealing with integers and then fractions, 0.3333... didn't have any meaning, and it wasn't deduced that 0.333... = 1/3. It was rather decided that when a sequence of digits reappear in the division process, we put the sign "..." to represent the fraction in question. Later it was taken as an infinite sum. We extended our mathematical notation, which is equivalent to extending mathematics (yes!).

This is somewhat confusing as it sounds like you are saying decimal notation would have come before fractions in the history of math.

I would say first came the idea of "cutting into three equal parts". So the "inductive" part of the argument was the generalisation that any whole can be divided equally. And the deductive part was that dividing into 3 equal bits would be a particular example of this operation.

Then along came decimals and suddenly dividing 10 by 3 was an issue. One solved by ... to stand for an infinite process taken to have a limit. But is this an "extension", something done specially just to deal with this situation, or the adoption of a generalisation about taking limits that had arisen already. I mean, that it was the right thing to do was not deduced from fractional notation but from broader principles.

It doesn't make sense to convinced of a axiom, it doesn't even make sense to be "convinced" of any particular part of mathematics.

You are saying I think that mathematicians should be free to believe anything. But as the reference to primitive notions shows, in practice your axioms have to be quite convincing to your peers in some sense.

And remember that the OP is about the exact status of maths vs physical reality. And so we have to become very careful and precise about the actual practice of maths. I've provided references to that actual practice. So you would have to show me that some of the important and useful axioms of maths arose as a result of no-one having any prior conviction about their worth or ontic validity.

What does it mean to be convinced of "502+32 = 534"? We really aren't convinced of this statement (our terms treat it as such (a statement) which makes it sound like we are, but that I covered when I talked about mathematical truth being more of a label). Rather, we are convinced that we calculated correctly, which again is an entirely different thing.

But now you are not talking about the axioms but the calculations. So yes, an entirely different thing.

In the same sense, being convinced of an axiom does not make sense. We didn't calculate anything, but we gave rule. For axioms, it is like being convinced of the rules of chess. We never say "the rules of chess are correct", but we may say "these are the rules of chess", which "translates" to "these axioms are correct". And we may say "this move is correct", corresponding to a theorem, meaning it was in accordance with the rules (the axioms).

The rules of chess would indeed be a set of constraints. And for the chess pieces, they would appear to be the necessary truths of their world . But from our human point of view, we can see the rules are arbitrary. Or "axiomatic" only in the sense that the rules must be such that we can derive pleasure or diversion from their existence.

Our relationship to the world is a little different. We seem to have little choice about its rules. So - unless you are arguing that maths is just a diverting game, and does not have a primary sociological purpose of modelling reality - the chess analogy falls a little flat.

I have a slightly broader understanding of the term "formal". It is the language we use into argue mathematically that is formal. In this sense semantics is also formal, and not opposed to, say, formal operations.

Well, going back to epistemology, the map is not the territory. And the map is pure syntax. It cannot understand itself. The semantics lies elsewhere in the informal part of someone reading a map to find a path across the territory.

I agree, many believe that semantics can be reduced to syntax. Every computer scientist, for a start. But that is another (lengthy) discussion.

I think it is a trap to think of logic as "formalized rules of inference". Logic is part of the structure of language, which is critically important, and not rules in essence. Yes, logic may well be formalized, but how then are we arguing for more general logical statements following logical axioms? We are using the logical axioms much like we are using mathematical axioms, and that is just what is going on: we are doing mathematics. We are using logic to argue about logical rules. Logic, in a sense, "hovers" above all the formalizations regardless of whether it itself is what has been formalized. In this sense I am still convinced that the transition from mathematical calculations to a statement in a given physical model is logical in nature.

Yes, and now you are agreeing that symbols must be grounded, that syntax is not semantics.

Logic can't formally generate itself. We need to be convinced of some primitive notions to get the game going.

 

[Ken G]

And in this context we should not forget the Godel proof that semantics and syntax can never be exactly the same thing (no matter what the computer scientists think!). In any interestingly complex and consistent system of axioms, there will always be at least one semantic truth that is not a syntactic truth. So we have a wedge there, although how wide it is is not at all clear-- it might be the most imperceptible crack, or it might be a vast chasm that we simply have not the mental clarity to see.

 

[disregardthat]

Does "extension" have some technical meaning here? I'm sure you don't intend the set theoretic usage.

As I mentioned briefly later, extensions of a mathematical calculus is essentially creating new notation. What do you mean by set theoretic extensions?

This is somewhat confusing as it sounds like you are saying decimal notation would have come before fractions in the history of math.

It may have been somewhat chronologically confusing, but what I meant was that after we have established the digit representation of fractions, recurring sequences were given a meaning by adding "..." to the end of a recurring sequence to denote the corresponding fraction (from which the digits were calculated). The point is that we extended our calculus to incorporate symbols such as 0.333..., and did not finally discover or deduce what it actually was, as if it had any meaning prior to our decision.

You are saying I think that mathematicians should be free to believe anything. But as the reference to primitive notions shows, in practice your axioms have to be quite convincing to your peers in some sense.

Convincing in what sense? I don't believe any non-platonist out there "believes" in "sets" or their properties any more than one would believe in any abstract concept. He may were well believe in that mathematics ought to be extended in accordance to set theory however, but this is of course an entirely different thing.

And remember that the OP is about the exact status of maths vs physical reality. And so we have to become very careful and precise about the actual practice of maths. I've provided references to that actual practice. So you would have to show me that some of the important and useful axioms of maths arose as a result of no-one having any prior conviction about their worth or ontic validity.

The problem is what does "ontic validity" mean for mathematics. I propose it is utter nonsense, and while many may have convictions of something, it is certainly not ontologically in nature. The question that doesn't seem to be answered is "what is mathematics talking about"? Without a proper answer for this we can't start talking about the ontology of mathematics.

But now you are not talking about the axioms but the calculations. So yes, an entirely different thing.

Yes, I first tried to explain how we more appropriately could consider mathematical statements, and then axioms in the second paragraph.

The rules of chess would indeed be a set of constraints. And for the chess pieces, they would appear to be the necessary truths of their world . But from our human point of view, we can see the rules are arbitrary. Or "axiomatic" only in the sense that the rules must be such that we can derive pleasure or diversion from their existence.

Our relationship to the world is a little different. We seem to have little choice about its rules. So - unless you are arguing that maths is just a diverting game, and does not have a primary sociological purpose of modelling reality - the chess analogy falls a little flat.

The question here is not the purpose of mathematics, but its status as a whole, as you mentioned, is the question here. Thus being arbitrary or not is not that relevant. Axioms are created for various purposes: to use mathematics in various circumstances, but this is not the issue here. That we are more inclined to, say, make axioms for physical models doesn't mean that mathematics have any connection to physics. If all mathematics were used for was to analyze games in particular, would this establish some sort of connection with games (other than it is actually what it is used for)?

 

[apeiron]

The question here is not the purpose of mathematics, but its status as a whole, as you mentioned, is the question here. Thus being arbitrary or not is not that relevant. Axioms are created for various purposes: to use mathematics in various circumstances, but this is not the issue here. That we are more inclined to, say, make axioms for physical models doesn't mean that mathematics have any connection to physics. If all mathematics were used for was to analyze games in particular, would this establish some sort of connection with games (other than it is actually what it is used for)?

Whether maths is arbitrary, platonic, or something else inbetween is the whole point of the OP.

We can quickly agree there is an absolute epistemic divide - the map is not the territory. But that still leaves three burning questions.

1) What is the nature of the map? (How is it formed, how does it operate?)

2) What is the nature of the relationship of the map to the territory? (Modelling relations for example takes the specific view that measurement, and so the grounding in semantics, is informal).

3) Then what is actually "out there"? Is the territory in any sense "mathematical" too?

Your replies are muddling all these issues.

What you appear to want to argue is that maths is so intrinsically arbitrary that there is no necessary connection to reality - either as ontology or even epistemology. Math is not even modelling, just some kind of abstract noodling. Beliefs and their consequences played out without any purpose or grounding (though if scientists and philosophers somehow find a use for these arbitrary mind games, well, mathematicians will smile benevolently).

 

[apeiron]

And in this context we should not forget the Godel proof that semantics and syntax can never be exactly the same thing (no matter what the computer scientists think!). In any interestingly complex and consistent system of axioms, there will always be at least one semantic truth that is not a syntactic truth. So we have a wedge there, although how wide it is is not at all clear-- it might be the most imperceptible crack, or it might be a vast chasm that we simply have not the mental clarity to see.

Exactly. And the trick is indeed to shrink that semantic cool person as small as possible so as to maximise the syntactical range of mathematical machinery. So it is no surprise that the necessity of semantics remains so well hidden from the casual gaze.

It is a religious attitude - going back to Pythagoras and Plato - that the mathematician is really divining the mind of god. It is pure reason that reveals the fundamental axioms on which all truths are built. Crude and brutish materiality in the form of sensory impressions is kept outside the door of the temple.

Why, part of the mythology of maths is that real mathematicians don't sully their thinking with visual imagery - intuitions are the mark of the female or primitive mind.

Every society must have its creation myths.

 

[disregardthat]

Mathematics is not "arbitrary noodling", it is more correctly described as "how to calculate", and calculation must accede to formal rules. There is no such thing as an informal calculation. Mathematics is surely and as you certainly will agree arbitrary in the sense that we can freely choose what to calculate, but what we want to calculate is however often not arbitrary. It's a simple point really, but not relevant to the status of mathematics itself.

(How does it make sense to be intrinsically arbitrary? It seems quite meaningless to me.)

Mathematics is not at any rate modeling, and must not be confused with the physical model in which it is utilized. We can set up a mathematical framework for a model, but the conclusions about reality will never be mathematical. The problem is that people have too many conceptions about what mathematics is, as if it somehow transcends its usage to a language of something abstract or even a language about reality itself. It does not however describe anything in the ordinary sense of the word describe. The description, or representation, is an interpretation depending on context, and is very much arbitrary, but not mathematical.

(R^2, the real plane, is used for limitless representations, but as a mathematical object it has no particular connection to either of these things)

What a mathematician may have in favor in this issue is that he can see the possibilities, and not get too entrenched in some particular usage of mathematics only to be tricked into believing that there is a deep connection to be found (as if mathematical statements about R^3 somehow were statements about space).

The main issue here is that the questions themselves are wrong. If it still makes sense to ask whether reality itself is mathematical (or as I translate your wording: territory) one has to backtrack ones thoughts about what mathematics actually is, and not confuse oneself into believing its various usages are part of it as a concept.

Don't think of intuition or visual imagination of mathematics as in any sort of conflict with the formalities of mathematics. The reality of the issue is that our intuition is exactly intuition of the mechanics of the mathematical rules. Much like intuition in chess. Reading your last post, I would like to give the following example: Does chess-players frown upon having a vivid imagery of what e.g. their following moves should be? No. (does it conflict with the rule-governed aspect of chess?)

 

[petm1]

Math can never be physically real for a mathematical expression is at best a static representation of one moment in time.

 

[Ken G]

And the trick is indeed to shrink that semantic cool person as small as possible so as to maximise the syntactical range of mathematical machinery. So it is no surprise that the necessity of semantics remains so well hidden from the casual gaze.

Yes. Another way to frame the OP is the question, "why is it possible to shrink that cool person so small that we no longer notice it?" Is this because it really is a small cool person, or is it just that we spent most of our formative years learning how to not see it, in exchange for being able to calculate?

 

[Varon]

Fellows. Supposed the Holographic Universe hypothesis were true.. meaning we are living in a 2D surface as the following article shows and experimental tests ongoing with initial good positive results. Does it mean that all the maths occur in the 2D holographic surface or would the mystery remains how math and holographic reality is related? Check the following site first.

http://refreshingnews9.blogspot.com/...thesis-of.html

Do you know that the GEO600 has detected a fuzzy, grainy interference, entirely consistent with Beckenstein's theory and calculations? In fact, he had predicted in advance that the cosmic projections from the surface of our universe would cause the precise patterns that are now being formed. Last year. Craig Hogan and his team of physicists at Fermilab near Chicago are designing a 40 meter-long "holometer" to test Beckenstein's theory, in an attempt to confirm and measure this fuzzy "interference" more precisely. If indeed, this and other research supports this theory, it could lead us to the inevitable conclusion that it is our eyes, ears, and touch that makes sense of this information, converting it all into a tangible reality. What would be the ramifications in the foundation of quantum theory and relativity for example?

In the case of the quantum. Would it mean that in the double slit in between emission and detection, reality is being processed using math in the 2D surface and calculations of electron path occur there and only when measurement is done that the particle is projected back into 3D? Is this possible? Would this solve math connection with reality? Or not?

 

[Ken G]

To me, a holographic interpretation just underscores the idea that what we think of a the "reality we are studying" is actually our own mental construct of the reality we are studying, and all the "physical attributes" we give to that reality are part of the construct not part of the reality. This means that ironically, "The Matrix" has it somewhat backward-- there's little value in imagining that the physics we study is actually just a kind of program that is actually being run in some different but similar type of reality, because if the program is embedded in any reality with similar physical attributes to the one we are studying, then we may as well take it to be the reality we see and interact with, for all the difference it would make. However, there may be considerable value in imagining that physics is an attempt to build "the Matrix"-- we are the ones writing the program that generates the "false reality" in which we live, and the laws of physics are simply the rules of what kind of program can successfully run on whatever is the machine we are testing the program on.

 

[lowing99]

Hi Kevin

I think maths is the programming language for the universe, yes I'm with the virtual Universe crew:)

In computer code you could write a program that works within itself and is free of error but it might present you with nothing of value or substance in the end product, similarly you can use maths to model 17 universes but it doesn't mean they have to exist.

Cheers

Colin

 

[lowing99]

In fact, he had predicted in advance that the cosmic projections from the surface of our universe would cause the precise patterns that are now being formed. Last year. Craig Hogan and his team of physicists at Fermilab near Chicago are designing a 40 meter-long "holometer" to test Beckenstein's theory, in an attempt to confirm and measure this fuzzy "interference" more precisely. If indeed, this and other research supports this theory, it could lead us to the inevitable conclusion that it is our eyes, ears, and touch that makes sense of this information, converting it all into a tangible reality.

Hi Varon

I saw a programme recently on this, I did chuckle somewhat at the notion, not so much that we were a hologram, but the fact that after 1 million years man kind finally found out it was just an exe program in a vast supercomputer modelling a universe.

Wait for the cry in another hundred years when we discover that we all occupy the same point in space and time and the universe is still held within the singularity, that reality is actually only there when we are looking at it because this conserves memory space.

Imagine everyone you love only there when you can percieve them, a universe only as large as the limit of our perception, when we don't look, it winks out of existence, to be stored as 1/0 on a mainframe.

Is that bleak or liberating? bleak in so much as it means I am downstairs at the moment and my sleeping child upstairs, isn't in her bed sleeping because she doesn't exist, liberating in as much as it basically proves a creator of sorts and takes that age old question, what is the meaning of life? and replaces it with a new more defined question, what is the purpose of life, to which the answer in my view is simple to live your life and collect as much data as possible before you return it to the core.

Hey it's late :)

Best

Colin

 

[Varon]

Hi Varon

I saw a programme recently on this, I did chuckle somewhat at the notion, not so much that we were a hologram, but the fact that after 1 million years man kind finally found out it was just an exe program in a vast supercomputer modelling a universe.

Wait for the cry in another hundred years when we discover that we all occupy the same point in space and time and the universe is still held within the singularity, that reality is actually only there when we are looking at it because this conserves memory space.

Imagine everyone you love only there when you can percieve them, a universe only as large as the limit of our perception, when we don't look, it winks out of existence, to be stored as 1/0 on a mainframe.

Is that bleak or liberating? bleak in so much as it means I am downstairs at the moment and my sleeping child upstairs, isn't in her bed sleeping because she doesn't exist, liberating in as much as it basically proves a creator of sorts and takes that age old question, what is the meaning of life? and replaces it with a new more defined question, what is the purpose of life, to which the answer in my view is simple to live your life and collect as much data as possible before you return it to the core.

Hey it's late :)

Best

Colin

If we were really inside a computer problem and the world were really equivalent to year 1,000,000 A.D. now. I bet the sky of the real world is orange color. You know why I said this. Because there are numerous fringe reports of these so called alien abductees who saw grey aliens poking at them on the table. What if these abductees or people are actually temporarily awake to the real world and in the midst of the real inhabitants (the Greys). It's like in the movie Matrix where sometimes maintenance need to be done and the hybernating people have to be awaken or accidentally awaken. Then they would see themselves surrounded by arrays of living beings in vats. In those fringe reports, people who saw Greys also saw vats of beings and fetuses. Maybe these fetuses were our children in the real Matrix world. They also all consistently report of orange sky and two suns when they were outside.

This is just another perspective of looking at them. Of course we normally think they were just crazy. Anyway. In case it were true. Perhaps the saying in Matrix "Ignorance is Bliss" is useful. Because we would all just be depressed if we knew we were merely prisoners in the virtual interactive dreamworld.

Lol. Time to review the Matrix movies. :)

Note that I don't believe this though. Just mentioning all this as food for thoughts in this possible math and computer generated dreamworld connections..

 

[Ken G]

Or, maybe it is a well-documented cultural phenomenon that appears over and over again throughout history, except they are only "greys" in our cultural period-- they are something else in the other ones, and will be something else a few decades from now when different cultural experiences control these kinds of reports.

 

[Math Is Hard]

I think this thread has gone off the deep end.