I Is the Joint-State of Alice and Bob's Instruments Separable in Spacetime?

[Eye_in_the_Sky]

OK, let the two subsystems be an electron (X) and a proton (Y). How would you make them space like separated? As far as I can tell space like separation refers to events, not to physical systems that are more or less eternal.

Bob's fixing of setting is spacelike separated from Alice's registration of outcome, and vice versa.
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As you said, in any classical theory condition 1 holds true. On the other hand if the subsystems X and Y interact with each other (and virtually all matter interacts electromagnetically and gravitationaly) condition 2 seems false.

But Bob's (free) choice of setting is spacelike separated from the registration of Alice's outcome, so just what kind of 'interaction' could possibly establish such a dependency?

 

[Eye_in_the_Sky]

1) The joint-system composed of the measuring instruments of Alice and Bob is a separable system.

(Thus, the relationship that the two instruments share in spacetime is a relationship of classical objects.)

Each of the instruments (in and of itself) can, for the sake of making the argument, be regarded as a classical object altogether.

(This is because the argument does not involve, in any way, any of their subsystems).

But the scope of the argument remains in the broader sense.

 

[ueit]

Bob's fixing of setting is spacelike separated from Alice's registration of outcome, and vice versa.
_____

But Bob's (free) choice of setting is spacelike separated from the registration of Alice's outcome, so just what kind of 'interaction' could possibly establish such a dependency?

In your post #5 you said:

I should not have included "free choice" in the ASIDE.

Let the ASIDE be restricted to conditions 2,3,4 only.

I understand that you have changed your mind. In this case, what is your take on my observation:

"As far as I can tell your condition 1 (free choice) has no justification in any theory, classical or quantum."

I am especially interested in what mechanism do you think is responsable for the property of free choice so that we can asses if it is compatible with the classical theory that you intend to test.

Andrei

Andrei

 

[Eye_in_the_Sky]

what is your take on my observation:

"As far as I can tell your condition 1 (free choice) has no justification in any theory, classical or quantum."

I agree.

I am especially interested in what mechanism do you think is responsable for the property of free choice so that we can asses if it is compatible with the classical theory that you intend to test.

I do not think it is a 'mechanism'. I think it is a 'soul' and that the 'soul' has a character which is out of the scope of any of the known "physics" of today. I would like to believe that there is a subject matter which, in a very deep way, is somehow like 'physics' and is also somehow about the 'soul', but I have no idea what that could be.

 

[ueit]

I agree.

I do not think it is a 'mechanism'. I think it is a 'soul' and that the 'soul' has a character which is out of the scope of any of the known "physics" of today. I would like to believe that there is a subject matter which, in a very deep way, is somehow like 'physics' and is also somehow about the 'soul', but I have no idea what that could be.

What you are saying is that the existence of free-choice represents a falsification of all current physical theories. Are you aware of any experiment backing that up?

 

[PeterDonis]

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