I Is there a bad intuition or bad explanation in quantum entanglement?

[PeterDonis]

By proposing a further explanation.

And having it confirmed by making predictions that previously were not made, and which turn out to be right.

 

[syed]

By proposing a further explanation. Until this happens there is no explanation, just as a book does not exist until someone writes it.

so are you saying that before we figured out what causes thunder, we should have assumed there's no explanation? How would we find an explanation if you assume there is none?

Before Einstein figured out a deeper explanation for gravity, he presumably first started with the assumption that an explanation exists in the first place. By telling others no explanation exists, there is no incentive to search for one. Being able to only arrive at probabilities is also a potential sign a further explanation exists, which is why Einstein believed that there was one underlying QM.

Or are you just saying that we should say there is currently no KNOWN further explanation for QM?

 

[Herman Trivilino]

so are you saying that before we figured out what causes thunder, we should have assumed there's no explanation?

I can't speak for @Nugatory but my understanding of what he said is not that we shouldn't look, but that until we succeed in finding that explanation we don't have one.

 

[dextercioby]

[...]

Or are you just saying that we should say there is currently no KNOWN further explanation for QM? [...]

This is too far, but it boils down to the infinite chain of `why' questions. So "why are the particles entangled?" cannot receive other answer than "the concept of entanglement is currently (see, this automatically means that people should not stop investigating) the best theoretical explanation we have for those particular results of experiments". You and anyone else is free to provide explanations of "Nature behavio(u)r" without entanglement. And use your own theory to assert: "your fuzzy, muddy concept of entanglement can easily be explained using this and that arguments and notions, therefore, in my theory, it's not only non-fundamental, but also useless".

 

[Nugatory]

I can't speak for @Nugatory but my understanding of what he said is not that we shouldn't look, but that until we succeed in finding that explanation we don't have one.

thank you, yes.

 

[Fra]

so are you saying that before we figured out what causes thunder, we should have assumed there's no explanation? How would we find an explanation if you assume there is none?

By creating it, rather than just finding it?

Before Einstein figured out a deeper explanation for gravity, he presumably first started with the assumption that an explanation exists in the first place. By telling others no explanation exists, there is no incentive to search for one.

Ironically, the old idea of objective hidden variables explaining outcomes (applied to QM), is conceptually similar at inference level, to the idea that the truth exists objectively before it's at hand.

As we know from Bell's theorem, the difference between how the future follow from the past, gives different results.

One might ask, in the context of evolving science, is there also a significant difference between the view that science discovers previously hidden truths of nature, or are explanations something that is created?

If we reject realism as in Bell's ansatz, is it conceptually consistent to view science as "discovering" pre-determined facts of nature? I personally lean towards a big No.

I find the idea that explanations pre-exist and that we just havent found it, is a very confused position.

/Fredrik

 

[syed]

thank you, yes.

oh okay

By creating it, rather than just finding it?

Ironically, the old idea of objective hidden variables explaining outcomes (applied to QM), is conceptually similar at inference level, to the idea that the truth exists objectively before it's at hand.

As we know from Bell's theorem, the difference between how the future follow from the past, gives different results.

One might ask, in the context of evolving science, is there also a significant difference between the view that science discovers previously hidden truths of nature, or are explanations something that is created?

If we reject realism as in Bell's ansatz, is it conceptually consistent to view science as "discovering" pre-determined facts of nature? I personally lean towards a big No.

I find the idea that explanations pre-exist and that we just havent found it, is a very confused position.

/Fredrik

There seems to be a misconception here. You are confusing the sense of an objective truth independent of measurement with the results of measurements being determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of measurement. The latter is what Bell meant by "realism", not the former.

As Bell says in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics (1987),

The results of measurements are assumed to be determined by pre-existing properties of particles, independent of the act of measurement. This is what I mean by “realism.”

Note that measurement is an active process, and at the quantum scale, even if things or states are "created" or influenced by the measurement process, it does not imply that truth isn't objective, nor does it imply that there is no explanation for why we get certain measurements.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

By the way, what exactly is meant by 'objective truth' and how might one actually arrive at 'objective truth'?

 

[Herman Trivilino]

You are confusing the sense of an objective truth independent of measurement with the results of measurements being determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of measurement.

Can you explain where, in the passage you quoted, "objective truth independent of measurement" plays a part?

What does "objective truth" in physics even mean?

 

[syed]

Can you explain where, in the passage you quoted, "objective truth independent of measurement" plays a part?

What does "objective truth" in physics even mean?

It doesn't play a part, I was referring to the other poster. He was confusing the results of measurements independent of the act of measurement with objective truth independent of measurement.

Objective truth really just means truth, and truth with respect to reality is simply what actually, objectively, exists.

 

[Herman Trivilino]

Objective truth really just means truth, and truth with respect to reality is simply what actually, objectively, exists.

Are there things in physics that are unobjectively true?

 

[gentzen]

Are there things in physics that are unobjectively true?

The probability of rain today at 13:00 (where I live) is 20%.

 

[gentzen]

Are there things in physics that are unobjectively true?

The Dirac equation is beautiful!

 

[syed]

Are there things in physics that are unobjectively true?

there is no such thing as "subjective" truth, there is only one truth, so the idea of "unobjectively true" is incoherent, but you're asking a philosophical question at this point

 

[Herman Trivilino]

there is no such thing as "subjective" truth, there is only one truth, so the idea of "unobjectively true" is incoherent,

My point is that in the phrase "objectively true" the adverb objectively adds no meaning to the phrase.

but you're asking a philosophical question at this point

The entire concept of truth is philosophical.

Getting back to your statement:

There seems to be a misconception here. You are confusing the sense of an objective truth independent of measurement with the results of measurements being determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of measurement.

There is no place in physics for truth especially when it's independent of measurement. The validity of a concept is established only through measurement.

 

[javisot]

It doesn't play a part, I was referring to the other poster. He was confusing the results of measurements independent of the act of measurement with objective truth independent of measurement.

Objective truth really just means truth, and truth with respect to reality is simply what actually, objectively, exists.

I've never heard those terms used in physics. Perhaps "physical reality" was once used as the regime of reality that can be described by physics. The terms "truth" and "objective" are not used and are not necessary for physics.

Reality: where physicists conduct their experiments.

Physical reality: the regime of reality that can be described by physics. The set of all the knowledge we can acquire both theoretically and experimentally.

Making it more complicated is a matter of philosophy, not physics.

 

[gentzen]

The entire concept of truth is philosophical.

Yeah, but in physics it typically arises because of probabilities, and how to interpret them.

 

[PeterDonis]

there is no such thing as "subjective" truth, there is only one truth

The entire concept of truth is philosophical.

This is getting way off topic. Please keep the discussion focused on QM and the thread topic.

 

[Fra]

You are confusing the sense of an objective truth independent of measurement with the results of measurements being determined by pre-existing properties of particles independent of measurement.

As often I fail to convey the point. I was not confusing things - I was attempting a deeper but subtle comparasion between two things to provide a fresh perspective, but still keeping it brief.

1. a measurement, which leads to a "measurent outcome"
2. an general inference, which leads to a "result of the inference"

(in my view, a measurement is a special type of a more general inference. So (2) is a generalization of (1)).

In (1) one can discuss wether the measurement outcome was "predetermined" by some existing but to the measurement context "objective" but unknonwn HV, and then Bells theorem gives us an inequality to distinguish them.

In (2), if the inference is a logical deduction, one can call the "result of the inference" truth. If not, it may be some sort of interpretation as degree of belief (which can in some circumstances but formalized into probability).

My implicit view was that BOTH (1) and (2) are necessarily contextual. And the adjective "objective" thus suggeests either that its NOT contectual or that all possible contexts will still yield a compatible/consistent (or equivalent) result.

Note that measurement is an active process, and at the quantum scale, even if things or states are "created" or influenced by the measurement process, it does not imply that truth isn't objective, nor does it imply that there is no explanation for why we get certain measurements.

A general inference process is also an active process

It doesn't play a part, I was referring to the other poster. He was confusing the results of measurements independent of the act of measurement with objective truth independent of measurement.

Objective truth really just means truth, and truth with respect to reality is simply what actually, objectively, exists.

But if even inferences are contextual (unless you you disagree); then there is no rational basis for claiming objectivity. My conclusion is that objectivity can only be rationally define in terms of emergence, which is also an active process involving complex interactions.

there is no such thing as "subjective" truth, there is only one truth, so the idea of "unobjectively true" is incoherent,

Here is a problem with trying to understand nature by starting to assume hat there is a top-down logic system as a constraint. I think the "coherence" you refer to here is a fiction because there is not non-contextual deduction in NATURE. This is fiction of mathematics and logic. Nothing wrong with it per see, but its application to describe physical nature should be careful.

I would rather say, there is no given non-contextual results of inferences. There are only a plethoria of contextual inferences. And what is "TRUE" in one contexy could simply be that there the best inferences is subjectivety indistinguishable from perfection. This does not reule out that this can be inconsistent with inferences from a different context. The comparastion of the two contextual inferences requires nothing less than a physical interaction. (this small part is in line also with how Rovelli reasons in his relationa QM; before he claims that that interaction is simply QM, as it stands)

/Fredrik