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marcus

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## Main Question or Discussion Point

Joe Henson posted a beautiful paper today which is also curiously reminiscent of the 2006 Rovelli Smerlak paper "

In 2006, to resolve troubling paradoxes, R&S proposed relaxing the assumption of "strict Einstein realism"

(an absolute observerindependent ontology: a complete definite Reality that, however, only a kind of super-observer could appreciate.)

In a somewhat similar way, also to resolve paradoxes, Henson proposes to relax the assumption of ontic definiteness: that all statements about the universe can simultaneously be given truth values. Ontic definiteness attributes to Existence, or to Reality, a feature which only a superbeing could appreciate: The idea that definite answers to all questions exist, in an absolute observerindependent sense, even though we mortals cannot know them.

Henson's paper is (from my perspective) deep, and finely argued. It takes me into new territory. And it also, as I said, reminds me strongly of R&S "Relational EPR".

Here is Henson's paper:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.2855

Joe Henson

40 pages (26 main text), 3 figures

(Submitted on 14 Feb 2011)

"Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as 'local causality' is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of 'ontic definiteness', that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed."

I must say that personally I find it easy to reliquish the assumption of ontic definiteness and indeed am not certain I ever adhered to it.

**Relational EPR**".In 2006, to resolve troubling paradoxes, R&S proposed relaxing the assumption of "strict Einstein realism"

(an absolute observerindependent ontology: a complete definite Reality that, however, only a kind of super-observer could appreciate.)

In a somewhat similar way, also to resolve paradoxes, Henson proposes to relax the assumption of ontic definiteness: that all statements about the universe can simultaneously be given truth values. Ontic definiteness attributes to Existence, or to Reality, a feature which only a superbeing could appreciate: The idea that definite answers to all questions exist, in an absolute observerindependent sense, even though we mortals cannot know them.

Henson's paper is (from my perspective) deep, and finely argued. It takes me into new territory. And it also, as I said, reminds me strongly of R&S "Relational EPR".

Here is Henson's paper:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.2855

**Causality, Bell's theorem, and Ontic Definiteness**Joe Henson

40 pages (26 main text), 3 figures

(Submitted on 14 Feb 2011)

"Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as 'local causality' is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of 'ontic definiteness', that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed."

I must say that personally I find it easy to reliquish the assumption of ontic definiteness and indeed am not certain I ever adhered to it.

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