MWI experience of created worlds

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Discussion Overview

The discussion revolves around the implications of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics, particularly focusing on the nature of personal identity and experience in the context of world branching following a binary measurement. Participants explore the philosophical and conceptual challenges of describing experiences in MWI using ordinary language.

Discussion Character

  • Conceptual clarification
  • Debate/contested
  • Philosophical exploration

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants propose that in MWI, upon making a binary measurement, the world splits into two branches (A and B), and one experiences both, but the experiences become separated.
  • Others argue that the concept of "you" and "experience" in MWI cannot be directly equated to ordinary language, leading to questions about whether the "yous" in different branches are the same or different.
  • A participant suggests that if there is a "me" in any world, it raises the question of whether it is still "me" when branched off, indicating a potential illusion of self generated by the brain.
  • Some participants liken the situation to biological twins, suggesting that each copy has distinct experiences and memories, leading to differing opinions on whether they can all be considered "you."
  • There is a discussion about the equivalence of all copies in MWI and how this relates to the concept of identity, with some suggesting that the current copy is not the same as the others.
  • One participant points out that the use of pronouns like "you" and "me" complicates the discussion, as they are context-dependent and refer to the entity engaging in the conversation.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express multiple competing views regarding the nature of identity and experience in MWI, with no consensus reached on whether the branched copies can be considered the same or different entities.

Contextual Notes

The discussion highlights limitations in using ordinary language to describe the MWI, particularly regarding the definitions of self and experience, which may not align with the implications of the theory.

entropy1
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Would this be correct: in MWI, if a binary measurement is made, the world splits, say in world A and B. Is it then correct to say that you experience both A and B, but that the experiences of A and B become separated?
 
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entropy1 said:
Is it then correct to say that you experience both A and B, but that the experiences of A and B become separated?

There is no good way to describe what the MWI says happens to your experience using ordinary language. The problem is that words like "you" and "experience" can't possibly mean in the MWI what they mean in ordinary conversation. In the case you describe, there will be a "you" that experiences A and a "you" that experiences B, and both of these "yous" will be "descended", physically, from "you" before the measurement. But are they "the same" you, having both experiences? There is no good answer, because the underlying assumptions behind our ordinary concept of "the same" are not valid for this case.
 
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PeterDonis said:
There is no good way to describe what the MWI says happens to your experience using ordinary language. The problem is that words like "you" and "experience" can't possibly mean in the MWI what they mean in ordinary conversation. In the case you describe, there will be a "you" that experiences A and a "you" that experiences B, and both of these "yous" will be "descended", physically, from "you" before the measurement. But are they "the same" you, having both experiences? There is no good answer, because the underlying assumptions behind our ordinary concept of "the same" are not valid for this case.
If there is a "me" in the ordinary sense, and there is, there must be a "me" in any world, right? Perhaps just not "the same" ones. So indeed the question arises if it is still "me" when brached off; is that what you mean?

The alternative is that "me" is an illusion altogether, perhaps generated by the brain.

If I adopt MWI, I would be happy to adopt that the "me" I know already branched many times in my life. Still I am "me" and I see no reason to believe my branched-off versions are not too.

I wonder if I am still abiding by the forum rules with this post :oldbiggrin: .
 
entropy1 said:
the question arises if it is still "me" when brached off; is that what you mean?

That's part of it, yes. Each "copy" of you in different branches has a different set of experiences and memories. So if "you" are defined by a particular set of experiences and memories, then the copies can't possibly all be "you". Different people have different opinions on this, and there is no way to resolve the question by experiment because it's not a question of physics, it's a question of definitions.

entropy1 said:
The alternative is that "me" is an illusion altogether, perhaps generated by the brain.

This isn't an alternative; it's a different way of describing the same physics. As far as the physics is concerned, the brain is the physical system involved.
 
entropy1 said:
Would this be correct: in MWI, if a binary measurement is made, the world splits, say in world A and B. Is it then correct to say that you experience both A and B, but that the experiences of A and B become separated?
I like to think of it as being analog to biological twins. The other copy is not you.
 
Demystifier said:
I like to think of it as being analog to biological twins. The other copy is not you.
The problem I see with that is, to be consistent, the copy you are now is not you too.
 
entropy1 said:
The problem I see with that is, to be consistent, the copy you are now is not you too.
Why not?
 
Demystifier said:
Why not?
Because the math handles all copies equivalently, I suspect.
 
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entropy1 said:
Because the math handles all copies equivalently, I suspect.
So? How that differs from biological twins?
 
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Demystifier said:
So? How that differs from biological twins?
Good point.

So I now think of this, given a "biological" world-twin: they are both "me" (from their own vantage point) and they are both 'biological' twin of the other one(s) (from the other one's viewpoint). This seems satisfying to me, for this seems to hold for all copies.
 
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  • #12
entropy1 said:
to be consistent, the copy you are now is not you too

Yes, it is, because the word "you" (or "me" when you are speaking of yourself) refers to whichever copy is engaging in this discussion, and only one copy is doing that. That's one of the things about ordinary language that makes it unsuitable for describing these kinds of situations: pronouns like "me" and "you" are indexical--which entity they refer to depends on who is using them and in what context.
 

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