Wasn't that the same chick that was crying about removal of Terri's feeding tube? Seriously, there is an organization that backs this kind of stuff, and I'm sure she's a member.pattylou said:Equating Kerry to dead babies = % tender hearted christian votes for Bush
(remember the girl in tears at the town hall debate? The one that voiced the question about Kerry's stand on abortion? This coupled with Bush's "culture of life.")
I personally believe that there would be problems to overcome with printing out so much hard copy at once. I also believe that resolving such issues wouldn't be that difficult. I only bring them up because I believe it's very possible the reason my the particular model lacked a paper trail was lazy engineering.Manchot said:Running out of ink and paper is certainly not a problem, because that can be prevented by ordering lots of it. Paper jams are easy to fix. In general, laser printers are very reliable, and to suggest that so many would be failing that it wouldn't be prudent to use them is absurd.
An interesting Op-Ed piece at the NY-Times. (Sorry, I know that it is about the 2000 election .. but it is an interesting observation)champ2823 said:How does a county in Ohio with 600 residents record 6,000 votes for Bush? Greg Palast has a great BBC documentary on this on his website along with the 2000 election and the documents showing the felonies list of innocent people...mostly African Americans who were turned away at the polls. I was in the minority on this one...Right leaning and believe there was fraud,
Diebold made a classic business error: they assumed that since their product was the best on the market, it would sell. But if that were the case, we'd all be using Beta vcr's.SOS2008 said:More than half of all states now require Voter-Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB) for touch-screen machines so that voters can verify their vote is recorded correctly, and the paper ballots are the vote of record in a recount. Apparently Diebold is getting nervous—they just hired a former DNC chair to lobby Democrats to allow unverifiable paperless systems. Hmm...
Another example of why I still refer to them all as Republicrats. They all belong to the lobbyists that pay to elect them, not political parties.SOS2008 said:More than half of all states now require Voter-Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB) for touch-screen machines so that voters can verify their vote is recorded correctly, and the paper ballots are the vote of record in a recount. Apparently Diebold is getting nervous—they just hired a former DNC chair to lobby Democrats to allow unverifiable paperless systems. Hmm...
Nice piece and thanks for the readThe Smoking Man said:
http://www.sdcitybeat.com/article.php?id=3674 [Broken]According to a CBS/New York Times poll, only 35 percent of people surveyed had “a lot” of confidence that their votes would be properly counted.
pattylou said:...confidence in our election system is only enjoyed by well under 50% of the population.
1. Do you consider the dropping of the words "a lot", when you paraphrased the article, significant?from pattylou's link said:...35 percent of people surveyed had “a lot” of confidence that their votes would be properly counted.[emphasis added]
The problem is some votes appear to be getting counted too often or in the wrong column. Following Bush's first election victory where there were thousands of probable democrat voters disenfranchised, it seems a new approach was adopted in the last election of simply falsifying the results. Perhaps the neo-conservative election slogan should be 'Vote early - Vote often' or 'Neo-con votes are so good they count them twice.'russ_watters said:more votes were counted in this election than last election.
People can be afraid if they want. I think it is more important that the votes actually count.
BREAKING : Due to contractual non-performance and security design issues, Leon County (Florida) supervisor of elections Ion Sancho told Black Box Voting that he will never again use Diebold in an election. He has requested funds to replace the Diebold system from the county. He will issue a formal announcement to this effect shortly. This comes on the heels of the resignation of Diebold CEO Wally O'Dell, and the announcement that a stockholder's class action suit has been filed against Diebold by Scott & Scott.
Black Box Voting: http://www.blackboxvoting.org Leon County Election Supervisor Ion Sancho:
Finnish security expert Harri Hursti proved that Diebold lied to Secretaries of State across the nation when Diebold claimed votes could not be changed on the memory card.
A test election was run in Leon County Tusday Dec. 13 with a total of eight ballots - six ballots voted "no" on a ballot question as to whether Diebold voting machines can be hacked or not. Two ballots, cast by Dr. Herbert Thompson and by Harri Hursti voted "yes" indicating a belief that the Diebold machines could be hacked.
At the beginning of the test election the memory card programmed by Harri Hursti was inserted into an Optical Scan Diebold voting machine. A "zero report" was run indicating zero votes on the memory card.
In fact, however, Hursti had pre-loaded the memory card with plus and minus votes.
The eight ballots were run through the optical scan machine. The standard Diebold-supplied "ender card"
was run through as is normal procedure ending the election. A results tape was run from the voting machine.
Correct results should have been:
However, just as Hursti had planned, the results tape read:
The results were then uploaded from the optical scan voting machine into the GEMS central tabulator.
The central tabulator is the "mother ship" that pulls in all votes from voting machines. The results in the central tabulator read:
This exploit, accomplished without being given any password and with the same level of access given thousands of poll workers across the USA, showed that the votes themselves were changed in a one-step process. This hack would not be detected in any normal canvassing procedure, and it required only a single a credit-card sized memory card.
On Oct. 17, 2005 Diebold Elections Systems Research and Development chief Pat Green specifically told the Cuyahoga County (Ohio) board of elections that votes cannot be changed using only a memory card.
Video of Pat Green, Cuyahoga County
According to Public Records responses obtained by Black Box Voting in response to our requests shows that Diebold promulgated this misrepresentation to as many as 800 state and local elections officials.
In other news, a stockholder suit was filed today against Diebold by the law offices of Scott and Scott:
Diebold CEO resigns: http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=175001748 [Broken]
That is your opinion Russ, not a fact, the fact is there is the potential for zero error in manual balloting. The post above shows what the potential can be in a papertrail-less unmonitored E-ballot system made by cronies....No manual form of balloting even has the potential for zero error in the casting and counting of ballots.
Permission to reprint granted, with link to: http://www.blackboxvoting.org
BREAKING Dec. 20, 2005: California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson has laid a subtle and elegant trap. Today, California threw Diebold Election Systems pending certification into a tailspin, using Machiavellian logic designed to cast doubt on the federal testing lab process, the upcoming HAVA deadline and Diebold voting systems simultaneously (while standing neatly aside to watch the house of cards collapse).
This move follows on the heels of a devastating hack demonstration by Harri Hursti sponsored by Black Box Voting, which took place in Leon County, Florida on Dec. 13.
This hack manipulated memory cards by exploiting design defects and Diebolds customized AccuBasic program code.
Here's how the California trap works: In a terse letter to Diebold, State elections chief Caren Daniels-Meade writes, "Unresolved significant security concerns exist with respect to the memory card used to program and configure the AccuVote-OS [optical scan] and the AccuVote-TSX [touch-screen] components of this system because this component was not subjected to federal source code review and evaluation by the Independent Testing Authorities (ITA) who examined your system for federal qualification. It is the Secretary of State's position that the source code for the AccuBasic code on these cards, as well as for the AccuBasic interpreter that interprets this code, should have been federally reviewed.
"we are requesting that you submit the source code relating to the AccuBasic code on the memory cards and the AccuBasic interpreter to the ITA for immediate evaluation. We require this additional review before proceeding with further consideration of your application for certification in California."
And herein lies the trap. Federal testing authorities are supposed to rely on standards set by the Federal Election Commission. The FEC standards prohibit Interpreted code thus, the AccuBasic interpreter is illegal. [/b](The entire AccuBasic source code tree is written in a home-brewed language that Diebold programmers made up themselves, making it more difficult for certifiers to examine.)
The Hursti memory card attack demonstrated in Leon County Florida manipulated the voting system by passing code through -- drum roll please -- the Diebold interpreter, using a set of programs called AccuBasic which was written in a concocted computer language and (now it is revealed) was never examined at all by federal testing labs.
The ITA dilemma: ITAs have the choice of either recommending code that explicitly violates FEC standards (placing an unsupportable liability burden on them) or admitting that the original certification was defective. If the ITAs retract their recommendation, it will effectively strip Diebold of its federal certification, and may also affect its older products.
The Diebold dilemma: Diebold can refuse to submit its code to the ITAs, but that will lose the state of California, continuing a pattern initiated last week when two Florida counties dumped their Diebold machines. Alternatively, Diebold can submit its code and watch as the federal authorities sever their product line from the U.S. market.
The position is made more unstable because Diebold is now fending off stockholder suits by an armload of attorneys piling on to solicit clients for a voting machine-related securities fraud lawsuit.
California Secretary of State letters to Diebold Election Systems:
Something terribly wrong has happened here.
American citizens have been commenting on the unacceptable performance of the ITAs since before Black Box Voting was incorporated in 2004.
In November 2002, Dan Spillane (a former senior test engineer for VoteHere) met with Black Box Voting founder Bev Harris.
"It's a house of cards," he said, showing her stacks of bogus ITA reports.
"The bottom card is the certification process." Spillane says he flagged more than 250 system integrity errors in the touch-screen system he evaluated, yet the system passed every level of certification. He was terminated by VoteHere, he sued, and the case was settled by VoteHere with details kept confidential.
Here are writings by computer programmer Jim March on this subject: "The Federal testing process was subverted multiple times by Diebold staff we're going to need to study the Federal certification process, in public." http://www.equalccw.com/lewisdeconstructed.pdf (Date 9/23/2003; Jim March)
Bev Harris's book, Black Box Voting, took the ITAs, NASED and the state examiners to task: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-6.pdf (Date 10/10/2003; Bev Harris). Harris published interviews with state voting machine examiners exposing slipshod state certification that relies on the flawed premise of strong federal certification: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-9.pdf
A Riverside (Calif.) computer programmer Jeremiah Akin writes of ITA failure during testing of Sequoia voting software: "Failure of certification process to catch major security flaws in software:"Riverside has run elections on software that was later found to contain major security vulnerabilities that were not spotted in the certification process."
(Date 2/29/2004; Jeremiah Akin)
Black Box Voting published ITA reports from Ciber Labs for Diebold showing that "penetration tests" (security evaluations) were marked "not applicable" and "not tested." http://www.bbvdocs.org/general/ciber-reports.zip
(Date: Oct. 17, 2004; Black Box Voting, Inc.)
Susan Pynchon, an ordinary citizen who now runs the Florida Fair Elections Coalition, wrote this analysis demonstrating a breakdown in Florida's state certification process:
http://www.bbvdocs.org/general/FFECreport.pdf (Date July 11, 2005; Susan Pynchon)
Ordinary citizens led this investigation, gathering momentum and evidence nationwide, resulting in the Thompson and Hursti security tests in Florida, culminating in the California Secretary of State ordering Diebold and federal testing labs to go clean up their room (while neatly diverting attention from state-level certification failures).
And now, a word from one of our forefathers:
"There is only one force in the nation that can be depended upon to keep the government pure and the governors honest, and that is the people themselves.
They alone, if well informed, are capable of preventing the corruption of power, and of restoring the nation to its rightful course if it should go astray. They alone are the safest depository of the ultimate powers of government."
-- Thomas Jefferson - END
That's not an opinion, Amp1, it's a matter of math. You may not be understanding what I'm talking about when I say that, so let me explain:Amp1 said:That is your opinion Russ, not a fact, the fact is there is the potential for zero error in manual balloting.
Great posts Patty Lou. This may be the smoking gun that many of us knew was there all along.pattylou said:California is considering certifying some new Diebold machines (this is old news.) Because of last week's hack in Leon County FL, California is requesting that Diebold provide the code that is on the memory cards, in order to certify these machines for the state.
It turns out that the code on the cards violates Federal Election Commission restrictions. Read about the sticky wicket that Diebold is currently in:
See also: http://www.news-record.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051223/NEWSREC0101/512230306/1010/NEWSREC020107 [Broken]Diebold Withdraws As N.C. Voting Equipment Vendor
RALEIGH, N.C. -- The effort to upgrade voting equipment in North Carolina by next spring took a hit when an approved vendor pulled out of the running.
Diebold Election Systems said it can't follow a new law that required it to share its software coding with the state.
The company told the State Board of Elections it would be impossible to meet a deadline to account for all software used by the company for machines certified to be sold in all 100 counties.
The decision means that only one vendor currently is cleared to sell equipment, raising more questions about whether counties will have enough time to buy machines that meet the state's technical and security standards.
Another firm that was certified, Sequoia Voting Systems, withdraw earlier this month.
Now, I have spent the last twenty minutes on this post. I wanted to get references, and double check my recollection on dates, numbers, etc (They were all correct, except for the stock upswing which I had forgotten about following O'Dell's resignation.) . I didn't spend that amount of time because I wanted to argue with you. I spent that amount of time because this is a damn important issue, and you should be informed. And you should recognize when you are obfuscating the issue. And you shouldn't make throw-away comments as some sort of point-scoring ego trip.Federal testing authorities are supposed to rely on standards set by the Federal Election Commission. The FEC standards prohibit Interpreted code thus, the AccuBasic interpreter is illegal. (The entire AccuBasic source code tree is written in a home-brewed language that Diebold programmers made up themselves, making it more difficult for certifiers to examine.)
All headlines:In a letter obtained by The Associated Press, Assistant Secretary of State for Elections Bradley J. Clark threatened to start the process of decertifying Election Systems and Software machines for use in California if senior officials didn't address the concerns immediately.
"The California Secretary of State is deeply concerned about problems experienced by counties utilizing ES&S voting equipment and software," Clark wrote in a letter addressed to company president Aldo Tesi nine days after the Nov. 8 (special) election.
Software problems included incorrect counting of turnout figures, a malfunction that prevented voters from verifying that their choices were registered accurately and one machine recording the wrong vote during a test, according to the letter.
Clark's letter said that on Nov. 8 a state monitoring team "experienced an alarming error on the iVotronic system in Merced County, where a voter chose one candidate but the vote was recorded for another candidate. This error is documented on videotape and demonstrates that it was not an operator error, but was, rather, an error in the system."