rkastner
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I'm glad! For collapse details, please see fmoldove.blogspot.com, Part 1 (that's last week).
The discussion revolves around the concepts of superposition and observables in quantum mechanics, particularly in the context of spin states. Participants explore the implications of being in a definite state of one observable (X-spin) and its relationship to superpositions of other observables (Z-spin and Y-spin), as well as the philosophical interpretations of these concepts, including the Many Worlds Hypothesis (MWH).
Participants do not reach a consensus on the nature of superposition and its implications for physical reality. Multiple competing views remain regarding the interpretation of superposition and the relationship between different observables.
Participants acknowledge that the discussion involves complex interpretations of quantum mechanics, including the ontological status of the wavefunction and the implications of the MWH. There are limitations in the assumptions made about the nature of superposition and the definitions of observables.
bhobba said:Its a general assumption.
For example do you believe stray photons from the CBMR interacting with a dust particle are entangled?
Thanks
Bill
rkastner said:I'm glad! For collapse details, please see fmoldove.blogspot.com, Part 1 (that's last week).
rkastner said:Do you know Boltzmann's H-theorem purporting to derive the 2nd Law of Thermo?
kith said:It doesn't seem unreasonable to me to say that it is precisely the fact that the environment is assumed to be already in a time-independent decohered state which leads to permanent decoherence in the system.
Many Worlds proved inconsistent?To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis, which is an old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often finds the claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M Schwindt points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence solves the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the system into subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment). But if the state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split is not unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is all what exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define separate worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in the states of the Hilbert space themselves. As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he mentions observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not fundamental at all.
Why MWI?MWI in it's current form simply becomes invalid, with or without Born rule, because it does not have an additional structure which is necessary to fix the preferred basis: The papers prove that different choices are possible, and lead to different physics. The Copenhagen intepretation solves this problem with its association of the operators p, q with classical experimental arrangements, but this solution is not available in the Everett interpretation. Thus, to make MWI a (viable) intepretation, you not only have to derive the Born rule, but also have to add some new structure to fix the canonical preferred basis.
I disagree with this and I've outlined in post #29 why I think so.bohm2 said:I think this also the reason why the Everett interpretation which is more in need of decoherence to define their structure fails to deliver the goods as outlined in a number of posts.