Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

[metacristi]

Holbling

We are both wasting our times in this case.But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth,I don't think you are in such as position,even if you were a professional philosopher,facts speaks and the controversies are even greater now in this field than before.Ask some scientists and you'll hardly find one who is a commited relativist,feyerabendist (though he says that there are still rules,he defended his position against the accusations of pure anarchy).I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.The quark model,though ad hoc at the time when was proposed,actually made some predictions and there is even indirect evidence for the existence of quarks (the collision electron positron at very high energies where the jets of pions obtained originate from different points showing indirectly the presence of smaller particles whose trajectories are conserved by hadrons,the variety of energies at which exist the J/psi particles which are analogous with the atomic spectres,showing indirectly the existence of two smaller components and so on).Such theoretical constructs are accepted usually even in the absence of indirect or direct evidence or at least potential testability but only if their predictions explain a wide enough range of empirical facts.Sometimes even ad hoc hypotheses are accepted if they are coherent with the body of all accepted scientific knowledge,as I said not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level.Even if we were to accept that a specific variant of the Greek Gods research program (when Murray Gell Mann first presented his model of quarks) as being on the same level of priority with that of science's don't you think the latter observations,I presented above, constitute a diproval of that variant of the model?Of course you can build potentially (but I'm not really sure it is an easy task) another variant,which will have the same fate on very short time,anyway this is a clear evidence that the scientific approach is superior on long run.As I said I could easily use the bayesian interpretation of probabilities for that.Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

We can never deduce knowledge from observations,we can only infer it indeed,still this does not mean all possible explanations are on the same level of rationality.Observed facts speak,having the principle of sufficient reason at base,of course once we accept the basic assumptions of science,otherwise it becomes an incoherent system.This approach does not exclude absolutely anything,since science is openly fallible,even the basic assumptions are open to revise.If it were not so then I would be fully entitled to claim that my worldview,my 'research system',based also on my own interpretation of some strange experiences,not amenable to scientific inquiry now,that a 'soul' of some sort does survive death,is on the same level with the whole research program of science.Or the Creationist science program.We need a standard of knowledge,the minimum to be accepted by all would be rational people.Of course,my 'research program' is not non rational or irrational.But it is still a mere belief,notwithstanding that rational,I am basically open to accept later that my personal experiences can be explained within the standard program of science with sufficient reasons,without the need to resort at the existence of a soul.But of course it might also happen that science will find sufficient evidence supporting my view.To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.Or at least a hypothesis which does not contain redundant assumptions,where all assumptions are valuble to the process of making new predictions,which explains facts already explained by science and makes also some new predictions.Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?Understand of rationality,it is based on all observed facts and the principle of sufficient reason (allowing some valuable theoretical constructs in science though there is no need to believe in their existence before direct or indirect experimental evidence for them).Why are they on the same level?Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

 

[Canute]

Sleeth - But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

I think this is a good point. Empricirical knowledge is gained through experience. This is true whether that knowledge is derived from a scientific experiment, a revelation on the road to Damascus, or a meditative experience of non-dual oneness and many-ness of Being. Science has no privilege over other systems of knowledge that are equally or more emprirical.

Also, as all knowledge derives ultimately from experience it is not always easy to distinguish which is more or less 'emprirical'.

On top of this most scientific 'knowledge' is more theoretical than empirical. Based on observation yes, but there is nothing in the way of experience to 'empiricise' much of scientific theory, and most scientific entities are no more than theoretical constructs.

Science is based more on observation than experience and as such is by definition less empirical than methods based on exploring direct experience.

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth

I'm not, and your explicit attempts to poison the well are rather pathetic. I don't think my ideas are superior to yours; instead, i think that i'll disagree to try to learn something. Alas, you have nothing but invective to offer.

I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.

Yet you seem to presume to tell me what i think, where i got it from, what my motives are and how i need to address you. Perhaps you should cease pissing in the well and ask yourself if this is the way to present your ideas in the best light?

Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

No, you haven't. All you do is write and write without actually saying anything. The privilege you want to award is epistemological, yet you refuse to address the epistemological points at issue here and declare the privilege to be justified by assuming it implictly before you even start. That, alas, is what you are plainly unable to even appreciate, let alone counter. My last post explained this, but you apparently don't follow. How can you award your privilege in a non-circular way? Try again, preferably without insulting me.

To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.

This is naive empiricism at its best (and therefore worst). "Facts" don't speak at all; they are theory-laden all the way down. The question here is what we are supposed to mean by terms like "superior" in the first place, a question you steadfastly refuse to answer.

Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?

This only serves to demonstrate your inability to charitably read my posts here and continue the mischaracterisation to make an empty point. By questioning the awarding of an epistemological privilege i do not thereby commit myself to the notion that all ideas are equally rational. This rather disappointing non sequitur makes me wonder if you have any interest in learning anything and prefer instead to just shout at me until i give up.

Why are they on the same level?

Why are you incapable of dealing with me charitably? Why should i argue against your straw men?

Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

Are you able to stop insulting me? Others might find your insistence that i can't think for myself and am merely parroting what i read in some books to be objectionable, but not me. In the absence of any justification as to why i should waste my time on someone so insistent on poisoning the well here and telling me i can't think on my own, can you tell me the lottery numbers instead?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.

 

[Canute]

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.

It's impossible for me say what I mean by angry but I imagine you also have experiences of anger (especially here!) so let's say they are the same experiences.

Is your anger theory-laden, (or your hunger, pain etc)? To me they seem to be direct experiences. I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact. I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

At the moment I would say that when I perceive an orange I am theorising about the pattern of photons and the signals in my brain, however the experience of wanting to eat it (for instance) is direct and non-theoretical.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.

I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact.

Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):

Any experience makes its apearance within the frame of our customary points of view and forms of perception.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though: what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.

What do you think?

 

[metacristi]

Hugo Holbling

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning;anyway I've already (implicitly) recognized that explanations of newly observed facts might be theory laden when I said,as Popper observed once,that we cannot deduce explanations from facts,we can only infer them (as matter of fact they could be infinite).Still this does not represent an argument against some general rules,it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden,I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.Even today many scientists,the vast majority of them in fact,reject his anarchism.You might disagree with me,I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it (evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference),but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

Everything goes indeed but only if you provide also a method of establishing what is real.Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science and possible more variants of the method (though this is very controversial especially among scientists) anyway all these methods have the principle of intersubjectivity,be it only at limit,and the principle of sufficient reason incorporated (used including in the theory making process as I've explained before).The fact that there exist equally valid competing scientific hypotheses does not change too much the situation when talking about the whole of science;it (science) splits into more competing huge research programs indeed,but the above mentioned basic principles,potentially making the difference between them,are still accepted.No problem even if we accept some new assertions as being provisionally true (specific to that version of the research program),even by changing large parts of the actual accepted knowledge,if it offers a valid explanation and respects also the above mentioned basic requirements (something which I still expect from you to provide).

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths',a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.So Feyerabend might be somehow right,still keeping some rules,there is not exactly a total anarchy;as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Thus if I were to claim that my worldview is on the same level of rationality with that of science's (which I don't,at least for the moment,I still try to make it empirically progressive) I would be forced either to provide a hypothesis using the soul as a fruitful theoretical construct indispensable for the new predictions made,present indirect/direct evidence sustaining the existence of a soul whilst still accepting the actual basic requirements of the scientific method (+possible some other auxiliary assumptions) which to sustain my hypothesis,or provide a better method of establishing what's real,if I were to reject at least one of those basic requirements of the actual method.If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has even epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.If my system does not epxplain (counting as predictions) some already known but not unrelated facts,as many as possible,I cannot even claim that it has the same privilege.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning

It's only a problem insofar as you continue the insults. I'm glad you've refrained in your goodbye speech, at least.

it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden

Instead, this is a standard remark in the philosophy of science. I know, because i found it in a book.

I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.

At least we agree about Lakatos.

The problem here - yet again - is that you declare things to be so without offering any justification at all; saying that the arguments proceed "rightly" cooks the books before I've even objected. Others, like Dupre, Cartwright, Galison, to name but a few, have noted what you cannot; namely, that denying the existence of a single method does not imply anarchism at all. Instead, it could be that science is far too complex to be accounted for without the plurality of methodologies that we actually see if - ironically enough, given this thread to date - we look instead of theorising.

I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it

I understand well enough, but see no reason to accept this epistemological privilege when you have used it in your arguments, smuggling it in implicitly beforehand. In any case, my objection was never that it was incoherent or inferior, so i don't know where you're getting this stuff. Either you misunderstood (perhaps my fault) or these are more straw men.

(evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference)

*shrug* You could ask for clarification before insulting me, i guess.

but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

What "point of view" am i espousing, exactly?

Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science

Here is your problem: we do not have a "single science" and the talk in the philosophy of science these days is about the disunity of science (i know, because i read it in a book). I suggest you look at Galison's collection of papers for an introduction, if you're interested.

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.

To begin with, i haven't proposed such a system and called it equally valid; instead, I've time and again asked why an epistemological privilege should be granted to your naive empiricism. The example of the Homeric gods was provided to ask why those gods stand on a different epistemological footing to quarks, to give you a chance to show why your privilege should allow me to choose quarks instead of gods for some reason or other.

In the second place, it isn't at all obvious that anyone interested in this question should allow you to smuggle in an epistemological privilege a priori, as you have here: why should we privilege the scientific method, so-called, when the issue here is precisely to ask why this privilege should be granted to start with? Even if i were to fit your mischaracterisation and declare an alternative epistemology equally valid, we judge the two by some means of comparison - not by assuming the one to be priviledged and asking the other to match up to it. You are assuming the result beforehand in order to justify it, which isn't cricket.

I won't attack the sniff of parsimony i smell here for now...

The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths'

Nonsense. How do we decide what "superiority" means in this context? It won't do to say that the scientific method, so-called, has empirical support because that again assumes what is to be proven; namely, that it gets at reality while other methodologies do not.

a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.

If you had read any philosophy of science, you'd know that Bayesian analysis is subject to severe skepticism.

as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Why don't you read his own works instead of mischaracterising them? I promise i won't insult you for getting information out of a book, even though i was fair game on that charge.

If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.

Wrong again. You cannot grant an epistemological privilege on the basis of scientific method or the demarcation criteria you offer here without first explaining why we should accept their epistemological priviledge. That is what you still have failed to do.

Whatever the case, i thank you for an interesting discussion. I hope you will refrain from insult next time, as i sincerely hope we'll cross paths again.

 

[metacristi]

You solve nothing by not allowing empirical facts as the criterion of making the difference between theories on rational grounds (or even different branch of scientific programmes,I mean the whole of science here) at least on long run.You cannot simply say 'concepts are theory ladden therefore you cannot make an empirical difference between alternative theories or programmes',this is on the same foot with saying 'subjective experiences are private therefore science will never be able to accommodate them'.My point is that there is a strong ground for this,even history of science does support this view,I will present later an example;there is an evolution of science,the point of Lakatos.There is absolutely no proof that such a programme where large chuncks of science,not coherent at limit with at least some (many) of old enunciations,is possible practically,though I agree that it is equally valid on short run.You must first prove that such a programme is possible and we can continue the discussion.It seems to me that if I try to retroactively create such a programme (assuming that I do this in 1870 for example but taking in account the later development of science) it would not have stand in a more or less stable form in time.If I understood well,sorry if I mischaracterise again,never inteneded by the way,but you haven't explained too much of your views,you do not support this approach.While such alternative programmes are viable on purely empirical grouns on short run I don't think they resist on long run.Empirical grounds still prove crucial to make the difference.

Some concepts might be theory ladden indeed still we can make the difference using common concepts accepted by competing programmes,at a more basic level.There might exist cases when crucial experiments do not exist indeed,still this does not prove that there are not cases when even instant disproval is possibile,not to mention diproval of specific variants of a programme.As a matter of fact on long run history proves that we can make a difference.Even Kaufmann's experiment is a good exmaple here,though it seems to vindicate Kuhn first.Einstein's theory seemed diproved because it was used a model of Kaufmann's experimental dispositive which was specific for Abraham's model (specific to that theory).Not even Planck,though using another model for Einstein's theory,was able to settle things in 1906.Still in later reviews Bucherer using the results of other experiments (acceptable by both programmes Abraham's and Einstein's) measuring the value of e/m0 settled the things in the favor of Einstein's theory by proving that in Kaufmann's experiments that value is almost constant for SR theory,varying in a significant way for the data of Abraham's model.By 1915 this problem has been completely resolved using empirical grounds entirely.Finally some concepts might be embedded in all those programmes,at a very basic level,like was the atomic theory,thus allowing empirical difference between programmes on long run at least.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Apparently the several times you've said this discussion is over were not enough. I don't think i can help you here since you still fail to appreciate that you simply cannot use an "epistemological priviledge" to justify an "epistemological priviledge". I already explained the circularity inherent in your approach and left you with plenty of questions and hidden presuppositions in your account to consider; what's clear is that you may not smuggle in your conclusion as a premise as you continue to do, and i think this is plain enough for everyone else that I'm content to leave it for now. Perhaps there is a communication problem here, but my post above stands as it is.

Edit: no need to apologise. Let me know how i can make this clearer, if i can.

 

[metacristi]

What to explain?i don't think that the accepted knowedge of an alien culture on the other part of the galaxy,situated at roghly our level of development,is too different...I think finding one would settle things clearer.

 

[Canute]

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.

Yes, I've never understood why M thinks science has 'e-priviledge'. I've asked on a few threads with no answer yet.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.

I was considering two things. Firstly that all knowledge begins in experience, and secondly that certain knowledge lies in a unity of knower and known (as per Aristotle and Popper and other notables). If all experiences are theory-laden then neither of these two things would be true, knowledge would begin in theory and certain knowledge would be impossible. Also introspection suggests to me that if not all then most experiences are direct and 'pure'.

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.

I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid. However you raise a good point here, namely that experience and subject are denied by some.

I cannot see how to deny experience. However I would agree that ultimately 'self' is an epiphenomenon which can be transcended. In this state experiences occur, but those experiences are un-owned, there is no 'self' having them. This is precisely the knower and known becoming one. But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):

Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view. because of this he missed the fact that meditative practitioners assert that 'points of view' and 'forms of perception' are exactly what are to be avoided in pursuing knowledge through experience.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though:

Is it? It seems exactly the point to me.

what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.

Good points. I don't think the views of Churchland or Bohr are correct, partly for the reasons you give. There's a chicken and egg problem (as there is with all scientific explanations).

What do you think?

Ah, my favourite question. I think that exclusive use of the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge produces a horribly warped idea of reality. According to science consciousness, the thing that allows us to know anything in the first place, cannot be shown to exist, cannot be causally or reductively explained, has no reason for existing, has no purpose or function, did not evolve, cannot be studied except in the third-person (even though third-persons cannot be shown to be conscious) and consists of no more than matter self-referencing. To me Heidegger was spot on, science confuses Being with beings.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth. Science denies the possibility of certain knowledge so can only come in second at best. Combining them seems the best way forward, not dismissing either but accepting each for what they can tell us and what they can't.

To waffle on - if we want to understand the world it must be inevitable that we combine science, metaphysics and what we know from personal experience. Whatever we call this combination it is not science, ergo the practice of science alone isn't ever going to give us a true understanding of the world. The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

 

[olde drunk]

i confess that i haven't read all the posts on this thread, however, i wonder why bother?

if you do not accept that you exist then nothing can be discussed or 'proved'. to me, this shows a complete lack of selfconfidence.

in order to move forward, we MUST believe that we are our own individual authority( not egotistically but confidently).

once i have faith in self, i am free to accept experience and determine it's value.

it seems a fruitless waste of time debating whether or not there is a reality. all i know is that i am experiencing something and i want to understand it by discussing and/or sharing what has been learned. perhaps, the real problem is that we all experience reality in a slightly different way.

when i experience pain i have pain, same for pleasure, etc, etc --let's not debate whether it's an illusion or photons or a dream. let's discuss what is learned and how to apply the lesson for a better society, etc.

it all begins with self awareness. that's my reality.

love and peace,

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I may theorise from the experience, theorise on the cause of it and so on, but it's hard to see how the experience itself can be anything other than what it is.

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).

I'm not impressed by Churchland I'm afraid.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.

But this is wandering into meditative practice and you may not want to go there.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.

Bohr did not explore inner states but just adopted the scientific view.

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.

IMO introspective practice has epistemilogical privilege over all other forms of enquiry into truth.

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?

The scientific view only appears to make sense because it has the luxury of hiding all its self-contradictions and paradoxes in the dusty and cobwebbed realms of academic 'metaphysics'. But in reality questions are questions, they don't come divided into neat academic categories.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?

 

[Canute]

Well, the point was that it isn't possible to have an experience other than within an interpretive framework (or rather, that was the suggestion).

I can't see a way of denying that, on the other hand I can't see how it can be demonstrated either. All I can do is go back to the chicken and egg problem here. Even if we do interpret experiences before having them it would seem odd to argue that in an evolutionary or a 'morphogenical' sense we develop the means of interpreting experiences before we develop the means of having them.

I'm convinced that we have experiences directly when we focus on what they are). However perhaps it's true that much of the time we do not focus on what they are, and thus 'colour' them with our discriminations, preferences and habitual reactions. Underneath these, however, is the original experience, the one we had which led to their subsequent processing.

*shrug* Fair enough, but that isn't much of an argument. The paper I'm thinking of is in my library, so i'll let you know later what it was called; at any rate, i found it different to his usual stuff and it would seem to be worth your while locating, if you're interested.

I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Why not? I've studied such issues myself, so you can post whatever you like.

Ok

Since Bohr is one of my favourite thinkers, i'll have to rake you over the coals for that one. He didn't "just adopt the scientific view" at all - what's that supposed to mean, in any case? Instead, Bohr devised an entirely new epistemology that he applied widely and he wrote much on the demise of the boundary between subject and object. Calling complementarity "the scientific view", even if only by implication, is rather wide of the mark.

I suppose I meant 'the scientific way of thinking', rather than meaning to imply Bohr didn't think for himself. (I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

I do respect Bohr as a thinker, particularly for his explorations of what the findings of QM research might mean. However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa). Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object? (I'm no physicist but complementarity and the C-interpretation appear to be on their way out. Not that this is in any way a criticism of him).

Since i gave meta a hard time, i'll have to ask you why?

That's very even-handed of you. In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain. All other forms of it are not. Hence, for instance, idealism is unfalsifiable and always will be however much scientific research we do. All knowledge gained through proofs or through our sensory apparatus is uncertain, relative, dependent on assumptions or premises, and as such has limits.

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued. To add some weight I'll also cite Spinoza as saying that "nothing exists external to God, and certainly not man's understanding of him". I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

What are these "self-contradictions and paradoxes" that you write of?

All the undecidable questions of metaphysics, plus Zeno's paradoxes of motion, Russell's paradox, Goedel's proofs, the impossibility of certain proof, the problem of infinities and infinitessimals, the undetectability of consciousness, wavicles, the 'something-nothing' problem entailed by materialism, etc. These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways. (BTW I'd say the same of religion for similar reasons - in case you think I'm arguing for God).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I don't know that paper so can only comment on what you said about it. As such it was presented without an argument so didn't seem to call for much of a rebuttal. In addition I know some of the Churchlands other work and supposed that it followed much the same lines, but perhaps not.

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:

... no cognitive activity takes place save as the input vectors pass through that speculative configuration of synaptic connections, that theory. Theory-ladenness thus emerges not as an unwelcome and accidental blight on what would otherwise be a neutral cognitive achievement, but rather as that which makes processing activity genuinely cognitive in the first place.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.

(I don't remember mentioning complementarity).

You didn't; i brought it up to counter your remarks on Bohr.

However as far as I'm aware his paradigm remained the scientific one (and vice versa).

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.

Can you say more about what he thought about subject and object?

Bohr thought that it was impossible to maintain a sharp separation of observer and observed. He talked often in metaphors and i recall a story in which the observer peered closer and closer at reality until he finally saw himself peering back, but i can't remember where at the moment; it may be a paraphrasing of one of his parables. Maybe i'll remember in the morning?

In brief it's because knowledge gained by direct experience is certain.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?

In the end one might say it is because certain knowledge requires seeing beyond the shadows to reality, and this cannot be done by reasoning, perceiving, observing, measuring, or even by conceiving, as Plato argued.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?

I don't like S's idea of God but epistemilogically this seems equivalent to the view of most philosophers of knowledge.

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?

These suggest to me that science is an ineffective way of understanding anything properly, however useful it is in other ways.

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?

 

[RageSk8]

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/10/05/out_of_the_matrix?mode=PF

Davidson would reply that Cartesian skeptics are misusing the expression "really real." It makes sense to say that the people I encounter in my dreams, or the things I see after taking hallucinogens, are not really real. For denying them reality is just a way of saying that we cannot make beliefs about these people or things cohere with the rest of our beliefs -- specifically, with our beliefs about other people and things. The expression "not really real" is, in such contexts, given its meaning by contrasting cases in which we are prepared to say that those other people or things are really real.

Davidson's point is that retail skepticism makes sense, but wholesale skepticism does not. We have to know a great deal about what is real before we can call something an illusion, just as we have to have a great many true beliefs before we can have any false ones. The proper reply to the suggestion that beavers might be illusory is this: Illusory by comparison to what?

Even a mind-bending movie like "The Matrix" supports this insight. If you see the film after having read Davidson, you will be struck by the fact that the hero has mostly the same beliefs after he is ripped out of his artificial environment as he did before. He still believes millions of the same commonplaces -- the commonplaces that make it possible for him to use the same language outside the Matrix that he used inside it. He had been fooled about what was going on around him, but had never been fooled about what sorts of things the world contains, what is good and what evil, the color of the sky, the warmth of the sun, or the salient features of beavers.

 

[Canute]

Not to fret. I'm back with my library now, so i can say some more. The paper is called A Deeper Unity and here's a small quote:

The trouble is that all the Churchlands' theorising is based on the same presumption, what Gold & Stoljar call the 'neuron hypothesis', which states that all reference to mental events are simply 'folk-psychological' and that all such events will eventually be reduced to neuroscience or 'psychopharmacology'. I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

The basic idea, of course, is that there is simply too much information taken into be able to make sense of it without filtering it through the equivalent of a theory (or theories) first.

It seems fair enough to say that all experiences derived from sensory data are theory-laden, (if one calls a set of connections in the brain a 'theory' as seems do be done in your quoted extract).

However we know this already from philosphers (Plato again). The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose, which suggests that certain knowledge is impossible and that mind is an illusion reducible to brain computation and 'connectionism', begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Well, it might be an idea to drop talk of paradigms to begin with, unless you find that type of analysis convincing. In any case, how much Bohr do you know? I'd like to know how much i can assume, either for now or in future.

I wasn't drifting off into Kuhn country, but was using 'paradigm' in its everyday sense, in which as individuals we all have one. My impression is that Bohr stuck with looking at the issue from the 'western' 'third-person' point of view (unlike Shroedinger for instance). However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

It is? How do avoid the charge that you've conflated two different forms of knowledge?

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are you a Platonist of sorts?

I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Perhaps you can expand? What is this view that "most" hold?

Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known. Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us.

“Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.”
(Critique of Pure Reason) Hawking also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place -

“What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

That probably depends on what you mean by "properly". Perhaps they just suggest that science is limited, like most other things?

Ok - same difference.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this? (Just so I know where we are likely to agree and disagree).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I feel that this view is illogical, (as does Searle, Chalmers and others) so I tend not to follow their work.

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?

The issue they do not address is non-sensory experience. Because of this the eliminative materialism they propose ... begs most of the important questions about consciousness and 'knowing'.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?

However I accept that there is an overlap, particularly in such ideas as implicate/explicate orders 'enfolded' into one another and so on. All I know about Bohr (not much) is picked up piecemeal in discussions of QM.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.

I'm not sure what you mean here.

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.

However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?

(BTW I don't want to bore you with quotes but didn't want you to think I was posting just ad hoc opinions).

No problem. I don't mind ad hoc or quotes, in any case.

Is there an 'ism' that characterises your view on all this?

No.

 

[Canute]

Out of interest, what's your objection(s)?

The same as the writers mentioned, the 'hard' problem and all that. I fail to see how science can explain something it cannot prove to exist.

Likewise, which questions are they begging?

What consciousness is, how (or if) it is caused, and how we can know (experience) anything.

That's Bohm. I think you'd enjoy reading some more Bohr.

Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Are the two forms of knowledge, certain and scientific (to use the terms we've seen so far), variations on the same or a conflation? What do you mean by "knowledge"?

They are distinct categories of knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be certain for reasons given earlier. By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

Not all of them. I'm not sure how "consistent" this really is.

If you're not sure then I'll stick to my opinion, which I still think is correct. I don't believe that what I said was contentious.

Did you check the introduction i referred you to? What form of truth are you using?

Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?) I don't have a quick answer on 'truth', but briefly I take a truth to be what is the case. It's a bit more complicated because if we are to know that something is the truth then it must be the sort of thing we can know. (E.g. 2+2=4 we can know is the case because it's a tautology. The existence of self-awareness we can know, because we know directly).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Thanks for your additional remarks.

Whoops, apologies for my temporary insanity. What makes Bohr interesting here?

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.

By 'knowledge' I mean what is known to the person who has the knowledge.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?

Umm, can't remember what introduction that was. I may have done. (What was it?)

Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).

(Are you disagreeing or asking for more of the reasoning behind my assertions? I've assumed the former and been brief. If it's the latter I'll post more quotes since other people usually write about these things more helpfully than I do).

You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.

 

[Canute]

Er... because i said so? I just guessed you might be interested in his many writings on the boundary between observer and observed being fluid at best and not as rigid as some suppose.

Sorry - I didn't mean he wasn't interesting - I just couldn't remember how he connected with the topic.

That doesn't really help much, though: what is it to know something?

Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

Ah, well. You can find it here (and my apologies for plugging something i don't intend to suppose worth anyone's while).

I wasn't saying I couldn't be bothered. I have quite a few threads here and elsewhere on the go and get confused which is which sometimes. My apologies.

You can post quotes if you like but I've already read many of them before, i expect. I'd always like to hear more of your reasoning.

Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers. I'll stick to 'glib and not very rigorous' for now.

Edit: Aha - just read some of your essay on truth. (I thought it was very good). It illustrates what I meant earlier by saying that I took a naive approach to truth. I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute. This gives me just four kinds of truth, or equivalently four kinds of knowledge. (Bear with me, I'm having to figure out what I think as I go).

These are relative truths that I do or do not know, and absolute truths that I do or do not know. I exclude all truths or true knowledge that I cannot know from this system, since it can't possibly ever be true as far as I'm concerned. This is a sort of mixed subjective/objective way of coming at it, and it seems functional (even if rather folk-epistemilogical).

This has the strange consequence that a certain truth is one which I am certain is true. But then what else can a certain truth be? One has to trust ones own rationality somewhere along the line and if one doesn't know a truth is certain then it isn't, if you see what I mean.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.
. . . . Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean
. . . . that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not.
. . . Quine's remark . . . was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and I've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods.
. . . . That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the privilege because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view (hey, you told me to attack . . . just kidding! ). However, I am serious when I say I believe the reason for all your objections above are not because of a problem with experience, but they are inherent to the epistemological approach of rationalization. I define rationalization for this little critique as the attempt to justify, prove, or formulate statements of “verisimilitude” (to rely on Popper) without reference to experience.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to. Recently I had to revisit his thinking to figure out what Ragesk8 meant when he referred to himself as a “holist,” so my interpretation of your point might be influenced by that.

I do see a way to interpret Quine’s idea of a man-made “fabric of knowledge and belief” as you suggest. In this holist view, he suggests there is no statement which can be considered completely immune to revision. Quoting from his Two Dogmas of Empiricism he says, “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. . . . A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth-values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. . . . . Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. . . . Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision.”

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended. I say it is because rationalization cannot be anything but circular. That’s why I quoted the statements you made above. Every statement can be said to be self-justifying, and every premise can be questioned with “how do we know what __________ [fill in the blank] is.”

The rationalists had a couple of millennia to show us they could get out of their endless circular traps, and they never could. It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt) and everyone else into rationalizing were/are nonetheless dinosaurs, still trying to figure out too much in their heads. It’s amazing what a little experience adds to any subject being thought about. Talk about a major adjustment to one’s thinking!

Do you want to argue if a wall is there? We’ll never decide because how do we define what a wall is? How do we know if the eyes accurately convey the image of a real wall? Just the very statement, “is there a wall,” assumes we can know (or not) and so is circular. So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain. Of course, no doubt (if you are a die-hard rationalist) you can say “how do I know if what just flattened my face was a wall, or if I am just imagining it?” Me, looking at another bloody face, accepts that the wall is there (until new evidence suggests otherwise) and can see no more need for discussion about that issue.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I singled out those quotes as examples of what’s wrong with your view

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism.

It’s been awhile since I’ve read Quine, so I am not sure which of his remarks you are referring to.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

When he explains the rationalist’s preference for keeping experience “along the edges,” he has also shown us exactly why no purely mental position can be defended.

Alternatively, he could be pointing out the necessity of boundary conditions for methodologies.

I hate to seem so biased, but to me Quine, Popper, (GREAT thinkers no doubt)

I'm afraid i do doubt and am quite surprised by the reverence shown to Popper by several members here.

So, what’s my solution? Walk straight ahead and see if you smash into that wall, then you will know for certain.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

EXPERIENCE AND KNOW! (although that's your decision since I am also an individualist)

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience and your remarks do no better, other than to give me pause and wonder if i am wasting my time here. Nevertheless, I'm inclined to be more charitable than you; thus:

It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

How does this process work?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Wow, do you think I'll have an answer to that? I generally assume that this is something we each have to decide for ourselves.

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.

Ok I got that, but I haven't quite got a picture of what lies behind your questions, so I'm not quite certain how best to pitch my answers.

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).

I have given up philosophising very much about truth because I see only two important kinds, relative or absolute.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.

 

[Theothanatologist]

Bunghole philosophy has infected the physicsforums...

I've been following this thread since i registered for this board. Being a philosophisticator myself, i couldn't help but zero on your musings of a philosophical nature.

I don't know. I believe that the non-dual explanation of everything is correct, and most of the Greeks held some version of that view. (This is arguable but it's my opinion at the moment).

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd. This is manifestly false, because first of all it would be a sweeping generalization that marginalizes the difference under a mischaracterization. Anaximander pushed a dualist view while Heraclitus was comfortable with a non-essentialist take of Being as Becoming, a ceaseless fluctuation, constantly changing state of affairs. Parmenides dealt a deathblow to material monism with his privileging of the intelligible over the sensible, and his philosophy in turn spawned a school of puralists: Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus. Leucippus and Democritus intended to replace monism with their atomism. The only true monist among the Greeks would be Xenophanes, who thought that God was identical with the entire universe.

Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century. And even then, empiricism bloomed only in England, where Bishop George Berkeley and David Hume took the principles of empiricism to new heights. However, thanks to Hume the philosophy of empiricism found itself at a dead end, stuck in the abyss of skepticism. The logical positivists exhumed Hume and resurrected his Fork of Knowledge (a posteriori and a priori), but they didn't last beyond the first half of the 20th century. Wittgenstein instigated a linguistic revolution in the mid 20th century and after Wilfred Sellars published his book on empiricism, it's safe to say that empiricism is no longer in vogue. :)

Those that don't, (Kant would be one I think) conclude that certain knowledge is forever beyond us. “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” (Critique of Pure Reason)

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.

Hawkings also agrees, for reasons connected with Goedel. (Online essay somewhere called 'The End of Physics').

Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?

Because Popper also takes the scientific view of direct experience he arrives in the same place - “What we should do, I suggest, is give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge. And admit that all human knowledge is human: that it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes: that all we can do is grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach". Problem of Induction.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.

This is a consistent conclusion across most philosophies. Even Christians say we must believe rather than know. However not everybody takes the limits of reason as as implying that we cannot know the answers or the truth.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.

 

[Canute]

Claiming that most of the Greeks held a monist view is absurd.

Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.

This is also false, because while Aristotle was a proto-empiricist of sorts, Empiricism did not emerge as a bona fide philosophy until John Locke in the 17th century.

I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did? I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.

Nope, this quote doesn't get your case anywhere. It actuall pertains to the function of reason, how it transcends the principle of significance (empirical knowledge) not about how knowledge is gained via the senses. Read the book.

I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.

Would you mind supplying the link to this essay?

I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.

The quote doesn't indicate Popper has sworn fealty to empirical foundationalism. It only claims that truth is to be sought after, even if it is an impossiblity.

I know.

No, you have consistently demonstrated that you don't know what you are talking about.

Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.

 

[Canute]

That doesn't seem too satisfactory, especially when you use the term so often and make important points thereby.

I wasn't saying it was satisfactory, just that there is no other way forward. Are you saying that you know how we know?

Why do you require such a picture, along with an "ism" with which to categorise me? My objections apply whether I'm a solipsist or naive empiricist (like most here, apparently).

Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

As my essay explained, this isn't sufficient - not least because not everyone agrees about what truth means in the first place. Avoiding this problem as you do doesn't make it go away.

But of course not everyone agrees. This is the problem, and why one has to make ones own mind up based on pragmatic considerations (or remain forever on the spot trapped in philosophical debate). 'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case). That doesn't mean throwing philosophical considerations out of the window, just acknowledging that they are not a final guide to what is true.

"There is one great question," he writes in 1911. "Can human beings know anything, and if so, what and how? This question is really the most essentially philosophical of all questions." (Bertrand Russell in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell 1911,)

Analytic philosophers have not yet answered this question. I don't intend to wait through another two millenia of philosophical anlaysis before deciding what I think is the best way to know what is true. I haven't got time. If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

BTW when I said my approach was 'naive' I didn't mean simpleminded. It might be wrong of course, but you'll have to show that. It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

To be clear - I think it is possible to know certain truths, but not by the senses or by reason alone. There are a few reasons for this, some of which you give in your essay. I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

 

[Theothanatologist]

Do not misunderestimate my powers of misunderstanding misrepresentations!

Hi and welcome to the madness. I didn't claim that the Greeks were monists so this point does not apply.

You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?

I quoted Aristotle - are you saying he didn't say what I said he did?

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.

I certainly did not suggest that Aristotle was an 'empiricist' in any modern sense. Don't be too quick to jump to conclusions about what I'm saying.

I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.

I have. Again you have misinterpreted what I said. I agree with what you say here about Kant. I am not arguing for empiricism, at least not in its restricted sense of giving primacy to sensory data.

I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known. The faculty of reason does encourage the intellect to posit objects without a corresponding form of intuition, which lies outside of experience, but this is not a "certain knowledge" by any stretch of the imagination.

I don't have it to hand but a search should do it.

Passing the buck...

Hmm. I think you've demonstrated that you've invented most of what you thought I said. Easily done on these forums.

C'est la vie.

 

[Canute]

You did claim that they were non-dualists, and i inferred that this meant monism. What exactly did you mean by this: " non-dual explanation of everything"?

Non-dual means literally 'not-two', it does not mean 'one'. If I could explain what it means I'd be cleverer than Chuang-Tsu. Roughly it's the view that all dualisms are ultimately false, in the sense that ultimate reality and ultimate states of consciousness (roughly same thing in this view) are non-dual, beyond truth/falsity, one/many etc. Mathematically speaking it's the view from the meta-system.

Not at all. Let's look at your claim, and I will walk you through my interpretation: Most philosophers seem to reach the same conclusion as Aristotle on certain knowledge, that it consists in direct experience of the known.

At first whiff, the phrse "certain knowledge consists in direct experience of the known" seems circular, but i wasn't going to take you to task on that, and i thought it would be charitable to assume you intended that as a description of some type of empiricism. My response was that this was false, that "most philosophers" agreed or concluded with Aristotle. You will need to rebut this with evidence.

I'll change it to 'most philosophers who conclude that certain knowledge is possible agree that it is only achievable by a 'oneness' of knower and known'. (I suppose a Christian mystic or gnostic would say becoming one with God, but personally I don't hold with God). Others (like Popper) do not take this final step but conclude certain knowledge is impossible. I take this conclusion as consistent with the first, but less well considered.

I have problems with the word 'empiricism' because people take it to mean various different things. For that reason I'm not arguing for it.

I did write that Aristotle was a proto-empiricist, but i disagreed that "most philosophers" concluded with him on what constituted certain knowledge.

Ok - see above for my amendment assertion. Who is it that disagrees?

I apologize for any misinterpretations, its' late and i should be asleep. But it's still false. It is not the case that Kant thought that certain knowledge lay outside of the direct experience of the known.

Quite agree. I didn't suggest otherwise.

Passing the buck...

It's you that's passing it. Try typing 'Hawking End of Phsyics' into your search engine. Or do want me to do it? Have I offended you in some way?