Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

[Hugo Holbling]

Are you saying that you know how we know?

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?

Oh dear, I think you have me in the wrong pidgeon-hole. I just wanted to be clear what style of communication was most appropriate.

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.

But of course not everyone agrees.

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.

If you cannot tell me a better way than mine to decide then I see no reason to change. It's not enough to simply say 'it's not sufficient'. Something has to be put in its place if I'm to get rid of my method.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.

It's a little more subtle than it looks but I didn't want to write an essay when you asked about it.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.

I take the Buddhist view of true knowledge (and Aristotle's I think), if it isn't self-evident then it must be doubted.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.

 

[Canute]

No. Are you intending to continue the non sequiturs?

Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

That wins an irony award. You can communicate however you like, as i already said.

Do you read what I write?

You miss the point again. Not everyone agrees about what truth means or refers to in the first place, so it's no use for you to talk about deciding what's true when there are already issues of pragmatism prior to these concerns.

It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Nonsense. This is a stasis that relies on an implicit assumption of the function of critique and another mischaracterisation to boot. You don't have to change your ideas wholesale for another worldview; it's enough that you tinker with them if you find a weakness and perhaps try to strengthen them as a result.

So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*shrug* You can send me stuff privately, post it here or say nothing. I think i can cope.

I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Sure, but you don't add that this doubt requires an alternative to be stated. Here i am, then - doubting.

I think I agree. If you doubt something then you can conceive of it being false. However if you cannot conceive of it being false it is not necessarily true.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It's not clear to me what "my view" is supposed to represent or why it's "wrong" because i allegedly haven't noted that empiricism came along and changed rationalism. . . . wonder if i am wasting my time here.

Hugo, I really don't think your view is "wrong." I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack." I was in a playful mood last night, and that accounts for some of my comments. I've been enjoying your comments so far. I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

My comments below mix up the order of your post, I hope you don't mind.

I'll look for a reference for you: chapter six of his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism.

That's what I was took my interpretation from. His point about experience infringing only on the edges of any system of thought, and that within any system of thought we can revise components to still get the answer we want I think is pretty good. If that is what you are referring to, then I don't think Quine is saying there cannot be an epistomological privilege established in some area of investigation, but rather he demonstrates what believing something a priori can do to one's objectivity.

Do you likewise believe that my jumping from a tall building and subsequently smashing myself upon contact with the ground makes gravity certain? Perhaps you need to think again?

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Why are you mischaracterising me in this way? None of my objections to the utter inability to justify an epistemological privilege of any kind here have required a rationalism shorn of experience . . .

I haven't purposely mischaracterized you, but obviously I might have done so anyway (purposefully or not). I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism. But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made? Of course, that doesn't excuse me from making my case, so here is what I was referring to.

I chose a number of your quotes of which I claim two types characterize the overly-rationalistic debate. For example, you said, ". . . we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way." You also said, ". . . it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what 'successful' or 'useful' are supposed to mean." And then a combination of both! "That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place?"

What I find to be a problem with those types of arguments is that there is no way to propose anything without first stating assumptions (premises), and also unless we accept (even if temporarily) certain definitions. I realize either can be used improperly, and in fact often are. But the problem, I claim, is that even if one is perfectly logical there is no way to state anything and prove the truthfulness of it with pure reason alone (other than tautologies). So when you say we cannot state what is real can be tested because we've already assumed what's to be proven, what is the way out of that dilemma? I say there is no logical way out, we are stuck going in circles unless . . .

Les said: It took the addition of experience to rationality to turn circular traps into spirals which might lead “up” to knowledge.

Hugo said: How does this process work?

I remember when I first started reading philosophy I was hoping it would make me wise. Several years later I decided that it had made me dizzy because nothing was ever decided until, that is, empiricism came along. With that lots of stuff got decided. Why? The only reason I can see is the addition of experience to reason. That is what did it.

Now, in case you think I believe empiricism is the answer for everything . . . I don't. I've simply stated that experience proved its epistomological advantage very well there. But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

That has been my point to you all along. I can see how relative epistomological privilege might be allowed.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Are you intending to continue never answering questions?

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.

Do you read what I write?

For my sins, i do indeed.

It's no use taking the fact that we cannot agree intra-subjectively about what 'truth' means as entailing that we can never know any truth as individuals. It's not logical and not necessary.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur. If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another. Thus, when you say:

'Knowing' is personal, so it is me who has to decide what is true and what is not as honestly as I can (or you in your case).

... it makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuff.

So I should give up my idea of truth because you think it's insufficient? I think I'd rather you made a case first, or suggested a better idea.

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.

I said I didn't want to write an essay. What I meant was that I didn't want to write an essay.

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I was teasing you because you said you like to take opposing views, and then telling me to "attack."

You can tease all you like, but principled objection doesn't appear to be welcome here. Oh well.

I hope yon't take too personally those here who get a bit testy when they debate; besides we can't afford to lose anybody that can think!

*shrug* I don't take this stuff personally but I'm not interested in the behaviour I've had directed at me so far, in this thread.

That's what I was took my interpretation from.

Read on a little further. Quine remarks thus:

For my part i do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and i consider it to be a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistemological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No I don't, but I wouldn't set up that experiment to prove gravity either. What I would use that experiement for is to prove what happens when you jump from a tall building.

Fair enough, but my falling wouldn't prove that.

I admit I am not yet convinced that overall I missed the mark when I implied your view might be too oriented toward rationalism.

In fact, you do me a great honour: usually my name is mentioned in the same breath as irrationalist (along with "jackass" and some others i won't repeat).

But that's okay to suggest that isn't it if it leads to interesting points being made?

You can suggest i walk on all fours if you like; it seems to be the fashion here already.

But since empiricism relies only on sense experience, and I happen to know there are other types of conscious experiences, I would never award absolute epistomological privilege to empiricism, even though I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). I also don't believe you that "empiricism relies only on sense experience", not least because sense-datum accounts of knowledge are long-dead.

That has been my point to you all along.

Fair enough, but countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

 

[Canute]

I'll gladly answer you if you're able to cease mischaracterising me, offering non sequiturs and stop worrying about which box i'll fit into.

I'm not trying to fit you into a box. I can't think what gave you that idea. The question I asked was purposely a non sequitur, that why I asked it. You asked me what 'knowing' was. I was illustrating that there couldn't be an answer to it because The question is a non sequitur. (I haven't characterised you yet, so I can't have mischaracterised you).

For my sins, i do indeed.

I feel that you're reading things into what I'm writing that aren't there. That could be my fault of course.

Sure, but this is yet another rampant non sequitur.

In what way? It doesn't seem one to me.

[If you intend to discuss these matters and use terms like truth and knowledge, it's standard (indeed, basic) to ask how you understand them. Without that, we could easily misunderstand one another.

I agree, but this is the whole problem with the discussion. My view is that 'truth' can only be known from direct experience. (A view I'd call empiricism if the term didn't seem to be usually interpreted as related only to sensory experience).

In this case how can I define what truth is, since experiences are incommensurable? I'd have the same trouble explaining what I think 'pain' is. I could attempt to define truth it in relative terms, (systems of proof and so on), but much better philosophers than I have done that already. I don't need to do this, since I do not take systematic proofs or even the evidence of my senses as bringing complete certainty so I can bypass all the stuff about correspondence theories and so on. I suspect I'm roughly in agreement with Sleeth on this one.

makes perfect sense to ask what form of these terms you employ, especially if they happen to be ones of your own devising. Like i said, it's basic stuf.

Usually I'd completely agree with you. But discussions that relate to consciousness (knowing etc) are a bit different. They always have this defintion problem at their heart. As you'll know it crops up all the time in consciousness studies. It leads to strange situations - for instance Francis Crick, in papers claiming to explain consciousness, argues at the same time that we shouldn't try to define it.

The issue of 'knowing' raises all these issues and they can't be avoided. I cannot tell you what 'knowing' is, any more than you can tell me. All we can do is assume that we have the same sort of experiences and are talking about the same thing. We are only having the same discussion as researchers have about whether consciousness should be defined as 'what it is like' or more intra-subjectively. (Perhaps 'knowing' can be defined as 'what it is like to know).

*sigh* Another non sequitur. It helps in these kinds of discussions if you at least make an attempt to be charitable to the other participants. I'm trying to do likewise, but you seem to think I'm being difficult for the sake of it.

Charitable is certainly not how I'd characterise it, but I expect I don't come across as I think I do either. You sigh and shrug as if it's as if you are bored in the company of mortals.

I have no idea why you called this comment a non sequitur. I pointed out that I'm not changing my opinions just because you think I should, and before you have shown what is wrong with them. What makes that a non-sequitur?

Good for you. Are you willing to offer the more subtle version of your ideas for me to look at, either here or privately?

Of course, but this is why I was trying to figure out your angle, there are lots of ways of coming at it. But I'll give up on that since you misinterpret my motives.

In the end I'd go with this from the Kuan Tsu.

"What all people desire to know is that (meaning the external world).

But our means of knowing that is by this" (our self, our mind).

How can we know that?" (the external world)?

Only by perfecting this."

Thus I'd say that (certain) truth lies on the inside not the outside, for while 'truth' implies a fact, something that is the case (let's say) 'certainty' implies knowing, and knowing is the task of consciousness, which is not on the outside, not 'lo there or lo here' to quote the apocryphal Jesus.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Of course, Quine was quite mistaken: the question of efficaciousness is not his to decide, for it depends on the goals of those employing the many such myths that people have come up with over history. Moreover, if we happen to agree on such goals for a time, it isn't any more rational to award an epistomological privilege to physical objects than the gods for the same reason that Lakatos' methodology fails to provide any normative advice: the utility of a myth cannot be determined a priori.

No one, I think, is disputing the potential utility to people to employ myths or superstition, or any other device that helps them cope psychologoically. But I thought metacristi's initial point concerning epistomological privilege was about what helps us find proof of reality. In other words, what best contributes to knowing.

That is the problem, how can we "know that we know," as William James put it. We can believe in gods, no problem, but how will the gods help us acquire information about the nature of reality? For that matter, how can we even find the gods to ask them (or however one gets knowledge from god belief) about reality?

So the point never has been awarding epistomological privilege to physical objects over gods, except in the sense of what we actually can study and get to know. Physical reality just happens to be available to experience, gods so far have not been found.

Les said: . . . I would grant its demonstrated effectiveness in studying the physical aspects of reality.

Hugo responded: I'm afraid I'm bound to ask you how you decided that empiricism has demonstrated that (which was the point of my quoted remarks, of course). . . . countering radical skepticism (or something short of it, like we have here) by saying that it gets us nowhere doesn't justify the epistemological privilege we've been discussing.

I do not see how we can leave "utility" out of what we value epistomologically. I want some reassurance that my methods of knowing are actually giving me knowledge. How do I achieve that?

Well, trying to figure out how reality works by ideas, reason and imagination alone left us perpetually undecided. There were no reassurances to be found in purely rationalistic endeavors. We can say there are gods, but anyone can say "how do you know?". We can say we know because our belief in gods makes us feel better, but then anyone can say "maybe, but you've assumed what we're asking you to demonstrate." Thus, these arguments keep reason alone from ever being able to decide for sure about knowing.

So we add a test, and the test is what "works." Now, the rationalist can also demand justification for why what "works" should be assigned any particular epistomological priviledge. We cannot justify it rationally, just like we cannot justify anything with pure rationality. What we've done, essentially, is decided rationality needs something more to work epistomologically, and so we added two entirely different components to rationality: experience, and, less formally, utility.

The current epistomological paradigm seems to be that we rely on rationality to consider if something is true, we try to observe what we propose, and then (when possible) we try to use what we've observed in some practical application. The feedback particularly from something "working" indicates reality has been perceived correctly. Can we doubt it? Yes, but only with radical skepticism. The evidence is mounted before our eyes.

Of course, just being able to manipulate physical reality doesn't mean we've understood all there is to understand about what exists. I catch thinkers here at PF assuming all the time that because of the successes of empiricism at producing knowledge, that empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge; and that because empiricism only produces physical knowledge, physicalism has been all but proven. But those assumption overlook a huge possibility which is, that the only reason physical aspects are being discovered through empiricism is because physical aspects are all empiricism is capable of revealing!

The interior world of consciousness, though under attack by the physicalist hopefuls, still holds itself aloof from their reductionist efforts. I still think experience is what we need to study the nature of consciousness, just not sense experience.

 

[Canute]

Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's. Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

 

[olde drunk]

Les: your comments are worth a second read.

may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.

that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.

love and peace,
olde drunk

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les - Nice post. Also utility is strange measure of the success of science. Firstly it is anthropomorphic. Firearms weren't useful for dodo's.

It doesn't really matter to my point if it's anthropomorphic . . . dodo's found what worked for them too. I'll explain more of what I mean as I answer your post. I am going to mix up the order of your statements a bit to help me keep from repeating myself.

Are you sure your use of 'empricism' is correct? According to its general dictionary meaning the methods of meditative practice are just as empirical as those of science, and technically more so.

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data. Meditation is experience, but what one learns from it is not via sense experience. I think you know I am an advocate for the value of that "inner" experience, so I hope you don't think I am discounting it. I am just granting empiricism the standards of its own definition.

Secondly that a piece of information is useful does not make it true. Most theistic systems were useful in their context. I don't suppose the Incas would have got the practice of human sacrifice off the ground without the knowledge that the Sun was a God.

I made a mistake when I accepted Hugo's term "utility" without explaining what I meant. I assumed everyone was familiar with philosophical pragmatism, which I can now see was a bit egocentric . . . more below.

Perhaps I'm coming at it from the wrong direction, but I can't see how the usefulness of a piece of knowledge can be any guide to its truth unless some judgement is made as to the benefit or disbenefit of using it is jusged against some yardstick, (human happiness, material wealth or spirtual progress etc). At the moment we say science is useful but all we mean is that we use it.

My perspective on "utility" or "usefulness" is pragmatic in the sense that Pierce, James, et al, developed the pragmatic concept. This uniquely American philosophy truly reflects our down-to-earth attitude (later hair splitting disputes notwithstanding). I can't express how much I love it as an unpretentious standard for evaluating if one has accurately perceived or understood reality. However, to use it one cannot evaluate superficially; one must have the wisdom to realize that what first shows up in a situation very often isn't all there is to it.

Let's start with a simple example. If I propose humans will be most likely to survive if they cooperate, I can test that by figuring out how to get people to cooperate, and then seeing how that "works." If we really do thrive when we cooperate, then a principle may have been validated. I emphasize "may" because the cooperative experiment will almost certainly develop aspects down the road that didn't show up in the beginning. So a second part of the test is to do cooperativeness over time.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. But has it really worked?

They have not correctly understood what it is that leads to crop decimation, and so they likely will not focus enough on figuring out how to prepare for the idiosyncrasies of nature. Also, like a child who is beaten while growing up, their brutality desensitizes people, and encourages them to accept that as the norm. Violence as a standard has proven not to be socially beneficial. So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.

Along comes the scientist, and he says, "let's not just speculate, let's look at what we can do to prepare for hard times." We study climate and weather patterns, we do statistical studies on past frequencies of conditions, we calculate how much people need to survive desperate times . . . When we have accurately portrayed the way reality is, then our plans should "work." When we haven't, then we get wiped out.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, say, in a solar cell. The model predicts that resident electrons in a semiconductor material will be forced out by sunlight, and then other electrons migrating into vacated positions through an external circuit will create a current. When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les: your comments are worth a second read.

may I add that we all have annecdotal evidence of how our belief system has been a tool in gaining knowledge and manipulating physical reality. unfortunately, this does not satisfy or lend itself to scientific measurement.

that is why all truths are subjective. even empericism. they create a view based on their inner belief. as they look outward, that is all they observe.

love and peace,
olde drunk

I hope you read my response to Canute; I believe I've argued well that my evidence isn't merely anecdotal.

However, I think you might be expressing something I believe, which is that our consciousness is not a perfectly-confirming tool of the truth. The situation isn't really, in my opinion, that all "truths" are subjective; but rather, it is that we humans are nothing but subjective and so we have no other avenue to the truth. We cannot possibly escape it because no matter how "objective" we try to be, there is no way to avoid the reality that what we experience and think is taking place inside our consciousness.

I also agree that (I hope this is what you are saying) that looking "outward" confirms what devoted empiricists already believe. I think a great many people have a priori decided that what's "out there" is all there is. If that is all one is looking for, and if that is all one accepts as "truth," then obviously anything else which might exist is going to be missed.

 

[Canute]

You probably know that general dictionaries are often not relevant to philosophical definitions because dictionaries are intended to help with language, and so include all the ways a word is employed by the general populace. I am using empiricism as a synonym for science, and there it very strictly limits acceptable "experience" to sense experience, and acceptable information to sense data.

I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.

Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.

Now let's consider your example of human sacrifice. Humans fearful of the unpredictableness and destructiveness of nature believe a god is behind that, and that if they sacrifice a human, the god will be pleased and not destroy their crops, etc. Because of what they believe, after the sacrifice they feel better . . . their fear is assuaged. In that way, human sacrifice "worked" because they are not as afraid. But has it really worked?

I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.

So although it appears at first that human sacrifice "works," in terms of all the effects it has, in actuality it doesn't work very well at all.

But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.

A much less dramatic example of the pragmatist idea is how well the predictions and calculations for the development of a physical tool are confirmed when we get around to testing it, snip... When we build that device and it "works" as we predicted, then a little bit more of our understanding of reality has been confirmed.

I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.

But don't get me wrong, I am not trying to limit what "works" to physical stuff. What works to make us happier, wiser, more content? I do not mean to imply that utility is only that which benefits us physically.

Yes I realize that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I understand that this is what you're doing and why, but I wonder whether we should let academics steal our language. It is now impossible to use the word 'empirical' with its proper (philosophical) meaning because it has been given a narrow scientific definition and there is no term to replace it. This keeps happening and I believe that it affects the way we think about such issues. People now believe that science is more 'empirical' than experience, which is incoherent but true according to the new defintion.

Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.

Regarding utility I see what you mean, but find it an odd view. It lacks any objective standards. On this view if we predict that Thalidomide will deform babies and it does then it is useful. Or have I misunderstood 'pragmatism'.

Yes, I don't think you have understood it (I will try to answer some of your objections below). I HIGHLY recommend giving pragmatism a look if you haven't ever studied it. I did a thread on it in the old PF, but maybe I'll try another one after the two I have planned already.

I think it has yes. Of course in hindsight it was a daft idea, but at the time it could be defined as a useful practice, at least as long as the crops came up. They wouldn't have done it if they hadn't thought it was useful. 'Useful' is what we think is useful.

But they had quite a civilisation so it served its purpose. I feel 'pragmatism' does not work unless you unconsciously (or explicitly) build in assumptions and values that are arbitrary. For instance, you cite the case of a knowledge that helps humans to survive in greater numbers. If you substitute cockroaches for humans the example doesn't seem to work so well.

In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time. If you look at what has caused a great deal of misinterpretation in the past, it has always been the rush to form conclusions before all the evidence was in.

In the days of Henry Ford, it was believed the way you motivated a worker was to keep him intimidated. If you looked at the new situation of an assembly line, it seemed this theory might be correct. But as people got used to that situation, the downside began to show itself.

Lots of things are like that. Heroin is a great way to relieve stress . . . up front that is. The backside of heroin use reveals itself after one does it for awhile.

Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?

My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.

I think that's my point - it confirms our understanding but it does not confirm that our understanding is correct. It is common for scientific predictions to come true but for misunderstood reasons. When we call scientific knowledge useful we don't say anything other than that we use it.

Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true. We might not have perfect understanding yet of everything involved in the success we had (which often shows up when the cell fails or operates in ways not predicted by the concept), but nonetheless certain things are confirmed.

I am not saying that anything can be taken at face value with pragmatism, it has to be worked with intelligently, thoroughly, and patiently -- just like we must do in any investigative approach. The hurry to reach conclusions is a perennial problem for all interpretative efforts.

Yes I realize that. But I would argue that knowledge gained through inner experience is not just empirical but also useful. This is because my yardstick for usefulness is human happiness. Having a yardstick allows me to be pragmatic about utility without begging the question of what utility is, or having to define it self-referentially. But this is probably an idiosyncratic view.

Right, that's what I said (or meant). I think happiness is incredibly practical. I can't see any reason to limit practicality to physical stuff.

 

[Canute]

Yes, I agree. It's too bad we can't share the word empirical without causing confusion. I've been contemplating doing a thread on "experientialism" which might be a better word anyway. When I researched it on Google, the only thing I didn't like about it was that the definition had it opposed to intuitionism. I know what the author meant, but I wouldn't want to eliminate intuition as a means to help one look for where to find verifying experience.

I agree. I'll look out for the thread.

In your examples, you left out a condition I included in my response to you: observance over time.

It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.

Not letting your wife out of the house "works" to keep her faithful, but what sort of overall relationship does it create when a person isn't faithful because they want to be?

Have you been talking to her?

My point is, one cannot properly evaluate any proposed theory or behavior by only looking at part of it. So to criticize pragmatism because something "appears" to work when looked at piecemeal or superficially is not a fair criticism.

I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.

I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.

The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.

Not true. I think you are mixing up interpretation with observation. When that solar cell "works" to create a current, and we have designed that cell to do exactly what it did applying principles based on certain ways we believe reality functions, then we have confirmed to some degree our understanding of the way reality works is true.

I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.

For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.

 

[Les Sleeth]

It might look like that but actually I didn't leave out. I just took into account that any timescale you choose to observe over is totally arbitrary. There is never a particular moment when you can stop observing and make a judgement.

I didn't mean time exactly, I meant to look at any situation with sufficient depth to see its patterns develop -- it just so happens that takes time.

I agree that one should try to see the bigger picture, but one can never hope to see much of it, and it'll look different depending on when you choose to look, and at what.

My approach is to do the best I can, see the biggest I can, be as thorough as I can. I only have the conscious tools I have; the issue for me is what helps me understand. No intellectual tool is perfect as far as I can see, but every little bit helps. I can tell you without the slightest exaggeration that I am almost obsessed with the technique of looking for what "works." As I said, one uses it intelligently, realizing its limitations.

I'm not suggesting that science is not useful. I'm suggesting that any measure of its usefulness is arbitrary. 'Usefulness' has no objective meaning as far as I can tell, and no subjective one until one has chosen a yardstick (happiness, cheaper energy or whatever). Until this is done one cannot even measure it pragmatically.

The question of knowledge or scientific data or whatever then becomes not whether it is useful or not, a question with no meaning, but what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it.

It's too bad we got stuck on usefulness. I was trying to segue from Hugo's comment about utility to the idea of pragmatism, which isn't a precise fit. A better description is what "works" in the sense of creating some technology, social system, business plan, etc. and then observing how it functions, looking for areas that thrive and also for areas that seem to less effective. I agree in can be used as you say, to help us with "what are we trying to achieve and does it help us achieve it." But for me I take it much further.

It is possible that pragmatism works best for someone who believes reality has a "nature." That is, some existential bottom line which cannot change essentially. I do believe that reality in general has an immutable aspect and human nature too. So when something works, whether technology or within the human realm, I suspect that its conformed to that nature. Personally, I have yet to find a better intellectual technique to guide me in contemplating the nature of reality.

I agree. However I'm not quite sure what follows from that. The fact that we can make predictions from theories only shows that we have spotted a pattern in the behaviour of some subset of physical entities. It hardly constitutes an understanding of anything, and such theories cannot be judged to either true or false.

You seem in too much of a hurry to understand. If you've seen a pattern, then as far as I'm concerned that has potential value. Later you might observe something else which, when considered with the pattern, will help you understand the overall situation.

For instance microphenominalism supposes that photons are conscious. It has respectable proponents. One is David Bohm who speculates about what his pilot wave actually is. This approach is scientifically pointless, completely untestable and offering no greater predictive powers than current theories. However it could be true. If we decided it was then this would give us a completely different understanding of reality without in any way changing the way solar cells work.

You are now talking about something quite different from pragmatic evaluation. I've never suggested it has much value in speculative or purely theoretical thinking (except possibly for inductive thinking). We can't understand what we can't experience, and so if we can't experience anything that indicates a photon is conscious, there won't be a way to take that idea any further.

You know, pragmatic evaluation isn't meant to replace other mental techniques we make use of. It is another evaluative tool. One has to use it empiricially (in the sense of your meaning of empiricism), carefully, objectively, etc., and even then it is just an "indicator" and not some absolute determining factor.

 

[Canute]

I'm not quite clear whether we really disagree on this or not.

I agree totally with pragmatically assessing the usefulness of new ideas based on what happens. But surely this can only be done after we have defined what we mean by useful, and defining 'useful' has nothing to with pragmatism, it has to do with our agenda and goals. If we want to reduce the population of rabbits then spreading a fatal disease amongst them is useful. However it's not at all useful if we are trying to increase the population. 'Usefulness' only has meaning relative to a goal or overall purpose. Without this context it can only be an empty term.

This is what I meant by saying that 'usefulness' should not be applied to scientific discoveries and methods prior to defining what science is trying to achieve. The term can have no meaning before that is done.

So I'm not in any way against pragmatism, just saying that we have to know what we're being pragmatic about before we start making judgements of usefulness.

At the moment we seem to assume that a discovery is useful if something can be done with it, but this strikes me as a misuse of the term.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm not quite clear whether we really disagree on this or not.

I agree totally with pragmatically assessing the usefulness of new ideas based on what happens. But surely this can only be done after we have defined what we mean by useful, and defining 'useful' has nothing to with pragmatism, it has to do with our agenda and goals. If we want to reduce the population of rabbits then spreading a fatal disease amongst them is useful. However it's not at all useful if we are trying to increase the population. 'Usefulness' only has meaning relative to a goal or overall purpose. Without this context it can only be an empty term.

This is what I meant by saying that 'usefulness' should not be applied to scientific discoveries and methods prior to defining what science is trying to achieve. The term can have no meaning before that is done.

So I'm not in any way against pragmatism, just saying that we have to know what we're being pragmatic about before we start making judgements of usefulness.

At the moment we seem to assume that a discovery is useful if something can be done with it, but this strikes me as a misuse of the term.

I think you might have overlooked one thing I said: "It's too bad we got stuck on usefulness. I was trying to segue from Hugo's comment about utility to the idea of pragmatism, which isn't a precise fit. A better description is what "works" in the sense of creating some technology, social system, business plan, etc. and then observing how it functions, looking for areas that thrive and also for areas that seem to less effective."

So forget about "useful," it is not directly relevant to pragmatic evaluation. The standard is what "works," in the sense of paying attention to how designing things (systems) relying on our concepts about the nature of reality is confirmed or contradicted by how well something functions after applying what we've hypothesized to be true.

 

[Canute]

I can go along with that. However in relation to the utility or truth of scientific knowledge, whether the truth of such knowledge should be judged by its 'usefulness', this just seems to shift the problem to what we mean by 'works', and whether this is any better a guide to its value or truth.

Because of this, linking back to the earlier issue, we cannot automatically grant epistemilogical privilege to knowledge gained through scientific methods. Knowledge gained through some other methods also work, and it could be argued that it works much better.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I can go along with that. However in relation to the utility or truth of scientific knowledge, whether the truth of such knowledge should be judged by its 'usefulness', this just seems to shift the problem to what we mean by 'works', and whether this is any better a guide to its value or truth.

Well, I can tell you don't like the pragmatic idea much, which is perfectly okay of course. If you were to read carefully the specific way I've said it is applied, I don't think your stated objections are anything I am talking about. Almost any valuable process can be applied either obtusely or in an enlightened way. I have been recommending the enlightened approach.

Because of this, linking back to the earlier issue, we cannot automatically grant epistemilogical privilege to knowledge gained through scientific methods. Knowledge gained through some other methods also work, and it could be argued that it works much better.

I agree, and in fact that is what I've been implying. I would in no way limit what "works" to science. I do however recognize science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality.

 

[Canute]

Well, I can tell you don't like the pragmatic idea much, which is perfectly okay of course. If you were to read carefully the specific way I've said it is applied, I don't think your stated objections are anything I am talking about. Almost any valuable process can be applied either obtusely or in an enlightened way. I have been recommending the enlightened approach.

No, I'm quite happy with pragmatism, I'm just suggesting that whether one takes a pragmatic approach or not it doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing. This directly relates to the issue below.

I agree, and in fact that is what I've been implying. I would in no way limit what "works" to science. I do however recognize science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality.

Your second sentence here is tautological. Of course science is the best way of producing a testable physicalist explanation of the phsyical world. It would be very surprising if that wasn't true. However this in no way helps us decide the absolute epistemilogical status of its methods and knowledge, or the truth or falsity of its model of reality.

 

[Les Sleeth]

No, I'm quite happy with pragmatism, I'm just suggesting that whether one takes a pragmatic approach or not it doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing. This directly relates to the issue below.


Your second sentence here is tautological. Of course science is the best way of producing a testable physicalist explanation of the phsyical world. It would be very surprising if that wasn't true. However this in no way helps us decide the absolute epistemilogical status of its methods and knowledge, or the truth or falsity of its model of reality.

Ha! I knew it, you are not happy with pragmatism.

Here we go again, but to say it "doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing" tells me you don't accept it as a valid method of evaluation.

In this conversation neither of us have said empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge. To me the issues we've been discussing go beyond science, and have extended into the general issue of how one acquires knowledge.

I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

I've made no absolute statements even about science's ability to reveal physical aspects; I've only said it has been more effective (at revealing physical aspects) than any other method we now have at our disposal. I did not say or imply it had any epistomological value beyond that because I don't think it does. But why not grant to science what science really has demonstrated it can do? My argument isn't with that, but rather it is with the assumption some science enthusiasts make that only science gives us knowledge and therefore it deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

This gets us back to my test of a pragmatist evalution of science. I claimed to Hugo that we can tell science is effective in its realm because of how well it predicts and produces things that work (again, physically). By the same standard, we can also judge it by how poorly it predicts or produces things that work. What does it tell us about God? Nothing. Does that mean God does not exist, or instead does it simply tell us science doesn't work with issues of God?

And then we of course can ask . . . well, what does work? Good question I think. I like turning inward, that works for me. Will it "work" for you? You have to try what I do and tell me if it works for you because I cannot observe inside you to find out if it works.

As I said, what "works" in my little pragmatic system is not limited to mundane utility issues (although I use it extensively there too); in truth, for me the main thing I care about is what works to give me understanding, happiness, peace, wisdom, enlightenment, knowledge of God . . . I can honestly report that that practical attitude toward such qualities has helped me weed out lots of deadends quickly, and kept me learning what I want to learn. If it can't prove it works . . . out with it!

 

[metacristi]

Nicely said,indeed we cannot award to science an absolute priviledge,as a matter of fact very few repsectable scientists really claim this.The point is that so far it is the best 'tool' making sense of the observed reality,it's accepted enunciations deserving to be the standard of knowledge,accepted by all would be rational people.

In gnoseology,and implicitly in epistemology,knowledge is defined as being a set of enunciations for which exist sufficient reasons to be considered as being true (provisionally of course we can never attain certitudes in science).Thus to accept something as being knowledge (in general) we must have reasons for that,reasons which are represented by the correspondence with facts (in the form of highly coherent enunciations explaining/describing facts accurately,making also predictions).Since the scientific method has proved to be the most successful so far we are entitled to consider now as being part from the standard of knowledge only the enunciations that have been inferred (not deduced) from observed facts using the actual variant of the scientific method.In spite of the possible attacks on what success means the success of scientific induction is a reality,indeed the so called 'common truths',inferred hastily by people,are very unreliable (anyway there is no alternative,enough different and highly coherent,set of enunciations which to replace the actual accepted scientific knowledge).This does not mean that other enunciations are forbidden to be considered knowledge,on a purely personal base,when a ground exist and the scientific inquiry is not possible (for example the existence of extraterrestrials) but in any case are those people (whose interpretation of some strange,personal,observations is that aliens do exist) entitled to claim that that assumption (aliens exist) makes part from the standard of knowledge if she does not provide also some sufficient reasons for that (at least a scientific hypothesis,making new testable predictions,with prospects to become a scientific theory).The same is valid also in the case of consciousness.

 

[Canute]

This is odd, I replied to this previously but my reply disppeared. Oh well.

Ha! I knew it, you are not happy with pragmatism.

I'm perfectly happy with pragmatism, in fact I practice it assiduously. But one has to have something to be pragmatic about.

Here we go again, but to say it "doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing" tells me you don't accept it as a valid method of evaluation.

Look at it this way. In business 'management by objectives' is considered a useful management tool. It is pragmatic. It depends on constant monitoring of performance against targets, with targets quantified and methods of measurement agreed. It is a very pragmatic means of judging performance. However it doesn't work at all until targets have been agreed upon.

In this conversation neither of us have said empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

By my definition of empiricism, which is "the view that all knowledge is based on or derived from experience" (Penguin Dict. of Philosophy) meditational practice is more empirical than scientific 'third-person' observation. I do not see any objection to this view. This is especially so when one considers that it is commonly argued that certain knowledge is identical with its object, a scenario only achievable introspectively.

To me the issues we've been discussing go beyond science, and have extended into the general issue of how one acquires knowledge.

Absolutely. Discussions of knowledge inevitably go beyond science.

I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

Does it matter who says it? The statement says that science is the best method of doing science.

I've made no absolute statements even about science's ability to reveal physical aspects; I've only said it has been more effective (at revealing physical aspects) than any other method we now have at our disposal.

I don't disagree with that. After all it'd be a sorry state of affairs if it wasn't true. Physical aspects are science's specialism.

But why not grant to science what science really has demonstrated it can do?

I do, but no more than that.

My argument isn't with that, but rather it is with the assumption some science enthusiasts make that only science gives us knowledge and therefore it deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

I think I understand your view, which mostly I agree with, and I realize that you're not arguing for absolute priviledge. However I am. I'm suggesting that direct experience has absolute epistemilogical priviledge. As far as I'm aware this is the orthodox philosophical view. Science is good at what it does, but what does it does not do includes producing certain or absolute knowledge.

This gets us back to my test of a pragmatist evalution of science. I claimed to Hugo that we can tell science is effective in its realm because of how well it predicts and produces things that work (again, physically). By the same standard, we can also judge it by how poorly it predicts or produces things that work.

This is not pragmatic until you have defined 'works'. That may sound pedantic but it is the point at issue.

What does it tell us about God? Nothing. Does that mean God does not exist, or instead does it simply tell us science doesn't work with issues of God?

Never mind God, science cannot ever tell us what matter is. The moment science gets near to reality it is of no use, it becomes metaphysics. These are its limits.

And then we of course can ask . . . well, what does work? Good question I think. I like turning inward, that works for me. Will it "work" for you? You have to try what I do and tell me if it works for you because I cannot observe inside you to find out if it works.

What do you mean by 'works'?

As I said, what "works" in my little pragmatic system is not limited to mundane utility issues (although I use it extensively there too); in truth, for me the main thing I care about is what works to give me understanding, happiness, peace, wisdom, enlightenment, knowledge of God . . . I can honestly report that that practical attitude toward such qualities has helped me weed out lots of deadends quickly, and kept me learning what I want to learn. If it can't prove it works . . . out with it!

I know what you're saying and I agree. However note that here you have started by defined what you mean by 'works'. (Not addressing just mundane utility issues, but understanding and happiness etc). Once you have done that I'm happy with pramatism. You probably do this defining it unconsciously so may think 'works' has some absolute meaning, but it doesn't, and you can't measure something without a yardstick, however pragmatic you are.

What I'm arguing, underneath the detail, is that there is no way of measuring the value of scientific enquiry that is not anthropomorphic and arbitrary. That doesn't mean it isn't worth doing, but just that we should not be dogmatic about the value of science, or the absolute value of the relative knowledge that it produces. 'Works' is mostly self-defining within science, but not in any wider view.

As a route to knowledge science has its strengths, but it also has weaknesses. I think we should accept both.

Mathematician Spencer-Brown also wrote a book called Only Two Can Play This Game (1972). He wrote it under the pseudonym of James Keys. It is dedicated "To his Coy Mistress." It begins with a "Prescript" which itself begins: "If like me you were brought up in a western culture, with the doctrine that everything has a scientific explanation, there will be certain ideas you will not be allowed to know.” This is someone who Russell thanked for solving a few of his set-theoretic problems, so he was no fool.

 

[Les Sleeth]

This is odd, I replied to this previously but my reply disppeared. Oh well.

Something didn't work.

I'm perfectly happy with pragmatism, in fact I practice it assiduously. But one has to have something to be pragmatic about.

I am not exaggerating when I say I am pragmatic about everything.

I know what you're saying and I agree. However note that here you have started by defined what you mean by 'works'. (Not addressing just mundane utility issues, but understanding and happiness etc). Once you have done that I'm happy with pramatism. You probably do this defining it unconsciously so may think 'works' has some absolute meaning, but it doesn't, and you can't measure something without a yardstick, however pragmatic you are.

Actually I defined "works" earlier. I explained I am not content to label something as working until I observe all its consequences. In your example of manangement by objectives, which I have utilized myself, it really does work if it is applied properly. I've counseled managers who over-planned details to the point that keeping track of progress took so much time nothing ever got done. How did I judge that? Well, I know that when people have come together to do business, they need to achieve certain things for the business to survive, and those things weren't getting done with those managers. Of course, if you ask them, they thought MBO was working perfectly for them; but the reason they did was because they weren't looking at the big picture.

Now we could take that a bit further and say, even if the business were thriving, what if the business was one which made cigarettes? That business directly contributes to the deaths of a lot of people, and so while the business is successful, as far as improving the health of society, it doesn't work. So is this business working or not?

Well, I'd say MBO works, when done properly, to bring about effective management. I'd say the business is working if it gives its employees a living. And I'd say that selling cigarettes doesn't work to bring about a healthy society. Each case has its own internal standards, but none of that has to do with the principle of what "works."

If you are concerned I will be so impressed by something working I won't look beyond its immediate application, don't worry. You've talked about a "yardstick." Well, ultimately for me reality is the yardstick I use. I see reality itself as what both allows some things to work, and doesn't allow other things to work. Does the Mafia work? Partially; it may take more time, but the part that doesn't work is destroying it. Does a serial killing work for the killer? Partially; but the part that doesn't work destroys him. Does heroin work? Partially; but . . .

Does love work. Yes, and I've never found a down side if there is one. Does understanding work? Yes, and I've never found a down side if there is one. Does meditation work? Yep, and if it is done correctly I've never found a down side if there is one.

So some things seem to work from start to finish, other things need wisdom to see the full consequences. That is why I still say, the pragmatic perspective, when understood and applied properly, is an excellent means for evaluating things.

Les said: I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

Canute said: Does it matter who says it? The statement says that science is the best method of doing science.

I did not say science is the best method of doing science! I said science is best at investigating the physical aspects of reality. There are other means, such as astrology or psychic detectives, and my statement was meant to place science above those other means in terms of producing consistent results.

When I claimed it might be tautological for the 100% physicalist, I was being a little sarcastic. What I meant was, that for him reality can only be exposed through science. I think it is worth keeping the ideas of science and physical reality separate if for no other reason than to point out the limitations of science.

What I'm arguing, underneath the detail, is that there is no way of measuring the value of scientific enquiry that is not anthropomorphic and arbitrary. That doesn't mean it isn't worth doing, but just that we should not be dogmatic about the value of science, or the absolute value of the relative knowledge that it produces. 'Works' is mostly self-defining within science, but not in any wider view.

I don't know about anthropomorphic; I suspect you might mean humanity-centered, and if so I would agree. But so what? That's all I really care about. Even the health of planet Earth and preserving other life forms I support because I believe humanity will benefit overall. In fact, I can't think of anything I do which ultimately isn't because of my human-centered value system. How can we escape self interest? It is hardly arbitrary if we are capable of being no other way than self-interested. I believe we cannot be any other way, but we can develop enlightened self interest where what we want is good for us and harms no others (and maybe even helps others).

Science can certainly be beneficial to humanity, and that makes me attach value to it.

As a route to knowledge science has its strengths, but it also has weaknesses. I think we should accept both.

True, but everything has its strengths and weakness, including meditation (e.g., I would not rely on it to study physics). I might be wrong but it seems you are hesitant to give science its due. I thought the main objection was to science devotees who try to claim that what science can't reveal must not exist or be relevant, and not to the epistomological methods of science itself. I don't see how anyone can question how effective those methods have been, which was metacristi's point, and to which I agree as long as he doesn't mean to assign absolute epistomological privilege to science (notice I avoided the term "empiricism"? )

 

[metacristi]

There is absolutely no reason now to claim an absolute epistemological privilege for science and the actual variant of empiricism used to establish what is real,not even in what empiricism in general is concerned,since science is based on a series of assumptions regarding the existence of an objective reality and some alternative,highly coherent and sufficiently different,systems of enunciations,potentially better on long run,are logically possible (so far no such successful approach,potentially having a new method,has been proposed).

Still for the moment,from all we know using the principle of sufficient reason,the best approach is empiricism.In accordance with the criterions of truth defined within gnoseology and epistemology (the correspondence with facts+internal coherence+coherence with other accepted enunciations+finally integration within larger-as scope-theories),our models of reality must be non contradictory and capable to describe/explain as many as possible of the observed features of reality.Since at the base of model making is the analogical reasoning,we expect our models to be able to reveal also new features of reality based on what we observe (counting also as predictions of our models).This is why the predictory power (new predictions) is crucial,otherwise there is no good reason to think that our model is something more than an ad hoc explanation without any further prospects.It is exactly here where science's way of knowing has proved superior,so far at least,to all other approaches,giving consistent results,always providing sufficient reasons for its assumptions.This is why when scientists say it's dangerous to carry radioactive materials in the pocket all rational people will avoid this but when an astrologer predicts that on May 12 2011 will come the end of the world very few will really believe.Common knowledge is very unreliable,it usually lacks the sufficient reasons needed.Finally there is no proof that other methods cannot be better indeed (including here the process of establishing what hypotheses deserve to be scientific-now based on the principle of sufficient reason also) unfortunately no one has been found so far.If they exist and can be found by us then certainly no rational people would try to prevent them become the science of tomorrow,we must always define a standard of knowledge,provisionally.

 

[Canute]

Something didn't work.

Lol

I am not exaggerating when I say I am pragmatic about everything.

Nor me.

Actually I defined "works" earlier. I explained I am not content to label something as working until I observe all its consequences.

How do you know which consequences equal 'works', and which equal 'does not work'. Only be defining your objectives.

In your example of manangement by objectives, which I have utilized myself, it really does work if it is applied properly.

I didn't say it didn't work. (Actually I don't think it does, but that's irrelevant here) All I was pointing out was that it is management by objectives. If you have no objectives you have nothing to measure, pragmatically or not. I'm afraid I don't yet understand why you disagree with this.

Now we could take that a bit further and say, even if the business were thriving, what if the business was one which made cigarettes? That business directly contributes to the deaths of a lot of people, and so while the business is successful, as far as improving the health of society, it doesn't work. So is this business working or not?

Depends who you ask. For the managers it's working well. I'm not suggesting that we have to make moral judgements when deciding whether something works or not. We can use any yardstick we like.

If you are concerned I will be so impressed by something working I won't look beyond its immediate application, don't worry.

I have no argument with the way you decide whether something works or not. I do the same. However in both cases our objectives are self-defined, not absolute.

You've talked about a "yardstick." Well, ultimately for me reality is the yardstick I use.

How can you use reality as a yardstick unless you know what it is and understand it? I think what you mean is that you use the evidence of your senses as your yardstick, not at all the same thing.

Does meditation work?

This is an unaswerable question. If you want to know about some kinds of things it does not work, if you want to know about others it does. 'Works' doesn't mean anything until you decide on what you're trying to do.

I did not say science is the best method of doing science! I said science is best at investigating the physical aspects of reality.

I find it odd that you value meditation yet say this, and do not see the self-circularity in it. The two sentences are equivalent. It's like saying meditation is the best way of gaining the knowledge one gains through meditation. It can't possibly not be true.

There are other means, such as astrology or psychic detectives, and my statement was meant to place science above those other means in terms of producing consistent results.

I don't believe that astrology or psychic detective work produces knowledge, but I could be wrong. I'd certainly put science above these.

I don't know about anthropomorphic; I suspect you might mean humanity-centered, and if so I would agree. But so what?

So it follows that there is no absolute way of measuring the usefulness of science, whether it works or not, or whether the fact that in scientific terms it works tells us anything much about whether the scientific model is is true. We have to measure it anthropocentrically (you're right, that's what I meant).

That's all I really care about.

Even the health of planet Earth and preserving other life forms I support because I believe humanity will benefit overall.

Is that really true? It seems rather a selfish view.

In fact, I can't think of anything I do which ultimately isn't because of my human-centered value system. How can we escape self interest? It is hardly arbitrary if we are capable of being no other way than self-interested. I believe we cannot be any other way, but we can develop enlightened self interest where what we want is good for us and harms no others (and maybe even helps others).

I'm afraid I disagree violently, but I don't want to start another disagreement.

Science can certainly be beneficial to humanity, and that makes me attach value to it.

What do you mean by 'beneficial'.

True, but everything has its strengths and weakness, including meditation (e.g., I would not rely on it to study physics). I might be wrong but it seems you are hesitant to give science its due.

Not at all. I've been giving it its due throughout. I think you are giving it more than its due by unconsciously measuring it by its own standards, which are bound to be flattering.

I thought the main objection was to science devotees who try to claim that what science can't reveal must not exist

It's more subtle than that. I would also claim this.

I don't see how anyone can question how effective those methods have been, which was metacristi's point, and to which I agree as long as he doesn't mean to assign absolute epistomological privilege to science (notice I avoided the term "empiricism"? )

What do you mean by 'effective'?

 

[Les Sleeth]

How do you know which consequences equal 'works', and which equal 'does not work'. . . . If you have no objectives you have nothing to measure, pragmatically or not. I'm afraid I don't yet understand why you disagree with this. . . . We can use any yardstick we like. . . . in both cases our objectives are self-defined, not absolute. . . . 'Works' doesn't mean anything until you decide on what you're trying to do. . . . What do you mean by 'beneficial' . . . What do you mean by 'effective'? . . . How can you use reality as a yardstick unless you know what it is and understand it? I think what you mean is that you use the evidence of your senses as your yardstick, not at all the same thing.

I suspect if we talked in person I could explain myself better, trying to cover all the avenues in writing can be frustrating at times. As of now, the responses I chose in the above clips let me know you're not understanding me. Believe me, there's no need to question me about setting objectives. And I do NOT mean the evidence of my senses only. I assume I've not been clear enough about what I mean, so let me try one more time to explain myself.

Let me start off with your remarks about defining what's effective or beneficial. Personally I feel it's a waste of time to talk about that in relation to my meaning of pragmatism because I willing to grant any achievement can be considered effective or beneficial to a situation short term. So you want to shoot your wife? Well, a gun is effective and beneficial to your objective. I am not attaching any value judgements whatsoever to the chosen action. What "works" minimully is anything, and I mean anything, that helps someone achieve an objective.

But people's short term objectives are almost always linked to higher level goals. If you wanted to shoot your wife for the insurance money, I'd start questioning you about what you ultimately want. Why do you want the money? Because you will get out of debt and get to buy things. Why do you want to do that? You think it will make you feel good. After killing your wife and spending that money will you really feel good? And so on . . . In the end I'd ask, so will killing your wife really "work" in terms of your ultimate goal?

The truth is, everything people do is for the purpose of getting what they want, but everything they are doing doesn't necessarily lead to the results they hope for. Why not? Here we get into a little of the deeper meaning of pragmatic evaluation the way I am using it.

I believe that apparent reality has an underlying nature. I've come to that conclusion after noticing reality consistantly functions in certain ways. So the way I use pragmatic evalution is with ONE overall objective: I use the pragmatic approach as a general method to find clues about the underlying nature of reality.

What I do is to look for any sign, whatsoever, that some set of conditions, circumstances, operations, principles, etc. consistantly functions in specific ways. When I think I see that, I pay attention to it because if I can understand something about the underlying aspect, I can design stuff in harmony with that. The assumption is, the more something is designed in harmony with the underlying nature of reality, the better it will work in terms of achieving desired results and consistancy. By the same token, anything working as predicted and consistantly reflects something about that underlying nature. So my pragmatism is an epistomological technique, a way to look for clues.

Now, I rely on two classes of pragmatic evalution. One is for understanding "stuff," as science does (such as in my earlier solar cell example). As I said, I've not found anything better than science for investigating stuff. And the other is human consciousness, which like the rest of reality I think has a "nature" too. But each has different rules for success when designing systems for/with them, as far as I can tell. Human situations, for example, seem to thrive best when they assist people in being happy, developing as individuals, and achieving things.

Is that really true? It seems rather a selfish view. . . . I'm afraid I disagree violently, but I don't want to start another disagreement.

Well, if you believe we are at our best when we are conscious and happy, if you think we are most conscious and happy when doing things that help us thrive, and if you believe to thrive our actions must harmonize with nature, etc. . . . then there is no reason to be concerned about someone who wants to focus on furthering the consciousness and happiness of humnity over all else. I don't see it as selfish, I see it as practical. Afterall, it is unconscious and miserable people causing all the problems in this world.

 

[Canute]

I suspect if we talked in person I could explain myself better, trying to cover all the avenues in writing can be frustrating at times.

Yes, it's a hopeless way of communicating.

However I do not think I am misunderstanding you. I don't disagree with most of what you say.

I am just pointing out what a logical positivist would point out, that you cannot undertake 'pragmatic evaluation' of anything until you have decided on your values, and these are not absolute.

Suppose you wanted to pragmatically evaluate the performance of a member of your staff (I think you said you are in management). How would you do this? You would start by determining the parameters to be measured, the 'performance indicators'. These are your parameters not eternal Forms. You just made them up.

That does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with them. It just means that we must be careful not to define things self-referentially, as when we say science is useful. Yes it is useful for splitting atoms and so on, and we couldn't get out of bed in the morning without using the scientific method. Also its theories are useful for making predictions.

However it is not 'useful' in some abstract or absolute way. Pragmatism is subjective in the final analysis. Knowledge is knowledge, and whether it is useful depends only on whether you use it or not.

I'm not making a moral argument, or saying one set of values is better than another. Just that they are all relative. The only one which is absolute is true knowledge of reality. This must score full marks by any pragmatic measure of its truth and value. (I know I'm muddling the issues slightly, but they are all connected).

I believe that apparent reality has an underlying nature. I've come to that conclusion after noticing reality consistantly functions in certain ways.

I believe you can't possibly be wrong. There must be a meta-system if the universe is systematic. I won't bang on about George Spencer-Brown forever but he covers all this in his talks and mathematics. If he's too mathematical for you try Chuang-Tsu, who he completely agrees with. They suggest that you and I are ultimate reality.

So the way I use pragmatic evalution is with ONE overall objective: I use the pragmatic approach as a general method to find clues about the underlying nature of reality.
Me too.

What I do is to look for any sign, whatsoever, that some set of conditions, circumstances, operations, principles, etc. consistantly functions in specific ways.

Like the laws of form?

Well, if you believe we are at our best when we are conscious and happy, if you think we are most conscious and happy when doing things that help us thrive, and if you believe to thrive our actions must harmonize with nature, etc. . . . then there is no reason to be concerned about someone who wants to focus on furthering the consciousness and happiness of humnity over all else. I don't see it as selfish, I see it as practical. Afterall, it is unconscious and miserable people causing all the problems in this world.

I'm not against improving the human lot. But I believe we have a responsibility to do the same for everything that is sentient, for both pragmatic and empirically knowable reasons.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am just pointing out what a logical positivist would point out, that you cannot undertake 'pragmatic evaluation' of anything until you have decided on your values, and these are not absolute.

Suppose you wanted to pragmatically evaluate the performance of a member of your staff (I think you said you are in management). How would you do this? You would start by determining the parameters to be measured, the 'performance indicators'. These are your parameters not eternal Forms. You just made them up.

I realize you've been saying that, and this is where we are disagreeing in my opinion.

I don't think I have to "decide" anything if my goal is to look at things with a clear mind. We've talked before about the stillness of mind that can be attained through meditation. Sometimes one can be so still the mind becomes like a window that is open, and one is then merely "seeing" through the window. Before the mind is opened like that, one peers through the pane, and of course it always distorts the view; to me, that is parallel to having "values" (or opinions, or bias, etc.) in place as one experiences.

Now, I am not saying there isn't a time to close the window and reflect on what one has seen, and at that time of interpretation one's opinions and values very much make a difference to what one has to say about what has been seen. I might decide this is "valuable" to that, or that is valuable to this, etc. But during the time of "seeing" with an eye for the pragmatic evaluation one will do later, one is merely looking for patterns, consistant behaviors, underlying influences, and so on.

(BTW -- I'm not in management, but I was an organizational development consultant in my former professional life, among other things)

That does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with them. It just means that we must be careful not to define things self-referentially, as when we say science is useful. Yes it is useful for splitting atoms and so on, and we couldn't get out of bed in the morning without using the scientific method. Also its theories are useful for making predictions.

Well, I really don't know what you think I said that is self-referential (of course, I've already explained several times I didn't mean "utility" when talking about what "works"). If I were to say, like Socrates, that every proposition is false, then I am being self-referential. You claimed that to say science reveals physical principles is self-referential because it is the same as saying science does science. Yet science is a series of steps involving hypothesizing, sense observation, logical interpretation, and verification. That is science. We know it now, but I don't think it was immediately clear to everyone that science was only going to expose physical aspects of reality. Even today you hear science-types regularly contend that there is no scientific evidence of God or soul or spirit or life force . . . well, duuhhhhhhhh

Certainly to say science has demonstrated it deserves epistomological privilege in the study of physical reality is not self-referential. When asked to define what "demonstrated" means, I claimed one can see how successful science has been at understanding physcial stuff by how well they can apply principles as predicted (i.e., what I define as doing things that "work"). I say it indicates the scientific method really is effective at discovering physical principles, and the underlying physical nature of the universe. Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma. That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

So my acknowledgment that science "works" has no values built into it at all, and is not self-referential in the slightest. It is merely the basis of my observation that if we understand something, then we are able to work with it with more versitility, more broadly, more in-depth than when we don't understand as well. So the test of pragmatism is nothing but a way to look for clues and for helping with verification.

However it is not 'useful' in some abstract or absolute way. Pragmatism is subjective in the final analysis. Knowledge is knowledge, and whether it is useful depends only on whether you use it or not.

I wish we could stop talking about "useful." It's NOT what I meant. I've already admitted that my attempt to link utility to the pragmatic idea of what "works" wasn't precise logically. I might fail to be completely logical sometimes, but I am not the slightest bit confused about the points you keep making about relative value, deciding objectives, etc.

I'll define "works": to apply principles as one understands them, and then for what results to function as one predicted. If something behaves according to plan, then it also reflects something about the nature of reality.

I'm not making a moral argument, or saying one set of values is better than another. Just that they are all relative. The only one which is absolute is true knowledge of reality. This must score full marks by any pragmatic measure of its truth and value. (I know I'm muddling the issues slightly, but they are all connected).

That's a pretty high-falutin' statement. I don't know about you, but as much as I aspire to "true knowledge of reality," I find I must be content to do the best I can do. In my quest to know reality, I don't feel I can afford to pass up any method or aid which might assist me in that quest. Regarding pragmatic measure, it is what it is, and it does what it does. Nothing more and nothing less . . . I have no idealistic illusions about it.

 

[Canute]

I realize you've been saying that, and this is where we are disagreeing in my opinion.

We're going to have to agree to differ. Perhaps we could disentangle this over a beer but we can't seem to here.

Certainly to say science has demonstrated it deserves epistomological privilege in the study of physical reality is not self-referential.

But science cannot explain physical reality. You've said this yourself. Science uses the scientific method to model the scientific evidence in a scientific way in order to produce scientific theories. It's bound to be good at doing it.

When asked to define what "demonstrated" means, I claimed one can see how successful science has been at understanding physcial stuff by how well they can apply principles as predicted (i.e., what I define as doing things that "work").
That is to interpret 'works' as meaning 'can predict physical interactions'. If that's how you define 'works' then yes, science works. It's bound to, seeing that it's entirely concerned with predicting physical interactions. But this your personal definition of 'works'. Other people are free to define it differently.

I say it indicates the scientific method really is effective at discovering physical principles, and the underlying physical nature of the universe.

Does the universe have an underlying physical nature, or is that a scientific assumption? If it has one then certainly science cannot explain it, for it is a metaphysical issue.

Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma.

I agree. If you judge then you must set standards against which to judge. However I'd argue that one does not need to judge, and that this is how one escapes getting trapped in the dillemma.

That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

By that view the universe must remain forever mysterious to us and we must make do with knowing just what works. I don't agree.

So my acknowledgment that science "works" has no values built into it at all, and is not self-referential in the slightest.

I presume you mean that science predicts physical interactions. In that case science definitely 'works'.

It is merely the basis of my observation that if we understand something, then we are able to work with it with more versitility, more broadly, more in-depth than when we don't understand as well.

Fine. (And there is no doubt that science helps us understand things scientifically).

So the test of pragmatism is nothing but a way to look for clues and for helping with verification.

Don't get that bit.

I wish we could stop talking about "useful." It's NOT what I meant. I've already admitted that my attempt to link utility to the pragmatic idea of what "works" wasn't precise logically. I might fail to be completely logical sometimes, but I am not the slightest bit confused about the points you keep making about relative value, deciding objectives, etc.

I think your definition of 'works' (or 'useful' or whatever) is practical and logical. I'm just saying that it is dangerous to overlook the subjective nature of those judgements. It's possible to start thinking that because science makes predictions about physical interactions this shows that it 'works' in some abstract sense. As a method of understanding reality it does not work at all, both for the epistemilogical reasons we've discussed and also because it cannot do metaphysics.

That's a pretty high-falutin' statement. I don't know about you, but as much as I aspire to "true knowledge of reality," I find I must be content to do the best I can do.

I quite agree that the best we can do is all we can do. However it seems that I believe that we can do a lot more than you think we can.

Do you think we should drop this? We seem to be in a rut. I'm happy with a draw.